Pub Date : 2019-06-04DOI: 10.1515/9780823284481-005
D. Lohmar
This chapter investigates phenomenology’s “eidetic” methodology, which, when applied to the essential structures of consciousness, opposes an empirical psychology that must rest on empirical generalizations. It clarifies the sense in which eidetic intuition is a form of cognition and how it yields knowledge of a priori (necessary and universal) structures without falling into a kind of Platonism that hypostasizes what is essential to a type. It also explores the intimate connection between “free phantasy” or imaginative variation and the resultant eidetic intuition. In concluding, it discusses a series of potential difficulties with the notions of eidetic variation and intuition.
{"title":"The Phenomenological Method of Eidetic Intuition and Its Clarification as Eidetic Variation","authors":"D. Lohmar","doi":"10.1515/9780823284481-005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/9780823284481-005","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter investigates phenomenology’s “eidetic” methodology, which, when applied to the essential structures of consciousness, opposes an empirical psychology that must rest on empirical generalizations. It clarifies the sense in which eidetic intuition is a form of cognition and how it yields knowledge of a priori (necessary and universal) structures without falling into a kind of Platonism that hypostasizes what is essential to a type. It also explores the intimate connection between “free phantasy” or imaginative variation and the resultant eidetic intuition. In concluding, it discusses a series of potential difficulties with the notions of eidetic variation and intuition.","PeriodicalId":44408,"journal":{"name":"HUSSERL STUDIES","volume":"176 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2019-06-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77716530","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-06-04DOI: 10.5422/FORDHAM/9780823284467.003.0007
Verena Mayer, C. Erhard
This chapter details Husserl’s reconstruction of the concept of presentation (Vorstellung) and his transformation of Brentano’s thesis that all acts are either presentations or founded on presentations into the thesis that all acts are either objectifying or based on objectifications. The study reveals that, for Husserl, the intentionality-characteristic of any particular experience depends upon objectivating acts. Since all other kinds of experiences beyond the objectifications in perception (of things) and judgments (of states of affairs pertaining to things) depend on these underlying objectifications, the intentionality of these other kinds of experience—their directedness to an object—can be properly understood only in the light of the notion of objectifying acts. Carefully noted, however, is the fact that although non-objectifying acts are grounded in objectifications, they cannot be reduced to the objectifying acts.
{"title":"The Significance of Objectifying Acts in Husserl’s Fifth Investigation","authors":"Verena Mayer, C. Erhard","doi":"10.5422/FORDHAM/9780823284467.003.0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5422/FORDHAM/9780823284467.003.0007","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter details Husserl’s reconstruction of the concept of presentation (Vorstellung) and his transformation of Brentano’s thesis that all acts are either presentations or founded on presentations into the thesis that all acts are either objectifying or based on objectifications. The study reveals that, for Husserl, the intentionality-characteristic of any particular experience depends upon objectivating acts. Since all other kinds of experiences beyond the objectifications in perception (of things) and judgments (of states of affairs pertaining to things) depend on these underlying objectifications, the intentionality of these other kinds of experience—their directedness to an object—can be properly understood only in the light of the notion of objectifying acts. Carefully noted, however, is the fact that although non-objectifying acts are grounded in objectifications, they cannot be reduced to the objectifying acts.","PeriodicalId":44408,"journal":{"name":"HUSSERL STUDIES","volume":"33 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2019-06-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78247508","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Husserl’s Phenomenology of the Monad:","authors":"K. Mertens, Robin Litscher Wilkins","doi":"10.2307/j.ctvfjd08m.13","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvfjd08m.13","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44408,"journal":{"name":"HUSSERL STUDIES","volume":"19 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2019-06-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81558202","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-06-04DOI: 10.5422/FORDHAM/9780823284467.003.0006
K. Schuhmann
This chapter challenges the widely held view that Husserl’s early account of intentionality was a simple and direct development of Brentano’s theory. Husserl’s theory developed as a response to the account of intentionality in Twardowski’s On the Content and Object of Presentations. The chapter argues that Twardowski thought Brentano’s theory inadequate to address Bolzano’s problem of objectless presentations and that Husserl’s account, which differs from both Brentano’s and Twardowski’s, satisfactorily addressed this problem. Later developments in Husserl’s theory, he concludes, were the result of attempting to address problems other than the Bolzano problem.
{"title":"Intentionality and the Intentional Object in the Early Husserl","authors":"K. Schuhmann","doi":"10.5422/FORDHAM/9780823284467.003.0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5422/FORDHAM/9780823284467.003.0006","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter challenges the widely held view that Husserl’s early account of intentionality was a simple and direct development of Brentano’s theory. Husserl’s theory developed as a response to the account of intentionality in Twardowski’s On the Content and Object of Presentations. The chapter argues that Twardowski thought Brentano’s theory inadequate to address Bolzano’s problem of objectless presentations and that Husserl’s account, which differs from both Brentano’s and Twardowski’s, satisfactorily addressed this problem. Later developments in Husserl’s theory, he concludes, were the result of attempting to address problems other than the Bolzano problem.","PeriodicalId":44408,"journal":{"name":"HUSSERL STUDIES","volume":"9 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2019-06-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75649389","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-06-04DOI: 10.5422/FORDHAM/9780823284467.003.0011
Karel Mertens, Robin Litscher Wilkins
This chapter argues that the differences between Husserl’s account of intersubjectivity and Leibniz’s monadology are serious enough to defeat any attempt to construct a phenomenological monadology. Monadological thinking cannot solve the phenomenological problem of intersubjectivity, and phenomenological thinking cannot yield a properly metaphysical monadology, for there can be no phenomenological grounding for the idea of a monad determined by a complete concept. From the phenomenological perspective, a subject’s experience of the world is always limited and incomplete. The chapter argues, furthermore, that Husserl’s attempt at a monadology reveals the weakness in the phenomenological account of intersubjectivity, for by starting with a subject’s limited experience, phenomenology cannot account for the communalization that is presupposed in the recognition that an individual’s experience is limited.
{"title":"Husserl’s Phenomenology of the Monad: Remarks on Husserl’s Confrontation with Leibniz","authors":"Karel Mertens, Robin Litscher Wilkins","doi":"10.5422/FORDHAM/9780823284467.003.0011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5422/FORDHAM/9780823284467.003.0011","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter argues that the differences between Husserl’s account of intersubjectivity and Leibniz’s monadology are serious enough to defeat any attempt to construct a phenomenological monadology. Monadological thinking cannot solve the phenomenological problem of intersubjectivity, and phenomenological thinking cannot yield a properly metaphysical monadology, for there can be no phenomenological grounding for the idea of a monad determined by a complete concept. From the phenomenological perspective, a subject’s experience of the world is always limited and incomplete. The chapter argues, furthermore, that Husserl’s attempt at a monadology reveals the weakness in the phenomenological account of intersubjectivity, for by starting with a subject’s limited experience, phenomenology cannot account for the communalization that is presupposed in the recognition that an individual’s experience is limited.","PeriodicalId":44408,"journal":{"name":"HUSSERL STUDIES","volume":"169 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2019-06-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72886314","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-06-04DOI: 10.1515/9780823284481-009
Klaus Held
Phenomenology is concerned not only with the study of the intentional correlation but also the structures of intentional subjectivity, the most important of which for Husserl is the nontemporal structure of the living present that underlies the temporalization of the subject’s experiences (and of objective time). This chapter considers Husserl’s account of the consciousness of inner time in order to provide a critique of Husserl’s discussions of the temporality of the phenomenal field. Focusing on the latter allows one to articulate more clearly both the structure of time as the dimensional character of the phenomenal field and the manner in which transcendent objects and their temporality are disclosed within the phenomenal field.
{"title":"The Phenomenology of Time Following Husserl","authors":"Klaus Held","doi":"10.1515/9780823284481-009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/9780823284481-009","url":null,"abstract":"Phenomenology is concerned not only with the study of the intentional correlation but also the structures of intentional subjectivity, the most important of which for Husserl is the nontemporal structure of the living present that underlies the temporalization of the subject’s experiences (and of objective time). This chapter considers Husserl’s account of the consciousness of inner time in order to provide a critique of Husserl’s discussions of the temporality of the phenomenal field. Focusing on the latter allows one to articulate more clearly both the structure of time as the dimensional character of the phenomenal field and the manner in which transcendent objects and their temporality are disclosed within the phenomenal field.","PeriodicalId":44408,"journal":{"name":"HUSSERL STUDIES","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2019-06-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75585519","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-06-04DOI: 10.5422/FORDHAM/9780823284467.003.0002
S. Rinofner-Kreidl
This chapter is a detailed discussion of the nature of psychologism and the efficacy of Husserl’s critique thereof. It argues, first, that the critique of logical psychologism in the “Prolegomena” reveals that the problem raised by psychologism is fundamentally one of determining the proper philosophical standpoint and, second, that this critique played a central and decisive role in the development of Husserl’s phenomenology. The proper standpoint incorporates a commitment to the presuppositionless description of essential structures of experience, and from this perspective, Husserl saw that his initial response to psychologism was inadequate insofar as it focused on the consequences of psychologism rather than its presuppositions.
{"title":"The Prob em of Psychologism and the Idea of a Phenomenological Science","authors":"S. Rinofner-Kreidl","doi":"10.5422/FORDHAM/9780823284467.003.0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5422/FORDHAM/9780823284467.003.0002","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter is a detailed discussion of the nature of psychologism and the efficacy of Husserl’s critique thereof. It argues, first, that the critique of logical psychologism in the “Prolegomena” reveals that the problem raised by psychologism is fundamentally one of determining the proper philosophical standpoint and, second, that this critique played a central and decisive role in the development of Husserl’s phenomenology. The proper standpoint incorporates a commitment to the presuppositionless description of essential structures of experience, and from this perspective, Husserl saw that his initial response to psychologism was inadequate insofar as it focused on the consequences of psychologism rather than its presuppositions.","PeriodicalId":44408,"journal":{"name":"HUSSERL STUDIES","volume":"28 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2019-06-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88961513","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-06-04DOI: 10.5422/FORDHAM/9780823284467.003.0012
E. Ströker, Hayden Kee
This essay takes up a recurring theme in Husserl’s phenomenology: the crisis of European culture and, more specifically, the crisis of reason that manifests itself in the failure of the positive sciences to understand their origins and their lack of a fully scientific methodology. Husserl’s phenomenology attempts to return to those origins—to things and states of affairs simply as they present themselves to experiencing subjects—and to proceed with a rigorous methodology to examine them and articulate their essential structures. Only in this way are we able to understand higher-order cultural achievements of the sort we find in the positive and formal sciences. The chapter notes how Husserl extended his analyses to consider the formation and transmission of traditions, including the dangers lurking in tradition when we passively accept its results without actively appropriating their truth.
{"title":"Husserl’s Phenomenology: Philosophia Perennis in the Crisis of European Culture","authors":"E. Ströker, Hayden Kee","doi":"10.5422/FORDHAM/9780823284467.003.0012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5422/FORDHAM/9780823284467.003.0012","url":null,"abstract":"This essay takes up a recurring theme in Husserl’s phenomenology: the crisis of European culture and, more specifically, the crisis of reason that manifests itself in the failure of the positive sciences to understand their origins and their lack of a fully scientific methodology. Husserl’s phenomenology attempts to return to those origins—to things and states of affairs simply as they present themselves to experiencing subjects—and to proceed with a rigorous methodology to examine them and articulate their essential structures. Only in this way are we able to understand higher-order cultural achievements of the sort we find in the positive and formal sciences. The chapter notes how Husserl extended his analyses to consider the formation and transmission of traditions, including the dangers lurking in tradition when we passively accept its results without actively appropriating their truth.","PeriodicalId":44408,"journal":{"name":"HUSSERL STUDIES","volume":"33 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2019-06-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76560451","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：