This paper analyzes the effects on teacher retention and between-school mobility of a program that rewards excellence in pedagogical practice in Chile. Teachers apply voluntarily for the award and those who succeed on a set of assessments receive a 6 percent annual wage increase for up to 10 years. A sharp regression discontinuity design is used to identify the causal effect of receiving the award. Using administrative data over several cohorts of applicants, the estimates indicate that locally the award does not alter transitions out of the school system. This suggests that around the threshold the skills rewarded by the program are not strongly correlated with the value of the teachers’ outside option. An increase in mobility, however, is observed within the school system among teachers who receive the award. These mobility patterns are consistent with the award providing a signal of teacher quality.
{"title":"Does Rewarding Pedagogical Excellence Keep Teachers in the Classroom?","authors":"S. Berlinski, A. Fernández","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3305513","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3305513","url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyzes the effects on teacher retention and between-school mobility of a program that rewards excellence in pedagogical practice in Chile. Teachers apply voluntarily for the award and those who succeed on a set of assessments receive a 6 percent annual wage increase for up to 10 years. A sharp regression discontinuity design is used to identify the causal effect of receiving the award. Using administrative data over several cohorts of applicants, the estimates indicate that locally the award does not alter transitions out of the school system. This suggests that around the threshold the skills rewarded by the program are not strongly correlated with the value of the teachers’ outside option. An increase in mobility, however, is observed within the school system among teachers who receive the award. These mobility patterns are consistent with the award providing a signal of teacher quality.","PeriodicalId":424829,"journal":{"name":"Inter-American Development Bank Research Paper Series","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125560524","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Sudden Stops in net capital flows can be prevented when the actions of domestic investors offset a reduction in foreign lending. This paper presents evidence that while sudden stops in gross inflows—i.e., a tightening of the external borrowing constraint—are associated with global conditions and therefore, are largely outside of the control of local policymakers, domestic factors such as low levels of liability dollarization, exchange rate flexibility, inflation targeting regimes, and a solid institutional background are important to prevent these episodes from becoming sudden stops in net capital flows. Under these favorable local conditions, domestic investors may perceive reduced risk in bringing in resources at the time of an external shock, thus insulating the country from this shock.
{"title":"Domestic Antidotes to Sudden Stops","authors":"E. Cavallo, A. Izquierdo, John J. Leon-Diaz","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3103801","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3103801","url":null,"abstract":"Sudden Stops in net capital flows can be prevented when the actions of domestic investors offset a reduction in foreign lending. This paper presents evidence that while sudden stops in gross inflows—i.e., a tightening of the external borrowing constraint—are associated with global conditions and therefore, are largely outside of the control of local policymakers, domestic factors such as low levels of liability dollarization, exchange rate flexibility, inflation targeting regimes, and a solid institutional background are important to prevent these episodes from becoming sudden stops in net capital flows. Under these favorable local conditions, domestic investors may perceive reduced risk in bringing in resources at the time of an external shock, thus insulating the country from this shock.","PeriodicalId":424829,"journal":{"name":"Inter-American Development Bank Research Paper Series","volume":"2015 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127720269","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper studies the cyclical properties of two key expenditure categories (current and public investment spending) during the different phases of the business cycle (good times and bad times). Anecdotal evidence suggests that policymakers usually cannot resist the temptation of spending more on current expenditure in good times, but only pick capital expenditures to adjust during bad times. The paper answers the following questions: do current and capital expenditures react to the business cycle? If so, by how much, and why? In a sample of more than 100 developing countries and 30 developed countries observed between 1980 and 2014, a new empirical regularity specific to developing countries is identified: upswings are associated with increases in current primary expenditures (e.g., wages, transfers) only, while public investment falls and current spending remains acyclical during downturns. Evidence is also presented that this asymmetrical response is more pronounced in countries where incumbent politicians face shorter time horizons and weak institutions. Other type of factors traditionally discussed in the literature (limited creditworthiness, fiscal rules, and tax base volatility) have limited explanatory power.
{"title":"Current Expenditure Upswings in Good Times and Capital Expenditure Downswings in Bad Times?: New Evidence from Developing Countries","authors":"Martín Ardanaz, A. Izquierdo","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3103799","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3103799","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies the cyclical properties of two key expenditure categories (current and public investment spending) during the different phases of the business cycle (good times and bad times). Anecdotal evidence suggests that policymakers usually cannot resist the temptation of spending more on current expenditure in good times, but only pick capital expenditures to adjust during bad times. The paper answers the following questions: do current and capital expenditures react to the business cycle? If so, by how much, and why? In a sample of more than 100 developing countries and 30 developed countries observed between 1980 and 2014, a new empirical regularity specific to developing countries is identified: upswings are associated with increases in current primary expenditures (e.g., wages, transfers) only, while public investment falls and current spending remains acyclical during downturns. Evidence is also presented that this asymmetrical response is more pronounced in countries where incumbent politicians face shorter time horizons and weak institutions. Other type of factors traditionally discussed in the literature (limited creditworthiness, fiscal rules, and tax base volatility) have limited explanatory power.","PeriodicalId":424829,"journal":{"name":"Inter-American Development Bank Research Paper Series","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124530346","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Merit-based selection of bureaucrats is central to state capacity building, yet rare in developing countries. Most executives instead favor patronage -political discretion- in public employment. This paper proposes and tests an original theory to explain when executives forsake patronage for merit. The theory exploits exogenous variation in the institutional design of patronage states. In some, constitutions and budget laws monopolize patronage powers in the executive; in others, patronage benefits accrue to the legislature and public employees. When institutions fragment patronage powers and challengers control other government branches, merit becomes more incentive-compatible: it enables executives to deprive challengers of patronage while enhancing public goods provision to court electoral support. Drawing on 130 face-to-face elite interviews, a comparison of reforms in Paraguay, the Dominican Republic and the United States validates the theory. How patronage states are institutionally designed thus shapes their reform prospects: fragmented control over bad government can incentivize good government reforms.
{"title":"When the Victor Cannot Claim the Spoils: Institutional Incentives for Professionalizing Patronage States","authors":"Christian Schuster","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2956685","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2956685","url":null,"abstract":"Merit-based selection of bureaucrats is central to state capacity building, yet rare in developing countries. Most executives instead favor patronage -political discretion- in public employment. This paper proposes and tests an original theory to explain when executives forsake patronage for merit. The theory exploits exogenous variation in the institutional design of patronage states. In some, constitutions and budget laws monopolize patronage powers in the executive; in others, patronage benefits accrue to the legislature and public employees. When institutions fragment patronage powers and challengers control other government branches, merit becomes more incentive-compatible: it enables executives to deprive challengers of patronage while enhancing public goods provision to court electoral support. Drawing on 130 face-to-face elite interviews, a comparison of reforms in Paraguay, the Dominican Republic and the United States validates the theory. How patronage states are institutionally designed thus shapes their reform prospects: fragmented control over bad government can incentivize good government reforms.","PeriodicalId":424829,"journal":{"name":"Inter-American Development Bank Research Paper Series","volume":"87 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126179746","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Fluctuations in commodity prices are an important driver of business cycles in small emerging market economies (EMEs). This paper documents how these fluctuations correlate strongly with the business cycle in EMEs. A commodity sector is then embedded into a multi-country EMEs business cycle model where exogenous fluctuations in commodity prices follow a common dynamic factor structure and coexist with other driving forces. The estimated model assigns to commodity shocks 42 percent of the variance in income, of which a considerable part is linked to the common factor. A further amplification mechanism is a spillover effect from commodity prices to risk premia.
{"title":"Sharing a Ride on the Commodities Roller Coaster: Common Factors in Business Cycles of Emerging","authors":"Andrés Fernández, A. Gómez, Diego Rodríguez","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2729736","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2729736","url":null,"abstract":"Fluctuations in commodity prices are an important driver of business cycles in small emerging market economies (EMEs). This paper documents how these fluctuations correlate strongly with the business cycle in EMEs. A commodity sector is then embedded into a multi-country EMEs business cycle model where exogenous fluctuations in commodity prices follow a common dynamic factor structure and coexist with other driving forces. The estimated model assigns to commodity shocks 42 percent of the variance in income, of which a considerable part is linked to the common factor. A further amplification mechanism is a spillover effect from commodity prices to risk premia.","PeriodicalId":424829,"journal":{"name":"Inter-American Development Bank Research Paper Series","volume":"94 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131193460","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper explores the effect of party system institutionalization on the relevance of the personal income tax in the tax composition. Based on a fiscal contractualism approach, it is argued that institutionalized political party systems increase the capacity of political actors to credibly commit to fiscal contracts agreed with wealthy taxpayers. Consequently, in countries characterized by institutionalized political party systems wealthy taxpayers accept paying a bigger share of the tax burden, as reflected in a greater relevance of progressive tax types. The analysis of panel data for more than 90 countries from 1990 to 2010 supports this hypothesis, showing that party system institutionalization has an especially significant and strong positive effect on the relevance of the personal income tax where bureaucratic capacity is low. At high levels of bureaucratic capacity the effect disappears. The findings strongly support the claim that, particularly in developing countries, where bureaucratic capacity tends to be limited, taxation is best understood as a problem of credible commitment.
{"title":"Party System Institutionalization and Reliance on Personal Income Tax in Developing Countries","authors":"A. Schiller","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2729733","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2729733","url":null,"abstract":"This paper explores the effect of party system institutionalization on the relevance of the personal income tax in the tax composition. Based on a fiscal contractualism approach, it is argued that institutionalized political party systems increase the capacity of political actors to credibly commit to fiscal contracts agreed with wealthy taxpayers. Consequently, in countries characterized by institutionalized political party systems wealthy taxpayers accept paying a bigger share of the tax burden, as reflected in a greater relevance of progressive tax types. The analysis of panel data for more than 90 countries from 1990 to 2010 supports this hypothesis, showing that party system institutionalization has an especially significant and strong positive effect on the relevance of the personal income tax where bureaucratic capacity is low. At high levels of bureaucratic capacity the effect disappears. The findings strongly support the claim that, particularly in developing countries, where bureaucratic capacity tends to be limited, taxation is best understood as a problem of credible commitment.","PeriodicalId":424829,"journal":{"name":"Inter-American Development Bank Research Paper Series","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131039506","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper provides new measures of labor law enforcement across the world. The constructed dataset shows that countries with more stringent de jure regulation tend to enforce less. While civil law countries tend to have more stringent de jure labor codes as predicted by legal origin theory, they enforce them less, suggesting a more nuanced version of legal origin theory. The paper further hypothesizes that in territories where Europeans pursued an extractive strategy, they created economies characterized by monopolies and exploitation of workers, which ultimately led to stringent labor laws in an attempt to buy social peace. Those laws, however, applied de facto only in firms and sectors with high rents and workers capable of mobilizing. Finally, it is shown that territories with higher European settler mortality presently have more stringent de jure labor regulations, lower overall labor inspection, and larger differences in effective regulation of bigger firms.
{"title":"Enforcement and the Effective Regulation of Labor","authors":"L. Ronconi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2729730","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2729730","url":null,"abstract":"This paper provides new measures of labor law enforcement across the world. The constructed dataset shows that countries with more stringent de jure regulation tend to enforce less. While civil law countries tend to have more stringent de jure labor codes as predicted by legal origin theory, they enforce them less, suggesting a more nuanced version of legal origin theory. The paper further hypothesizes that in territories where Europeans pursued an extractive strategy, they created economies characterized by monopolies and exploitation of workers, which ultimately led to stringent labor laws in an attempt to buy social peace. Those laws, however, applied de facto only in firms and sectors with high rents and workers capable of mobilizing. Finally, it is shown that territories with higher European settler mortality presently have more stringent de jure labor regulations, lower overall labor inspection, and larger differences in effective regulation of bigger firms.","PeriodicalId":424829,"journal":{"name":"Inter-American Development Bank Research Paper Series","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125404107","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Using reduced-form regression models, this paper shows that average predicted private saving rates in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) are significantly lower than in other regions, particularly Emerging Asia (about 4 percentage points of GDP on average). Predicted public saving rates in LAC are also lower than in Emerging Asia, but by a smaller margin (1 percentage point of GDP on average). It is further shown that LAC private saving rates are below the region-specific prediction by approximately 1. 5 percentage points of GDP on average. Finally, it is found that a greater reliance on external savings does not fully close the negative estimated private saving gap, reducing it by less than 1 percentage point. No gap is found in the case of public saving rates, suggesting that the lower predicted public saving rate in LAC is accounted for by the known determinants of fiscal policy.
{"title":"The Mystery of Saving in Latin America","authors":"O. Becerra, E. Cavallo, Ilan Noy","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2729668","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2729668","url":null,"abstract":"Using reduced-form regression models, this paper shows that average predicted private saving rates in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) are significantly lower than in other regions, particularly Emerging Asia (about 4 percentage points of GDP on average). Predicted public saving rates in LAC are also lower than in Emerging Asia, but by a smaller margin (1 percentage point of GDP on average). It is further shown that LAC private saving rates are below the region-specific prediction by approximately 1. 5 percentage points of GDP on average. Finally, it is found that a greater reliance on external savings does not fully close the negative estimated private saving gap, reducing it by less than 1 percentage point. No gap is found in the case of public saving rates, suggesting that the lower predicted public saving rate in LAC is accounted for by the known determinants of fiscal policy.","PeriodicalId":424829,"journal":{"name":"Inter-American Development Bank Research Paper Series","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121036223","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
R. Cerda, Rodrigo Fuentes, Gonzalo García, Josep Llodrà
This paper constructs time series data on savings per type of agent for Chile during the period 1960-2012. It is found that the economy's average savings rate increased by 11 percentage points in the period 1985-2012 compared to 1960- 1984, with particularly pronounced growth in corporate savings. The evidence suggests that this increase was driven largely by the following measures: i) pension reform that introduced mandatory savings and private sector management, ii) banking reform, iii) tax reform, iv) capital markets reform and v) privatizations.
{"title":"Understanding Domestic Savings in Chile","authors":"R. Cerda, Rodrigo Fuentes, Gonzalo García, Josep Llodrà","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2729731","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2729731","url":null,"abstract":"This paper constructs time series data on savings per type of agent for Chile during the period 1960-2012. It is found that the economy's average savings rate increased by 11 percentage points in the period 1985-2012 compared to 1960- 1984, with particularly pronounced growth in corporate savings. The evidence suggests that this increase was driven largely by the following measures: i) pension reform that introduced mandatory savings and private sector management, ii) banking reform, iii) tax reform, iv) capital markets reform and v) privatizations.","PeriodicalId":424829,"journal":{"name":"Inter-American Development Bank Research Paper Series","volume":"329 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122837462","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Countries around the world are facing important challenges to the sustainability of their pension systems. Changing policies, especially those of large scope and financial magnitude, is a political challenge. It takes a combination of willingness, capacity and enough political support to change the status quo and avoid costly subsequent reversals. Taking advantage of several waves of public opinion data in Latin America and the Caribbean, this paper aims to identify and analyze individual-level factors that are relevant to gauging political support for pension reform.
{"title":"The Political Economy of Pension Reform: Public Opinion in Latin America and the Caribbean","authors":"Fabiana Machado, G. Vesga","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2729665","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2729665","url":null,"abstract":"Countries around the world are facing important challenges to the sustainability of their pension systems. Changing policies, especially those of large scope and financial magnitude, is a political challenge. It takes a combination of willingness, capacity and enough political support to change the status quo and avoid costly subsequent reversals. Taking advantage of several waves of public opinion data in Latin America and the Caribbean, this paper aims to identify and analyze individual-level factors that are relevant to gauging political support for pension reform.","PeriodicalId":424829,"journal":{"name":"Inter-American Development Bank Research Paper Series","volume":"56 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121487704","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：