Pub Date : 2019-09-19DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198793366.003.0014
Rowan Cruft
Chapter 14 turns from property to a further class of rights groundable only by how they serve parties beyond the right-holder. Unlike property, the rights of Chapter 14 protect the right-holder’s performance of role-defining duties to serve others: e.g. a bus driver’s or politician’s rights to be unimpeded in performing her duties of office, or a doctor’s to her assistant’s help. The chapter argues that unlike with property, there is little risk of people erroneously conceiving such rights as grounded fundamentally by the right-holder’s good. Nonetheless, such rights distinctively protect the right-holder’s important interest in carrying out her morally justified duties. On this basis, the chapter defends our use of the concept of a ‘right’ in such cases—even though because the right-holder’s interest cannot be the main ground of the duties to assist or to avoid impeding, conceiving such duties as correlating with rights is not conceptually compulsory.
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Pub Date : 2019-09-19DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198793366.003.0013
Rowan Cruft
Where Chapter 12 established that property belonging to those with reasonable wealth cannot be ‘natural’ rights grounded for the right-holder’s sake, Chapter 13 argues that such property is, rather, groundable on the common good, as outlined by classical liberals like Hayek, Hume, and Smith. Surprisingly, this approach gives us reason to stop seeing most property as an individual right, but rather as duties-owed-to-the-community, duties that individuals control. This is because property—unlike many other rights that are not ‘for the right-holder’s sake’—does not wear on its face its ground in the common good. Owners’ rights are not like those of a teacher, say: rights clearly protecting an other-serving role. Conceiving property as a right therefore carries a major risk that it will be seen as ‘natural’, grounded by the right-holder’s own good. To avoid this, the chapter argues that we should start conceiving free markets as involving ‘controllership’, in which duties-not-to-trespass are owed to the community rather than to particular owners.
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Pub Date : 2019-09-19DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198793366.003.0003
Rowan Cruft
Chapter 3 examines the relation between rights and the powers typically borne by right-holders: powers to waive duties, demand their fulfilment, enforce them, resent them, forgive them. It argues that there are impersonal parallels, performable by third parties, for all the powers that one might think can only be performed by the person to whom a duty is owed. We therefore cannot identify to whom a duty is owed by asking who can exercise the relevant powers. Instead we need to ask, circularly, who can exercise these powers as right-holder to whom the duty is owed. This reasoning is used to criticize the Will Theory of Rights (as found in Hart and Steiner), and other problems are found with Sreenivasan’s Hybrid Theory and Feinberg’s demand-based approach.
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