Pub Date : 2022-09-12DOI: 10.1108/s1569-3732202221
{"title":"Empirical Research in Banking and Corporate Finance","authors":"","doi":"10.1108/s1569-3732202221","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1108/s1569-3732202221","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":439901,"journal":{"name":"Advances in Financial Economics","volume":"57 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132797704","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-10-23DOI: 10.1108/S1569-373220180000020006
Ahmed Bouteska
Abstract The aim of this paper is to analyze the impact of corporate governance (focused on some key mechanisms as board size, board independence, managerial ownership, institutional ownership, and chief executive officer duality) on financial analysts’ behavior in US. Results from panel data analysis for 294 US listed firms observed from 2007 to 2014 show that several attributes of the board of directors and audit committee have no effects on the number of analysts who are following the firm and the properties of analysts’ earnings forecasts. Findings also suggest that firms with independent and large boards and blockholders ownership benefit of more analyst following. In addition, it is proven that analysts’ earnings forecasts are optimistic and more accurate for companies where blockholder ownership, either by managers or external entities have larger quoted spreads but of lower quality for the ones which have greater independent board members and institutional investor’s holding.
{"title":"The Influence of Corporate Governance Mechanisms on the Behavior of Financial Analysts of US Firms: An Empirical Analysis","authors":"Ahmed Bouteska","doi":"10.1108/S1569-373220180000020006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1108/S1569-373220180000020006","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract \u0000The aim of this paper is to analyze the impact of corporate governance (focused on some key mechanisms as board size, board independence, managerial ownership, institutional ownership, and chief executive officer duality) on financial analysts’ behavior in US. Results from panel data analysis for 294 US listed firms observed from 2007 to 2014 show that several attributes of the board of directors and audit committee have no effects on the number of analysts who are following the firm and the properties of analysts’ earnings forecasts. Findings also suggest that firms with independent and large boards and blockholders ownership benefit of more analyst following. In addition, it is proven that analysts’ earnings forecasts are optimistic and more accurate for companies where blockholder ownership, either by managers or external entities have larger quoted spreads but of lower quality for the ones which have greater independent board members and institutional investor’s holding.","PeriodicalId":439901,"journal":{"name":"Advances in Financial Economics","volume":"77 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133163312","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-10-23DOI: 10.1108/S1569-373220180000020008
O. Berkman, Shlomith D. Zuta
We investigate the association between attributes of the audit committee of a firm and the likelihood of negative events occurring in the firm’s life in Israel. The mandate of the audit committee in Israel is substantially different from its mandate in the US. The responsibilities of the committee in the US are divided between two committees in Israel, one of which deals with reviewing the financial statements and the other one, titled “audit committee,” is in charge of the remaining tasks of the US-type audit committee. This allows us a unique opportunity to focus on the roles of the audit committee other than reviewing the financial statements. Using hand-collected data on firms traded on Tel Aviv Stock Exchange in 2010–2014, we find that the larger the audit committee size, the larger the likelihood of negative events, consistent with the cumbersome workings and potential conflicts of interests characterizing a large committee. The percentage of directors with accounting and financial expertise on the audit committee is associated with a lower likelihood of negative events, in line with the value of such experts in tasks beyond reviewing the financial statements. The fraction of independent directors on the audit committee is not found to be significantly related to the likelihood of negative events. This is consistent with the notion that some independent directors are independent in form but not necessarily in substance, which is surprising in light of the comprehensive regulation regarding audit committee independence imposed by the Israeli regulator.
{"title":"Reconsidering the Mandate of the Audit Committee: Evidence from Corporate Governance in Israel","authors":"O. Berkman, Shlomith D. Zuta","doi":"10.1108/S1569-373220180000020008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1108/S1569-373220180000020008","url":null,"abstract":"We investigate the association between attributes of the audit committee of a firm and the likelihood of negative events occurring in the firm’s life in Israel. The mandate of the audit committee in Israel is substantially different from its mandate in the US. The responsibilities of the committee in the US are divided between two committees in Israel, one of which deals with reviewing the financial statements and the other one, titled “audit committee,” is in charge of the remaining tasks of the US-type audit committee. This allows us a unique opportunity to focus on the roles of the audit committee other than reviewing the financial statements. Using hand-collected data on firms traded on Tel Aviv Stock Exchange in 2010–2014, we find that the larger the audit committee size, the larger the likelihood of negative events, consistent with the cumbersome workings and potential conflicts of interests characterizing a large committee. The percentage of directors with accounting and financial expertise on the audit committee is associated with a lower likelihood of negative events, in line with the value of such experts in tasks beyond reviewing the financial statements. The fraction of independent directors on the audit committee is not found to be significantly related to the likelihood of negative events. This is consistent with the notion that some independent directors are independent in form but not necessarily in substance, which is surprising in light of the comprehensive regulation regarding audit committee independence imposed by the Israeli regulator.","PeriodicalId":439901,"journal":{"name":"Advances in Financial Economics","volume":"62 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116206777","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-10-23DOI: 10.1108/S1569-373220180000020002
Amélie Charles, R. Dang, Etienne Redor
Abstract Numerous empirical studies have been conducted to analyze the impact of board gender diversity (BGD) on firm performance without being able to establish a clear relationship. In this paper, we reassess the relationship between BGD and firm performance by using a quantile regression approach. Our results indicate that BGD matters only across a subset of the firm performance distribution. Moreover, when the possible endogeneity of the relationship between BGD and firm performance is taken into account, there are some conditions under which a positive and significant relationship is observed for the eight lowest quantiles.
{"title":"Board Gender Diversity and Firm Financial Performance: A Quantile Regression Analysis","authors":"Amélie Charles, R. Dang, Etienne Redor","doi":"10.1108/S1569-373220180000020002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1108/S1569-373220180000020002","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract \u0000Numerous empirical studies have been conducted to analyze the impact of board gender diversity (BGD) on firm performance without being able to establish a clear relationship. In this paper, we reassess the relationship between BGD and firm performance by using a quantile regression approach. Our results indicate that BGD matters only across a subset of the firm performance distribution. Moreover, when the possible endogeneity of the relationship between BGD and firm performance is taken into account, there are some conditions under which a positive and significant relationship is observed for the eight lowest quantiles.","PeriodicalId":439901,"journal":{"name":"Advances in Financial Economics","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116401646","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-10-23DOI: 10.1108/S1569-373220180000020003
Bobby K. Alexander, Stephen P. Ferris, Sanjiv Sabherwal
This study examines whether dividend payout, an internal corporate governance mechanism, is a substitute for or an outcome of product market competition, an external corporate governance mechanism. The sample includes firms in six of the world’s most prominent economies. We find that firms in more competitive industries pay less in the way of dividends to their shareholders, which is consistent with the notion that dividends and competition are substitutes. We also determine that the above negative relationship is weaker in countries with stronger regulation protecting minority shareholders against corporate self-dealing. Furthermore, the relationship has attenuated following the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act that increased regulation and enhanced governance standards. Collectively, our findings provide consistent evidence across countries that the two corporate governance mechanisms examined in the study are substitutes, and greater regulation weakens the substitution effect. Our empirical findings are robust to alternative measures of dividend payout, industry definition, and shareholder protection.
{"title":"Are Dividends an Outcome of or a Substitute for External Corporate Governance? International Evidence Based on Product Market Competition","authors":"Bobby K. Alexander, Stephen P. Ferris, Sanjiv Sabherwal","doi":"10.1108/S1569-373220180000020003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1108/S1569-373220180000020003","url":null,"abstract":"This study examines whether dividend payout, an internal corporate governance mechanism, is a substitute for or an outcome of product market competition, an external corporate governance mechanism. The sample includes firms in six of the world’s most prominent economies. We find that firms in more competitive industries pay less in the way of dividends to their shareholders, which is consistent with the notion that dividends and competition are substitutes. We also determine that the above negative relationship is weaker in countries with stronger regulation protecting minority shareholders against corporate self-dealing. Furthermore, the relationship has attenuated following the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act that increased regulation and enhanced governance standards. Collectively, our findings provide consistent evidence across countries that the two corporate governance mechanisms examined in the study are substitutes, and greater regulation weakens the substitution effect. Our empirical findings are robust to alternative measures of dividend payout, industry definition, and shareholder protection.","PeriodicalId":439901,"journal":{"name":"Advances in Financial Economics","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115593201","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-10-23DOI: 10.1108/s1569-3732201820
Stephen P. Ferris
Advances in Financial Economics Vol 20 is peer reviewed and focusses on International Corporate Governance.
《金融经济学进展》第20卷是同行评议的，重点是国际公司治理。
{"title":"International Corporate Governance and Regulation","authors":"Stephen P. Ferris","doi":"10.1108/s1569-3732201820","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1108/s1569-3732201820","url":null,"abstract":"Advances in Financial Economics Vol 20 is peer reviewed and focusses on International Corporate Governance.","PeriodicalId":439901,"journal":{"name":"Advances in Financial Economics","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125095018","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-10-23DOI: 10.1108/S1569-373220180000020005
Zhongzhi He, M. Kusý, Deepak Singh, Samir Trabelsi
Abstract The Canadian mutual fund setting is unique in that two governance mechanisms – corporate and trust – coexist. This study empirically examines the impact of each mechanism on fund fees and performance. We find that corporate class funds charge higher fees but deliver superior fee-adjusted returns than trust funds. We then analyze the impact of various board characteristics on fees and performance for corporate class funds. We find that a board with smaller size, CEO duality, and a higher percentage of independent directors is more likely to charge lower fees. In addition, smaller boards are strongly associated with higher fee-adjusted performance. Our study supports agency theory over stewardship theory and provides valuable guidelines for Canadian investors and regulatory agencies.
{"title":"Should We Trust Fund Managers? A Close Look at the Canadian Mutual Fund Governance","authors":"Zhongzhi He, M. Kusý, Deepak Singh, Samir Trabelsi","doi":"10.1108/S1569-373220180000020005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1108/S1569-373220180000020005","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract \u0000The Canadian mutual fund setting is unique in that two governance mechanisms – corporate and trust – coexist. This study empirically examines the impact of each mechanism on fund fees and performance. We find that corporate class funds charge higher fees but deliver superior fee-adjusted returns than trust funds. We then analyze the impact of various board characteristics on fees and performance for corporate class funds. We find that a board with smaller size, CEO duality, and a higher percentage of independent directors is more likely to charge lower fees. In addition, smaller boards are strongly associated with higher fee-adjusted performance. Our study supports agency theory over stewardship theory and provides valuable guidelines for Canadian investors and regulatory agencies.","PeriodicalId":439901,"journal":{"name":"Advances in Financial Economics","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131266585","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This study provides practical implications for brokerage firms to utilize the importance of corporate governance fundamentals in marketing the equity securities. It models a structural relationship of board qualification, management competency, transparent corporate disclosure, and earning quality to the intention to invest. Data were collected from 1,410 investors who were asked about their investment intentions in the 13 ASEAN-Stars Thai listed companies. The investors in our model form their investment attitudes based on the company’s earning quality which is determined by its corporate governance attributes. The results show that corporate governance fundamentals significantly influence the investors’ perception on the company’s perceived earning quality and that the perceived earning quality has a significant positive effect on the investors’ intention to invest in the company. Our findings can help marketers at brokerage firms to persuade their customers to invest if they recommend equity securities of good governance companies.
{"title":"Corporate Governance That Influences an Investment Intention in the ASEAN-Stars Thai Listed Companies: A Marketing Application for Brokerage Firms","authors":"Wasukarn Ngamchom, Malai Kamolsakulchai, Thanomsak Suwannoi, Jutamas Wongkantarakorn","doi":"10.1108/S1569-373220180000020007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1108/S1569-373220180000020007","url":null,"abstract":"This study provides practical implications for brokerage firms to utilize the importance of corporate governance fundamentals in marketing the equity securities. It models a structural relationship of board qualification, management competency, transparent corporate disclosure, and earning quality to the intention to invest. Data were collected from 1,410 investors who were asked about their investment intentions in the 13 ASEAN-Stars Thai listed companies. The investors in our model form their investment attitudes based on the company’s earning quality which is determined by its corporate governance attributes. The results show that corporate governance fundamentals significantly influence the investors’ perception on the company’s perceived earning quality and that the perceived earning quality has a significant positive effect on the investors’ intention to invest in the company. Our findings can help marketers at brokerage firms to persuade their customers to invest if they recommend equity securities of good governance companies.","PeriodicalId":439901,"journal":{"name":"Advances in Financial Economics","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126591659","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-10-23DOI: 10.1108/S1569-373220180000020004
M. Liao
Abstract The literature has documented evidence that economic freedom is positively associated with economic growth, investment spending, income equality, employment, gender equality, etc. Economic freedom is also found to be associated with a country’s rule of law and legal regime. There is, however, little studies examining how economic freedom affects a firm’s performance such as firm valuation and profitability. The evidence presented in this study shows that economic freedom strengthens a firm’s valuation and profitability. Additionally, firms headquartered in emerging markets or younger firms from countries with higher levels of economic freedom experience higher valuation and profitability. That is, economic freedom is more beneficial for firms from emerging markets and is crucial to the success of early-stage firms.
{"title":"International Evidence on Economic Freedom, Governance, and Firm Performance","authors":"M. Liao","doi":"10.1108/S1569-373220180000020004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1108/S1569-373220180000020004","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract \u0000The literature has documented evidence that economic freedom is positively associated with economic growth, investment spending, income equality, employment, gender equality, etc. Economic freedom is also found to be associated with a country’s rule of law and legal regime. There is, however, little studies examining how economic freedom affects a firm’s performance such as firm valuation and profitability. The evidence presented in this study shows that economic freedom strengthens a firm’s valuation and profitability. Additionally, firms headquartered in emerging markets or younger firms from countries with higher levels of economic freedom experience higher valuation and profitability. That is, economic freedom is more beneficial for firms from emerging markets and is crucial to the success of early-stage firms.","PeriodicalId":439901,"journal":{"name":"Advances in Financial Economics","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127806591","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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