Pub Date : 2022-07-03DOI: 10.1080/1460728x.2022.2124068
T. Butter
ABSTRACT The aim of this paper is twofold: first, it seeks to provide a better understanding of lawyers’ ethics in practice in the field of publicly funded asylum law. It does so by examining Dutch asylum legal aid lawyers’ moral reasoning in respect of the ethically challenging issue of ‘the hopeless case’, employing a version of Christine Parker’s four approaches to moral reasoning in legal practice: adversarial advocacy, responsible lawyering, moral activism and relational lawyering. Second, it aims to demonstrate the applicability of Parker’s taxonomy, developed in a common law country (Australia), to a civil law country (The Netherlands). This paper shows, in line with what Parker argued, that lawyers may apply a combination of approaches – different ethical considerations carry different in weight in different circumstances. It provides illustrations of situations in which approaches coexist and compete and the circumstances in which one prevails over the other in the area under review.
{"title":"Ethics in practice in asylum law: asylum legal aid lawyers’ moral reasoning in respect of ‘hopeless cases’","authors":"T. Butter","doi":"10.1080/1460728x.2022.2124068","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1460728x.2022.2124068","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The aim of this paper is twofold: first, it seeks to provide a better understanding of lawyers’ ethics in practice in the field of publicly funded asylum law. It does so by examining Dutch asylum legal aid lawyers’ moral reasoning in respect of the ethically challenging issue of ‘the hopeless case’, employing a version of Christine Parker’s four approaches to moral reasoning in legal practice: adversarial advocacy, responsible lawyering, moral activism and relational lawyering. Second, it aims to demonstrate the applicability of Parker’s taxonomy, developed in a common law country (Australia), to a civil law country (The Netherlands). This paper shows, in line with what Parker argued, that lawyers may apply a combination of approaches – different ethical considerations carry different in weight in different circumstances. It provides illustrations of situations in which approaches coexist and compete and the circumstances in which one prevails over the other in the area under review.","PeriodicalId":42194,"journal":{"name":"Legal Ethics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41426552","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-07DOI: 10.1080/1460728x.2021.1979731
John F. Sherman III
ABSTRACT
Global soft law (notably the 2011 UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights ‘UNGPs’), multistakeholder norms, the business practices and policies of leading companies, the expectations of investors and stakeholders, and hard law in a growing number of jurisdictions, all expect that businesses should respect human rights in their operations and in their value chains. The COVID 19 pandemic has made it urgent for corporate legal departments, led by the general counsel, to support the company’s commitment to respect human rights. This means using human rights due diligence to improve human rights performance, rather than as a paper exercise intended primarily to avoid legal liability. This paper provides practical guidance on how corporate general counsel can help their companies conduct authentic and robust human rights due diligence by acting as technical legal experts, wise counsellors, and leaders.
{"title":"The corporate general counsel who respects human rights","authors":"John F. Sherman III","doi":"10.1080/1460728x.2021.1979731","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1460728x.2021.1979731","url":null,"abstract":"<p><b>ABSTRACT</b></p><p>Global soft law (notably the 2011 UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights ‘UNGPs’), multistakeholder norms, the business practices and policies of leading companies, the expectations of investors and stakeholders, and hard law in a growing number of jurisdictions, all expect that businesses should respect human rights in their operations and in their value chains. The COVID 19 pandemic has made it urgent for corporate legal departments, led by the general counsel, to support the company’s commitment to respect human rights. This means using human rights due diligence to improve human rights performance, rather than as a paper exercise intended primarily to avoid legal liability. This paper provides practical guidance on how corporate general counsel can help their companies conduct authentic and robust human rights due diligence by acting as technical legal experts, wise counsellors, and leaders.</p>","PeriodicalId":42194,"journal":{"name":"Legal Ethics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138526714","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-03DOI: 10.1080/1460728x.2022.2059742
T. Clark, R. Moorhead, S. Vaughan, A. Brener
ABSTRACT In this article, we look at the contested role of in-house lawyers in regulated organisations in the financial sector. A recent Financial Conduct Authority consultation on whether to designate the head of legal of banks, insurance companies and other financial firms as ‘Senior Managers’ and the decision which flowed from it, reflected a flawed view of lawyers as a neutral technocracy of mere legal technicians; we show how the FCA’s decision is potentially damaging to the public interest and failed to take into account that in-house lawyers are often important decision-makers and influencers within their organisations. We put the case for an alternative view; that in-house lawyers are professionals, with agency that requires them to act in accordance with ethical norms and means they should be made more accountable for their conduct.
{"title":"Agency over technocracy: how lawyer archetypes infect regulatory approaches: the FCA example","authors":"T. Clark, R. Moorhead, S. Vaughan, A. Brener","doi":"10.1080/1460728x.2022.2059742","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1460728x.2022.2059742","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In this article, we look at the contested role of in-house lawyers in regulated organisations in the financial sector. A recent Financial Conduct Authority consultation on whether to designate the head of legal of banks, insurance companies and other financial firms as ‘Senior Managers’ and the decision which flowed from it, reflected a flawed view of lawyers as a neutral technocracy of mere legal technicians; we show how the FCA’s decision is potentially damaging to the public interest and failed to take into account that in-house lawyers are often important decision-makers and influencers within their organisations. We put the case for an alternative view; that in-house lawyers are professionals, with agency that requires them to act in accordance with ethical norms and means they should be made more accountable for their conduct.","PeriodicalId":42194,"journal":{"name":"Legal Ethics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46523647","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-03DOI: 10.1080/1460728x.2022.2027118
A. Melville, V. Caines, Marcus Glenn Walker
ABSTRACT Lawyers in many jurisdictions are ageing, and yet there is little information concerning the age profile of the legal profession. This paper presents the first consideration of the age profile of lawyers outside of the US, showing that Australian lawyers are ageing and delaying retirement. These findings have serious implications. Problems associated with a growing proportion of older lawyers include an increasing risk of lawyers suffering from age-related cognitive and physical impairment, and the related rise of complaints and malpractice claims against older lawyers. It is also clear that the Australian legal profession is unprepared to address these problems. The legal profession has ignored important gender-specific implications of ageing, such as female lawyers experiencing menopause and the lower savings of female lawyers moving into retirement. Regulatory regimes have not considered the impact of the profession's ageing profile, and there is no mandatory reporting of lawyers suffering from age-related impairment or provisions should a lawyer die. The profession also has not provided strategies to positively transition lawyers into retirement, and there is a lack of flexible working arrangements and succession planning, especially in firms located outside urban centres.
{"title":"The grey zone: the implications of the ageing legal profession in Australia","authors":"A. Melville, V. Caines, Marcus Glenn Walker","doi":"10.1080/1460728x.2022.2027118","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1460728x.2022.2027118","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Lawyers in many jurisdictions are ageing, and yet there is little information concerning the age profile of the legal profession. This paper presents the first consideration of the age profile of lawyers outside of the US, showing that Australian lawyers are ageing and delaying retirement. These findings have serious implications. Problems associated with a growing proportion of older lawyers include an increasing risk of lawyers suffering from age-related cognitive and physical impairment, and the related rise of complaints and malpractice claims against older lawyers. It is also clear that the Australian legal profession is unprepared to address these problems. The legal profession has ignored important gender-specific implications of ageing, such as female lawyers experiencing menopause and the lower savings of female lawyers moving into retirement. Regulatory regimes have not considered the impact of the profession's ageing profile, and there is no mandatory reporting of lawyers suffering from age-related impairment or provisions should a lawyer die. The profession also has not provided strategies to positively transition lawyers into retirement, and there is a lack of flexible working arrangements and succession planning, especially in firms located outside urban centres.","PeriodicalId":42194,"journal":{"name":"Legal Ethics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49100866","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-03DOI: 10.1080/1460728x.2022.2049522
Felicity Bell, Justin Rogers
ABSTRACT With an upsurge of interest and investment in new legal technologies comes consideration of who is making them and whether these individuals or entities should be subject to regulation. This article looks at how such regulation might function in light of the existing regulatory regimes governing lawyers and the capacities of legal regulators. It considers the ramifications both of maintaining the existing system, or in extending some form of regulation to these new entrants to the legal services market.
{"title":"‘Fit and proper’ coders? How might legal service delivery by non-lawyers be regulated?","authors":"Felicity Bell, Justin Rogers","doi":"10.1080/1460728x.2022.2049522","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1460728x.2022.2049522","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT With an upsurge of interest and investment in new legal technologies comes consideration of who is making them and whether these individuals or entities should be subject to regulation. This article looks at how such regulation might function in light of the existing regulatory regimes governing lawyers and the capacities of legal regulators. It considers the ramifications both of maintaining the existing system, or in extending some form of regulation to these new entrants to the legal services market.","PeriodicalId":42194,"journal":{"name":"Legal Ethics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47765971","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-02DOI: 10.1080/1460728x.2021.1979729
S. Seck, Richard F. Devlin, S. Quigg
We are all familiar with the old adage that hard cases make for bad law. This symposium riffs off that idea to inquire whether soft law can make for (great) ethical lawyering? To interrogate this question, the Schulich School of Law at Dalhousie University, Canada, hosted the 30th annual Wickwire Lecture and invited several scholars from different jurisdictions to share their reflections on the complicated, but increasingly common, challenges of the relationship between emerging soft law norms and the ethical obligations of corporate lawyers. Soft law norms for corporate actors emerge from a variety of sources, and a bright line between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ law is often not obvious. For example, from the international human rights law sphere, the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs) were endorsed by the member states of the UN Human Rights Council in 2011. The UNGPs were developed over a number of years through many multi-stakeholder processes that included input from states, business actors, and non-governmental human rights organisations, as well as corporate lawyers. Often referred to as the authoritative global standard on business and human rights, the UNGPs are comprised of three pillars: 1) the state duty to protect human rights in accordance with existing international human rights law; 2) the business responsibility to respect human rights as a reflection of social expectations; and 3) the need for effective access to remedy for victims of business-related human rights abuses, whether through judicial, non-judicial, state-based, or non-state-based processes, including company-level grievance processes. Particularly, pillar two further provides that corporate actors should adopt human rights policies, engage in human rights due diligence throughout the business enterprise, and both prevent and account for human rights impacts that they identify, among other conduct. However, while the point of reference
{"title":"Soft law, legal ethics and the corporate lawyer: confronting human rights and sustainability norms","authors":"S. Seck, Richard F. Devlin, S. Quigg","doi":"10.1080/1460728x.2021.1979729","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1460728x.2021.1979729","url":null,"abstract":"We are all familiar with the old adage that hard cases make for bad law. This symposium riffs off that idea to inquire whether soft law can make for (great) ethical lawyering? To interrogate this question, the Schulich School of Law at Dalhousie University, Canada, hosted the 30th annual Wickwire Lecture and invited several scholars from different jurisdictions to share their reflections on the complicated, but increasingly common, challenges of the relationship between emerging soft law norms and the ethical obligations of corporate lawyers. Soft law norms for corporate actors emerge from a variety of sources, and a bright line between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ law is often not obvious. For example, from the international human rights law sphere, the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs) were endorsed by the member states of the UN Human Rights Council in 2011. The UNGPs were developed over a number of years through many multi-stakeholder processes that included input from states, business actors, and non-governmental human rights organisations, as well as corporate lawyers. Often referred to as the authoritative global standard on business and human rights, the UNGPs are comprised of three pillars: 1) the state duty to protect human rights in accordance with existing international human rights law; 2) the business responsibility to respect human rights as a reflection of social expectations; and 3) the need for effective access to remedy for victims of business-related human rights abuses, whether through judicial, non-judicial, state-based, or non-state-based processes, including company-level grievance processes. Particularly, pillar two further provides that corporate actors should adopt human rights policies, engage in human rights due diligence throughout the business enterprise, and both prevent and account for human rights impacts that they identify, among other conduct. However, while the point of reference","PeriodicalId":42194,"journal":{"name":"Legal Ethics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47915135","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-02DOI: 10.1080/1460728x.2021.1979732
Birgit Spiesshofer
ABSTRACT Law firms, bars and lawyers associations qualify as ‘enterprises’ in the sense of all international CSR norms such as the UN Global Compact, the UN Guiding Principles, the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and ISO 26000 Guidance on Social Responsibility. Thus, these CSR norms apply to law firms and lawyers in principle. Lawyers are, however, not only service providers. They have also an official function based on human rights and rule of law guarantees of access to justice and the courts. Therefore, the application of CSR norms has to be adapted to the specific role and duties of the lawyers. This applies in particular to their capacity (1) as enterprises and suppliers of services, (2) as gatekeepers concerning the ‘CSR-compliance’ of their clients, and (3) as ‘legal’ advisors. An important element is lawyers’ independence. Besides certain legally defined responsibilities, lawyers are not to be identified with their clients and their deeds. A more far-reaching responsibility, based on ‘social expectations’ in line with the UN Guiding Principles, risks undermining the independence of the attorneys and their role in the administration of justice as the examples from the Nazi regime and McCarthy era show. Be careful what you wish for.
{"title":"Be careful what you wish for: a European perspective on the limits of CSR in the legal profession","authors":"Birgit Spiesshofer","doi":"10.1080/1460728x.2021.1979732","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1460728x.2021.1979732","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Law firms, bars and lawyers associations qualify as ‘enterprises’ in the sense of all international CSR norms such as the UN Global Compact, the UN Guiding Principles, the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and ISO 26000 Guidance on Social Responsibility. Thus, these CSR norms apply to law firms and lawyers in principle. Lawyers are, however, not only service providers. They have also an official function based on human rights and rule of law guarantees of access to justice and the courts. Therefore, the application of CSR norms has to be adapted to the specific role and duties of the lawyers. This applies in particular to their capacity (1) as enterprises and suppliers of services, (2) as gatekeepers concerning the ‘CSR-compliance’ of their clients, and (3) as ‘legal’ advisors. An important element is lawyers’ independence. Besides certain legally defined responsibilities, lawyers are not to be identified with their clients and their deeds. A more far-reaching responsibility, based on ‘social expectations’ in line with the UN Guiding Principles, risks undermining the independence of the attorneys and their role in the administration of justice as the examples from the Nazi regime and McCarthy era show. Be careful what you wish for.","PeriodicalId":42194,"journal":{"name":"Legal Ethics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46611012","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-02DOI: 10.1080/1460728x.2021.1979730
Amy Salyzyn, Penelope Simons
ABSTRACT Lawyers defending extractive corporations in transnational human rights and environmental cases tend to reflect the dominant ‘resolute advocacy’ model of litigation, which directs lawyers to aggressively pursue clients’ interests though all available means. Is a different vision of advocacy more appropriate in this context? In answering this question, we look to the rule of law foundation of the ‘resolute advocacy’ model and note the ways in which rationales for aggressive litigation behaviour are pragmatic, contextual and contingent. From this observation, we propose a model of ‘moderated resolute advocacy’. We ground this claim in the background context generated by the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and the Sustainable Development Goals and in the barriers that plaintiffs face. The model we propose would not only emphasise existing obligations on lawyers not to generate unreasonable costs, create undue delay or advance unfounded legal claims but also promote an approach to litigation oriented towards the efficient determination of substantive claims on their merits. To operationalise this model, we propose a two-pronged approach that includes the development of a voluntary litigation code of conduct alongside legislative action to remove some of the legal obstacles for plaintiffs bringing these cases.
{"title":"Professional responsibility and the defence of extractive corporations in transnational human rights and environmental litigation in Canadian courts","authors":"Amy Salyzyn, Penelope Simons","doi":"10.1080/1460728x.2021.1979730","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1460728x.2021.1979730","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Lawyers defending extractive corporations in transnational human rights and environmental cases tend to reflect the dominant ‘resolute advocacy’ model of litigation, which directs lawyers to aggressively pursue clients’ interests though all available means. Is a different vision of advocacy more appropriate in this context? In answering this question, we look to the rule of law foundation of the ‘resolute advocacy’ model and note the ways in which rationales for aggressive litigation behaviour are pragmatic, contextual and contingent. From this observation, we propose a model of ‘moderated resolute advocacy’. We ground this claim in the background context generated by the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and the Sustainable Development Goals and in the barriers that plaintiffs face. The model we propose would not only emphasise existing obligations on lawyers not to generate unreasonable costs, create undue delay or advance unfounded legal claims but also promote an approach to litigation oriented towards the efficient determination of substantive claims on their merits. To operationalise this model, we propose a two-pronged approach that includes the development of a voluntary litigation code of conduct alongside legislative action to remove some of the legal obstacles for plaintiffs bringing these cases.","PeriodicalId":42194,"journal":{"name":"Legal Ethics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45531238","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-07-02DOI: 10.1080/1460728x.2020.1799303
Anna Cody
ABSTRACT This article analyses teaching reflection skills as a means to inculcate students’ capacity to contribute to justice. Arising out of understandings of professionalism, the rule of law, as well as model codes of conduct for solicitors, lawyers have an ethical duty to contribute to building the justice of law and the legal system. Learning how to reflect is an essential part of being able to fulfil this duty, and clinical legal education as a method within legal education is an effective means to teach students how to reflect. They learn how to deal with ‘disorienting moments’ and to make sense of the complexity of legal practice through a process of self-reflection and reflection on law and the legal system. The article discusses the range of ways in which reflection can be taught to emphasise the integration of values, emotions, thinking and analytical skills in forming lawyers who are well- rounded lawyers. A growth mindset which recognises the ability of brains to constantly change and grow is a radical and positive development in our understanding of intelligence which supports the nurturing of lawyers’ ability to reflect and continue to fulfil their ethical duty to work towards justice in some form.
{"title":"Reflection and clinical legal education: how do students learn about their ethical duty to contribute towards justice","authors":"Anna Cody","doi":"10.1080/1460728x.2020.1799303","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1460728x.2020.1799303","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article analyses teaching reflection skills as a means to inculcate students’ capacity to contribute to justice. Arising out of understandings of professionalism, the rule of law, as well as model codes of conduct for solicitors, lawyers have an ethical duty to contribute to building the justice of law and the legal system. Learning how to reflect is an essential part of being able to fulfil this duty, and clinical legal education as a method within legal education is an effective means to teach students how to reflect. They learn how to deal with ‘disorienting moments’ and to make sense of the complexity of legal practice through a process of self-reflection and reflection on law and the legal system. The article discusses the range of ways in which reflection can be taught to emphasise the integration of values, emotions, thinking and analytical skills in forming lawyers who are well- rounded lawyers. A growth mindset which recognises the ability of brains to constantly change and grow is a radical and positive development in our understanding of intelligence which supports the nurturing of lawyers’ ability to reflect and continue to fulfil their ethical duty to work towards justice in some form.","PeriodicalId":42194,"journal":{"name":"Legal Ethics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/1460728x.2020.1799303","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45935040","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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