Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.1080/08066200050505788
L. Goble
This multiplex semantics incorporates multiple relations of deontic accessibility or multiple preference rankings on alternative worlds to represent distinct normative standards. This provides a convenient framework for deontic logic that allows conflicts of obligation, due either to conflicts between normative standards or to incoherence within a single standard. With the multiplex structures, two general senses of "ought" may be distinguished, an indefinite sense under which something is obligatory when it is enjoined by some normative standard and a core sense for when something is enjoined by all normative standards. Multiple normative standards may themselves be given a preferential order; this leads to a concept of ranked obligation. This paper presents the foundations of this multiplex semantics and the propositional deontic logics they define.
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Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.1080/08066200050217986
J. Cantwell
1.PreliminariesIn an attempt to understand the philosophical, linguistic and logicalproblems of the progressive tense, it may be valuable to start with a detailedanalysis of actions, and the verbs relating to them. The loss of generality ofsuch an analysis may perhaps be excused if it helps shed some light on themain issues, even if it does not provide answers to all questions on thesubject. The issues that are approached in this paper are: (i) to define aformal language suitable for analysing certain aspects of action sentences,(ii) to outline a theory of action with sufficient precision to formulateplausible truth-conditions for action sentences in the progressive tense, and(iii) to provide a partial analysis of tenses that satisfy basic inferentialpatterns for action sentences.The main work of this paper is to formulate a theory of actions preciselyenough to enable us to construct a simple formal language in which simpleassertions about actions can be given precise truth-conditions. This meansthat a number of issues relating mainly to action theory will have to beaddressed. Despite this, many, if not most, issues relating to problems inthe theory of actions will have to be ignored, and so the theory, aspresented, will have to be viewed as a rough sketch.The sentences discussed here are primarily of the form: a is v-ing. Thefocus is on defeasible progressives such as:(A) Anne was walking to the store when she was run over.In particular, the truth-conditions for such sentences and their logicalrelation to other sentences, such as ‘‘Anne walked to the store’’, arediscussed.2. Speaking of ActionsThe infinitive form of action verbs is the most basic means available inEnglish for speaking of actions. The verb phrase (to) walk to the store can besaid to designate an action-type (as opposed to an action token). Theinfinitive form is not normally manifested in actual utterances of English;rather, different aspects of the performance of actions are manifested: an
1.为了理解进行时的哲学、语言学和逻辑问题，首先对动作和与之相关的动词进行详细的分析可能是有价值的。如果这种分析有助于阐明主要问题，那么它的一般性的丧失也许是可以原谅的，即使它不能提供有关主题的所有问题的答案。本文探讨的问题是:(i)定义一种适合分析动作句某些方面的形式语言，(ii)概述一种足够精确的动作理论，以制定进行时动作句的似是而非的真条件，以及(iii)对满足动作句基本推理模式的时态进行部分分析。本文的主要工作是制定一个足够精确的行动理论，使我们能够构建一种简单的形式语言，其中关于行动的简单愉悦可以给出精确的真值条件。这意味着一些主要与行动理论有关的问题将不得不加以解决。尽管如此，许多(如果不是大多数的话)与行动理论中的问题有关的问题将不得不被忽略，因此，所提出的理论将不得不被视为一个粗略的草图。这里讨论的句子主要是这样的形式:a is v-ing。重点是可行的进步，如:(A)安妮在去商店的路上被车撞了。特别是讨论了这类句子的真值条件及其与其他句子的逻辑关系，如“Anne walked to the store”。动作动词的不定式是英语中最基本的表示动作的形式。动词短语(to)步行到商店可以用来指定一个操作类型(与操作令牌相反)。不定式通常不会在英语的实际话语中表现出来，而是表现出行为的不同方面
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Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.1080/08066200050217977
N. Cocchiarella
Russell's "new contradiction" about "the totality of propositions" has been connected with a number of modal paradoxes. M. Oksanen has recently shown how these modal paradoxes are resolved in the set theory NFU. Russell's paradox of the totality of propositions was left unexplained, however. We reconstruct Russell's argument and explain how it is resolved in two intensional logics that are equiconsistent with NFU. We also show how different notions of possible worlds are represented in these intensional logics.
{"title":"Russell's paradox of the totality of propositions","authors":"N. Cocchiarella","doi":"10.1080/08066200050217977","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08066200050217977","url":null,"abstract":"Russell's \"new contradiction\" about \"the totality of propositions\" has been connected with a number of modal paradoxes. M. Oksanen has recently shown how these modal paradoxes are resolved in the set theory NFU. Russell's paradox of the totality of propositions was left unexplained, however. We reconstruct Russell's argument and explain how it is resolved in two intensional logics that are equiconsistent with NFU. We also show how different notions of possible worlds are represented in these intensional logics.","PeriodicalId":430352,"journal":{"name":"Nordic Journal of Philosophical Logic","volume":"121 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134090866","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.1080/080662001753275945
P. Schuster
Even after yet another grand conjecture has been proved or refuted, any omniscience principle that had trivially settled this question is just as little acceptable as before. The significance of the constructive enterprise is therefore not affected by any gain of knowledge. In particular, there is no need to adapt weak counterexamples to mathematical progress.
{"title":"Too simple solutions of hard problems","authors":"P. Schuster","doi":"10.1080/080662001753275945","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/080662001753275945","url":null,"abstract":"Even after yet another grand conjecture has been proved or refuted, any omniscience principle that had trivially settled this question is just as little acceptable as before. The significance of the constructive enterprise is therefore not affected by any gain of knowledge. In particular, there is no need to adapt weak counterexamples to mathematical progress.","PeriodicalId":430352,"journal":{"name":"Nordic Journal of Philosophical Logic","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123374089","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.1080/080662001753275927
S. Elli
In this paper I provide a semantic analysis of non-specific uses of indexical expressions, such as "you" in typical utterances of "you just can't tell". My treatment employs independently motivated conceptual tools, such as the treatment of generics within Discourse Representation Theory, and the distinction between context of utterance and context of interpretation.
{"title":"You just can't tell: An analysis of the non-specific use of indexicals","authors":"S. Elli","doi":"10.1080/080662001753275927","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/080662001753275927","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper I provide a semantic analysis of non-specific uses of indexical expressions, such as \"you\" in typical utterances of \"you just can't tell\". My treatment employs independently motivated conceptual tools, such as the treatment of generics within Discourse Representation Theory, and the distinction between context of utterance and context of interpretation.","PeriodicalId":430352,"journal":{"name":"Nordic Journal of Philosophical Logic","volume":"84 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126204062","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.1080/080662001316865837
J. Dejnozka
In the December 1999 special edition of Nordic Journal of Philosophical Logic on Hugh MacColl, Ivor Grattan-Guinness and Jan Wolenski describe my discussions of Russell and MacColl in superficially true but unfortunately misleading ways. After replying to them, I proceed to my main topic, whether we can impute S5 to MacColl in light of Stephen Read's paper in the same special edition denying that MacColl has S4 or even S3. I argue that MacColl has an S5 formal modal logic with invariant formal certainties and impossibilities, and following Read, a T material modal logic with material certainties and impossibilities which can vary relative to fresh data, and that MacColl writes these logics using the same generic notation.
{"title":"Russell and Maccoll : Reply to Grattan-Guinness, WoleŃski, and Read","authors":"J. Dejnozka","doi":"10.1080/080662001316865837","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/080662001316865837","url":null,"abstract":"In the December 1999 special edition of Nordic Journal of Philosophical Logic on Hugh MacColl, Ivor Grattan-Guinness and Jan Wolenski describe my discussions of Russell and MacColl in superficially true but unfortunately misleading ways. After replying to them, I proceed to my main topic, whether we can impute S5 to MacColl in light of Stephen Read's paper in the same special edition denying that MacColl has S4 or even S3. I argue that MacColl has an S5 formal modal logic with invariant formal certainties and impossibilities, and following Read, a T material modal logic with material certainties and impossibilities which can vary relative to fresh data, and that MacColl writes these logics using the same generic notation.","PeriodicalId":430352,"journal":{"name":"Nordic Journal of Philosophical Logic","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123172168","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.1080/08066200050505805
Jan Odelstad, L. Lindahl
Analyse des liens entre les structures conceptuelles d'un systeme normatif, a travers l'exemple des quasi-classements de Boole. Examinant les structures d'implication, ainsi que les relations de congruence et l'homomorphisme, l'A. etudie l'ensemble des fragments, connexions et intermediaires qui permettent de reconstruire le systeme normatif represente.
{"title":"Normative systems represented by boolean quasi-orderings","authors":"Jan Odelstad, L. Lindahl","doi":"10.1080/08066200050505805","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08066200050505805","url":null,"abstract":"Analyse des liens entre les structures conceptuelles d'un systeme normatif, a travers l'exemple des quasi-classements de Boole. Examinant les structures d'implication, ainsi que les relations de congruence et l'homomorphisme, l'A. etudie l'ensemble des fragments, connexions et intermediaires qui permettent de reconstruire le systeme normatif represente.","PeriodicalId":430352,"journal":{"name":"Nordic Journal of Philosophical Logic","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125472415","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.1080/080662001316865846
P. Tomassi
Wittgenstein's later rejection of the externalist Tractarian picture of logic according to which all rationally analysable discourse is properly understood as truth-functional rules out any conception of logic as the study of universal features of discourse. Given later references to 'the logic of our language', some conception of logic appears to survive even on Wittgenstein's later view. However, given his rejection of any conception of philosophical theory as explanatory or hypothetical, Wittgenstein seems to be forced into descriptivism. Despite these constraints, I attempt to show that a valuable account of logic consistent with Wittgenstein's critique can be identified. That possibility raises the question: can any conception of formal logic as valuable modulo natural language survive Wittgenstein's later change of heart? Taking Wittgenstein's rejection of Tractarian conceptions seriously, logic is relativised to language-games in general and, perhaps, localised to particular language-games. Looking...
{"title":"Logic after Wittgenstein","authors":"P. Tomassi","doi":"10.1080/080662001316865846","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/080662001316865846","url":null,"abstract":"Wittgenstein's later rejection of the externalist Tractarian picture of logic according to which all rationally analysable discourse is properly understood as truth-functional rules out any conception of logic as the study of universal features of discourse. Given later references to 'the logic of our language', some conception of logic appears to survive even on Wittgenstein's later view. However, given his rejection of any conception of philosophical theory as explanatory or hypothetical, Wittgenstein seems to be forced into descriptivism. Despite these constraints, I attempt to show that a valuable account of logic consistent with Wittgenstein's critique can be identified. That possibility raises the question: can any conception of formal logic as valuable modulo natural language survive Wittgenstein's later change of heart? Taking Wittgenstein's rejection of Tractarian conceptions seriously, logic is relativised to language-games in general and, perhaps, localised to particular language-games. Looking...","PeriodicalId":430352,"journal":{"name":"Nordic Journal of Philosophical Logic","volume":"83 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114730512","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.1080/08066200050505779
Mark A. Brown
This paper investigates the semantic treatment of conditional obligation, explicit permission (often called positive permission), and prohibition based on models with agents and branched time. In such models branches (rather than moments) are taken as basic, and the branching provides a way to represent the indeterminism which is normally presupposed by talk of free will, responsibility, action and ability. Careful treatment of the relation between ability and responsibility avoids many common problems with accounts of conditional obligation. Recognition of the generality often involved in conditional obligations makes possible a sensitive way of expressing some kinds of general prohibitions, which in turn makes it possible to account for the special role of explicit permission.
{"title":"Conditional obligation and positive permission for agents in time","authors":"Mark A. Brown","doi":"10.1080/08066200050505779","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08066200050505779","url":null,"abstract":"This paper investigates the semantic treatment of conditional obligation, explicit permission (often called positive permission), and prohibition based on models with agents and branched time. In such models branches (rather than moments) are taken as basic, and the branching provides a way to represent the indeterminism which is normally presupposed by talk of free will, responsibility, action and ability. Careful treatment of the relation between ability and responsibility avoids many common problems with accounts of conditional obligation. Recognition of the generality often involved in conditional obligations makes possible a sensitive way of expressing some kinds of general prohibitions, which in turn makes it possible to account for the special role of explicit permission.","PeriodicalId":430352,"journal":{"name":"Nordic Journal of Philosophical Logic","volume":"64 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127582996","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.1080/080662001316865828
N. Tennant
This paper rebuts criticisms by Hintikka of the author's account of game-theoretic semantics for classical logic. At issue are (i) the role of the axiom of choice in proving the equivalence of the game-theoretic account with the standard truth-theoretic account; (ii) the alleged need for quantification over strategies when providing a game-theoretic semantics; and (iii) the role of Tarski's Convention T. As a result of the ideas marshalled in response to Hintikka, the author puts forward a new conjecture concerning the relationship among truth, meaning and translation.
{"title":"Game theory and conventiont","authors":"N. Tennant","doi":"10.1080/080662001316865828","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/080662001316865828","url":null,"abstract":"This paper rebuts criticisms by Hintikka of the author's account of game-theoretic semantics for classical logic. At issue are (i) the role of the axiom of choice in proving the equivalence of the game-theoretic account with the standard truth-theoretic account; (ii) the alleged need for quantification over strategies when providing a game-theoretic semantics; and (iii) the role of Tarski's Convention T. As a result of the ideas marshalled in response to Hintikka, the author puts forward a new conjecture concerning the relationship among truth, meaning and translation.","PeriodicalId":430352,"journal":{"name":"Nordic Journal of Philosophical Logic","volume":"66 1-2","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120997914","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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