{"title":"Tra sociniani e impostori: Spinoza e l'Islam. Alcuni appunti","authors":"Luisa Simonutti","doi":"10.3280/sf2023-003003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3280/sf2023-003003","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":42923,"journal":{"name":"RIVISTA DI STORIA DELLA FILOSOFIA","volume":"54 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136204485","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this article, the Author aims to critically piece together some Peircean responses to Cartesian scepticism, evaluating both their robustness and whether they might be of any use against contemporary formulations of the sceptical challenge. First, the Author analyses the 1860s Peircean answer to what can be considered the first kind of Cartesian scepticism - which arises, according to Peirce, from Descartes' theory of intuition and regards the unknowability of reality - and holds that such an answer is not satisfactory since scepticism, after being put out through the door, comes back in through the window. Second, the Author examines Peirce's arguments on doubt and belief and claims that they represent a powerful questioning of what can be considered the second kind of Cartesian scepticism, which arises from Descartes' method of doubt and entails that we should always be sceptical about the truth of our beliefs. Finally, the Author shifts attention from the doubt-based scepticism that Peirce was criticising to contemporary sceptical positions employing a closure principle and argues that Peircean statements on doubt and belief can be employed to build an effective counter-argument to such sceptical claims.
{"title":"Charles S. Peirce and the Struggle Against Cartesian Scepticism. How the Doubt-Belief Dialectic Can Help Us Ignore the Possibility of a Wholesale Deception","authors":"Claudio Davini","doi":"10.3280/sf2023-002002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3280/sf2023-002002","url":null,"abstract":"In this article, the Author aims to critically piece together some Peircean responses to Cartesian scepticism, evaluating both their robustness and whether they might be of any use against contemporary formulations of the sceptical challenge. First, the Author analyses the 1860s Peircean answer to what can be considered the first kind of Cartesian scepticism - which arises, according to Peirce, from Descartes' theory of intuition and regards the unknowability of reality - and holds that such an answer is not satisfactory since scepticism, after being put out through the door, comes back in through the window. Second, the Author examines Peirce's arguments on doubt and belief and claims that they represent a powerful questioning of what can be considered the second kind of Cartesian scepticism, which arises from Descartes' method of doubt and entails that we should always be sceptical about the truth of our beliefs. Finally, the Author shifts attention from the doubt-based scepticism that Peirce was criticising to contemporary sceptical positions employing a closure principle and argues that Peircean statements on doubt and belief can be employed to build an effective counter-argument to such sceptical claims.","PeriodicalId":42923,"journal":{"name":"RIVISTA DI STORIA DELLA FILOSOFIA","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44607474","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Sottile e robusto, uno e plurale. Il pensiero di Duns Scoto analizzato in due recenti pubblicazioni.","authors":"Giacomo Fornasieri","doi":"10.3280/sf2023-002004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3280/sf2023-002004","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":42923,"journal":{"name":"RIVISTA DI STORIA DELLA FILOSOFIA","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45934503","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Alfred Baeumler e la \"maschera\" di Kant","authors":"A. Prina","doi":"10.3280/sf2023-002003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3280/sf2023-002003","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":42923,"journal":{"name":"RIVISTA DI STORIA DELLA FILOSOFIA","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48498350","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Recensioni","authors":"Antonella Del Prete, Riccarda Suitner, A. Loche","doi":"10.3280/sf2023-002007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3280/sf2023-002007","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":42923,"journal":{"name":"RIVISTA DI STORIA DELLA FILOSOFIA","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45983785","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"L'arte del \"sillogismo sensato\" nella Dialectica di Tommaso Campanella","authors":"M. Bertolini","doi":"10.3280/sf2023-002001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3280/sf2023-002001","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":42923,"journal":{"name":"RIVISTA DI STORIA DELLA FILOSOFIA","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45071204","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Una ragazza in cattedra: la prolusione di Laura Bassi","authors":"Elena Muceni","doi":"10.3280/sf2023-002006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3280/sf2023-002006","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":42923,"journal":{"name":"RIVISTA DI STORIA DELLA FILOSOFIA","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43376406","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Permanenza e distanza. Il Carteggio tra Hans Blumenberg e Hans Jonas","authors":"Omar Brino","doi":"10.3280/sf2023-002005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3280/sf2023-002005","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":42923,"journal":{"name":"RIVISTA DI STORIA DELLA FILOSOFIA","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46119440","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Esemplarità: excursus kantiano","authors":"M. Failla","doi":"10.3280/sf2023-001008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3280/sf2023-001008","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":42923,"journal":{"name":"RIVISTA DI STORIA DELLA FILOSOFIA","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2023-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48860661","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this article, it is argued that: 1) Aristotle's use of moral exemplars is not a mere practical empiricism;; 2) moral exemplarity counts as a legitimate tool for practical knowledge. At first glance, the moral exemplar looks like a mere empirical substitute for a scientific knowledge of the Good, which, strictly speaking, would be impossible. In that respect, the exemplar looks like a particular case, by contrast with real practical norms. Consequently, Aristotle's exemplarism seems, at best, to lead to a sort of relativistic particularism. However, Aristotle's use of examples and exemplars have a significant part in moral conduct, where the virtuous person stands for the human standard of good action. Moreover, Aristotle puts the emphasis on the notion of "measure" (metron). By doing so, he constructs a consistent conception of moral exemplarity. The wise person is the ‘measure' of moral conduct, and this means that he is neither an absolute model to be imitated, nor a mere particular case to be consider.
{"title":"La mesure et l'exemple: l'exemplarité morale dans l'éthique d'Aristote","authors":"P. Morel","doi":"10.3280/sf2023-001002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3280/sf2023-001002","url":null,"abstract":"In this article, it is argued that: 1) Aristotle's use of moral exemplars is not a mere practical empiricism;; 2) moral exemplarity counts as a legitimate tool for practical knowledge. At first glance, the moral exemplar looks like a mere empirical substitute for a scientific knowledge of the Good, which, strictly speaking, would be impossible. In that respect, the exemplar looks like a particular case, by contrast with real practical norms. Consequently, Aristotle's exemplarism seems, at best, to lead to a sort of relativistic particularism. However, Aristotle's use of examples and exemplars have a significant part in moral conduct, where the virtuous person stands for the human standard of good action. Moreover, Aristotle puts the emphasis on the notion of \"measure\" (metron). By doing so, he constructs a consistent conception of moral exemplarity. The wise person is the ‘measure' of moral conduct, and this means that he is neither an absolute model to be imitated, nor a mere particular case to be consider.","PeriodicalId":42923,"journal":{"name":"RIVISTA DI STORIA DELLA FILOSOFIA","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2023-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49355622","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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