Cash management involves managing money of the firm to maximize cash availability. Various collection and disbursement methods are done in order to efficiently manage cash in a business.This article explains the various methods adopted to manage cash efficiently.
{"title":"Efficient Cash Management Through E-Billing","authors":"S. Balasubramanian","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1446029","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1446029","url":null,"abstract":"Cash management involves managing money of the firm to maximize cash availability. Various collection and disbursement methods are done in order to efficiently manage cash in a business.This article explains the various methods adopted to manage cash efficiently.","PeriodicalId":437258,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Finance: Capital Structure & Payout Policies","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-08-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123452470","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A rich literature argues that stock repurchases often serve as positive economic signals beneficial to investors. Yet due to their inherent flexibility, open-market repurchase programs have long been criticized as weak signals lacking commitment. We evaluate whether some managers potentially use buyback announcements to mislead investors. We focus on cases where managers were seemingly under heavy pressure to boost stock prices and might have announced a repurchase only to convey a false signal. For suspect cases, the immediate market reaction to a buyback announcement does not differ from that generally observed. However over longer horizons, suspect firms do not enjoy the improvement in economic performance otherwise observed. Suspect firms repurchase less stock. Further, managers in suspect firms have comparatively higher exposure to stock options, a potentially endogenous result suggesting greater sensitivity to both stock valuation and to future equity dilution. Overall, the results suggest only a limited number of managers may have used buybacks in a misleading way as "cheap talk." Yet as theory also suggests, we find no long-run economic benefit to this behavior.
{"title":"Share Repurchases as a Potential Tool to Mislead Investors","authors":"K. Chan, D. Ikenberry, I. Lee, Yanzhi Wang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1485583","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1485583","url":null,"abstract":"A rich literature argues that stock repurchases often serve as positive economic signals beneficial to investors. Yet due to their inherent flexibility, open-market repurchase programs have long been criticized as weak signals lacking commitment. We evaluate whether some managers potentially use buyback announcements to mislead investors. We focus on cases where managers were seemingly under heavy pressure to boost stock prices and might have announced a repurchase only to convey a false signal. For suspect cases, the immediate market reaction to a buyback announcement does not differ from that generally observed. However over longer horizons, suspect firms do not enjoy the improvement in economic performance otherwise observed. Suspect firms repurchase less stock. Further, managers in suspect firms have comparatively higher exposure to stock options, a potentially endogenous result suggesting greater sensitivity to both stock valuation and to future equity dilution. Overall, the results suggest only a limited number of managers may have used buybacks in a misleading way as \"cheap talk.\" Yet as theory also suggests, we find no long-run economic benefit to this behavior.","PeriodicalId":437258,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Finance: Capital Structure & Payout Policies","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131644832","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
How should monetary policy respond to changes in financial conditions? In this paper we consider a simple model where firms are subject to idyosincratic shocks which may force them to default on their debt. Firms' assets and liabilities are denominated in nominal terms and predetermined when shocks occur. Monetary policy can therefore affect the real value of funds used to finance production. Furthermore, policy affects the loan and deposit rates. We find that maintaining price stability at all times is not optimal; that the optimal response to adverse financial shocks is to lower interest rates, if not at the zero bound, and engineer a short period of inflation; that the Taylor rule may implement allocations that have opposite cyclical properties to the optimal ones.
{"title":"Monetary Policy and the Financing of Firms","authors":"Fiorella De Fiore, Pedro Teles, O. Tristani","doi":"10.1257/MAC.3.4.112","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/MAC.3.4.112","url":null,"abstract":"How should monetary policy respond to changes in financial conditions? In this paper we consider a simple model where firms are subject to idyosincratic shocks which may force them to default on their debt. Firms' assets and liabilities are denominated in nominal terms and predetermined when shocks occur. Monetary policy can therefore affect the real value of funds used to finance production. Furthermore, policy affects the loan and deposit rates. We find that maintaining price stability at all times is not optimal; that the optimal response to adverse financial shocks is to lower interest rates, if not at the zero bound, and engineer a short period of inflation; that the Taylor rule may implement allocations that have opposite cyclical properties to the optimal ones.","PeriodicalId":437258,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Finance: Capital Structure & Payout Policies","volume":"33 1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125692938","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In a one-period setting Green (1984) demonstrates that convertible debt perfectly mitigates the asset substitution problem by curbing shareholders’ incentive to increase risk. This is because claimholders design the capital structure precisely when the risk-shifting opportunity is available. In practice, firms do not alter their capital structure over the life of the convertible debt. Hence, when the risk-shifting opportunity arises, convertible debt design may no longer match with firm asset value to mitigate the asset substitution problem. This leaves room for a strategic non-cooperative game between shareholders and convertible debtholders. We show that two risk-shifting scenarios arise as attainable Nash equilibria. Pure asset substitution occurs when, despite convertible debtholders not exercising their conversion option, shareholders still find it profitable to shift risk. Strategic conversion occurs when, despite convertible debtholders giving up the conversion option value, they are better off receiving their share of the wealth expropriation from straight debtholders. We use contingent claims analysis and the Black and Scholes (1973) setup to characterize the equilibria. Even when initial convertibles debt is endogenously designed so as to minimize the likelihood of risk-shifting equilibria, we show that asset substitution cannot be completely eliminated. Our overall conclusion is that – in contrast to agency theory’s claim – convertible debt is an imperfect instrument for mitigating shareholders’ incentive to increase risk.
{"title":"A Dynamic Model of Risk-Shifting Incentives with Convertible Debt","authors":"Pascal François, G. Hübner, N. Papageorgiou","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.884180","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.884180","url":null,"abstract":"In a one-period setting Green (1984) demonstrates that convertible debt perfectly mitigates the asset substitution problem by curbing shareholders’ incentive to increase risk. This is because claimholders design the capital structure precisely when the risk-shifting opportunity is available. In practice, firms do not alter their capital structure over the life of the convertible debt. Hence, when the risk-shifting opportunity arises, convertible debt design may no longer match with firm asset value to mitigate the asset substitution problem. This leaves room for a strategic non-cooperative game between shareholders and convertible debtholders. We show that two risk-shifting scenarios arise as attainable Nash equilibria. Pure asset substitution occurs when, despite convertible debtholders not exercising their conversion option, shareholders still find it profitable to shift risk. Strategic conversion occurs when, despite convertible debtholders giving up the conversion option value, they are better off receiving their share of the wealth expropriation from straight debtholders. We use contingent claims analysis and the Black and Scholes (1973) setup to characterize the equilibria. Even when initial convertibles debt is endogenously designed so as to minimize the likelihood of risk-shifting equilibria, we show that asset substitution cannot be completely eliminated. Our overall conclusion is that – in contrast to agency theory’s claim – convertible debt is an imperfect instrument for mitigating shareholders’ incentive to increase risk.","PeriodicalId":437258,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Finance: Capital Structure & Payout Policies","volume":"54 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133986480","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This research analyses the influence of the macroeconomic factors on the primary issue of stocks and debentures in the Brazilian market. Previous studies have agreed on the importance of aspects of the economic situation on a company’s capital structure, but have not established a relationship between the macroeconomic variables and the level of aggregate debt; we can mention Procianoy and Caselani (1997) and Terra (2003) as examples of this. According to Leal (2000), the limitations of the Brazilian capital market suggest that management takes advantage of moments of euphoria in the market - whether caused by a reduction in the rate of interest or by the return being offered by the equity market - to raise funds at rates that are more advantageous to the company. This characterizes the first evidence we have of opportunistic behavior influencing a company’s financing decisions. Eid Jr. (1996) provides us with the first evidence of this opportunistic behavior in his research in which 47% of those interviewed said that they chose fund sources that are economically more advantageous.
{"title":"The Influence of Macroeconomic Factors on Primary Issues in the Brazilian Market","authors":"William Eid Jr., Alexandre Kazuma Matsuo","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1435345","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1435345","url":null,"abstract":"This research analyses the influence of the macroeconomic factors on the primary issue of stocks and debentures in the Brazilian market. Previous studies have agreed on the importance of aspects of the economic situation on a company’s capital structure, but have not established a relationship between the macroeconomic variables and the level of aggregate debt; we can mention Procianoy and Caselani (1997) and Terra (2003) as examples of this. According to Leal (2000), the limitations of the Brazilian capital market suggest that management takes advantage of moments of euphoria in the market - whether caused by a reduction in the rate of interest or by the return being offered by the equity market - to raise funds at rates that are more advantageous to the company. This characterizes the first evidence we have of opportunistic behavior influencing a company’s financing decisions. Eid Jr. (1996) provides us with the first evidence of this opportunistic behavior in his research in which 47% of those interviewed said that they chose fund sources that are economically more advantageous.","PeriodicalId":437258,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Finance: Capital Structure & Payout Policies","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-07-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134218485","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2009-05-12DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-5957.2009.02126.x
Stephen P. Ferris, Nilanjan Sen, Emre Unlu
This study investigates patterns in dividend payment across nine common law and sixteen civil law countries over 1994-2007. We begin by examining whether the recent decline in the number of dividend payers is solely a US phenomenon or part of a more global trend. We find that at the beginning of our sample period, 72% of our sample firms pay dividends, but by 2007, this percentage decreases to 55%, with the decline more acute in common law countries. Our analysis further shows that the growing incidence of non-dividend paying firms can be explained by an increase in the percentage of firms that have never paid dividends. We find that common law firms are less likely to initiate new dividend programs than those in civil law nations, although they tend to have more abundant growth opportunities. We further establish that this global decline in the propensity to pay dividends is more pronounced in firms incorporated in common law jurisdictions. Finally, we find that both the percentage increase in aggregate dividends and the dividend payout ratio is higher in civil law countries. Copyright (c) 2009 The Authors Journal compilation (c) 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
{"title":"An International Analysis of Dividend Payment Behavior","authors":"Stephen P. Ferris, Nilanjan Sen, Emre Unlu","doi":"10.1111/j.1468-5957.2009.02126.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5957.2009.02126.x","url":null,"abstract":"This study investigates patterns in dividend payment across nine common law and sixteen civil law countries over 1994-2007. We begin by examining whether the recent decline in the number of dividend payers is solely a US phenomenon or part of a more global trend. We find that at the beginning of our sample period, 72% of our sample firms pay dividends, but by 2007, this percentage decreases to 55%, with the decline more acute in common law countries. Our analysis further shows that the growing incidence of non-dividend paying firms can be explained by an increase in the percentage of firms that have never paid dividends. We find that common law firms are less likely to initiate new dividend programs than those in civil law nations, although they tend to have more abundant growth opportunities. We further establish that this global decline in the propensity to pay dividends is more pronounced in firms incorporated in common law jurisdictions. Finally, we find that both the percentage increase in aggregate dividends and the dividend payout ratio is higher in civil law countries. Copyright (c) 2009 The Authors Journal compilation (c) 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.","PeriodicalId":437258,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Finance: Capital Structure & Payout Policies","volume":"70 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-05-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"119258930","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
When estimating finance panel regressions, it is common practice to adjust standard errors for correlation either across firms or across time. These procedures are valid only if the residuals are correlated either across time or across firms, but not across both. This paper shows that it is very easy to calculate standard errors that are robust to simultaneous correlation along two dimensions, such as firms and time. The covariance estimator is equal to the estimator that clusters by firm, plus the estimator that clusters by time, minus the usual heteroskedasticity-robust ordinary least squares (OLS) covariance matrix. Any statistical package with a clustering command can be used to easily calculate these standard errors.
{"title":"Simple Formulas for Standard Errors that Cluster by Both Firm and Time","authors":"S. B. Thompson","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.914002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.914002","url":null,"abstract":"When estimating finance panel regressions, it is common practice to adjust standard errors for correlation either across firms or across time. These procedures are valid only if the residuals are correlated either across time or across firms, but not across both. This paper shows that it is very easy to calculate standard errors that are robust to simultaneous correlation along two dimensions, such as firms and time. The covariance estimator is equal to the estimator that clusters by firm, plus the estimator that clusters by time, minus the usual heteroskedasticity-robust ordinary least squares (OLS) covariance matrix. Any statistical package with a clustering command can be used to easily calculate these standard errors.","PeriodicalId":437258,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Finance: Capital Structure & Payout Policies","volume":"59 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-05-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132266021","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, Leora F. Klapper, Georgios A. Panos
The authors examine the factors affecting the transition to self-employment in Bosnia and Herzegovina, using the World Bank Living Standard Measurement Survey panel household survey for the years 2001-2004. In the beginning of the sample, the country changed its legal framework, with the primary aim to promote labor market flexibility and to encourage entrepreneurial activity. The analysis identifies individuals that switched to self-employment (employers and own account) during the sample period and the viability of this transition, in terms of business survival for more than one year. The results suggest an important role for financing constraints. Specifically, wealthier households are more likely to become entrepreneurs and survive in self-employment. After controlling for household wealth, having an existing bank relationship increases the likelihood of starting a business with hired employees and increases the chances of survival for the new entrepreneur. By contrast, overseas - and in some cases domestic - remittances decrease the likelihood of becoming an entrepreneur.
{"title":"Entrepreneurship in Post-Conflict Transition : The Role of Informality and Access to Finance","authors":"Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, Leora F. Klapper, Georgios A. Panos","doi":"10.1596/1813-9450-4935","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-4935","url":null,"abstract":"The authors examine the factors affecting the transition to self-employment in Bosnia and Herzegovina, using the World Bank Living Standard Measurement Survey panel household survey for the years 2001-2004. In the beginning of the sample, the country changed its legal framework, with the primary aim to promote labor market flexibility and to encourage entrepreneurial activity. The analysis identifies individuals that switched to self-employment (employers and own account) during the sample period and the viability of this transition, in terms of business survival for more than one year. The results suggest an important role for financing constraints. Specifically, wealthier households are more likely to become entrepreneurs and survive in self-employment. After controlling for household wealth, having an existing bank relationship increases the likelihood of starting a business with hired employees and increases the chances of survival for the new entrepreneur. By contrast, overseas - and in some cases domestic - remittances decrease the likelihood of becoming an entrepreneur.","PeriodicalId":437258,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Finance: Capital Structure & Payout Policies","volume":"72 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129139129","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Entrepreneurs face significant non-diversifiable business risks. We build a dynamic incomplete markets model of entrepreneurial finance to demonstrate the important implications of nondiversifiable risks for entrepreneurs' interdependent consumption, portfolio allocation, financing, investment, and business exit decisions. The optimal capital structure is determined by a generalized tradeoff model where leverage via risky non-recourse debt provides significant diversification benefits. More risk-averse entrepreneurs default earlier, but also choose higher leverage, even though leverage makes his equity more risky. Non-diversified entrepreneurs demand both systematic and idiosyncratic risk premium. Cash-out option and external equity further improve diversification and raise the entrepreneur's valuation of the firm. Finally, entrepreneurial risk aversion can overturn the risk-shifting incentives induced by risky debt.
{"title":"Entrepreneurial Finance and Nondiversifiable Risk","authors":"Hui Chen, Jianjun Miao, Neng Wang","doi":"10.3386/W14848","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/W14848","url":null,"abstract":"Entrepreneurs face significant non-diversifiable business risks. We build a dynamic incomplete markets model of entrepreneurial finance to demonstrate the important implications of nondiversifiable risks for entrepreneurs' interdependent consumption, portfolio allocation, financing, investment, and business exit decisions. The optimal capital structure is determined by a generalized tradeoff model where leverage via risky non-recourse debt provides significant diversification benefits. More risk-averse entrepreneurs default earlier, but also choose higher leverage, even though leverage makes his equity more risky. Non-diversified entrepreneurs demand both systematic and idiosyncratic risk premium. Cash-out option and external equity further improve diversification and raise the entrepreneur's valuation of the firm. Finally, entrepreneurial risk aversion can overturn the risk-shifting incentives induced by risky debt.","PeriodicalId":437258,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Finance: Capital Structure & Payout Policies","volume":"116 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117342471","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This study examines the informational role of credit watch placements in the overall bond rating process. We show that the act of a company’s bond being put on a credit watch is, in itself, associated with significant abnormal returns in the company’s stock and bond rating revision that are associated with their initial inclusion on credit watch, are more informative than rating changes solely without credit watch. Furthermore, institutional trading in equities displays opportunism around the event of the corresponding companies’ bonds being included on the watchlist, around its subsequent upgrade or downgrade, as well as over the interim transitional period. More importantly, institutions earn economically and statistically significant profits from their trades following credit watch events. Overall, our findings underscore the importance of credit watch placements in the overall fabric of credit ratings adjustments and on informed trading behavior.
{"title":"On the Informativeness of Credit Watch Placements","authors":"Sugato Chakravarty, C. Chiyachantana, Y. Lee","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1252542","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1252542","url":null,"abstract":"This study examines the informational role of credit watch placements in the overall bond rating process. We show that the act of a company’s bond being put on a credit watch is, in itself, associated with significant abnormal returns in the company’s stock and bond rating revision that are associated with their initial inclusion on credit watch, are more informative than rating changes solely without credit watch. Furthermore, institutional trading in equities displays opportunism around the event of the corresponding companies’ bonds being included on the watchlist, around its subsequent upgrade or downgrade, as well as over the interim transitional period. More importantly, institutions earn economically and statistically significant profits from their trades following credit watch events. Overall, our findings underscore the importance of credit watch placements in the overall fabric of credit ratings adjustments and on informed trading behavior.","PeriodicalId":437258,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Finance: Capital Structure & Payout Policies","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130003019","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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