Xiaojing Liao, Kan Yuan, Xiaofeng Wang, Zhou Li, Luyi Xing, R. Beyah
To adapt to the rapidly evolving landscape of cyber threats, security professionals are actively exchanging Indicators of Compromise (IOC) (e.g., malware signatures, botnet IPs) through public sources (e.g. blogs, forums, tweets, etc.). Such information, often presented in articles, posts, white papers etc., can be converted into a machine-readable OpenIOC format for automatic analysis and quick deployment to various security mechanisms like an intrusion detection system. With hundreds of thousands of sources in the wild, the IOC data are produced at a high volume and velocity today, which becomes increasingly hard to manage by humans. Efforts to automatically gather such information from unstructured text, however, is impeded by the limitations of today's Natural Language Processing (NLP) techniques, which cannot meet the high standard (in terms of accuracy and coverage) expected from the IOCs that could serve as direct input to a defense system. In this paper, we present iACE, an innovation solution for fully automated IOC extraction. Our approach is based upon the observation that the IOCs in technical articles are often described in a predictable way: being connected to a set of context terms (e.g., "download") through stable grammatical relations. Leveraging this observation, iACE is designed to automatically locate a putative IOC token (e.g., a zip file) and its context (e.g., "malware", "download") within the sentences in a technical article, and further analyze their relations through a novel application of graph mining techniques. Once the grammatical connection between the tokens is found to be in line with the way that the IOC is commonly presented, these tokens are extracted to generate an OpenIOC item that describes not only the indicator (e.g., a malicious zip file) but also its context (e.g., download from an external source). Running on 71,000 articles collected from 45 leading technical blogs, this new approach demonstrates a remarkable performance: it generated 900K OpenIOC items with a precision of 95% and a coverage over 90%, which is way beyond what the state-of-the-art NLP technique and industry IOC tool can achieve, at a speed of thousands of articles per hour. Further, by correlating the IOCs mined from the articles published over a 13-year span, our study sheds new light on the links across hundreds of seemingly unrelated attack instances, particularly their shared infrastructure resources, as well as the impacts of such open-source threat intelligence on security protection and evolution of attack strategies.
{"title":"Acing the IOC Game: Toward Automatic Discovery and Analysis of Open-Source Cyber Threat Intelligence","authors":"Xiaojing Liao, Kan Yuan, Xiaofeng Wang, Zhou Li, Luyi Xing, R. Beyah","doi":"10.1145/2976749.2978315","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2976749.2978315","url":null,"abstract":"To adapt to the rapidly evolving landscape of cyber threats, security professionals are actively exchanging Indicators of Compromise (IOC) (e.g., malware signatures, botnet IPs) through public sources (e.g. blogs, forums, tweets, etc.). Such information, often presented in articles, posts, white papers etc., can be converted into a machine-readable OpenIOC format for automatic analysis and quick deployment to various security mechanisms like an intrusion detection system. With hundreds of thousands of sources in the wild, the IOC data are produced at a high volume and velocity today, which becomes increasingly hard to manage by humans. Efforts to automatically gather such information from unstructured text, however, is impeded by the limitations of today's Natural Language Processing (NLP) techniques, which cannot meet the high standard (in terms of accuracy and coverage) expected from the IOCs that could serve as direct input to a defense system. In this paper, we present iACE, an innovation solution for fully automated IOC extraction. Our approach is based upon the observation that the IOCs in technical articles are often described in a predictable way: being connected to a set of context terms (e.g., \"download\") through stable grammatical relations. Leveraging this observation, iACE is designed to automatically locate a putative IOC token (e.g., a zip file) and its context (e.g., \"malware\", \"download\") within the sentences in a technical article, and further analyze their relations through a novel application of graph mining techniques. Once the grammatical connection between the tokens is found to be in line with the way that the IOC is commonly presented, these tokens are extracted to generate an OpenIOC item that describes not only the indicator (e.g., a malicious zip file) but also its context (e.g., download from an external source). Running on 71,000 articles collected from 45 leading technical blogs, this new approach demonstrates a remarkable performance: it generated 900K OpenIOC items with a precision of 95% and a coverage over 90%, which is way beyond what the state-of-the-art NLP technique and industry IOC tool can achieve, at a speed of thousands of articles per hour. Further, by correlating the IOCs mined from the articles published over a 13-year span, our study sheds new light on the links across hundreds of seemingly unrelated attack instances, particularly their shared infrastructure resources, as well as the impacts of such open-source threat intelligence on security protection and evolution of attack strategies.","PeriodicalId":432261,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"64 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133162762","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Internet of Things (IoT) enables a network of communication between people-to-people, people-to-things and things-to-things. The security of these communications against all possible attacks is a significant part of todays security and privacy. Due to the design nature of IoT systems, IoT devices are easily accessible by attackers which increases the importance of their security against physical attacks. This workshop is dedicated to research on the design of cryptographic algorithms and implementations secure against physical attacks.
{"title":"Theory of Implementation Security Workshop (TIs 2016)","authors":"Begül Bilgin, S. Nikova, V. Rijmen","doi":"10.1145/2976749.2990488","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2976749.2990488","url":null,"abstract":"The Internet of Things (IoT) enables a network of communication between people-to-people, people-to-things and things-to-things. The security of these communications against all possible attacks is a significant part of todays security and privacy. Due to the design nature of IoT systems, IoT devices are easily accessible by attackers which increases the importance of their security against physical attacks. This workshop is dedicated to research on the design of cryptographic algorithms and implementations secure against physical attacks.","PeriodicalId":432261,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"57 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133210095","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper, a brief introduction is presented on the 8th International Workshop on Managing Insider Security Threats (MIST 2016). MIST 2016 takes place in conjunction with the 23rd ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (ACM CCS 2016). Its main goal is to provide a forum for sharing the most recent challenges and advanced technologies in managing insider security threats.
{"title":"MIST 2016: 8th International Workshop on Managing Insider Security Threats","authors":"I. You, E. Bertino","doi":"10.1145/2976749.2990482","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2976749.2990482","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, a brief introduction is presented on the 8th International Workshop on Managing Insider Security Threats (MIST 2016). MIST 2016 takes place in conjunction with the 23rd ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (ACM CCS 2016). Its main goal is to provide a forum for sharing the most recent challenges and advanced technologies in managing insider security threats.","PeriodicalId":432261,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"43 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121740068","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Joppe W. Bos, Craig Costello, L. Ducas, Ilya Mironov, M. Naehrig, V. Nikolaenko, A. Raghunathan, D. Stebila
Lattice-based cryptography offers some of the most attractive primitives believed to be resistant to quantum computers. Following increasing interest from both companies and government agencies in building quantum computers, a number of works have proposed instantiations of practical post-quantum key exchange protocols based on hard problems in ideal lattices, mainly based on the Ring Learning With Errors (R-LWE) problem. While ideal lattices facilitate major efficiency and storage benefits over their non-ideal counterparts, the additional ring structure that enables these advantages also raises concerns about the assumed difficulty of the underlying problems. Thus, a question of significant interest to cryptographers, and especially to those currently placing bets on primitives that will withstand quantum adversaries, is how much of an advantage the additional ring structure actually gives in practice. Despite conventional wisdom that generic lattices might be too slow and unwieldy, we demonstrate that LWE-based key exchange is quite practical: our constant time implementation requires around 1.3ms computation time for each party; compared to the recent NewHope R-LWE scheme, communication sizes increase by a factor of 4.7x, but remain under 12 KiB in each direction. Our protocol is competitive when used for serving web pages over TLS; when partnered with ECDSA signatures, latencies increase by less than a factor of 1.6x, and (even under heavy load) server throughput only decreases by factors of 1.5x and 1.2x when serving typical 1 KiB and 100 KiB pages, respectively. To achieve these practical results, our protocol takes advantage of several innovations. These include techniques to optimize communication bandwidth, dynamic generation of public parameters (which also offers additional security against backdoors), carefully chosen error distributions, and tight security parameters.
{"title":"Frodo: Take off the Ring! Practical, Quantum-Secure Key Exchange from LWE","authors":"Joppe W. Bos, Craig Costello, L. Ducas, Ilya Mironov, M. Naehrig, V. Nikolaenko, A. Raghunathan, D. Stebila","doi":"10.1145/2976749.2978425","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2976749.2978425","url":null,"abstract":"Lattice-based cryptography offers some of the most attractive primitives believed to be resistant to quantum computers. Following increasing interest from both companies and government agencies in building quantum computers, a number of works have proposed instantiations of practical post-quantum key exchange protocols based on hard problems in ideal lattices, mainly based on the Ring Learning With Errors (R-LWE) problem. While ideal lattices facilitate major efficiency and storage benefits over their non-ideal counterparts, the additional ring structure that enables these advantages also raises concerns about the assumed difficulty of the underlying problems. Thus, a question of significant interest to cryptographers, and especially to those currently placing bets on primitives that will withstand quantum adversaries, is how much of an advantage the additional ring structure actually gives in practice. Despite conventional wisdom that generic lattices might be too slow and unwieldy, we demonstrate that LWE-based key exchange is quite practical: our constant time implementation requires around 1.3ms computation time for each party; compared to the recent NewHope R-LWE scheme, communication sizes increase by a factor of 4.7x, but remain under 12 KiB in each direction. Our protocol is competitive when used for serving web pages over TLS; when partnered with ECDSA signatures, latencies increase by less than a factor of 1.6x, and (even under heavy load) server throughput only decreases by factors of 1.5x and 1.2x when serving typical 1 KiB and 100 KiB pages, respectively. To achieve these practical results, our protocol takes advantage of several innovations. These include techniques to optimize communication bandwidth, dynamic generation of public parameters (which also offers additional security against backdoors), carefully chosen error distributions, and tight security parameters.","PeriodicalId":432261,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"113 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121912925","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) is a promising hardware security primitive with broad application prospect. However, the strong PUF with numerous Challenge and Response Pairs (CRPs), e.g. the arbiter PUF, is vulnerable to modeling attacks. There are two major kinds of countermeasures. One is restricting CRP access interface, such as controlled PUF and XOR arbiter PUF, which unfortunately has been broken with the help of side-channels. The other is using non-linear electronic characteristics to produce CRPs, such as the current mirror PUF and the voltage transfer PUF. They are only proved to be resistant to SVM based attack, while no more analysis is further explored so far. In this paper, we propose an attack method based on compound heuristic algorithms of evolution strategy, simulated annealing, and ant colony to efficiently attack these two non-linear PUFs. This paper reveals that current mirror and voltage transfer are still not able to help strong PUF resist attacks. Our experimental results show that the average CRP prediction accuracy is as high as 99%.
{"title":"POSTER: Attack on Non-Linear Physical Unclonable Function","authors":"Jing Ye, Yu Hu, Xiaowei Li","doi":"10.1145/2976749.2989039","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2976749.2989039","url":null,"abstract":"Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) is a promising hardware security primitive with broad application prospect. However, the strong PUF with numerous Challenge and Response Pairs (CRPs), e.g. the arbiter PUF, is vulnerable to modeling attacks. There are two major kinds of countermeasures. One is restricting CRP access interface, such as controlled PUF and XOR arbiter PUF, which unfortunately has been broken with the help of side-channels. The other is using non-linear electronic characteristics to produce CRPs, such as the current mirror PUF and the voltage transfer PUF. They are only proved to be resistant to SVM based attack, while no more analysis is further explored so far. In this paper, we propose an attack method based on compound heuristic algorithms of evolution strategy, simulated annealing, and ant colony to efficiently attack these two non-linear PUFs. This paper reveals that current mirror and voltage transfer are still not able to help strong PUF resist attacks. Our experimental results show that the average CRP prediction accuracy is as high as 99%.","PeriodicalId":432261,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"49 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126079308","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Motivated by the impossibility of achieving fairness in secure computation [Cleve, STOC 1986], recent works study a model of fairness in which an adversarial party that aborts on receiving output is forced to pay a mutually predefined monetary penalty to every other party that did not receive the output. These works show how to design protocols for secure computation with penalties that guarantees that either fairness is guaranteed or that each honest party obtains a monetary penalty from the adversary. Protocols for this task are typically designed in an hybrid model where parties have access to a "claim-or-refund" transaction functionality denote FCR*. In this work, we obtain improvements on the efficiency of these constructions by amortizing the cost over multiple executions of secure computation with penalties. More precisely, for computational security parameter λ, we design a protocol that implements l = poly}(λ) instances of secure computation with penalties where the total number of calls to FCR* is independent of l.
{"title":"Amortizing Secure Computation with Penalties","authors":"R. Kumaresan, Iddo Bentov","doi":"10.1145/2976749.2978424","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2976749.2978424","url":null,"abstract":"Motivated by the impossibility of achieving fairness in secure computation [Cleve, STOC 1986], recent works study a model of fairness in which an adversarial party that aborts on receiving output is forced to pay a mutually predefined monetary penalty to every other party that did not receive the output. These works show how to design protocols for secure computation with penalties that guarantees that either fairness is guaranteed or that each honest party obtains a monetary penalty from the adversary. Protocols for this task are typically designed in an hybrid model where parties have access to a \"claim-or-refund\" transaction functionality denote FCR*. In this work, we obtain improvements on the efficiency of these constructions by amortizing the cost over multiple executions of secure computation with penalties. More precisely, for computational security parameter λ, we design a protocol that implements l = poly}(λ) instances of secure computation with penalties where the total number of calls to FCR* is independent of l.","PeriodicalId":432261,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123432672","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Mobile security and privacy issues are receiving significant attention from the research community. The SPSM workshop was created to provide a venue for researchers and practitioners interested in such issues to get together and exchange ideas. Following the success of the previous editions, we present the sixth edition of the workshop. It brings together the expertise of an international program committee, comprising of 22 mobile security experts from the academia and the industry. The workshop received 31 submissions (regular and short papers combined) from a diverge set of authors located in 19 countries.
{"title":"Sixth Annual ACM CCS Workshop on Security and Privacy in Smartphones and Mobile Devices (SPSM 2016)","authors":"Long Lu, Mohammad Mannan","doi":"10.1145/2976749.2990487","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2976749.2990487","url":null,"abstract":"Mobile security and privacy issues are receiving significant attention from the research community. The SPSM workshop was created to provide a venue for researchers and practitioners interested in such issues to get together and exchange ideas. Following the success of the previous editions, we present the sixth edition of the workshop. It brings together the expertise of an international program committee, comprising of 22 mobile security experts from the academia and the industry. The workshop received 31 submissions (regular and short papers combined) from a diverge set of authors located in 19 countries.","PeriodicalId":432261,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"36 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129093478","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
D. Urbina, J. Giraldo, A. Cárdenas, Nils Ole Tippenhauer, J. Valente, M. Faisal, Justin Ruths, R. Candell, H. Sandberg
While attacks on information systems have for most practical purposes binary outcomes (information was manipulated/eavesdropped, or not), attacks manipulating the sensor or control signals of Industrial Control Systems (ICS) can be tuned by the attacker to cause a continuous spectrum in damages. Attackers that want to remain undetected can attempt to hide their manipulation of the system by following closely the expected behavior of the system, while injecting just enough false information at each time step to achieve their goals. In this work, we study if attack-detection can limit the impact of such stealthy attacks. We start with a comprehensive review of related work on attack detection schemes in the security and control systems community. We then show that many of those works use detection schemes that are not limiting the impact of stealthy attacks. We propose a new metric to measure the impact of stealthy attacks and how they relate to our selection on an upper bound on false alarms. We finally show that the impact of such attacks can be mitigated in several cases by the proper combination and configuration of detection schemes. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our algorithms through simulations and experiments using real ICS testbeds and real ICS systems.
{"title":"Limiting the Impact of Stealthy Attacks on Industrial Control Systems","authors":"D. Urbina, J. Giraldo, A. Cárdenas, Nils Ole Tippenhauer, J. Valente, M. Faisal, Justin Ruths, R. Candell, H. Sandberg","doi":"10.1145/2976749.2978388","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2976749.2978388","url":null,"abstract":"While attacks on information systems have for most practical purposes binary outcomes (information was manipulated/eavesdropped, or not), attacks manipulating the sensor or control signals of Industrial Control Systems (ICS) can be tuned by the attacker to cause a continuous spectrum in damages. Attackers that want to remain undetected can attempt to hide their manipulation of the system by following closely the expected behavior of the system, while injecting just enough false information at each time step to achieve their goals. In this work, we study if attack-detection can limit the impact of such stealthy attacks. We start with a comprehensive review of related work on attack detection schemes in the security and control systems community. We then show that many of those works use detection schemes that are not limiting the impact of stealthy attacks. We propose a new metric to measure the impact of stealthy attacks and how they relate to our selection on an upper bound on false alarms. We finally show that the impact of such attacks can be mitigated in several cases by the proper combination and configuration of detection schemes. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our algorithms through simulations and experiments using real ICS testbeds and real ICS systems.","PeriodicalId":432261,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128905870","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Smartphones are becoming the main data sharing and storage devices in both our personal and professional lives, as companies now allow employees to share the same device for both purposes, provided the company's confidential information can be protected. However, as history has shown, systems relying on security policies or rules to protect user data are not airtight. Any flaw in the constructed rules or in the code of privileged applications can lead to complete compromise. In addition, we can not rely only on TrustZone[6] world separation to isolate confidential data from unauthorized access, because in addition to severe limitations in terms of both communication and memory space, there is a very low limit on the number of applications that can be installed in the secure world before we can start questioning its security, especially when considering code originating from multiple sources. Thus, the solutions currently available for TrustZone devices are not perfect and the data confidentiality can not be guaranteed. We propose an alternative approach, which involves providing the majority of secure world application advantages to a set of normal world applications, with almost none of the drawbacks by relying only on the TrustZone world separation and the TZ-RKP[2] kernel protection scheme.
{"title":"POSTER: DroidShield: Protecting User Applications from Normal World Access","authors":"Darius Suciu, R. Sion","doi":"10.1145/2976749.2989052","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2976749.2989052","url":null,"abstract":"Smartphones are becoming the main data sharing and storage devices in both our personal and professional lives, as companies now allow employees to share the same device for both purposes, provided the company's confidential information can be protected. However, as history has shown, systems relying on security policies or rules to protect user data are not airtight. Any flaw in the constructed rules or in the code of privileged applications can lead to complete compromise. In addition, we can not rely only on TrustZone[6] world separation to isolate confidential data from unauthorized access, because in addition to severe limitations in terms of both communication and memory space, there is a very low limit on the number of applications that can be installed in the secure world before we can start questioning its security, especially when considering code originating from multiple sources. Thus, the solutions currently available for TrustZone devices are not perfect and the data confidentiality can not be guaranteed. We propose an alternative approach, which involves providing the majority of secure world application advantages to a set of normal world applications, with almost none of the drawbacks by relying only on the TrustZone world separation and the TZ-RKP[2] kernel protection scheme.","PeriodicalId":432261,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"12 7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127997961","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The premise of this year's SafeConfig Workshop is existing tools and methods for security assessments are necessary but insufficient for scientifically rigorous testing and evaluation of resilient and active cyber systems. The objective for this workshop is the exploration and discussion of scientifically sound testing regimen(s) that will continuously and dynamically probe, attack, and "test" the various resilient and active technologies. This adaptation and change in focus necessitates at the very least modification, and potentially, wholesale new developments to ensure that resilient- and agile-aware security testing is available to the research community. All testing, validation and experimentation must also be repeatable, reproducible, subject to scientific scrutiny, measurable and meaningful to both researchers and practitioners.
{"title":"SafeConfig'16: Testing and Evaluation for Active and Resilient Cyber Systems","authors":"Nicholas J. Multari, A. Singhal, David O. Manz","doi":"10.1145/2976749.2990485","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2976749.2990485","url":null,"abstract":"The premise of this year's SafeConfig Workshop is existing tools and methods for security assessments are necessary but insufficient for scientifically rigorous testing and evaluation of resilient and active cyber systems. The objective for this workshop is the exploration and discussion of scientifically sound testing regimen(s) that will continuously and dynamically probe, attack, and \"test\" the various resilient and active technologies. This adaptation and change in focus necessitates at the very least modification, and potentially, wholesale new developments to ensure that resilient- and agile-aware security testing is available to the research community. All testing, validation and experimentation must also be repeatable, reproducible, subject to scientific scrutiny, measurable and meaningful to both researchers and practitioners.","PeriodicalId":432261,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121110176","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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