Journal of Corporate Law Studies最新文献_第3页

ESG-based remuneration in the wave of sustainability 可持续发展浪潮中的esg薪酬

4区社会学 Q1 LAW

Journal of Corporate Law Studies

Pub Date : 2023-01-02 DOI: 10.1080/14735970.2023.2253888

Longjie Lu

By investigating ESG-based remuneration in the UK FTSE 350 companies, this article finds that in practice, ESG-based remuneration may depart from its expected role in promoting corporate sustainability, whereas being adopted as a tactic for impression management or managerial rent extraction. Due to the unmeasurable effects of most ESG factors on shareholder value and their subjective nature, ESG-based remuneration is vulnerable to exploitation for symbolic and self-serving purposes. For companies aiming to promote long-term shareholder value, extending the assessment period of financial performance is a less costly and risky option compared to ESG-based remuneration. Differently, for companies oriented by a stakeholder purpose, ESG-based remuneration may play a part in incentivising executives to achieve plural stakeholder interests. To mitigate the risk of exploitation, this article proposes rule tightening in the current disclosure and monitoring frameworks for executive remuneration.

通过调查英国富时350指数成份股公司的esg薪酬，本文发现，在实践中，esg薪酬可能偏离了其促进企业可持续发展的预期作用，而被用作印象管理或管理层租金提取的策略。由于大多数ESG因素对股东价值的影响是不可测量的，且具有主观性，因此基于ESG的薪酬很容易被象征性和自私自利的目的所利用。对于旨在促进长期股东价值的公司来说，与基于esg的薪酬相比，延长财务绩效评估期是一种成本更低、风险更低的选择。不同的是，对于以利益相关者为导向的公司，基于esg的薪酬可能在激励高管实现多元利益相关者利益方面发挥作用。为了降低剥削风险，本文建议在当前的高管薪酬披露和监督框架中收紧规则。

引用次数: 0

Third country central counterparty (CCP) supervision as a catalyst for more centralized EU CCP supervision? 第三国中央交易对手(CCP)监管是欧盟CCP监管更集中的催化剂?

IF 1.1 4区社会学 Q1 LAW

Journal of Corporate Law Studies

Pub Date : 2023-01-02 DOI: 10.1080/14735970.2023.2242089

Evariest Callens

ABSTRACT In early 2022, a UK CCP cancelled some $4 billion of transactions in the war-affected nickel market, triggering outrage from market participants that were in the money. The ‘nickel debacle’ illustrates that CCP risk management and loss absorption mechanisms may result in value redistribution among stakeholders. With CCP stakeholders located in multiple jurisdictions, crisis management decisions from a single-jurisdiction CCP supervisor may not pursue multi-jurisdictional financial stability or a fair balance of stakeholder interests across jurisdictions. Although the case for centralised supervision of EU CCPs thus appears strong, national concerns have persistently blocked increased centralisation. This article re-examines decentralised EU CCP supervision in light of the much-debated post-Brexit centralised EU supervisory regime for systemically important third country CCPs. Two new arguments emerge from this juxtaposition, revealing a dichotomy between the named supervisory regimes that appears hard to justify. First, a decentralised supervisory regime for EU CCPs is difficult to logically square with the policy arguments underpinning the post-Brexit EU supervisory system for systemically important third country CCPs. Secondly, the controversial location policy for ‘too systemically important’ third country CCPs could be more justifiable if the EU were to adopt centralised EU supervision of systemically important EU CCPs.

摘要2022年初，英国CCP取消了受战争影响的镍市场约40亿美元的交易，引发了市场参与者的愤怒。“镍崩溃”表明，CCP风险管理和损失吸收机制可能导致利益相关者之间的价值再分配。由于CCP利益相关者位于多个司法管辖区，单一司法管辖区CCP监管机构的危机管理决策可能无法实现多司法管辖区的金融稳定或各司法管辖区利益相关者利益的公平平衡。尽管对欧盟中央对手方清算所进行集中监管的理由似乎很充分，但各国的担忧一直阻碍着中央集权的增加。鉴于英国脱欧后备受争议的欧盟对具有系统重要性的第三国CCP的集中监督制度，本文重新审视了分散的欧盟CCP监督。从这种并置中出现了两个新的论点，揭示了被命名的监督制度之间的二分法，这似乎很难证明是合理的。首先，欧盟中央对手方清算所的分散监督制度很难与英国脱欧后欧盟对具有系统重要性的第三国中央对手方的监督制度的政策论点逻辑一致。其次，如果欧盟对具有系统重要性的欧盟中央对手方清算所实行集中监管，那么有争议的“过于系统重要性”的第三国中央对手方交易所的选址政策可能更合理。

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引用次数: 0

Thirty years and done – time to abolish the UK Corporate Governance Code 废除英国公司治理守则的时间已经过去了30年

IF 1.1 4区社会学 Q1 LAW

Journal of Corporate Law Studies

Pub Date : 2022-11-04 DOI: 10.1080/14735970.2022.2140496

Brian R. Cheffins, Bobby V. Reddy

ABSTRACT

A 1992 Code of Best Practice developed by a committee Sir Adrian Cadbury chaired revolutionised UK corporate governance. The Code, which introduced non-statutory best practice provisions with which listed companies could choose not to comply so long as they explained why, has evolved into the more expansive UK Corporate Governance Code of today. This article argues that after 3 decades it is time to do away with the code approach and ‘comply-or-explain’. Much of the current Code’s content is now irrelevant, and disclosure and compliance expectations have escalated to levels that create substantial net costs for companies. Additionally, the Code is now being used to address ‘stakeholder’ issues for which the Code’s shareholder enforcement dependent comply-or-explain mechanism is poorly suited. The Code correspondingly should be abolished, with some key points it addresses being dealt with instead by new disclosure requirements under the Financial Conduct Authority’s Listing Rules.

1992年由阿德里安•吉百利爵士主持的一个委员会制定的最佳实践准则彻底改变了英国的公司治理。《公司治理准则》引入了非法定的最佳实践条款，上市公司可以选择不遵守这些条款，只要它们解释原因就行。如今，《公司治理准则》已演变成内容更为广泛的《英国公司治理准则》。本文认为，经过30年的发展，现在是时候抛弃代码方法和“服从或解释”了。现行准则的许多内容现在已经无关紧要，对披露和合规的期望已经上升到给公司带来巨大净成本的水平。此外，《准则》现在被用于解决“利益相关者”问题，而《准则》依赖于股东执行的“遵守或解释”机制不适合解决这些问题。相应的，《行为准则》也应该被废除，其中涉及的一些关键问题应由英国金融市场行为监管局(Financial Conduct Authority)《上市规则》(Listing Rules)下新的披露要求来处理。

引用次数: 0

Thirty years and done – time to abolish the UK Corporate Governance Code 废除英国公司治理守则的时间已经过去了30年

IF 1.1 4区社会学 Q1 LAW

Journal of Corporate Law Studies

Pub Date : 2022-07-03 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.4132617

B. Cheffins, Bobby V. Reddy

ABSTRACT A 1992 Code of Best Practice developed by a committee Sir Adrian Cadbury chaired revolutionised UK corporate governance. The Code, which introduced non-statutory best practice provisions with which listed companies could choose not to comply so long as they explained why, has evolved into the more expansive UK Corporate Governance Code of today. This article argues that after 3 decades it is time to do away with the code approach and ‘comply-or-explain’. Much of the current Code’s content is now irrelevant, and disclosure and compliance expectations have escalated to levels that create substantial net costs for companies. Additionally, the Code is now being used to address ‘stakeholder’ issues for which the Code’s shareholder enforcement dependent comply-or-explain mechanism is poorly suited. The Code correspondingly should be abolished, with some key points it addresses being dealt with instead by new disclosure requirements under the Financial Conduct Authority’s Listing Rules.

1992年由阿德里安•吉百利爵士主持的一个委员会制定的最佳实践准则彻底改变了英国的公司治理。《公司治理准则》引入了非法定的最佳实践条款，上市公司可以选择不遵守这些条款，只要它们解释原因就行。如今，《公司治理准则》已演变成内容更为广泛的《英国公司治理准则》。本文认为，经过30年的发展，现在是时候抛弃代码方法和“服从或解释”了。现行准则的许多内容现在已经无关紧要，对披露和合规的期望已经上升到给公司带来巨大净成本的水平。此外，《准则》现在被用于解决“利益相关者”问题，而《准则》依赖于股东执行的“遵守或解释”机制不适合解决这些问题。相应的，《行为准则》也应该被废除，其中涉及的一些关键问题应由英国金融市场行为监管局(Financial Conduct Authority)《上市规则》(Listing Rules)下新的披露要求来处理。

引用次数: 2

Extraterritorial jurisdiction of China’s new securities law: policies, problems and proposals 中国新证券法域外管辖:政策、问题与建议

IF 1.1 4区社会学 Q1 LAW

Journal of Corporate Law Studies

Pub Date : 2022-07-03 DOI: 10.1080/14735970.2022.2107147

R. Huang, Charles C. Wang, Yuqi Zhou, S. Li

ABSTRACT With the increasing internationalization of its securities market, China has recently introduced Article 2(4) of the 2019 Securities Law, in order to deal with the important issue of extraterritorial jurisdiction over cross-border securities transactions. While it represents an important development, the provision is couched in very broad terms, bringing uncertainties and difficulties to its application in practice. This article proposes a phased reform agenda for improvement: in the short run, the effect test under Article 2(4) should be clarified with more guidance; in the long run, China should go beyond the effect test to consider other relevant tests such as the conduct test and the transactional test. The recent high-profile case of Luckin Coffee is carefully studied to show the factors that China may consider in applying Article 2(4), including the test of national interests, the principle of international comity, and the issue of judicial recourse constraints.

随着证券市场的日益国际化，中国最近出台了2019年《证券法》第2(4)条，以处理跨境证券交易的域外管辖权这一重要问题。虽然这是一项重要的发展，但这项规定的措词非常宽泛，给其在实践中的应用带来了不确定性和困难。本文提出了分阶段改进的改革议程:短期内应明确第2(4)条下的效果检验，并给予更多指导;从长远来看，中国应超越效果检验，考虑其他相关检验，如行为检验和交易检验。本文对最近备受关注的Luckin Coffee一案进行了仔细研究，以显示中国在适用第2(4)条时可能考虑的因素，包括国家利益的检验、国际礼让原则以及司法追索权约束问题。

引用次数: 1

Artificially intelligent boards and the future of Delaware corporate law 人工智能董事会与特拉华州公司法的未来

IF 1.1 4区社会学 Q1 LAW

Journal of Corporate Law Studies

Pub Date : 2022-07-03 DOI: 10.1080/14735970.2022.2153965

Christopher M. Bruner

ABSTRACT This article argues that the prospects for Artificial Intelligence (AI) to impact corporate law are at once over- and under-stated, focusing on the law of Delaware – the predominant jurisdiction of incorporation for US public companies. Claims that AI systems might displace human directors not only exaggerate AI’s foreseeable technological potential, but ignore doctrinal and institutional impediments intrinsic to Delaware’s competitive model – notably, heavy reliance on nuanced applications of the fiduciary duty of loyalty by a true court of equity. At the same time, however, there are discrete AI applications that might not merely be accommodated by Delaware corporate law, but perhaps eventually required. This would appear most likely in the oversight context, where loyalty has been interpreted to require good faith effort to adopt a reasonable compliance monitoring system, an approach driven by an implicit cost-benefit analysis that could lean decisively in favour of AI-based approaches in the foreseeable future.

摘要本文认为，人工智能（AI）影响公司法的前景既被夸大了，也被低估了，重点关注特拉华州法律——美国上市公司的主要注册管辖区。人工智能系统可能取代人类董事的说法不仅夸大了人工智能可预见的技术潜力，而且忽视了特拉华州竞争模式固有的理论和制度障碍——尤其是严重依赖真正的衡平法院对忠诚信托义务的细微应用。然而，与此同时，还有一些离散的人工智能应用程序，这些应用程序可能不仅受到特拉华州公司法的约束，而且可能最终被要求。这在监督背景下最有可能出现，因为忠诚度被解释为需要真诚努力，以采用合理的合规监控系统，这种方法由隐含的成本效益分析驱动，在可预见的未来可能会决定性地倾向于基于人工智能的方法。

引用次数: 1

Private companies: the missing link on the path to net zero 私营企业:通往零排放道路上缺失的一环

IF 1.1 4区社会学 Q1 LAW

Journal of Corporate Law Studies

Pub Date : 2022-07-03 DOI: 10.1080/14735970.2023.2191779

A. A. Gözlügöl, W. Ringe

ABSTRACT Global consensus is growing on the contribution that corporations and finance must make towards the net-zero transition in line with the Paris Agreement goals. However, most efforts have ultimately focused on public companies. This article argues that such a focus falls short of providing a comprehensive approach to the problem of climate change. It particularly examines the contribution of private companies to climate change and the phenomenon of brown-spinning. We show that one cannot afford to ignore private companies in the net-zero transition. Yet, private companies lack several disciplining mechanisms available to public companies, such as institutional investor engagement, certain corporate governance arrangements, and transparency through regular disclosure obligations. Nevertheless, along with some equally applicable generic regulatory instruments, private companies might be subject to external push by their financiers, banks. The article closes with policy implications. Primarily, we discuss and evaluate the recent push to extend climate-related disclosure requirements to private companies.

根据《巴黎协定》的目标，企业和金融机构必须为实现净零排放转型做出贡献，这一点正日益成为全球共识。然而，大多数努力最终都集中在上市公司上。这篇文章认为，这种关注不足以为气候变化问题提供一个全面的方法。它特别研究了私营公司对气候变化的贡献和棕纺现象。我们表明，在净零转型中，人们不能忽视私营企业。然而，私营公司缺乏上市公司所具备的一些约束机制，例如机构投资者参与、某些公司治理安排以及通过定期披露义务实现的透明度。然而，除了一些同样适用的通用监管工具外，私营企业可能还会受到它们的金融家——银行——的外部推动。文章最后提出了政策含义。首先，我们讨论和评估了最近将气候相关信息披露要求扩展到私营公司的推动。

引用次数: 4

The missing theory for regulation and law-making: women in corporate leadership 监管和立法中缺失的理论:企业领导中的女性

IF 1.1 4区社会学 Q1 LAW

Journal of Corporate Law Studies

Pub Date : 2022-07-03 DOI: 10.1080/14735970.2022.2156203

Anindita Jaiswal Jaishiv

ABSTRACT While enough ink has been spilled debating boardroom gender diversity, there is little analysis from a regulatory standpoint in relation to the divergence found in legal strategies across countries. It is this gap which this article seeks to address. In doing so, the article explores the nexus between the rationales and the policy approaches/legal strategies adopted by countries, through the specific comparative examples of Norway and the United Kingdom. This methodology, akin to reverse engineering, helps to explain what determines a country's choice for a mandatory quota or discretionary targets. While offering this explanation, the nuances of hard law versus soft law as policy approaches are examined, specifically within the realm of corporate governance. Next, based on the connections so deduced, an attempt is made to theorise how a legal strategy is derived, and, furthermore, how an optimum strategy can be formulated, although subject to national context.

虽然关于董事会性别多样性的争论已经有了足够多的文章，但从监管的角度来看，很少有关于各国法律策略差异的分析。本文试图解决的正是这一差距。在此过程中，本文通过挪威和联合王国的具体比较实例，探讨了各国采取的基本原理和政策方法/法律战略之间的联系。这种方法类似于逆向工程，有助于解释是什么决定了一个国家对强制性配额或自由目标的选择。在提供这种解释的同时，研究了硬法与软法作为政策方法的细微差别，特别是在公司治理领域。接下来，根据由此推断出的联系，试图对如何推导法律战略进行理论化，进而对如何制定一项最佳战略进行理论化，尽管这要视国家情况而定。

引用次数: 0

Proper purposes and directors’ duties - time to slay the chimera? 恰当的目的和董事的职责——是时候杀死奇美拉了吗？

IF 1.1 4区社会学 Q1 LAW

Journal of Corporate Law Studies

Pub Date : 2022-07-03 DOI: 10.1080/14735970.2023.2218770

Pearlie M. C. Koh

ABSTRACT The statutory statement of directors' duties contained in the Companies Act 2006 imposes a duty on directors to ‘only exercise powers for the purposes for which they are conferred’. The duty has been equiparated with the equitable fraud on a power doctrine. This paper challenges the correctness of this approach, and argues that the unwarranted ‘merging’ of the duty and the doctrine has resulted in a legal chimera standing in the way of a proper understanding of the roles of each of the duty and the doctrine. It is submitted that this erroneous linking of two entirely different concepts is the result of a failure to (i) separate the different measures that have evolved to control directorial exercise of corporate powers, and (ii) pay due heed to the distinctive nature of the devolution of corporate power.

《2006年公司法》中关于董事职责的法定声明规定，董事有义务“仅为其被授予的目的行使权力”。这一义务已与衡平法上的权力欺诈学说等同起来。本文对这种方法的正确性提出了挑战，并认为义务和原则的无根据“合并”导致了一种法律上的嵌合体，阻碍了对义务和原则各自角色的正确理解。有人认为，将两个完全不同的概念错误地联系在一起是未能(i)区分为控制公司权力的董事行使而发展起来的不同措施，以及(ii)适当注意到公司权力下放的独特性质的结果。

引用次数: 0

The cooperation mechanism and legal harmonisation: analysing the past, present and future of mutual recognition and assistance in insolvency proceedings across Mainland China and Hong Kong, with insights from EU insolvency regulations 合作机制和法律协调：分析中国大陆和香港破产程序相互承认和协助的过去、现在和未来，并从欧盟破产法规中获得启示

IF 1.1 4区社会学 Q1 LAW

Journal of Corporate Law Studies

Pub Date : 2022-07-03 DOI: 10.1080/14735970.2023.2212451

Emily Lee

ABSTRACT This article examines the potential and challenges of the ‘Cooperation Mechanism’, a scheme introduced jointly by the Supreme People’s Court in China and the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region on 14 May 2021, for enhancing mutual recognition and assistance in insolvency proceedings. This article contends that the Cooperation Mechanism does not in itself constitute a formal mechanism for mutual recognition. To assess the impact of the Cooperation Mechanism, this article traces and analyses court decisions on recognition and assistance made before the implementation of the Cooperation Mechanism, and places them in contrast to those pursuant to or influenced by the Cooperation Mechanism. Additionally, it highlights a similar practice between Europe’s Brussels Convention of 1968 and two arrangements between Hong Kong and China prior to the Cooperation Mechanism, namely the 2006 Arrangement and the 2019 Arrangement, in carving out bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, notwithstanding some technical differences.

摘要本文探讨了“合作机制”的潜力和挑战，这是中国最高人民法院和香港特别行政区政府于2021年5月14日联合推出的一项计划，旨在加强破产程序中的相互承认和协助。该条认为，合作机制本身并不构成相互承认的正式机制。为了评估合作机制的影响，本文追溯和分析了法院在实施合作机制之前作出的关于承认和援助的裁决，并将其与根据合作机制或受合作机制影响的裁决进行了对比。此外，它还强调了1968年欧洲《布鲁塞尔公约》与香港与中国在合作机制之前的两项安排，即2006年安排和2019年安排在制定破产和破产程序方面的类似做法，尽管存在一些技术差异。

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引用次数: 0