International Journal of Economic Theory最新文献

This paper studies the effect of factor substitution on long-run growth and the convergence speed in the one-sector endogenous-growth model. We consider a general production function that encompasses the most commonly used specifications as particular cases. For two economies with the same initial conditions and parameter values, including the baseline elasticity of substitution (EOS), the one with the higher asymptotic EOS has the higher long-run growth and convergence speed. If the asymptotic EOS is a nondecreasing function of its baseline value, an increase in the baseline EOS entails a higher long-run growth and convergence speed.

Consumer stockpiling involves the intertemporal demand substitution that allows the firm to differentiate stockpilers from others and employ varying pricing strategies. In this paper, I set up a two-period monopoly model that incorporates consumer stockpiling behavior to investigate the effect of stockpiling-based pricing. In equilibrium, I show that when the level of heterogeneity among consumers is high, consumer stockpiling can be used as a device for the firm to identify preferences and price discrimination. Welfare analysis suggests that consumer stockpiling improves consumer surplus and profit despite the associated stockpiling-based pricing.

Hiring workers is costly. Firms' costs reduce resources that can go to recruitment and amplify how unemployment responds to changes in productivity. Workers also incur up-front costs. Examples include moving expenses and regulatory fees. Workers' costs lessen unemployment volatility and leave resources available for recruitment unchanged. Their influence is bounded by the properties of a matching function. Using adjusted data on job finding, I estimate a bound that ascribes limited influence. The results demonstrate that workers' costs affect outcomes (firms threaten workers with paying the fixed costs again if negotiations fail), but their influence on volatility is less than firms' costs.

We derive a new theoretical model of money demand, which reflects backward- and forward-looking preferences in consumption and utility. The former aspect is captured by standard habit formation, and the latter by anticipation of future consumption preferences. By introducing both of these into the Ramsey–Sidrauski framework, we unveil a new highly general model of money demand. We discuss the model in light of the apparent breakdown of money-demand functions and diminished policy relevance of monetary aggregates.

This paper compares different environmental policies under free-trade and carbon tariffs. Our findings are as follows. First, taxes and standards of exporting countries become laxer under carbon tariffs than free trade. Next, if an importing country adopts free trade, its welfare is relatively lower (higher) under taxes when the marginal pollution damage is smaller (greater). Conversely, if an importing country implements a carbon tariff policy, its welfare is relatively higher under taxes. Last, the importing country's free-trade (carbon tariff) policy leads the exporting country to have lower (higher) welfare under taxes than standards.

Developing nations typically prioritize economic growth. Thus, industrial technological progress frequently leads to production expansion and subsequent environmental degradation. This paper, however, proposes that in a dual agricultural economy, the progress in industrial production technology does not necessarily degrade the environment when considering technology spillover. Utilizing a general equilibrium model, we conclude that, at the beginning of modern agricultural development, increasing technology spillover rate adversely affects the environment and social welfare. Yet, after the popularization of modern agriculture, increasing this rate can enhance environmental and welfare conditions. Under specific conditions, industrial technological progress might promote environmental and welfare benefits.

We study wars of attrition with spending constraints. Specifically, there are two players with different values of the prize and costs of continuing wars, and they are endowed with limited budgets that can be used during the war. Two players compete by choosing the time at which they intend to give up within the constraints. We find the constrained mixed strategy equilibrium for this model and provide a full characterization of equilibrium depending on whether each player's constraint is binding or nonbinding.

We propose the concept of local-$��\; ��k��$ farsighted consistent network for analyzing network formation games where players only consider a limited number of feasible networks. A network $��\; ��g��$ is said to be local-$��\; ��k��$ farsightedly consistent if, for any network $��\; ��g�\; �\prime ��$ within the distance-$��\; ��k��$ neighborhood of $��\; ��g��$, either $��\; ��g��$ is not defeated by $��\; ��g�\; �\prime ��$, or $��\; ��g��$ defeats $��\; ��g�$