We investigate the role of managers' country of origin in leverage decisions using data on foreign joint ventures in China. By focusing on foreign joint ventures in a single country, we are able to hold constant the financing environment, eliminate the effects of formal institutions in the foreign managers' home country, and consequently reveal the effects of informal institutions such as national culture on corporate finance decisions. Using cultural values of embeddedness, mastery, and uncertainty avoidance to explain country of origin effects, we find that national culture has significant explanatory power in the financial leverage decisions of foreign joint ventures in China. Country-level variation is evident in capital structure and appears to work through choices of firm characteristics, industry affiliation, ownership structure, and region of investment.
{"title":"Country of Origin Effects in Capital Structure Decisions: Evidence from Foreign Direct Investments in China","authors":"D. Griffin, Kai Li, Heng Yue, Longkai Zhao","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1354403","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1354403","url":null,"abstract":"We investigate the role of managers' country of origin in leverage decisions using data on foreign joint ventures in China. By focusing on foreign joint ventures in a single country, we are able to hold constant the financing environment, eliminate the effects of formal institutions in the foreign managers' home country, and consequently reveal the effects of informal institutions such as national culture on corporate finance decisions. Using cultural values of embeddedness, mastery, and uncertainty avoidance to explain country of origin effects, we find that national culture has significant explanatory power in the financial leverage decisions of foreign joint ventures in China. Country-level variation is evident in capital structure and appears to work through choices of firm characteristics, industry affiliation, ownership structure, and region of investment.","PeriodicalId":437258,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Finance: Capital Structure & Payout Policies","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-03-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115411458","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We analyze dividends tax systems in the world and assess their impact on dividend distributions. Using data from 24 OECD countries, we find that the dividend payout is monotonically distributed across tax regimes as firms in classical tax system countries have significantly lower payouts and speed of adjustment to target dividends than companies in partial or full imputation tax system countries. We also report that the type of dividend tax system affects the size of dividend payout while the tax rate differential between dividends and capital gain affects the propensity to pay and the decision to change dividends. Our results hold when we control for the other fundamental determinants of dividends. Finally, we find that ex-day returns are monotonically distributed across the tax systems, suggesting that the dividend taxation is also compounded into stock prices.
{"title":"The Impact of Taxation on Dividends: A Cross-Country Analysis","authors":"Mohammed Alzahrani, M. Lasfer","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1343826","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1343826","url":null,"abstract":"We analyze dividends tax systems in the world and assess their impact on dividend distributions. Using data from 24 OECD countries, we find that the dividend payout is monotonically distributed across tax regimes as firms in classical tax system countries have significantly lower payouts and speed of adjustment to target dividends than companies in partial or full imputation tax system countries. We also report that the type of dividend tax system affects the size of dividend payout while the tax rate differential between dividends and capital gain affects the propensity to pay and the decision to change dividends. Our results hold when we control for the other fundamental determinants of dividends. Finally, we find that ex-day returns are monotonically distributed across the tax systems, suggesting that the dividend taxation is also compounded into stock prices.","PeriodicalId":437258,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Finance: Capital Structure & Payout Policies","volume":"136 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131679477","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Since the 1960’s, there is an ongoing debate on dividend policy, which remains a controversial issue to this day. Why do firms pay dividends? The academics have not been able to agree on any convincing explanation, and the same time, many even claim that firms should not pay dividends, and so we have a “dividend puzzle”. The purpose of this paper is to summarize the main findings of two more recent fields of research, and to discuss why they seem to be the most promising avenues for further research, to solve the “dividend puzzle”, and to build a complete payout policy theory. These fields are: (i) the agency theory and (ii) the lifecycle theory. Besides being very intuitive, these theories are consistent with most empirical facts on U.S. firms’ payout policy.
{"title":"Is the Dividend Puzzle Solved?","authors":"Maria Rosa Borges","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1343782","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1343782","url":null,"abstract":"Since the 1960’s, there is an ongoing debate on dividend policy, which remains a controversial issue to this day. Why do firms pay dividends? The academics have not been able to agree on any convincing explanation, and the same time, many even claim that firms should not pay dividends, and so we have a “dividend puzzle”. The purpose of this paper is to summarize the main findings of two more recent fields of research, and to discuss why they seem to be the most promising avenues for further research, to solve the “dividend puzzle”, and to build a complete payout policy theory. These fields are: (i) the agency theory and (ii) the lifecycle theory. Besides being very intuitive, these theories are consistent with most empirical facts on U.S. firms’ payout policy.","PeriodicalId":437258,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Finance: Capital Structure & Payout Policies","volume":"55 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124317933","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
M. Agostino, Maurizio La Rocca, Tiziana La Rocca, F. Trivieri
The present study investigates the role of institutional differences at the local level as determinants of firms’ capital structure. Specifically, the aim is to empirically assess whether and to what extent SMEs’ financial decisions are affected by local financial development - evaluating this influence both ceteris paribus, and by allowing it to be conditional on different levels of legal enforcement inefficiency. After controlling for debt inertia, firms’ heterogeneity and endogeneity problems, the main finding of the analysis suggests that local financial development may be an important determinant of SMEs’ capital structure. In fact, firms appear to have better access to financial debt in areas characterized by a higher quality of the legal system - possibly as intermediaries may be more inclined to provide funds where the enforcement systems enable a more effective credit protection. Despite the international process of capital markets integration, local financial institutions do not seem to become irrelevant for SMEs - which are in need of well developed institutions at local level to gain easier access to external financial resources.
{"title":"Local Financial Development and SMEs Capital Structure: An Empirical Investigation","authors":"M. Agostino, Maurizio La Rocca, Tiziana La Rocca, F. Trivieri","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1399403","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1399403","url":null,"abstract":"The present study investigates the role of institutional differences at the local level as determinants of firms’ capital structure. Specifically, the aim is to empirically assess whether and to what extent SMEs’ financial decisions are affected by local financial development - evaluating this influence both ceteris paribus, and by allowing it to be conditional on different levels of legal enforcement inefficiency. After controlling for debt inertia, firms’ heterogeneity and endogeneity problems, the main finding of the analysis suggests that local financial development may be an important determinant of SMEs’ capital structure. In fact, firms appear to have better access to financial debt in areas characterized by a higher quality of the legal system - possibly as intermediaries may be more inclined to provide funds where the enforcement systems enable a more effective credit protection. Despite the international process of capital markets integration, local financial institutions do not seem to become irrelevant for SMEs - which are in need of well developed institutions at local level to gain easier access to external financial resources.","PeriodicalId":437258,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Finance: Capital Structure & Payout Policies","volume":"100 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-02-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115801446","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Much of empirical corporate finance focuses on sources of the demand for various forms of capital, not the supply. Recently, this has changed. Supply effects of equity and credit markets can arise from a combination of three ingredients: investor tastes, limited intermediation, and corporate opportunism. Investor tastes when combined with imperfectly competitive intermediaries lead prices and interest rates to deviate from fundamental values. Opportunistic firms respond by issuing securities with high prices and investing the proceeds. Correlations between capital market prices and corporate finance can in principle come from either supply or demand. This framework helps to organize empirical approaches that more precisely identify and quantify supply effects through variation in one of these three ingredients. Taken as a whole, the evidence shows that shifting equity and credit market conditions play an important role in dictating corporate finance and investment.
{"title":"Market-Driven Corporate Finance","authors":"Malcolm P. Baker","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1331567","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1331567","url":null,"abstract":"Much of empirical corporate finance focuses on sources of the demand for various forms of capital, not the supply. Recently, this has changed. Supply effects of equity and credit markets can arise from a combination of three ingredients: investor tastes, limited intermediation, and corporate opportunism. Investor tastes when combined with imperfectly competitive intermediaries lead prices and interest rates to deviate from fundamental values. Opportunistic firms respond by issuing securities with high prices and investing the proceeds. Correlations between capital market prices and corporate finance can in principle come from either supply or demand. This framework helps to organize empirical approaches that more precisely identify and quantify supply effects through variation in one of these three ingredients. Taken as a whole, the evidence shows that shifting equity and credit market conditions play an important role in dictating corporate finance and investment.","PeriodicalId":437258,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Finance: Capital Structure & Payout Policies","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-01-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127369419","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We examine the central prediction of the pecking order theory of financing among firms in two distinct life cycle stages, namely growth and maturity. In general, we find that firms in both stages follow the pecking order. More specifically, we find that within a life cycle stage and after sufficiently controlling for debt capacity constraints across several dimensions, firms with high adverse selection costs follow the pecking order more closely, as the theory predicts. We further show that certain determinants of debt capacity are specific to each life cycle stage, and cannot simply be generalized across a broad sample of firms. Our results highlight how intertwined firm financing decisions are with its life cycle and that one size does not fit all with regards to firm financial policy.
{"title":"Tests of the Pecking Order Theory and the Firm Life Cycle","authors":"L. Bulan, Zhipeng Yan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1347430","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1347430","url":null,"abstract":"We examine the central prediction of the pecking order theory of financing among firms in two distinct life cycle stages, namely growth and maturity. In general, we find that firms in both stages follow the pecking order. More specifically, we find that within a life cycle stage and after sufficiently controlling for debt capacity constraints across several dimensions, firms with high adverse selection costs follow the pecking order more closely, as the theory predicts. We further show that certain determinants of debt capacity are specific to each life cycle stage, and cannot simply be generalized across a broad sample of firms. Our results highlight how intertwined firm financing decisions are with its life cycle and that one size does not fit all with regards to firm financial policy.","PeriodicalId":437258,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Finance: Capital Structure & Payout Policies","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-01-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129907337","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Why do private firms stay private? Empirical evidence on this issue is sparse, as most private firms in the US do not report their financial results. We investigate why private status matters by taking advantage of a unique dataset of large, leveraged private firms with SEC filings. Unlike a number of other studies, we find that neither the existence of growth opportunities, nor the desire of firm founders to diversify, is a principal determinant of the decision whether or not to retain private status. Rather, the existence of private benefits of control appears to serve as the most significant incentive to stay private. Family-controlled firms have significantly lower probabilities of filing for an IPO, while a board structure that grants management relatively more autonomy lowers the probability of an IPO filing as well. Cross-sectional analysis of profitability and ex post performance suggests that while private benefits of control may encourage firms to stay private, they do not have detrimental effects on firm efficiency. In contrast, firms controlled by private equity specialists appear to place a low value on control benefits and are likely to go public as a means of cashing out.
{"title":"Private Matters","authors":"Jean Helwege, Frank Packer","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.641402","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.641402","url":null,"abstract":"Why do private firms stay private? Empirical evidence on this issue is sparse, as most private firms in the US do not report their financial results. We investigate why private status matters by taking advantage of a unique dataset of large, leveraged private firms with SEC filings. Unlike a number of other studies, we find that neither the existence of growth opportunities, nor the desire of firm founders to diversify, is a principal determinant of the decision whether or not to retain private status. Rather, the existence of private benefits of control appears to serve as the most significant incentive to stay private. Family-controlled firms have significantly lower probabilities of filing for an IPO, while a board structure that grants management relatively more autonomy lowers the probability of an IPO filing as well. Cross-sectional analysis of profitability and ex post performance suggests that while private benefits of control may encourage firms to stay private, they do not have detrimental effects on firm efficiency. In contrast, firms controlled by private equity specialists appear to place a low value on control benefits and are likely to go public as a means of cashing out.","PeriodicalId":437258,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Finance: Capital Structure & Payout Policies","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115507596","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I propose a new procedure for extracting probabilities of default from structural credit risk models based on virtual credit spreads (VCS) and implement this approach assuming a simple Merton (1974) model of capital structure. VCS are derived from the increase in the payout to debtholders necessary to offset the impact of an increase in asset variance on the option value of debt and equity. In contrast to real-world credit spreads, VCS do not contain risk premia for default timing and recovery uncertainty, thus yielding a purer estimate of physical default probabilities. Relative to the Merton distance to default (DD) measure, my measure (i) predicts higher credit risk for safe firms and lower credit risk for firms with high volatility and leverage (ii) requires fewer parameter assumptions (iii) clearly outperforms the DD measure when used to predict corporate default.
{"title":"Using Structural Models for Default Prediction","authors":"G. Grass","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1343091","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1343091","url":null,"abstract":"I propose a new procedure for extracting probabilities of default from structural credit risk models based on virtual credit spreads (VCS) and implement this approach assuming a simple Merton (1974) model of capital structure. VCS are derived from the increase in the payout to debtholders necessary to offset the impact of an increase in asset variance on the option value of debt and equity. In contrast to real-world credit spreads, VCS do not contain risk premia for default timing and recovery uncertainty, thus yielding a purer estimate of physical default probabilities. Relative to the Merton distance to default (DD) measure, my measure (i) predicts higher credit risk for safe firms and lower credit risk for firms with high volatility and leverage (ii) requires fewer parameter assumptions (iii) clearly outperforms the DD measure when used to predict corporate default.","PeriodicalId":437258,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Finance: Capital Structure & Payout Policies","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-11-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131914859","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We study the simplest discrete-time finite-maturity model in which default arises when the firm is not able to pay its debt obligation using the current cash-flow plus the corporate liquidity. An important distinction is made between liquidity and solvency of the firm. The corporate financial policy is simultaneously defined by the dividend policy, and the leverage policy (the coupon and the principal of the bond). When the corporate financial policy implies no default risk and no taxes, we show that the corporate financial policy is irrelevant and this irrelevance result holds for any probability measure. When the corporate financial policy implies now some default risk, we show that the value of the firm is a piecewise decreasing function of the dividend policy for any leverage policy, so that dividend policy affects the value of the firm. However, shareholders may not always have the incentives to implement this optimal dividend policy. We show that when the value of the assets is low, shareholders have an incentive to deviate from this optimal dividend policy, and we also study the resulting agency costs. We finally compare the resulting quantities of our model to the base case suggested by Huang and Huang (2003).
{"title":"Corporate Liquidity, Dividend Policy and Default Risk: Optimal Financial Policy and Agency Costs","authors":"Yann Braouezec, Charles-Albert Lehalle","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1116204","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1116204","url":null,"abstract":"We study the simplest discrete-time finite-maturity model in which default arises when the firm is not able to pay its debt obligation using the current cash-flow plus the corporate liquidity. An important distinction is made between liquidity and solvency of the firm. The corporate financial policy is simultaneously defined by the dividend policy, and the leverage policy (the coupon and the principal of the bond). When the corporate financial policy implies no default risk and no taxes, we show that the corporate financial policy is irrelevant and this irrelevance result holds for any probability measure. When the corporate financial policy implies now some default risk, we show that the value of the firm is a piecewise decreasing function of the dividend policy for any leverage policy, so that dividend policy affects the value of the firm. However, shareholders may not always have the incentives to implement this optimal dividend policy. We show that when the value of the assets is low, shareholders have an incentive to deviate from this optimal dividend policy, and we also study the resulting agency costs. We finally compare the resulting quantities of our model to the base case suggested by Huang and Huang (2003).","PeriodicalId":437258,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Finance: Capital Structure & Payout Policies","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-11-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121379504","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We survey chief financial officers from 29 countries to examine whether and why firms use lines of credit versus non-operational (excess) cash for their corporate liquidity. We find that these two liquidity sources are employed to hedge against different risks. Non-operational cash guards against future cash flow shocks in bad times, while credit lines give firms the option to exploit future business opportunities available in good times. Lines of credit are the dominant source of liquidity for companies around the world, comprising about 15% of assets, while less than half of the cash held by companies is held for non-operational purposes, comprising about 2% of assets. Across countries, firms make greater use of lines of credit when external credit markets are poorly developed.
{"title":"What Drives Corporate Liquidity? An International Survey of Cash Holdings and Lines of Credit","authors":"Karl V. Lins, H. Servaes, P. Tufano","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.971178","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.971178","url":null,"abstract":"We survey chief financial officers from 29 countries to examine whether and why firms use lines of credit versus non-operational (excess) cash for their corporate liquidity. We find that these two liquidity sources are employed to hedge against different risks. Non-operational cash guards against future cash flow shocks in bad times, while credit lines give firms the option to exploit future business opportunities available in good times. Lines of credit are the dominant source of liquidity for companies around the world, comprising about 15% of assets, while less than half of the cash held by companies is held for non-operational purposes, comprising about 2% of assets. Across countries, firms make greater use of lines of credit when external credit markets are poorly developed.","PeriodicalId":437258,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Finance: Capital Structure & Payout Policies","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125944314","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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