Pub Date : 2022-05-04DOI: 10.1163/18756735-00000158
J. Trächtler
The questions of how we can understand others and how we can know what they feel, think and sense have repeatedly preoccupied Wittgenstein since the 1930s and especially in his last writings. In this article, the author will tackle these questions by focusing on the other as other or strange. For it is also the strangeness of others, their otherness as such, that makes it difficult and even impossible to recognize and understand their inner life. As she will show, such otherness can be made comprehensible by fictional narratives, in which aspects of others’ lives are related to what is one’s own, i.e., our own inner experience, such that we can find ourselves in them. Moreover, she will argue that this idea of making something comprehensible through fictional narratives has a special methodological relevance for Wittgenstein when it comes to understanding what is ‘one’s own’ in the broadest sense.
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Pub Date : 2022-02-04DOI: 10.1163/18756735-00000155
Krystian Bogucki
The aim of this article is to examine Frege’s view of the context principle in his mature philosophical doctrine. Here, the author argues that the context principle is embodied in the contextual explanation of value-ranges presented in Basic Laws of Arithmetic. The contextual explanation of value-ranges plays essentially the same role as the context principle in The Foundations of Arithmetic. It is supposed to show how a reference to natural numbers is possible. Moreover, the author argues against the view that the context principle should be separated from the recarving thesis. This aspect of Frege’s view leads the author to the rejection of the purely referential view of the context principle, which is fairly widely accepted in the current literature.
{"title":"Frege’s View of the Context Principle After 1890","authors":"Krystian Bogucki","doi":"10.1163/18756735-00000155","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18756735-00000155","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000The aim of this article is to examine Frege’s view of the context principle in his mature philosophical doctrine. Here, the author argues that the context principle is embodied in the contextual explanation of value-ranges presented in Basic Laws of Arithmetic. The contextual explanation of value-ranges plays essentially the same role as the context principle in The Foundations of Arithmetic. It is supposed to show how a reference to natural numbers is possible. Moreover, the author argues against the view that the context principle should be separated from the recarving thesis. This aspect of Frege’s view leads the author to the rejection of the purely referential view of the context principle, which is fairly widely accepted in the current literature.","PeriodicalId":43873,"journal":{"name":"Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-02-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43990525","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-26DOI: 10.1163/18756735-00000154
Thorsten Sander
The author argues that there is no such thing as a unique and general taxonomy of non-at-issue contents. Accordingly, we ought to shun large categories such as “conventional implicature” (Grice), “F-implicature” (Horn), “CI” (Potts), “Class B” (Tonhauser, Beaver, Roberts & Simons) or the like. As an alternative, we may, first, describe the “semantic profile” of linguistic devices as accurately as possible. Second, we may explicitly tailor our categories to particular theoretical purposes.
作者认为，不存在所谓的非争议内容的唯一和一般分类。因此，我们应该避免使用诸如“常规含意”(Grice)、“f含意”(Horn)、“CI”(Potts)、“B类”(Tonhauser, Beaver, Roberts & Simons)之类的大类别。作为一种选择，我们可以首先尽可能准确地描述语言手段的“语义轮廓”。其次，我们可以明确地根据特定的理论目的调整我们的分类。
{"title":"Taxonomizing Non-at-Issue Contents","authors":"Thorsten Sander","doi":"10.1163/18756735-00000154","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18756735-00000154","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000The author argues that there is no such thing as a unique and general taxonomy of non-at-issue contents. Accordingly, we ought to shun large categories such as “conventional implicature” (Grice), “F-implicature” (Horn), “CI” (Potts), “Class B” (Tonhauser, Beaver, Roberts & Simons) or the like. As an alternative, we may, first, describe the “semantic profile” of linguistic devices as accurately as possible. Second, we may explicitly tailor our categories to particular theoretical purposes.","PeriodicalId":43873,"journal":{"name":"Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-01-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48180047","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.1163/18756735-00000164
Frauke Hildebrandt, R. Glauer
The ability to refer to objects – singular reference – is arguably the decisive innovation on the way to human propositional cognition. This article argues that object individuation requires singular reference because basic singular terms, namely spatial indexicals, provide a symbolic frame of reference for object individuation. The authors suggest that singular reference is intrinsically connected to essential characteristics of propositionality: among other things, it guarantees the situation-independence of meaning, allows for the distinction between truth and falsehood, and enables us to think about possibilities. The authors sketch how singular reference gives rise to the development of predication, the powerful logical tool of quantification, and forms the basis for differentiating between belief and desire.
{"title":"Singular Reference","authors":"Frauke Hildebrandt, R. Glauer","doi":"10.1163/18756735-00000164","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18756735-00000164","url":null,"abstract":"The ability to refer to objects – singular reference – is arguably the decisive innovation on the way to human propositional cognition. This article argues that object individuation requires singular reference because basic singular terms, namely spatial indexicals, provide a symbolic frame of reference for object individuation. The authors suggest that singular reference is intrinsically connected to essential characteristics of propositionality: among other things, it guarantees the situation-independence of meaning, allows for the distinction between truth and falsehood, and enables us to think about possibilities. The authors sketch how singular reference gives rise to the development of predication, the powerful logical tool of quantification, and forms the basis for differentiating between belief and desire.","PeriodicalId":43873,"journal":{"name":"Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"64935567","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-19DOI: 10.1163/18756735-00000144
M. Lievers
Michael Ayers’s Knowing and Seeing: Groundwork for a New Empiricism is a rich and detailed development of two ideas. The first is that perception presents reality to us directly in a perspicuous way. We thus acquire primary knowledge of the world: “knowledge gained by being evidently, self-consciously, in direct cognitive contact with the object of the knowledge.” (Ayers 2019, 63) The second idea is that concepts are not needed in perception. In this article, the author examines Ayers’s view. The author proceeds as follows: In the first section, he identifies the target of Ayers’s attacks, conceptualism. He then describes why many philosophers have felt this conceptualist view to be attractive. In the next section, he discusses Ayers’s criticisms of conceptualism in an attempt to disentangle these criticisms from the statement of his positive view, which the author discusses in the following section. He ends by describing some problems for Ayers’s positive position that are, so he argues, the result of his vehement opposition to conceptualism.
{"title":"Anti-Conceptualism and the Objects of Knowledge and Belief","authors":"M. Lievers","doi":"10.1163/18756735-00000144","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18756735-00000144","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Michael Ayers’s Knowing and Seeing: Groundwork for a New Empiricism is a rich and detailed development of two ideas. The first is that perception presents reality to us directly in a perspicuous way. We thus acquire primary knowledge of the world: “knowledge gained by being evidently, self-consciously, in direct cognitive contact with the object of the knowledge.” (Ayers 2019, 63) The second idea is that concepts are not needed in perception. In this article, the author examines Ayers’s view. The author proceeds as follows: In the first section, he identifies the target of Ayers’s attacks, conceptualism. He then describes why many philosophers have felt this conceptualist view to be attractive. In the next section, he discusses Ayers’s criticisms of conceptualism in an attempt to disentangle these criticisms from the statement of his positive view, which the author discusses in the following section. He ends by describing some problems for Ayers’s positive position that are, so he argues, the result of his vehement opposition to conceptualism.","PeriodicalId":43873,"journal":{"name":"Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-11-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45686073","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-19DOI: 10.1163/18756735-00000143
M. Antognazza
This article tries to show that focusing on why and how subject and object are distinct is of key importance for understanding the nature of knowledge itself. It argues that: 1) cognition starts with an aliud which is present to a felt self in a way fundamentally different from one’s own modes of being; 2) individual human knowledge in its paradigmatic form is essentially first-personal, that is, its object-directedness requires a built-in, implicit awareness of a ‘self’ that provides the unifying perspective from which the aliud is apprehended; 3) this is a first-order awareness which is crucially distinct from the second-order awareness which requires a reflexive cognitive act – a distinction which the author proposes to cash out in terms of ‘first-person knowledge’ versus ‘self-knowledge.
{"title":"Subject, Object, and Knowledge as First-Person","authors":"M. Antognazza","doi":"10.1163/18756735-00000143","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18756735-00000143","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This article tries to show that focusing on why and how subject and object are distinct is of key importance for understanding the nature of knowledge itself. It argues that: 1) cognition starts with an aliud which is present to a felt self in a way fundamentally different from one’s own modes of being; 2) individual human knowledge in its paradigmatic form is essentially first-personal, that is, its object-directedness requires a built-in, implicit awareness of a ‘self’ that provides the unifying perspective from which the aliud is apprehended; 3) this is a first-order awareness which is crucially distinct from the second-order awareness which requires a reflexive cognitive act – a distinction which the author proposes to cash out in terms of ‘first-person knowledge’ versus ‘self-knowledge.","PeriodicalId":43873,"journal":{"name":"Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-11-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47302323","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-19DOI: 10.1163/18756735-00000153
M. Ayers
These responses are replies to the contributions to a book symposium devoted to my book Knowing and Seeing. Groundwork for a New Empiricism (2019), held at the University of Vienna in February 2020.
{"title":"Response to Comments and Criticisms","authors":"M. Ayers","doi":"10.1163/18756735-00000153","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18756735-00000153","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 These responses are replies to the contributions to a book symposium devoted to my book Knowing and Seeing. Groundwork for a New Empiricism (2019), held at the University of Vienna in February 2020.","PeriodicalId":43873,"journal":{"name":"Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-11-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45336078","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-19DOI: 10.1163/18756735-00000148
Mira Magdalena Sickinger
This is a discussion note on Michael Ayers’ Knowing and Seeing. Groundwork for a New Empiricism.
这是关于迈克尔·艾尔斯的《知与见》的讨论笔记。新经验主义的基础工作。
{"title":"On Knowing and Seeing: Groundwork for a New Empiricism","authors":"Mira Magdalena Sickinger","doi":"10.1163/18756735-00000148","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18756735-00000148","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This is a discussion note on Michael Ayers’ Knowing and Seeing. Groundwork for a New Empiricism.","PeriodicalId":43873,"journal":{"name":"Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-11-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41980897","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-19DOI: 10.1163/18756735-00000151
R. Madden
The author raises a puzzle about the compatibility of the two features which, according to Ayers, jointly characterize paradigmatic cases of seeing, viz. ‘perspicuity’ and ‘immediacy’. In Section 1, the author explains why Ayers’s explanation of these two features suggests an inconsistent combination of reflexivity and realism about sense experience. Some of Ayers’s comments about our awareness of causation suggest a way of giving up on reflexivity. In Section 2, the author uses a thought-experiment to support the view that realism rather than reflexivity ought to be given up. In Section 3, the author gives a further reason for Ayers to take this option: it furnishes a response to a troublesome challenge concerning the epistemic significance of consciousness, a challenge which Ayers himself anticipates at the end of Chapter 2 of Knowing and Seeing but does not fully resolve.
{"title":"Reflexivity, Realism, and Consciousness","authors":"R. Madden","doi":"10.1163/18756735-00000151","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18756735-00000151","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The author raises a puzzle about the compatibility of the two features which, according to Ayers, jointly characterize paradigmatic cases of seeing, viz. ‘perspicuity’ and ‘immediacy’. In Section 1, the author explains why Ayers’s explanation of these two features suggests an inconsistent combination of reflexivity and realism about sense experience. Some of Ayers’s comments about our awareness of causation suggest a way of giving up on reflexivity. In Section 2, the author uses a thought-experiment to support the view that realism rather than reflexivity ought to be given up. In Section 3, the author gives a further reason for Ayers to take this option: it furnishes a response to a troublesome challenge concerning the epistemic significance of consciousness, a challenge which Ayers himself anticipates at the end of Chapter 2 of Knowing and Seeing but does not fully resolve.","PeriodicalId":43873,"journal":{"name":"Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-11-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49573997","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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