Pub Date : 2019-07-03DOI: 10.1080/1460728x.2019.1692474
Richard F. Devlin, S. Frame
On 19 October 2015 the Liberal Party of Canada won the general election and Justin Trudeau became Canada’s 23rd prime minister. During both the political campaign and the period after the election, Mr. Trudeau made many promises about ‘doing politics differently’. Two key claims in particular stood out: to make gender equality a key policy principle, and to make reconciliation with Indigenous peoples Canada’s most important relationship. As affirmation of the first commitment, Prime Minister Trudeau’s cabinet was the first in Canadian history to have a 50% female complement. As proof of the second commitment, he appointed Ms. Jody Wilson-Raybould as Minister of Justice and Attorney General. She was the first Indigenous person to be appointed to this position. Despite some challenges in moving the reconciliation agenda forward (particularly in the context of newly proposed pipelines crossing Indigenous territories and an Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Aboriginal Women) by all appearances it seemed as if Prime Minister Trudeau and Ms. Wilson-Raybould had a solid working relationship. But, out of the blue, on 14 January 2019, in what was meant to be a minor cabinet reconfiguration caused by an unanticipated resignation, the Prime Minister shuffled Ms. Wilson-Raybould from Minister of Justice and Attorney General to Minister of Veterans Affairs. At the press conference it was obvious that Ms. Wilson-Raybould was not pleased with this decision. The speculation was that the rift was over differences of opinion on how to respond to Indigenous issues. However, on 7 February 2019, a national newspaper suggested that the reassignment was about something very different – a disagreement
{"title":"Economic corruption, political machinations and legal ethics: correspondents’ report from Canada","authors":"Richard F. Devlin, S. Frame","doi":"10.1080/1460728x.2019.1692474","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1460728x.2019.1692474","url":null,"abstract":"On 19 October 2015 the Liberal Party of Canada won the general election and Justin Trudeau became Canada’s 23rd prime minister. During both the political campaign and the period after the election, Mr. Trudeau made many promises about ‘doing politics differently’. Two key claims in particular stood out: to make gender equality a key policy principle, and to make reconciliation with Indigenous peoples Canada’s most important relationship. As affirmation of the first commitment, Prime Minister Trudeau’s cabinet was the first in Canadian history to have a 50% female complement. As proof of the second commitment, he appointed Ms. Jody Wilson-Raybould as Minister of Justice and Attorney General. She was the first Indigenous person to be appointed to this position. Despite some challenges in moving the reconciliation agenda forward (particularly in the context of newly proposed pipelines crossing Indigenous territories and an Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Aboriginal Women) by all appearances it seemed as if Prime Minister Trudeau and Ms. Wilson-Raybould had a solid working relationship. But, out of the blue, on 14 January 2019, in what was meant to be a minor cabinet reconfiguration caused by an unanticipated resignation, the Prime Minister shuffled Ms. Wilson-Raybould from Minister of Justice and Attorney General to Minister of Veterans Affairs. At the press conference it was obvious that Ms. Wilson-Raybould was not pleased with this decision. The speculation was that the rift was over differences of opinion on how to respond to Indigenous issues. However, on 7 February 2019, a national newspaper suggested that the reassignment was about something very different – a disagreement","PeriodicalId":42194,"journal":{"name":"Legal Ethics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/1460728x.2019.1692474","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48036390","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-07-03DOI: 10.1080/1460728x.2019.1692473
Jonathan Hew
ABSTRACT This brief report discusses ethical-legal considerations in providing legal aid to refugees internationally. With the help of a case study, it considers the challenges lawyers and other legal aid providers face in assisting clients who are alleged to have committed immoral acts. It highlights how the failure to elevate professional ethics over personal morality in such situations can have serious human consequences.
{"title":"Fighting the good fight? Lessons from the Global South on providing legal aid to refugees in difficult situations","authors":"Jonathan Hew","doi":"10.1080/1460728x.2019.1692473","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1460728x.2019.1692473","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This brief report discusses ethical-legal considerations in providing legal aid to refugees internationally. With the help of a case study, it considers the challenges lawyers and other legal aid providers face in assisting clients who are alleged to have committed immoral acts. It highlights how the failure to elevate professional ethics over personal morality in such situations can have serious human consequences.","PeriodicalId":42194,"journal":{"name":"Legal Ethics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/1460728x.2019.1692473","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43675192","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-07-03DOI: 10.1080/1460728x.2019.1692472
Deborah Hartstein, J. Rogers
ABSTRACT Professional associations, once the bodies responsible for professional self-regulation, have lost regulatory power. Some have entered into co-regulatory arrangements with state or independent bodies; others have lost power entirely. But although self-regulation has been widely discredited, little research has examined how surviving regulator-associations are adapting to change and, in turn, how those adaptations affect their regulatory roles. Associations that have formal regulatory powers must reconcile their regulatory responsibilities with the need to retain membership and their desires to survive as organisations. This article examines the activities of the Law Society of New South Wales, an association jointly responsible for the regulation of the New South Wales legal profession. Drawing on the results of an interview study of the Law Society’s members and leaders, it analyses the Law Society’s formal and informal regulatory functions and shows how they interact with its commercial membership imperatives, to reveal where regulatory effects might be produced, or lost, and how. The findings support criticisms of association regulation and provide evidence of declining association influence. However, the association is also shown to embody self-regulatory, co-regulatory and corporate values simultaneously, reasserting regulatory influence and pursuing its own survival in the process.
{"title":"Professional associations as regulators: an interview study of the Law Society of New South Wales","authors":"Deborah Hartstein, J. Rogers","doi":"10.1080/1460728x.2019.1692472","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1460728x.2019.1692472","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Professional associations, once the bodies responsible for professional self-regulation, have lost regulatory power. Some have entered into co-regulatory arrangements with state or independent bodies; others have lost power entirely. But although self-regulation has been widely discredited, little research has examined how surviving regulator-associations are adapting to change and, in turn, how those adaptations affect their regulatory roles. Associations that have formal regulatory powers must reconcile their regulatory responsibilities with the need to retain membership and their desires to survive as organisations. This article examines the activities of the Law Society of New South Wales, an association jointly responsible for the regulation of the New South Wales legal profession. Drawing on the results of an interview study of the Law Society’s members and leaders, it analyses the Law Society’s formal and informal regulatory functions and shows how they interact with its commercial membership imperatives, to reveal where regulatory effects might be produced, or lost, and how. The findings support criticisms of association regulation and provide evidence of declining association influence. However, the association is also shown to embody self-regulatory, co-regulatory and corporate values simultaneously, reasserting regulatory influence and pursuing its own survival in the process.","PeriodicalId":42194,"journal":{"name":"Legal Ethics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/1460728x.2019.1692472","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41785826","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-07-03DOI: 10.1080/1460728x.2019.1693169
E. Carroll, S. Vaughan
ABSTRACT This paper explores professional identity formation and the increasing differentiation and fragmentation of the corporate end of the legal profession through a consideration of onshoring, the opening (for the first time) of satellite offices in the UK (but outside of London) by elite law firms. We situate interviews with 25 lawyers, associates and partners, working in onshored UK law firm offices in work on legal services globalisation and the sociology of ‘dirty work’ (tasks and occupations likely to be perceived as disgusting or degrading). In the context of onshoring, globalisation has led to sidelining in that onshoring allows entry to elite, global firms both for those (the graduates of ‘good-enough’ law schools) perhaps unable to ‘make it’ in London and for those law firm partners and associates who have tasted City life and rejected it. That entry is, however, imperfect. It is the ‘dirty [legal] work’ that is done outside of London: seen as both lesser and also necessary to the law firm’s profitability. We see onshoring as a relatively simple organisational change to the shape of the profession, and also as part of a radical reorientation of a division of labour and what it means to be a professional.
{"title":"Matter Mills and London-Lite offices: exploring forms of the onshoring of legal services in an age of globalisation","authors":"E. Carroll, S. Vaughan","doi":"10.1080/1460728x.2019.1693169","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1460728x.2019.1693169","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This paper explores professional identity formation and the increasing differentiation and fragmentation of the corporate end of the legal profession through a consideration of onshoring, the opening (for the first time) of satellite offices in the UK (but outside of London) by elite law firms. We situate interviews with 25 lawyers, associates and partners, working in onshored UK law firm offices in work on legal services globalisation and the sociology of ‘dirty work’ (tasks and occupations likely to be perceived as disgusting or degrading). In the context of onshoring, globalisation has led to sidelining in that onshoring allows entry to elite, global firms both for those (the graduates of ‘good-enough’ law schools) perhaps unable to ‘make it’ in London and for those law firm partners and associates who have tasted City life and rejected it. That entry is, however, imperfect. It is the ‘dirty [legal] work’ that is done outside of London: seen as both lesser and also necessary to the law firm’s profitability. We see onshoring as a relatively simple organisational change to the shape of the profession, and also as part of a radical reorientation of a division of labour and what it means to be a professional.","PeriodicalId":42194,"journal":{"name":"Legal Ethics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/1460728x.2019.1693169","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49035552","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-07-03DOI: 10.1080/1460728X.2018.1620158
Deanne Sowter
Common sense suggests that families ought not to resolve their disputes by increasing the conflict and taking legally defined positions. Family law disputes are riddled with emotional and financial complications and goals, not strictly legal issues. The challenge for lawyers working in this area is to respond to client needs in a cost-effective manner within the system of laws. Responding to that challenge is complicated by three factors: the access to justice crisis; the impact of family violence; and, the limitations of the law. This Correspondent’s Report details several recent reform initiatives in Canada that are starting to reflect the reality of family law, and explores the resulting questions about the role of the family law lawyer.
{"title":"Increasing the emphasis on family law lawyering: correspondent’s report from Canada","authors":"Deanne Sowter","doi":"10.1080/1460728X.2018.1620158","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1460728X.2018.1620158","url":null,"abstract":"Common sense suggests that families ought not to resolve their disputes by increasing the conflict and taking legally defined positions. Family law disputes are riddled with emotional and financial complications and goals, not strictly legal issues. The challenge for lawyers working in this area is to respond to client needs in a cost-effective manner within the system of laws. Responding to that challenge is complicated by three factors: the access to justice crisis; the impact of family violence; and, the limitations of the law. This Correspondent’s Report details several recent reform initiatives in Canada that are starting to reflect the reality of family law, and explores the resulting questions about the role of the family law lawyer.","PeriodicalId":42194,"journal":{"name":"Legal Ethics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/1460728X.2018.1620158","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45720455","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-07-03DOI: 10.1080/1460728X.2018.1620157
A. Woolley
In the first decade of this century Canadian legal regulators and professional organisations claimed a crisis in lawyer civility and pushed for cultural and regulatory change to encourage greater c...
{"title":"Did Joe Groia kill the civility movement?","authors":"A. Woolley","doi":"10.1080/1460728X.2018.1620157","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1460728X.2018.1620157","url":null,"abstract":"In the first decade of this century Canadian legal regulators and professional organisations claimed a crisis in lawyer civility and pushed for cultural and regulatory change to encourage greater c...","PeriodicalId":42194,"journal":{"name":"Legal Ethics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/1460728X.2018.1620157","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42417245","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-07-03DOI: 10.1080/1460728x.2018.1620156
H. Whalen-Bridge
ABSTRACT When used in legal forums, the persuasive abilities of narrative raise ethical questions. Depending on the jurisdiction, some ethical rules apply to persuasive legal narrative, but these rules establish a minimum standard that does not address how to analyse more nuanced forms of fabrication, such as what kind of inferences can be drawn from evidence to support a narrative. The need to allow lawyers discretion to fashion persuasive cases does not mean that the use of deception by lawyers or law students should be accepted with a shrug. The current lack of guidance to lawyers and students, which contributes to cynicism regarding fact presentation, should be addressed with guidance about how to use persuasive legal narrative in an effective, ethical manner.
{"title":"Persuasive legal narrative: articulating ethical standards","authors":"H. Whalen-Bridge","doi":"10.1080/1460728x.2018.1620156","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1460728x.2018.1620156","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT When used in legal forums, the persuasive abilities of narrative raise ethical questions. Depending on the jurisdiction, some ethical rules apply to persuasive legal narrative, but these rules establish a minimum standard that does not address how to analyse more nuanced forms of fabrication, such as what kind of inferences can be drawn from evidence to support a narrative. The need to allow lawyers discretion to fashion persuasive cases does not mean that the use of deception by lawyers or law students should be accepted with a shrug. The current lack of guidance to lawyers and students, which contributes to cynicism regarding fact presentation, should be addressed with guidance about how to use persuasive legal narrative in an effective, ethical manner.","PeriodicalId":42194,"journal":{"name":"Legal Ethics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/1460728x.2018.1620156","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47763832","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-07-03DOI: 10.1080/1460728x.2018.1551702
S. Delacroix
ABSTRACT This essay aims to contribute robust grounds to question the Susskinds’ influential, consequentialist logic when it comes to the legitimacy of automation within the legal profession. It does so by questioning their minimalist understanding of the professions. If it is our commitment to moral equality that is at stake every time lawyers (fail to) hail the specific vulnerability inherent in their professional relationship, the case for wholesale automation is turned on its head. One can no longer assume that, as a rule, wholesale automation is both legitimate and desirable, provided it improves the quality and accessibility of legal services (in an accountable and maximally transparent way). The assumption, instead, is firmly in favour of designing systems that better enable legal professionals to live up to their specific responsibility. The rest of the essay outlines key challenges in the design of such profession-specific, ‘ethics aware’ decision-support systems.
{"title":"Computer systems fit for the legal profession?","authors":"S. Delacroix","doi":"10.1080/1460728x.2018.1551702","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1460728x.2018.1551702","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This essay aims to contribute robust grounds to question the Susskinds’ influential, consequentialist logic when it comes to the legitimacy of automation within the legal profession. It does so by questioning their minimalist understanding of the professions. If it is our commitment to moral equality that is at stake every time lawyers (fail to) hail the specific vulnerability inherent in their professional relationship, the case for wholesale automation is turned on its head. One can no longer assume that, as a rule, wholesale automation is both legitimate and desirable, provided it improves the quality and accessibility of legal services (in an accountable and maximally transparent way). The assumption, instead, is firmly in favour of designing systems that better enable legal professionals to live up to their specific responsibility. The rest of the essay outlines key challenges in the design of such profession-specific, ‘ethics aware’ decision-support systems.","PeriodicalId":42194,"journal":{"name":"Legal Ethics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/1460728x.2018.1551702","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49374343","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-07-03DOI: 10.1080/1460728x.2018.1551677
A. Anand
ABSTRACT England and Australia have abandoned self-regulation of the legal profession, yet Canadian law societies continue to function on this basis. This article argues that the self-regulatory model on which the Law Society of Ontario (the ‘LSO’) operates represents an inadequate form of governance in terms of the accountability it yields. When compared to other organisations, including law societies in other common law jurisdictions as well as corporations, the weaknesses in the LSO's governance model are conspicuous. This article advocates replacing self-regulation in Ontario's legal profession with a co-regulatory regime. In the absence of such an extensive reform, this article puts forward recommendations for changes to the current bencher model of governance on which the LSO is based including the implementation of bencher expertise requirements and a duty of loyalty and a statutory duty of care to the public.
{"title":"Governance gone wrong: examining self-regulation of the legal profession","authors":"A. Anand","doi":"10.1080/1460728x.2018.1551677","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1460728x.2018.1551677","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT England and Australia have abandoned self-regulation of the legal profession, yet Canadian law societies continue to function on this basis. This article argues that the self-regulatory model on which the Law Society of Ontario (the ‘LSO’) operates represents an inadequate form of governance in terms of the accountability it yields. When compared to other organisations, including law societies in other common law jurisdictions as well as corporations, the weaknesses in the LSO's governance model are conspicuous. This article advocates replacing self-regulation in Ontario's legal profession with a co-regulatory regime. In the absence of such an extensive reform, this article puts forward recommendations for changes to the current bencher model of governance on which the LSO is based including the implementation of bencher expertise requirements and a duty of loyalty and a statutory duty of care to the public.","PeriodicalId":42194,"journal":{"name":"Legal Ethics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/1460728x.2018.1551677","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49344853","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}