INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS AND ECONOMIC POLICY最新文献

This paper discusses the scope for international macroprudential policy coordination in a financially integrated world economy. It begins with a review of the transmission channels associated with, and the empirical evidence on, financial spillovers and spillbacks. Limitations of the existing literature are also identified. The potential gains associated with cross-border macroprudential coordination, dwelling on both recent analytical contributions and quantitative studies based on multi-country models with financial frictions, are then evaluated. The issue of whether coordination of macroprudential policies simultaneously requires some degree of monetary policy coordination is also discussed. The analysis focuses on the potential for policy coordination between major advanced economies and a group identified as systemically-important middle-income countries (SMICs). Next, practical ways to promote international macroprudential policy coordination are considered. Following a discussion of Basel III's Principle of reciprocity and ways to improve it, the paper advocates a further strengthening of the current statistical, empirical and analytical work conducted by international financial institutions to evaluate, and raise awareness of, the gains from international coordination of macroprudential policies.

The reliability of forecast models in the aviation sector is an important factor for industry and policy makers likewise. Expanding airports and fleets usually is a cost and time intensive process, and in order to maintain efficient market behavior, accurate anticipation of future demand and structural changes is attempted. We present a new quantitative approach to air cargo forecasts utilizing global airport-dyadic ICAO CASS data in general linearized airport fixed effects gravity models. While the strong explanatory power of our time invariant constant model has its natural difficulties predicting a variety of smaller indicators from previous models found in literature, we achieve very good results for selected time variant variables as gross domestic product per capita or kerosene prices. This makes our model a perfect tool for forecast simulations: extrapolating general economic forecast data provided by IHS Markit yield similar results to Boeing cargo forecasts (2020), with a slight decrease in the long run. Additionally, we do not need to split or control our sample in regional groups due to airport fixed effects, which makes the model on the other hand suitable for country- and airport level forecasts as well. The utilization of a large unique bilateral freight data set also helps answering classical gravity model questions in aviation: we track the distance effect to a matter of sample selection, finding no significant interaction following state of the art gravity econometrics.

This paper analyzes recent developments in the British and European government bond markets with reference to the UK's decision to leave the European Union. The two main goals of the study are, firstly, to examine whether the Brexit referendum result has affected the risk premium and, secondly, whether there are any changes in risk pricing following the referendum. The paper finds a significant impact of the Brexit referendum on the risk premium in selected economies. Furthermore, the results suggest that there is a considerable change in risk pricing after the announcement of the referendum result. Credit default risk and the risk aversion play a much important role in the post-referendum period than they did prior to the vote, particularly in the UK.

What are the economic effects of the Ukraine war for Ukraine, Russia, and the rest of Europe? In this study, the Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (wiiw) sheds light on the immediate consequences on the one hand, but also on the medium-term structural changes caused by the largest armed conflict in Europe since the Second World War. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has triggered a humanitarian crisis. Pre-war, almost 19 m people lived in those regions that are currently directly affected. Refugee inflows to the rest of Europe are likely to be at least three times greater than in 2015/2016. As Black Sea ports come under Russian assault, Ukraine has lost its ability to sell more than half of its exports, primarily agricultural commodities and metals. Western financial support will become ever more important as the war continues. Turning to Russia, sanctions will have a very serious impact on that country's economy and financial sector. Despite being partly hamstrung by the fact that a large proportion of Russian reserve assets are frozen in the EU and G7, the central bank managed to stabilise financial markets by a combination of confidence-building and hard-steering measures: capital controls, FX controls, regulatory easing for financial institutions, and a doubling of the key policy rate. The medium-term and long-term outlook is negative. As a result of the war and the sanctions, the rest of Europe faces a surge in already high inflation; this will weigh on real incomes and will depress economic growth. Many European countries rely heavily on Russia for oil and gas imports: import shares are over 75% in Czechia, Latvia, Hungary, Slovakia, and Bulgaria with respect to natural gas; Slovakia, Lithuania, Poland, and Finland with respect to oil and petroleum; and Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Denmark, Lithuania, Greece, and Bulgaria with respect to solid fuels. Aside from energy, the fallout via trade for the rest of Europe is likely to be small. Non-energy trade and investment links between Russia and many European countries have declined in importance since 2013. There are four main areas of structural change and lasting impact for the EU (and Europe more broadly) as a result of Russia's invasion of Ukraine. First, the EU will get more serious about defence. Second, the green transition will gather pace. Third, broader Eurasian economic integration will be unwound. And fourth, the EU accession prospects for countries in Southeast Europe could (and should) improve.

Supplementary information: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s10368-022-00546-5.

The impact of environmental motivations on the individual's decisions regarding investments in energy efficiency and the adoption of energy-saving habits are analyzed for a representative sample of Chinese inhabitants from the larger Beijing area, replicating a comparative study on Western Europe. For the considered type of energy efficiency investments and daily energy-saving activities similarities and discrepancies between the two regions are discussed in regard to their sociocultural background as well as governmental regulations. The study provides empirical evidence that for Chinese environmental issues if all only play a tertiary role after monetary and regulatory incentives. The findings could suggest that in China policy programs aimed at raising environmental awareness and forming pro-environmental motivations might not lead to an increase in energy efficiency investments and daily energy-saving activities and the Chinese government's interests in this regard might be better served by implementing corresponding incentives via regulations. In the long-term. However, social peer pressure might affect a change in the Chinese mentality.

Considering the development of the shadow economy of 36 European and OECD countries over the period from 2003 to 2022 and the effect of the Coronavirus pandemic from 2020 onwards, the average size of the shadow economy of 36 European and OECD countries decreased from 16.48% of GDP in 2020 to 16.07% in 2021 (a decline of 0.41 percentage points). Due to a continued (forecasted) economic recovery in 2022, the average shadow economy of these 36 countries will slightly increase to 15.96% of GDP (average of all 36 countries): a very modest reduction of 0.11 percentage points.