Pub Date : 2023-05-01DOI: 10.1109/SP46215.2023.10179437
Xu Lin, F. Araujo, Teryl Taylor, Jiyong Jang, Jason Polakis
Browser fingerprinting remains a topic of particular interest for both the research community and the browser ecosystem, and various anti-fingerprinting countermeasures have been proposed by prior work or deployed by browsers. While preventing fingerprinting presents a challenging task, modern fingerprinting techniques heavily rely on JavaScript APIs, which creates a choke point that can be targeted by countermeasures. In this paper, we explore how browser fingerprints can be generated without using any JavaScript APIs. To that end we develop StylisticFP, a novel fingerprinting system that relies exclusively on CSS features and implicitly infers system characteristics, including advanced fingerprinting attributes like the list of supported fonts, through carefully constructed and arranged HTML elements. We empirically demonstrate our system's effectiveness against privacy-focused browsers (e.g., Safari, Firefox, Brave, Tor) and popular privacy-preserving extensions. We also conduct a pilot study in a research organization and find that our system is comparable to a state-of-the-art JavaScript-based fingerprinting library at distinguishing devices, while outperforming it against browsers with anti-fingerprinting defenses. Our work highlights an additional dimension of the significant challenge posed by browser fingerprinting, and reaffirms the need for more robust detection systems and countermeasures.
{"title":"Fashion Faux Pas: Implicit Stylistic Fingerprints for Bypassing Browsers' Anti-Fingerprinting Defenses","authors":"Xu Lin, F. Araujo, Teryl Taylor, Jiyong Jang, Jason Polakis","doi":"10.1109/SP46215.2023.10179437","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP46215.2023.10179437","url":null,"abstract":"Browser fingerprinting remains a topic of particular interest for both the research community and the browser ecosystem, and various anti-fingerprinting countermeasures have been proposed by prior work or deployed by browsers. While preventing fingerprinting presents a challenging task, modern fingerprinting techniques heavily rely on JavaScript APIs, which creates a choke point that can be targeted by countermeasures. In this paper, we explore how browser fingerprints can be generated without using any JavaScript APIs. To that end we develop StylisticFP, a novel fingerprinting system that relies exclusively on CSS features and implicitly infers system characteristics, including advanced fingerprinting attributes like the list of supported fonts, through carefully constructed and arranged HTML elements. We empirically demonstrate our system's effectiveness against privacy-focused browsers (e.g., Safari, Firefox, Brave, Tor) and popular privacy-preserving extensions. We also conduct a pilot study in a research organization and find that our system is comparable to a state-of-the-art JavaScript-based fingerprinting library at distinguishing devices, while outperforming it against browsers with anti-fingerprinting defenses. Our work highlights an additional dimension of the significant challenge posed by browser fingerprinting, and reaffirms the need for more robust detection systems and countermeasures.","PeriodicalId":439989,"journal":{"name":"2023 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)","volume":"70 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131890697","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-01DOI: 10.1109/SP46215.2023.10179459
Julie M. Haney, S. Furman
Updates may be one of the few tools consumers have to mitigate security and privacy vulnerabilities in smart home devices. However, little research has been undertaken to understand users’ perceptions and experiences with smart home updates. To address this gap, we conducted an online survey of a demographically diverse sample of 412 smart home users in the United States. We found that users overwhelmingly view smart home updates as important and urgent. However, relationships between update perceptions and security and privacy perceptions are less clear. We also identify problematic aspects of updates and gaps between current and preferred update modes. We then suggest ways in which update mechanisms and interfaces can be designed to be more usable and understandable to users.
{"title":"User Perceptions and Experiences with Smart Home Updates","authors":"Julie M. Haney, S. Furman","doi":"10.1109/SP46215.2023.10179459","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP46215.2023.10179459","url":null,"abstract":"Updates may be one of the few tools consumers have to mitigate security and privacy vulnerabilities in smart home devices. However, little research has been undertaken to understand users’ perceptions and experiences with smart home updates. To address this gap, we conducted an online survey of a demographically diverse sample of 412 smart home users in the United States. We found that users overwhelmingly view smart home updates as important and urgent. However, relationships between update perceptions and security and privacy perceptions are less clear. We also identify problematic aspects of updates and gaps between current and preferred update modes. We then suggest ways in which update mechanisms and interfaces can be designed to be more usable and understandable to users.","PeriodicalId":439989,"journal":{"name":"2023 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)","volume":"68 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128752782","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-01DOI: 10.1109/SP46215.2023.10179309
Hosein Yavarzadeh, Mohammadkazem Taram, Shravan Narayan, D. Stefan, D. Tullsen
This paper presents Half&Half, a novel software defense against branch-based side-channel attacks. Half&Half isolates the effects of different protection domains on the conditional branch predictors (CBPs) in modern Intel processors. This work presents the first exhaustive analysis of modern conditional branch prediction structures, and reveals for the first time an unknown opportunity to physically partition all CBP structures and completely prevent leakage between two domains using the shared predictor. Half&Half is a software-only solution to branch predictor isolation that requires no changes to the hardware or ISA, and only requires minor modifications to be supported in existing compilers. We implement Half&Half in the LLVM and WebAssembly compilers and show that it incurs an order of magnitude lower overhead compared to the current state-of-the-art branch-based side-channel defenses.
{"title":"Half&Half: Demystifying Intel’s Directional Branch Predictors for Fast, Secure Partitioned Execution","authors":"Hosein Yavarzadeh, Mohammadkazem Taram, Shravan Narayan, D. Stefan, D. Tullsen","doi":"10.1109/SP46215.2023.10179309","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP46215.2023.10179309","url":null,"abstract":"This paper presents Half&Half, a novel software defense against branch-based side-channel attacks. Half&Half isolates the effects of different protection domains on the conditional branch predictors (CBPs) in modern Intel processors. This work presents the first exhaustive analysis of modern conditional branch prediction structures, and reveals for the first time an unknown opportunity to physically partition all CBP structures and completely prevent leakage between two domains using the shared predictor. Half&Half is a software-only solution to branch predictor isolation that requires no changes to the hardware or ISA, and only requires minor modifications to be supported in existing compilers. We implement Half&Half in the LLVM and WebAssembly compilers and show that it incurs an order of magnitude lower overhead compared to the current state-of-the-art branch-based side-channel defenses.","PeriodicalId":439989,"journal":{"name":"2023 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125368725","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-01DOI: 10.1109/SP46215.2023.10179295
Sacha Servan-Schreiber, Simon Beyzerov, Elizabeth A. Yablon, Hyojae Park
Function Secret Sharing (FSS; Eurocrypt 2015) allows a dealer to share a function f with two or more evaluators. Given secret shares of a function f, the evaluators can locally compute secret shares of f (x) for any input x, without learning information about f in the process.In this paper, we initiate the study of access control for FSS. Given the shares of f, the evaluators can ensure that the dealer is authorized to share the provided function. For a function family $mathcal{F}$ and an access control list defined over the family, the evaluators receiving the shares of $f in mathcal{F}$ can efficiently check that the dealer knows the access key for f.This model enables new applications of FSS, such as: (1) anonymous authentication in a multi-party setting, (2) access control in private databases, and (3) authentication and spam prevention in anonymous communication systems.Our definitions and constructions abstract and improve the concrete efficiency of several recent systems that implement ad-hoc mechanisms for access control over FSS. The main building block behind our efficiency improvement is a discrete-logarithm zero-knowledge proof-of-knowledge over secret-shared elements, which may be of independent interest.We evaluate our constructions and show a 50–70× reduction in computational overhead compared to existing access control techniques used in anonymous communication. In other applications, such as private databases, the processing cost of introducing access control is only 1.5–3×, when amortized over databases with 500,000 or more items.
功能秘密共享;Eurocrypt 2015)允许交易商与两个或更多评估者共享函数f。给定函数f的秘密份额，求值器可以局部计算任何输入x的f (x)的秘密份额，而无需在此过程中学习有关f的信息。本文对FSS的访问控制进行了初步研究。给定f的份额，评估者可以确保经销商被授权共享所提供的功能。对于函数族$mathcal{F}$和在函数族上定义的访问控制列表，在mathcal{F}$中接收$ F 的评估器可以有效地检查经销商是否知道F的访问密钥。该模型支持FSS的新应用，例如:(1)多方设置中的匿名身份验证，(2)私有数据库中的访问控制，以及(3)匿名通信系统中的身份验证和垃圾邮件预防。我们的定义和结构抽象并提高了最近几个系统的具体效率，这些系统实现了对FSS的访问控制的特设机制。我们提高效率背后的主要构建块是秘密共享元素的离散对数零知识知识证明，这可能是独立的兴趣。我们评估了我们的结构，并显示与匿名通信中使用的现有访问控制技术相比，计算开销减少了50 - 70倍。在其他应用程序(如私有数据库)中，引入访问控制的处理成本仅为1.5 - 3倍，分摊到拥有500,000或更多项的数据库上。
{"title":"Private Access Control for Function Secret Sharing","authors":"Sacha Servan-Schreiber, Simon Beyzerov, Elizabeth A. Yablon, Hyojae Park","doi":"10.1109/SP46215.2023.10179295","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP46215.2023.10179295","url":null,"abstract":"Function Secret Sharing (FSS; Eurocrypt 2015) allows a dealer to share a function f with two or more evaluators. Given secret shares of a function f, the evaluators can locally compute secret shares of f (x) for any input x, without learning information about f in the process.In this paper, we initiate the study of access control for FSS. Given the shares of f, the evaluators can ensure that the dealer is authorized to share the provided function. For a function family $mathcal{F}$ and an access control list defined over the family, the evaluators receiving the shares of $f in mathcal{F}$ can efficiently check that the dealer knows the access key for f.This model enables new applications of FSS, such as: (1) anonymous authentication in a multi-party setting, (2) access control in private databases, and (3) authentication and spam prevention in anonymous communication systems.Our definitions and constructions abstract and improve the concrete efficiency of several recent systems that implement ad-hoc mechanisms for access control over FSS. The main building block behind our efficiency improvement is a discrete-logarithm zero-knowledge proof-of-knowledge over secret-shared elements, which may be of independent interest.We evaluate our constructions and show a 50–70× reduction in computational overhead compared to existing access control techniques used in anonymous communication. In other applications, such as private databases, the processing cost of introducing access control is only 1.5–3×, when amortized over databases with 500,000 or more items.","PeriodicalId":439989,"journal":{"name":"2023 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124071954","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-01DOI: 10.1109/SP46215.2023.10179427
Xianrui Qin, Shimin Pan, Arash Mirzaei, Zhimei Sui, O. Ersoy, A. Sakzad, Muhammed F. Esgin, Joseph K. Liu, Jiangshan Yu, Tsz Hon Yuen
Payment Channel Hub (PCH) is a promising solution to the scalability issue of first-generation blockchains or cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin. It supports off-chain payments between a sender and a receiver through an intermediary (called the tumbler). Relationship anonymity and value privacy are desirable features of privacy-preserving PCHs, which prevent the tumbler from identifying the sender and receiver pairs as well as the payment amounts. To our knowledge, all existing Bitcoin-compatible PCH constructions that guarantee relationship anonymity allow only a (predefined) fixed payment amount. Thus, to achieve payments with different amounts, they would require either multiple PCH systems or running one PCH system multiple times. Neither of these solutions would be deemed practical.In this paper, we propose the first Bitcoin-compatible PCH that achieves relationship anonymity and supports variable amounts for payment. To achieve this, we have several layers of technical constructions, each of which could be of independent interest to the community. First, we propose BlindChannel, a novel bi-directional payment channel protocol for privacy-preserving payments, where one of the channel parties is unable to see the channel balances. Then, we further propose BlindHub, a three-party (sender, tumbler, receiver) protocol for private conditional payments, where the tumbler pays to the receiver only if the sender pays to the tumbler. The appealing additional feature of BlindHub is that the tumbler cannot link the sender and the receiver while supporting a variable payment amount. To construct BlindHub, we also introduce two new cryptographic primitives as building blocks, namely Blind Adaptor Signature (BAS), and Flexible Blind Conditional Signature (FBCS). BAS is an adaptor signature protocol built on top of a blind signature scheme. FBCS is a new cryptographic notion enabling us to provide an atomic and privacy-preserving PCH. Lastly, we instantiate both BlindChannel and BlindHub protocols and present implementation results to show their practicality.
{"title":"BlindHub: Bitcoin-Compatible Privacy-Preserving Payment Channel Hubs Supporting Variable Amounts","authors":"Xianrui Qin, Shimin Pan, Arash Mirzaei, Zhimei Sui, O. Ersoy, A. Sakzad, Muhammed F. Esgin, Joseph K. Liu, Jiangshan Yu, Tsz Hon Yuen","doi":"10.1109/SP46215.2023.10179427","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP46215.2023.10179427","url":null,"abstract":"Payment Channel Hub (PCH) is a promising solution to the scalability issue of first-generation blockchains or cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin. It supports off-chain payments between a sender and a receiver through an intermediary (called the tumbler). Relationship anonymity and value privacy are desirable features of privacy-preserving PCHs, which prevent the tumbler from identifying the sender and receiver pairs as well as the payment amounts. To our knowledge, all existing Bitcoin-compatible PCH constructions that guarantee relationship anonymity allow only a (predefined) fixed payment amount. Thus, to achieve payments with different amounts, they would require either multiple PCH systems or running one PCH system multiple times. Neither of these solutions would be deemed practical.In this paper, we propose the first Bitcoin-compatible PCH that achieves relationship anonymity and supports variable amounts for payment. To achieve this, we have several layers of technical constructions, each of which could be of independent interest to the community. First, we propose BlindChannel, a novel bi-directional payment channel protocol for privacy-preserving payments, where one of the channel parties is unable to see the channel balances. Then, we further propose BlindHub, a three-party (sender, tumbler, receiver) protocol for private conditional payments, where the tumbler pays to the receiver only if the sender pays to the tumbler. The appealing additional feature of BlindHub is that the tumbler cannot link the sender and the receiver while supporting a variable payment amount. To construct BlindHub, we also introduce two new cryptographic primitives as building blocks, namely Blind Adaptor Signature (BAS), and Flexible Blind Conditional Signature (FBCS). BAS is an adaptor signature protocol built on top of a blind signature scheme. FBCS is a new cryptographic notion enabling us to provide an atomic and privacy-preserving PCH. Lastly, we instantiate both BlindChannel and BlindHub protocols and present implementation results to show their practicality.","PeriodicalId":439989,"journal":{"name":"2023 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121698141","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-01DOI: 10.1109/SP46215.2023.10179338
D. Bui, Brian Tang, K. Shin
All major web browsers support extensions to provide additional functionalities and enhance users’ browsing experience while the extensions can access and collect users’ data during their web browsing. Although the web extensions inform users of their data practices via multiple forms of notices, prior work has overlooked the critical gap between the actual data practices and the published privacy notices of browser extensions. To fill this gap, we propose ExtPrivA that automatically detects the inconsistencies between browser extensions’ data collection and their privacy disclosures. From the privacy policies and Dashboard disclosures, ExtPrivA extracts privacy statements to have a clear interpretation of the privacy practices of an extension. It emulates user interactions to trigger the extension’s functionalities and analyzes the initiators of network requests to accurately extract the users’ data transferred by the extension from the browser to external servers. Our end-to-end evaluation has shown ExtPrivA to detect inconsistencies between the privacy disclosures and data-collection behavior with an 85% precision. In a large-scale study of 47.2k extensions on the Chrome Web Store, we found 820 extensions with 1,290 flows that are inconsistent with their privacy statements. Even worse, we have found 525 pairs of contradictory privacy statements in the Dashboard disclosures and privacy policies of 360 extensions. These discrepancies between the privacy disclosures and the actual data-collection behavior are deemed as serious violations of the Store’s policies. Our findings highlight the critical issues in the privacy disclosures of browser extensions that potentially mislead, and even pose high privacy risks to, end-users.
所有主要的web浏览器都支持扩展，以提供额外的功能，增强用户的浏览体验，而扩展可以在用户浏览网页时访问和收集用户的数据。虽然网络扩展通过多种形式的通知告知用户他们的数据实践，但之前的工作忽略了实际数据实践与浏览器扩展发布的隐私声明之间的关键差距。为了填补这一空白，我们提出了ExtPrivA，它可以自动检测浏览器扩展的数据收集和隐私披露之间的不一致。从隐私政策和仪表板披露中，ExtPrivA提取隐私声明，以便对扩展的隐私实践有一个清晰的解释。它模拟用户交互来触发扩展的功能，并分析网络请求的发起者，以准确地提取由扩展从浏览器传输到外部服务器的用户数据。我们的端到端评估表明，ExtPrivA能够以85%的精度检测隐私披露和数据收集行为之间的不一致性。在一项针对Chrome Web Store上47.2万个扩展的大规模研究中，我们发现820个扩展中有1290个流与其隐私声明不一致。更糟糕的是，我们在360扩展的仪表板披露和隐私政策中发现了525对相互矛盾的隐私声明。这些隐私披露与实际数据收集行为之间的差异被视为严重违反商店政策。我们的研究结果强调了浏览器扩展隐私披露中的关键问题，这些问题可能会误导甚至给最终用户带来很高的隐私风险。
{"title":"Detection of Inconsistencies in Privacy Practices of Browser Extensions","authors":"D. Bui, Brian Tang, K. Shin","doi":"10.1109/SP46215.2023.10179338","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP46215.2023.10179338","url":null,"abstract":"All major web browsers support extensions to provide additional functionalities and enhance users’ browsing experience while the extensions can access and collect users’ data during their web browsing. Although the web extensions inform users of their data practices via multiple forms of notices, prior work has overlooked the critical gap between the actual data practices and the published privacy notices of browser extensions. To fill this gap, we propose ExtPrivA that automatically detects the inconsistencies between browser extensions’ data collection and their privacy disclosures. From the privacy policies and Dashboard disclosures, ExtPrivA extracts privacy statements to have a clear interpretation of the privacy practices of an extension. It emulates user interactions to trigger the extension’s functionalities and analyzes the initiators of network requests to accurately extract the users’ data transferred by the extension from the browser to external servers. Our end-to-end evaluation has shown ExtPrivA to detect inconsistencies between the privacy disclosures and data-collection behavior with an 85% precision. In a large-scale study of 47.2k extensions on the Chrome Web Store, we found 820 extensions with 1,290 flows that are inconsistent with their privacy statements. Even worse, we have found 525 pairs of contradictory privacy statements in the Dashboard disclosures and privacy policies of 360 extensions. These discrepancies between the privacy disclosures and the actual data-collection behavior are deemed as serious violations of the Store’s policies. Our findings highlight the critical issues in the privacy disclosures of browser extensions that potentially mislead, and even pose high privacy risks to, end-users.","PeriodicalId":439989,"journal":{"name":"2023 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115272695","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-01DOI: 10.1109/SP46215.2023.10179450
K. Mus, Yarkin Doröz, M. Tol, Kristi Rahman, B. Sunar
Digital Signature Schemes such as DSA, ECDSA, and RSA are widely deployed to protect the integrity of security protocols such as TLS, SSH, and IPSec. In TLS, for instance, RSA and (EC)DSA are used to sign the state of the agreed upon protocol parameters during the handshake phase. Naturally, RSA and (EC)DSA implementations have become the target of numerous attacks, including powerful side-channel attacks. Hence, cryptographic libraries were patched repeatedly over the years.Here we introduce Jolt, a novel attack targeting signature scheme implementations. Our attack exploits faulty signatures gained by injecting faults during signature generation. By using the signature verification primitive, we correct faulty signatures and, in the process deduce bits of the secret signing key. Compared to recent attacks that exploit single bit biases in the nonce that require 245 signatures, our attack requires less than a thousand faulty signatures for a 256-bit (EC)DSA. The performance improvement is due to the fact that our attack targets the secret signing key, which does not change across signing sessions. We show that the proposed attack also works on Schnorr and RSA signatures with minor modifications.We demonstrate the viability of Jolt by running experiments targeting TLS handshakes in common cryptographic libraries such as WolfSSL, OpenSSL, Microsoft SymCrypt, LibreSSL, and Amazon s2n. On our target platform, the online phase takes less than 2 hours to recover 192 bits of a 256-bit ECDSA key, which is sufficient for full key recovery. We note that while RSA signatures are protected in popular cryptographic libraries, OpenSSL remains vulnerable to double fault injection. We have also reviewed their Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) hardened versions which are slightly less efficient but still vulnerable to our attack. We found that (EC)DSA signatures remain largely unprotected against software-only faults, posing a threat to real-life deployments such as TLS, and potentially other security protocols such as SSH and IPSec. This highlights the need for a thorough review and implementation of faults checking in security protocol implementations.
{"title":"Jolt: Recovering TLS Signing Keys via Rowhammer Faults","authors":"K. Mus, Yarkin Doröz, M. Tol, Kristi Rahman, B. Sunar","doi":"10.1109/SP46215.2023.10179450","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP46215.2023.10179450","url":null,"abstract":"Digital Signature Schemes such as DSA, ECDSA, and RSA are widely deployed to protect the integrity of security protocols such as TLS, SSH, and IPSec. In TLS, for instance, RSA and (EC)DSA are used to sign the state of the agreed upon protocol parameters during the handshake phase. Naturally, RSA and (EC)DSA implementations have become the target of numerous attacks, including powerful side-channel attacks. Hence, cryptographic libraries were patched repeatedly over the years.Here we introduce Jolt, a novel attack targeting signature scheme implementations. Our attack exploits faulty signatures gained by injecting faults during signature generation. By using the signature verification primitive, we correct faulty signatures and, in the process deduce bits of the secret signing key. Compared to recent attacks that exploit single bit biases in the nonce that require 245 signatures, our attack requires less than a thousand faulty signatures for a 256-bit (EC)DSA. The performance improvement is due to the fact that our attack targets the secret signing key, which does not change across signing sessions. We show that the proposed attack also works on Schnorr and RSA signatures with minor modifications.We demonstrate the viability of Jolt by running experiments targeting TLS handshakes in common cryptographic libraries such as WolfSSL, OpenSSL, Microsoft SymCrypt, LibreSSL, and Amazon s2n. On our target platform, the online phase takes less than 2 hours to recover 192 bits of a 256-bit ECDSA key, which is sufficient for full key recovery. We note that while RSA signatures are protected in popular cryptographic libraries, OpenSSL remains vulnerable to double fault injection. We have also reviewed their Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) hardened versions which are slightly less efficient but still vulnerable to our attack. We found that (EC)DSA signatures remain largely unprotected against software-only faults, posing a threat to real-life deployments such as TLS, and potentially other security protocols such as SSH and IPSec. This highlights the need for a thorough review and implementation of faults checking in security protocol implementations.","PeriodicalId":439989,"journal":{"name":"2023 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129401848","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-01DOI: 10.1109/TABLETOP.2006.21
Leoncio Aguilar Negrete
Welcome to APCCAS and PrimeAsia 2019. On behalf of the organizing committee, it is our pleasure to cordially welcome and invite you to the 2019 IEEE Asia Pacific Conference on Circuits and Systems (APCCAS 2019), and the 2019 IEEE Asia Pacific Conference on Post Graduate Research in Microelectronics and Electronics (PrimeAsia 2019), to be held in Bangkok, Thailand, during November 11-14, 2019. The IEEE APCCAS is one of the major conferences sponsored by the IEEE Circuits and Systems (CAS) Society and has been held in Asia-Pacific countries, where APCCAS 2019 is the 15th annual conference in the series. APCCAS is the international forum for researchers, scientists, educators, students and engineers to discuss and exchange experiences with the aim to stimulate and enhance the research and development in the areas that are related to Circuits and Systems. This year the theme of the conference is “Innovative CAS Towards Sustainable Energy and Technology Disruption”. Bangkok (“Krungthep” in Thai or the city of Angles) is the city of very famous and appreciated by visitors in a large range of attractions, from temples, the Grand Palace, shopping centers, galleries and museums. Most of the sightseeing places can easily be reached by Skytrain (BTS) or Underground train (MRT). Please make sure to take this opportunity to visit and get around Bangkok with your own eyes. Finally, as the General Chair of the Conference, I would like to invite you to submit your technical paper for review, presentation and also attend the APCCAS and PrimeAsia 2019. We do hope that this conference will provide a good opportunity for researchers to meet and exchange ideas and to make contacts and collaboration.
{"title":"Message from the General Chair","authors":"Leoncio Aguilar Negrete","doi":"10.1109/TABLETOP.2006.21","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/TABLETOP.2006.21","url":null,"abstract":"Welcome to APCCAS and PrimeAsia 2019. On behalf of the organizing committee, it is our pleasure to cordially welcome and invite you to the 2019 IEEE Asia Pacific Conference on Circuits and Systems (APCCAS 2019), and the 2019 IEEE Asia Pacific Conference on Post Graduate Research in Microelectronics and Electronics (PrimeAsia 2019), to be held in Bangkok, Thailand, during November 11-14, 2019. The IEEE APCCAS is one of the major conferences sponsored by the IEEE Circuits and Systems (CAS) Society and has been held in Asia-Pacific countries, where APCCAS 2019 is the 15th annual conference in the series. APCCAS is the international forum for researchers, scientists, educators, students and engineers to discuss and exchange experiences with the aim to stimulate and enhance the research and development in the areas that are related to Circuits and Systems. This year the theme of the conference is “Innovative CAS Towards Sustainable Energy and Technology Disruption”. Bangkok (“Krungthep” in Thai or the city of Angles) is the city of very famous and appreciated by visitors in a large range of attractions, from temples, the Grand Palace, shopping centers, galleries and museums. Most of the sightseeing places can easily be reached by Skytrain (BTS) or Underground train (MRT). Please make sure to take this opportunity to visit and get around Bangkok with your own eyes. Finally, as the General Chair of the Conference, I would like to invite you to submit your technical paper for review, presentation and also attend the APCCAS and PrimeAsia 2019. We do hope that this conference will provide a good opportunity for researchers to meet and exchange ideas and to make contacts and collaboration.","PeriodicalId":439989,"journal":{"name":"2023 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128793817","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-01DOI: 10.1109/SP46215.2023.10179344
Jingjie Li, Kaiwen Sun, Brittany Skye Huff, Anna Marie Bierley, Younghyun Kim, F. Schaub, Kassem Fawaz
Smart home technologies offer many benefits to users. Yet, they also carry complex security and privacy implications that users often struggle to assess and account for during adoption. To better understand users’ considerations and attitudes regarding smart home security and privacy, in particular how users develop them progressively, we conducted a qualitative content analysis of 4,957 Reddit comments in 180 security- and privacy-related discussion threads from /r/homeautomation, a major Reddit smart home forum. Our analysis reveals that users’ security and privacy attitudes, manifested in the levels of concern and degree to which they incorporate protective strategies, are shaped by multi-dimensional considerations. Users’ attitudes evolve according to changing contextual factors, such as adoption phases, and how they become aware of these factors. Further, we describe how online discourse about security and privacy risks and protections contributes to individual and collective attitude development. Based on our findings, we provide recommendations to improve smart home designs, support users’ attitude development, facilitate information exchange, and guide future research regarding smart home security and privacy.
{"title":"“It’s up to the Consumer to be Smart”: Understanding the Security and Privacy Attitudes of Smart Home Users on Reddit","authors":"Jingjie Li, Kaiwen Sun, Brittany Skye Huff, Anna Marie Bierley, Younghyun Kim, F. Schaub, Kassem Fawaz","doi":"10.1109/SP46215.2023.10179344","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP46215.2023.10179344","url":null,"abstract":"Smart home technologies offer many benefits to users. Yet, they also carry complex security and privacy implications that users often struggle to assess and account for during adoption. To better understand users’ considerations and attitudes regarding smart home security and privacy, in particular how users develop them progressively, we conducted a qualitative content analysis of 4,957 Reddit comments in 180 security- and privacy-related discussion threads from /r/homeautomation, a major Reddit smart home forum. Our analysis reveals that users’ security and privacy attitudes, manifested in the levels of concern and degree to which they incorporate protective strategies, are shaped by multi-dimensional considerations. Users’ attitudes evolve according to changing contextual factors, such as adoption phases, and how they become aware of these factors. Further, we describe how online discourse about security and privacy risks and protections contributes to individual and collective attitude development. Based on our findings, we provide recommendations to improve smart home designs, support users’ attitude development, facilitate information exchange, and guide future research regarding smart home security and privacy.","PeriodicalId":439989,"journal":{"name":"2023 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128649296","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-01DOI: 10.1109/SP46215.2023.10179434
Yiping Ma, Jess Woods, Sebastian Angel, Antigoni Polychroniadou, T. Rabin
This paper introduces Flamingo, a system for secure aggregation of data across a large set of clients. In secure aggregation, a server sums up the private inputs of clients and obtains the result without learning anything about the individual inputs beyond what is implied by the final sum. Flamingo focuses on the multi-round setting found in federated learning in which many consecutive summations (averages) of model weights are performed to derive a good model. Previous protocols, such as Bell et al. (CCS ’20), have been designed for a single round and are adapted to the federated learning setting by repeating the protocol multiple times. Flamingo eliminates the need for the per-round setup of previous protocols, and has a new lightweight dropout resilience protocol to ensure that if clients leave in the middle of a sum the server can still obtain a meaningful result. Furthermore, Flamingo introduces a new way to locally choose the so-called client neighborhood introduced by Bell et al. These techniques help Flamingo reduce the number of interactions between clients and the server, resulting in a significant reduction in the end-to-end runtime for a full training session over prior work.We implement and evaluate Flamingo and show that it can securely train a neural network on the (Extended) MNIST and CIFAR-100 datasets, and the model converges without a loss in accuracy, compared to a non-private federated learning system.
{"title":"Flamingo: Multi-Round Single-Server Secure Aggregation with Applications to Private Federated Learning","authors":"Yiping Ma, Jess Woods, Sebastian Angel, Antigoni Polychroniadou, T. Rabin","doi":"10.1109/SP46215.2023.10179434","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP46215.2023.10179434","url":null,"abstract":"This paper introduces Flamingo, a system for secure aggregation of data across a large set of clients. In secure aggregation, a server sums up the private inputs of clients and obtains the result without learning anything about the individual inputs beyond what is implied by the final sum. Flamingo focuses on the multi-round setting found in federated learning in which many consecutive summations (averages) of model weights are performed to derive a good model. Previous protocols, such as Bell et al. (CCS ’20), have been designed for a single round and are adapted to the federated learning setting by repeating the protocol multiple times. Flamingo eliminates the need for the per-round setup of previous protocols, and has a new lightweight dropout resilience protocol to ensure that if clients leave in the middle of a sum the server can still obtain a meaningful result. Furthermore, Flamingo introduces a new way to locally choose the so-called client neighborhood introduced by Bell et al. These techniques help Flamingo reduce the number of interactions between clients and the server, resulting in a significant reduction in the end-to-end runtime for a full training session over prior work.We implement and evaluate Flamingo and show that it can securely train a neural network on the (Extended) MNIST and CIFAR-100 datasets, and the model converges without a loss in accuracy, compared to a non-private federated learning system.","PeriodicalId":439989,"journal":{"name":"2023 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)","volume":"238 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121310469","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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