Pub Date : 2021-11-29DOI: 10.1163/15718034-12341458
Avni Puka, Fisnik Korenica
The Kosovo Specialist Chambers (KSC) manifest the first effort of the European Union to participate in an international criminal law project by running a hybrid criminal tribunal, vested with jurisdiction to investigate the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe’s Marty Report. The KSC is entrusted with a mandate originating in a number of legal instruments. A “termination clause” is also present in the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo. The Specialist Constitutional Chamber has recently ruled on an amendment discreetly activating the termination of the KSC. The Chamber’s decision outlawing “the amendment” manifests an attempt to reinforce the constitutive nature of the EU’s proprietorship over the KSC, attaching to it an international personality detached from that of Kosovo. The decision contends that the “power to dissolve” the KSC is basically vested with the EU, and Kosovo’s internal law cannot affect that relationship unilaterally. The article argues that the strong adherence of the Chamber’s decision on fundamental rights is an attempt to expose the victim-rights-centered mission of the KSC, clearly leaning towards a legitimacy rather than a legalistic exercise. The article concludes that the decision will have ample effect on the EU’s responsibility over the KSC, the nature of the “power to dissolve”, and the KSC’s mission in the European fundamental rights landscape in general.
{"title":"The “Struggle” to Dissolve the Kosovo Specialist Chambers in The Hague: Stuck between Constitutional Text and Mission to Pursue Justice","authors":"Avni Puka, Fisnik Korenica","doi":"10.1163/15718034-12341458","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/15718034-12341458","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000The Kosovo Specialist Chambers (KSC) manifest the first effort of the European Union to participate in an international criminal law project by running a hybrid criminal tribunal, vested with jurisdiction to investigate the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe’s Marty Report. The KSC is entrusted with a mandate originating in a number of legal instruments. A “termination clause” is also present in the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo. The Specialist Constitutional Chamber has recently ruled on an amendment discreetly activating the termination of the KSC. The Chamber’s decision outlawing “the amendment” manifests an attempt to reinforce the constitutive nature of the EU’s proprietorship over the KSC, attaching to it an international personality detached from that of Kosovo. The decision contends that the “power to dissolve” the KSC is basically vested with the EU, and Kosovo’s internal law cannot affect that relationship unilaterally. The article argues that the strong adherence of the Chamber’s decision on fundamental rights is an attempt to expose the victim-rights-centered mission of the KSC, clearly leaning towards a legitimacy rather than a legalistic exercise. The article concludes that the decision will have ample effect on the EU’s responsibility over the KSC, the nature of the “power to dissolve”, and the KSC’s mission in the European fundamental rights landscape in general.","PeriodicalId":42613,"journal":{"name":"Law & Practice of International Courts and Tribunals","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-11-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42284828","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-29DOI: 10.1163/15718034-12341462
John F. Brosseau
{"title":"The Right to a Fair Trial in International Law, written by Amal Clooney and Philippa Webb","authors":"John F. Brosseau","doi":"10.1163/15718034-12341462","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/15718034-12341462","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":42613,"journal":{"name":"Law & Practice of International Courts and Tribunals","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-11-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44671715","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-29DOI: 10.1163/15718034-12341460
C. Foster
{"title":"Science and Judicial Reasoning: The Legitimacy of International Environmental Adjudication, written by Katalin Sulyok","authors":"C. Foster","doi":"10.1163/15718034-12341460","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/15718034-12341460","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":42613,"journal":{"name":"Law & Practice of International Courts and Tribunals","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-11-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42744894","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-29DOI: 10.1163/15718034-12341457
Eirini-Erasmia Fasia
The article argues that the Law of the Sea Convention’s (LOSC) dispute settlement system (DSS) is attuned only to certain types of disputes (bilateral) and does not allow for the effective enforcement of obligations erga omnes reflected in the Convention. Mechanisms established to address enforcement of communitarian norms specifically are scarce in international law and the traditional bilateral structure of adjudicatory dispute settlement circumscribes the ability of states to act as advocates of the international community to which obligations erga omnes are owed. The article identifies the obligations erga omnes reflected in the LOSC and assesses the extent to which its dispute settlement framework is suited to address their breach. It is submitted that some of the community interest obligations of the LOSC are “left behind” by the function of the system itself.
{"title":"No Provision Left Behind – Law of the Sea Convention’s Dispute Settlement System and Obligations Erga Omnes","authors":"Eirini-Erasmia Fasia","doi":"10.1163/15718034-12341457","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/15718034-12341457","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000The article argues that the Law of the Sea Convention’s (LOSC) dispute settlement system (DSS) is attuned only to certain types of disputes (bilateral) and does not allow for the effective enforcement of obligations erga omnes reflected in the Convention. Mechanisms established to address enforcement of communitarian norms specifically are scarce in international law and the traditional bilateral structure of adjudicatory dispute settlement circumscribes the ability of states to act as advocates of the international community to which obligations erga omnes are owed. The article identifies the obligations erga omnes reflected in the LOSC and assesses the extent to which its dispute settlement framework is suited to address their breach. It is submitted that some of the community interest obligations of the LOSC are “left behind” by the function of the system itself.","PeriodicalId":42613,"journal":{"name":"Law & Practice of International Courts and Tribunals","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-11-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47427195","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-29DOI: 10.1163/15718034-12341454
A. Pellet
{"title":"Adieu, James Crawford","authors":"A. Pellet","doi":"10.1163/15718034-12341454","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/15718034-12341454","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":42613,"journal":{"name":"Law & Practice of International Courts and Tribunals","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-11-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44091405","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-29DOI: 10.1163/15718034-12341456
Rowan Nicholson
A frequently used shortcut to identifying rules of customary international law is to rely on statements by the International Court of Justice instead of conducting a more cumbersome investigation of state practice and opinio iuris. The purpose of this article is to consider when the Court’s statements align or may come to align with customary rules and, consequently, to what extent this shortcut is justified. Its value is in systematically exploring ideas that international lawyers may already have internalised; it may also help students of the subject to understand why reliance is placed on judicial decisions. Often, the Court simply elucidates pre-existing customary rules. But examples such as Factory at Chorzów, Fisheries, and Reservations to the Genocide Convention suggest that an additional or alternative justification for the shortcut may be stronger. This is the tendency of states to endorse or “ratify” statements by the Court through subsequent practice and opinio iuris.
{"title":"The International Court of Justice as a “Shortcut” to Identifying Custom","authors":"Rowan Nicholson","doi":"10.1163/15718034-12341456","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/15718034-12341456","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 A frequently used shortcut to identifying rules of customary international law is to rely on statements by the International Court of Justice instead of conducting a more cumbersome investigation of state practice and opinio iuris. The purpose of this article is to consider when the Court’s statements align or may come to align with customary rules and, consequently, to what extent this shortcut is justified. Its value is in systematically exploring ideas that international lawyers may already have internalised; it may also help students of the subject to understand why reliance is placed on judicial decisions. Often, the Court simply elucidates pre-existing customary rules. But examples such as Factory at Chorzów, Fisheries, and Reservations to the Genocide Convention suggest that an additional or alternative justification for the shortcut may be stronger. This is the tendency of states to endorse or “ratify” statements by the Court through subsequent practice and opinio iuris.","PeriodicalId":42613,"journal":{"name":"Law & Practice of International Courts and Tribunals","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-11-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48130403","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-29DOI: 10.1163/15718034-12341461
Callum Musto
{"title":"Comparative Reasoning in International Courts and Tribunals, written by Daniel Peat","authors":"Callum Musto","doi":"10.1163/15718034-12341461","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/15718034-12341461","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":42613,"journal":{"name":"Law & Practice of International Courts and Tribunals","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-11-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48840666","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-08-17DOI: 10.1163/15718034-12341447
Katayoun Hosseinnejad
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties calls for consideration of the ordinary meaning as the starting point in the process of interpretation. Although the linguistic concept of ordinary meaning is founded on the idea that the meaning of a sentence is directly imposed by the norms of language so that interpreters are provided with an objective standard which is external to their subjectivity, this article demonstrates that the interpretive jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice has departed from the imperatives of the ordinary meaning doctrine. Rather, the Court, mindful of the problem that no mere sequence of words can represent actual legal meaning, has moved towards construction of ordinary meaning.
{"title":"Rethinking the Meaning of Ordinary Meaning in Light of the ICJ’s Jurisprudence","authors":"Katayoun Hosseinnejad","doi":"10.1163/15718034-12341447","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/15718034-12341447","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties calls for consideration of the ordinary meaning as the starting point in the process of interpretation. Although the linguistic concept of ordinary meaning is founded on the idea that the meaning of a sentence is directly imposed by the norms of language so that interpreters are provided with an objective standard which is external to their subjectivity, this article demonstrates that the interpretive jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice has departed from the imperatives of the ordinary meaning doctrine. Rather, the Court, mindful of the problem that no mere sequence of words can represent actual legal meaning, has moved towards construction of ordinary meaning.","PeriodicalId":42613,"journal":{"name":"Law & Practice of International Courts and Tribunals","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-08-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46989204","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-08-17DOI: 10.1163/15718034-12341446
Rebecca L. Brown
This article analyses the way in which international tribunals considering treaty- based disputes incorporate extraneous environmental principles through the use of interpretative mechanisms. Increasingly prominent in the international sphere, this approach allows States bringing claims under historical treaties to adopt and enforce contemporary understandings of environmental obligations. This article pursues an extensive survey of cases exhibiting this process, focusing on the interpretative techniques used; the extent to which the tribunals allowed for environmental arguments; and the basis, and use, of environmental norms. These results facilitate a comparative analysis, which concludes that tribunals’ choices regarding each of these features ultimately depends on the underlying treaty’s relationship with intertemporal law. This article thus provides a guide as to how States may effectively enforce environmental obligations, even absent explicit environmental enforcement mechanisms.
{"title":"Invoking International Environmental Norms Through Treaty Interpretation","authors":"Rebecca L. Brown","doi":"10.1163/15718034-12341446","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/15718034-12341446","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000This article analyses the way in which international tribunals considering treaty- based disputes incorporate extraneous environmental principles through the use of interpretative mechanisms. Increasingly prominent in the international sphere, this approach allows States bringing claims under historical treaties to adopt and enforce contemporary understandings of environmental obligations. This article pursues an extensive survey of cases exhibiting this process, focusing on the interpretative techniques used; the extent to which the tribunals allowed for environmental arguments; and the basis, and use, of environmental norms. These results facilitate a comparative analysis, which concludes that tribunals’ choices regarding each of these features ultimately depends on the underlying treaty’s relationship with intertemporal law. This article thus provides a guide as to how States may effectively enforce environmental obligations, even absent explicit environmental enforcement mechanisms.","PeriodicalId":42613,"journal":{"name":"Law & Practice of International Courts and Tribunals","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-08-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45329432","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-08-17DOI: 10.1163/15718034-12341448
Andrés Sarmiento Lamus, Rodrigo González Quintero
The possibility for judges and arbitrators to append individual opinions is a discretionary right that has existed since the early stages of international adjudication. From its inception, clear boundaries have existed between the three different kinds of individual opinions, namely, declarations, separate opinions and dissenting opinions. Despite these boundaries, the practice on appending declarations shows that they have never been circumscribed, to merely record the fact of the concurrence or dissent of a judge. In consequence, some analyses exist in an attempt to explain what the differences between declarations and other individual opinions are. The most recent practice from judges when appending declarations, however, seems to run counter to the conclusions provided in the said analyses. This fact leads to the question as to what is, in the light of this recent practice of appending individual opinions, the difference between declarations and separate or dissenting opinions. This article attempts to address the said question and as a consequence the relevance of declarations in international adjudication.
{"title":"The Practice of Appending Declarations at International Courts and Tribunals","authors":"Andrés Sarmiento Lamus, Rodrigo González Quintero","doi":"10.1163/15718034-12341448","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/15718034-12341448","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000The possibility for judges and arbitrators to append individual opinions is a discretionary right that has existed since the early stages of international adjudication. From its inception, clear boundaries have existed between the three different kinds of individual opinions, namely, declarations, separate opinions and dissenting opinions. Despite these boundaries, the practice on appending declarations shows that they have never been circumscribed, to merely record the fact of the concurrence or dissent of a judge. In consequence, some analyses exist in an attempt to explain what the differences between declarations and other individual opinions are. The most recent practice from judges when appending declarations, however, seems to run counter to the conclusions provided in the said analyses. This fact leads to the question as to what is, in the light of this recent practice of appending individual opinions, the difference between declarations and separate or dissenting opinions. This article attempts to address the said question and as a consequence the relevance of declarations in international adjudication.","PeriodicalId":42613,"journal":{"name":"Law & Practice of International Courts and Tribunals","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-08-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46622363","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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