Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition最新文献

Relationalism is the view that a quantity (i.e., space or mass) consists only of a network of concrete objects that stand in determinate relations (spatial relations or mass-relations). At its very core, the theory claims that an object possesses a determinate quantity fundamentally by standing in determinate relations in that quantity to other objects. For instance, my laptop’s mass consists fundamentally in the fact that it is k times more or less massive than other objects (my neighbor’s car, the Earth, the International Prototype of the Kilogram). The view is nominalistic insofar as, according to it, facts about quantities are fundamental facts about particulars (that they are so and so related) and not about their attributes (like quantitative universals or positions in abstract state spaces). I offer here an argument against this theory, which I call “ultimate” (borrowing Bird’s (2005) term) because it shows that the very core of this theory fails to account for what it is supposed to account for: the fact that objects possess determinate quantities. I show that by merely situating objects in relation to each other, it fails to situate them anywhere really, that is, to endow them with well-determined quantities.

Analytic truths are necessary but rather insubstantial, given that analytic sentences are true no matter how things are. It is nowadays a commonplace that there are also substantial metaphysical truths the necessity of which derives from things necessarily being one way rather than another. Theoretical identifications and certain suitably conditionalized identity statements count as paradigmatic examples of sentences expressing such necessary facts. Although there is no shortage of attempts to deflate these examples, this paper proposes another deflationary analysis. Based on this analysis, I shall try to defend a perhaps paradoxically sounding thesis: even under the interpretation under which the sentences in question turn out to be necessarily true, they merely state contingent facts.

What is inference? This paper discusses a recent account that aims to answer this question—Susanna Siegel’s Response Hypothesis. The hallmark of inference, on Siegel’s account, is the epistemic dependence of a mental transition’s output state(s) on its input state(s). In this paper, I argue that some alleged non-inferential transitions exhibit the kind of epistemic dependence that Siegel’s account takes to be characteristic of inference. More precisely, I argue that some associative transitions exhibit this kind of epistemic dependence—a problematic conclusion, since Siegel takes inference and association to be mutually exclusive kinds of mental transitions. I then suggest a way out of this problem: to reject the assumption that association and inference are mutually exclusive. This may be considered a bold move, for associative transitions are often considered a paradigm example of non-inferential transitions. So, I end up discussing the motivation behind the move and arguing that it opens up an attractive niche for the development of some philosophical projects. 

The disappearing agent problem is traditionally cast as a tension between events and event-causation, on the one hand, and agents and agent-causation on the other. However, as we show, the tension between events and agents can be recast as a tension between causation by agents and causation by parts of agents. If this is right, agent-causalists have their own disappearing agent problem to deal with. After setting out a version of this problem in the form of an overdetermination argument, we present available responses to it. By examining these responses, our aim is to motivate the elaboration of an idea of derivative causation within agent-causal theories of action, whereby complex agents with parts cause whatever they must cause in order to act by way of their parts causing it.

David Lewis’s classical counterfactual theory of causation fails to capture what we call the “reliability constraint on causation,” according to which c causes e only if e would occur in pertinently similar circumstances where c occurs. In this article, we put forward a modified counterfactual account of causation that attempts to accommodate the reliability constraint. Our account adopts a strengthened possible-worlds semantics while retaining the strong centering thesis. Moreover, by contrasting our approach with several alternative counterfactual approaches to reliability, we aim to argue that our account is more plausible than the competing accounts. 

Buck-passing analyses of normative concepts in terms of normative reasons face the so-called ‘wrong kind of reason’ (WKR) problem. Most work on this topic has focused either (i) on the WKR problem for the buck-passing account of value or (ii) more generally as an issue for ‘reasons fundamentalists’ (those that hold that all normative concepts can be analysed into normative reasons). This paper concerns the buck-passing analysis of deontic concepts, in particular the concept of wrongness, understood as an analysis into normative reasons for action. I first address the question of whether wrong kind reasons for action are possible in the first place, before examining and rejecting some accounts of the WKR/RKR for action. I end with a suggestion which points to a positive account of the distinction, and I explain one way in which appealing to this distinction can help to resolve the WKR problem.

A number of commentators have argued that epistemic contextualism faces the factivity problem, which is the problem that contextualism, together with some plausible epistemic principles, will lead to a contradiction. In this paper, I argue that on three variants of contextualism, two of the premises of the factivity problem are incompatible. Thus, the factivity problem is dissolved in the sense that contextualism does not lead to such a contradiction.

In this paper, we examine an overlooked answer to the Special Composition Question (SCQ), termed “Mereological Anti-Conservatism.” This view posits that extraordinary objects exist but that ordinary objects do not. For example, while tables and chairs do not exist, the mereological sums of these items do correspond to real objects. Although such a claim may initially seem absurd, we argue that (i) it is entirely derived from the claims and commitments of traditional rival theories—Nihilism, Universalism, and Conservatism; (ii) it resolves several issues that plague Conservatism, such as problems of vagueness, change and persistence, and the shortcomings of common sense; and (iii) it offers a more plausible perspective than Conservatism when considering the vast scale of possible worlds with differently segmented realities. Ultimately, we contend that if Anti-Conservatism is deemed implausible, then Conservatism must be as well, for structurally similar reasons.

Parfit (2011, 2017) denies that committing to the existence of reasons is ontologically costly. To motivate his denial, Mintz-Woo (2018) thinks Parfit forwards two arguments: the plural senses argument from elimination and the argument from empty ontology. Mintz-Woo believes he has “debunked” both arguments. In what follows, we do three things. First, we argue that his objections to the arguments fail or at best miss the point. Second, we argue that even if our independent responses fail, his responses meet an unfortunate dilemma. Lastly, we address his concerns about the relationship between Parfit’s ontology and truth.

There has been considerable debate among scholars as to whether maps can play an inferential role. The debate has focused on whether maps possess the representational format required for logical transitions. This paper addresses a distinct challenge, namely whether maps can satisfy the taking condition, which has been proposed as a necessary condition for inference. In doing so, the focus of the discussion is slightly shifted by analyzing not only the representational structure of maps but also the rational transitions within them. Given that one of the main reasons for the use of maps is navigation, a dynamic notion of inference is proposed which takes into account practical reasoning. According to this view, logical theoretical inferences are just one type of many different kinds of inferential processes.