Pub Date : 2022-10-04DOI: 10.1163/18756735-00000156
K. Lehrer
The form of representation cannot be fully described, as Wittgenstein noted. This is because there is a non-linguistic component in the representation of truth that aesthetic experience shows us. It is the self-represented exemplar of conscious experience. On this basis, the author defends empiricism against the objection that all representation of experience is subject to error.
{"title":"A Defense of Empiricism","authors":"K. Lehrer","doi":"10.1163/18756735-00000156","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18756735-00000156","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The form of representation cannot be fully described, as Wittgenstein noted. This is because there is a non-linguistic component in the representation of truth that aesthetic experience shows us. It is the self-represented exemplar of conscious experience. On this basis, the author defends empiricism against the objection that all representation of experience is subject to error.","PeriodicalId":43873,"journal":{"name":"Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-10-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43806912","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-04DOI: 10.1163/18756735-00000163
Marcello Ruta
{"title":"Musik, Komposition, Improvisation: Grundbegriffe der Musikphilosophie, written by Timo Dresenkamp","authors":"Marcello Ruta","doi":"10.1163/18756735-00000163","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18756735-00000163","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":43873,"journal":{"name":"Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-10-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49013978","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-04DOI: 10.1163/18756735-00000162
Julian Fink
Two or more attitudinal states are incoherent if and only if, necessarily, under conditions of full transparency, you are disposed to give up one of them. This is roughly the account of incoherence that has recently been put forward by Alex Worsnip (2018). In this article it is argued that Worsnip’s account of incoherence is incorrect. Not only does it fail to be fully general (i.e., it does not allow us to assess the coherence of all combinations of attitudes), but it also implies that an agent is necessarily incoherent just in virtue of being in one attitudinal state.
{"title":"What (In)coherence Is Not","authors":"Julian Fink","doi":"10.1163/18756735-00000162","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18756735-00000162","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000Two or more attitudinal states are incoherent if and only if, necessarily, under conditions of full transparency, you are disposed to give up one of them. This is roughly the account of incoherence that has recently been put forward by Alex Worsnip (2018). In this article it is argued that Worsnip’s account of incoherence is incorrect. Not only does it fail to be fully general (i.e., it does not allow us to assess the coherence of all combinations of attitudes), but it also implies that an agent is necessarily incoherent just in virtue of being in one attitudinal state.","PeriodicalId":43873,"journal":{"name":"Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-10-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47529165","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-04DOI: 10.1163/18756735-00000168
M. Antonelli
This article, inspired by Rudolf Haller’s thesis of an independent, specific, and unitary Austrian tradition of scientific philosophy, develops the idea of a specific Austrian tradition of psychological research, as distinguished in its development from that in Germany. This tradition was shaped by two phenomenological trends, which were merged into unity in Prague by Carl Stumpf and Brentano’s students of the second generation. One trend traces back to Goethe and was continued in Prague by the physiologists Jan E. Purkinje and Ewald Hering, culminating in the work of Ernst Mach. The other trend was initiated by Franz Brentano and spread through his school. Stumpf was the key integrator of these two traditions, which he then partially passed on to his Berlin students and founders of Gestalt psychology. Finally, Karl Bühler’s “reimport” of the Brentanian psychological legacy into the Vienna of the First Republic is briefly illustrated.
{"title":"Gibt es eine österreichische Psychologie?","authors":"M. Antonelli","doi":"10.1163/18756735-00000168","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18756735-00000168","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This article, inspired by Rudolf Haller’s thesis of an independent, specific, and unitary Austrian tradition of scientific philosophy, develops the idea of a specific Austrian tradition of psychological research, as distinguished in its development from that in Germany. This tradition was shaped by two phenomenological trends, which were merged into unity in Prague by Carl Stumpf and Brentano’s students of the second generation. One trend traces back to Goethe and was continued in Prague by the physiologists Jan E. Purkinje and Ewald Hering, culminating in the work of Ernst Mach. The other trend was initiated by Franz Brentano and spread through his school. Stumpf was the key integrator of these two traditions, which he then partially passed on to his Berlin students and founders of Gestalt psychology. Finally, Karl Bühler’s “reimport” of the Brentanian psychological legacy into the Vienna of the First Republic is briefly illustrated.","PeriodicalId":43873,"journal":{"name":"Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-10-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46231333","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-04DOI: 10.1163/18756735-00000161
Tamaz Tokhadze
Evidential support is often equated with confirmation, where evidence supports hypothesis H if and only if it increases the probability of H. This article argues against this received view. As the author shows, support is a comparative notion in the sense that increase-in-probability is not. A piece of evidence can confirm H, but it can confirm alternatives to H to the same or greater degree; and in such cases, it is at best misleading to conclude that the evidence supports H. The author puts forward an alternative view that defines support in terms of measures of degree of confirmation. The proposed view is both sufficiently comparative and able to accommodate the increase-in-probability aspect of support. The author concludes that the proposed measure-theoretic approach to support provides a superior alternative to the standard confirmatory approach.
{"title":"Is Evidential Support the Same as Increase-in-Probability?","authors":"Tamaz Tokhadze","doi":"10.1163/18756735-00000161","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18756735-00000161","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000Evidential support is often equated with confirmation, where evidence supports hypothesis H if and only if it increases the probability of H. This article argues against this received view. As the author shows, support is a comparative notion in the sense that increase-in-probability is not. A piece of evidence can confirm H, but it can confirm alternatives to H to the same or greater degree; and in such cases, it is at best misleading to conclude that the evidence supports H. The author puts forward an alternative view that defines support in terms of measures of degree of confirmation. The proposed view is both sufficiently comparative and able to accommodate the increase-in-probability aspect of support. The author concludes that the proposed measure-theoretic approach to support provides a superior alternative to the standard confirmatory approach.","PeriodicalId":43873,"journal":{"name":"Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-10-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49285158","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-04DOI: 10.1163/18756735-00000159
Josef Hlade, Rudolf Meer
With the first edition of the Philosophical Criticism, published in the 1870s and 1880s, Alois Riehl became the founder and most important representative of Realistic Criticism, and emerged as one of the leading figures in German-speaking philosophy at the turn of the century. In 1901, he applied for a chair at the Faculty of Philosophy at the University of Vienna. In the appointment procedure for the succession to Ernst Mach, he was chosen by the committee with the recommendation unico loco, and also confirmed by the faculty. Nevertheless, the Minister of Education, Wilhelm von Hartel, rejected the recommendation for political and ideological reasons. Using previously unpublished archival sources, the present study reconstructs Riehl’s academic career, the conditions of the appointment procedure, the internal decision-making processes, and the reasons that ultimately led to his rejection. The aim of the article is to develop a case study that, first, makes educational policy in Austria visible and, second, critically evaluates the term Austrian Philosophy that dates back to this time.
{"title":"Zwischen Universitätsreformen und katholischer Renaissance","authors":"Josef Hlade, Rudolf Meer","doi":"10.1163/18756735-00000159","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18756735-00000159","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 With the first edition of the Philosophical Criticism, published in the 1870s and 1880s, Alois Riehl became the founder and most important representative of Realistic Criticism, and emerged as one of the leading figures in German-speaking philosophy at the turn of the century. In 1901, he applied for a chair at the Faculty of Philosophy at the University of Vienna. In the appointment procedure for the succession to Ernst Mach, he was chosen by the committee with the recommendation unico loco, and also confirmed by the faculty. Nevertheless, the Minister of Education, Wilhelm von Hartel, rejected the recommendation for political and ideological reasons. Using previously unpublished archival sources, the present study reconstructs Riehl’s academic career, the conditions of the appointment procedure, the internal decision-making processes, and the reasons that ultimately led to his rejection. The aim of the article is to develop a case study that, first, makes educational policy in Austria visible and, second, critically evaluates the term Austrian Philosophy that dates back to this time.","PeriodicalId":43873,"journal":{"name":"Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-10-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48289581","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-04DOI: 10.1163/18756735-00000166
Michele Lenoci
This essay presents a personal remembering of Rudolf Haller and deals with his interpretation and evaluation of Meinong’s theory of impossible and incomplete objects in order to better understand the objects of fiction and imagination.
{"title":"Unmögliche und unvollständige Gegenstände bei Alexius Meinong","authors":"Michele Lenoci","doi":"10.1163/18756735-00000166","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18756735-00000166","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000This essay presents a personal remembering of Rudolf Haller and deals with his interpretation and evaluation of Meinong’s theory of impossible and incomplete objects in order to better understand the objects of fiction and imagination.","PeriodicalId":43873,"journal":{"name":"Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-10-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43230707","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-07DOI: 10.1163/18756735-00000160
Nils Neuhaus
Historically contingent concepts like human dignity do not allow for the exclusion of historical considerations from their analysis. In order to demonstrate this, the present essay compares the positions of Hans-Johann Glock and Hans Blumenberg. While Glock deals with the convergence of analytic philosophy and historical approaches, Blumenberg highlights the importance of historical constants. Glock argues for a pragmatic historicism according to which historical inquiry is useful but not indispensable. Through comparison with Blumenberg’s position, it is shown that this assessment is incomplete. It is then argued that there is a more fitting position, according to which historical inquiry is essential for some, though not all, concepts. This position is illustrated by the concept of human dignity, which cannot be adequately grasped without reference to its genesis. Blumenberg’s approach can thus help precisely where the connection between analytical philosophy and historical investigation in Glock’s sense falters.
{"title":"Die Herausforderung historisch kontingenter Begriffe für die analytische Philosophie am Beispiel der Menschenwürde","authors":"Nils Neuhaus","doi":"10.1163/18756735-00000160","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18756735-00000160","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Historically contingent concepts like human dignity do not allow for the exclusion of historical considerations from their analysis. In order to demonstrate this, the present essay compares the positions of Hans-Johann Glock and Hans Blumenberg. While Glock deals with the convergence of analytic philosophy and historical approaches, Blumenberg highlights the importance of historical constants. Glock argues for a pragmatic historicism according to which historical inquiry is useful but not indispensable. Through comparison with Blumenberg’s position, it is shown that this assessment is incomplete. It is then argued that there is a more fitting position, according to which historical inquiry is essential for some, though not all, concepts. This position is illustrated by the concept of human dignity, which cannot be adequately grasped without reference to its genesis. Blumenberg’s approach can thus help precisely where the connection between analytical philosophy and historical investigation in Glock’s sense falters.","PeriodicalId":43873,"journal":{"name":"Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-07-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45462872","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-05-13DOI: 10.1163/18756735-00000147
Claudio Calosi
Multilocation – the notion of an object being 18756735_00000147_text.pdfat two places – is a central notion in metaphysics. According to a widespread view, multilocation is problematic but metaphysically possible. In effect, it has been claimed that in a quantum world, multilocation is not simply possible but actual. This article provides a new argument against the latter claim: there is no quantum multilocation.
{"title":"There Are No Saints","authors":"Claudio Calosi","doi":"10.1163/18756735-00000147","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18756735-00000147","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000Multilocation – the notion of an object being 18756735_00000147_text.pdfat two places – is a central notion in metaphysics. According to a widespread view, multilocation is problematic but metaphysically possible. In effect, it has been claimed that in a quantum world, multilocation is not simply possible but actual. This article provides a new argument against the latter claim: there is no quantum multilocation.","PeriodicalId":43873,"journal":{"name":"Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-05-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41958234","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-05-13DOI: 10.1163/18756735-00000157
S. Sturgeon
It is argued that higher-order awareness is central to one type of everyday rationality. The author starts by specifying the target notion of rationality, contrasting it with other useful notions in the neighbourhood. It is then shown that the target notion relies on first-person awareness of the unfolding of cognition. This is used to explain the kernel of truth in epistemic conservatism, the structure of defeasibility, and the root motive behind the widely accepted distinction between rational inference and trivial entailment.
{"title":"Rationality and Higher-order Awareness","authors":"S. Sturgeon","doi":"10.1163/18756735-00000157","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18756735-00000157","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000It is argued that higher-order awareness is central to one type of everyday rationality. The author starts by specifying the target notion of rationality, contrasting it with other useful notions in the neighbourhood. It is then shown that the target notion relies on first-person awareness of the unfolding of cognition. This is used to explain the kernel of truth in epistemic conservatism, the structure of defeasibility, and the root motive behind the widely accepted distinction between rational inference and trivial entailment.","PeriodicalId":43873,"journal":{"name":"Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-05-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46712169","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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