International Journal of Economic Theory最新文献

We propose the concept of local-$��\; ��k��$ farsighted consistent network for analyzing network formation games where players only consider a limited number of feasible networks. A network $��\; ��g��$ is said to be local-$��\; ��k��$ farsightedly consistent if, for any network $��\; ��g�\; �\prime ��$ within the distance-$��\; ��k��$ neighborhood of $��\; ��g��$, either $��\; ��g��$ is not defeated by $��\; ��g�\; �\prime ��$, or $��\; ��g��$ defeats $��\; ��g�$

This paper constructs a general equilibrium model in a world with two-symmetric countries. It explains welfare gains from international trade and horizontal Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the economy with firm heterogeneity and variable markups stemming from oligopolistic competition. My model shows that the pro-competitive effects of trade and horizontal FDI happen because trade openness induces an increase in product market competition that reduces markups and toughens selection, increasing aggregate productivity. The most significant contribution of the paper is that multinational firms, via horizontal FDI, produce the most significant welfare gains through the toughest selection and lowest markups.

This paper presents various examples of two-player submodular or supermodular contest games. Emphasizing the three main elements of a contest model, our examples revolve around situations where (i) contest success function allows for a draw, (ii) winning prize is not exogenously given but rather jointly produced, or (iii) individual effort cost also depends on the rival's effort. We then illustrate how submodularity and supermodularity can be used to study the existence of equilibrium, the order structure of the equilibrium set, and monotone comparative statics in such contest game examples.

We investigate a finite-horizon dynamic pricing problem of a seller under limited commitment. Even when the buyers are ex ante symmetric to the seller, the seller can charge different prices to different buyers. We show that under the class of posted-price mechanisms this asymmetric treatment of symmetric buyers strictly revenue-dominates symmetric treatment. The seller implements this by using a priority-based deterministic tie-breaking rule instead of using a random tie-breaking rule. The effect of asymmetric treatment on revenue increment increases monotonically as we increase the time horizon of the game.

We study the effects of three forms of taxation—a tax levied on the platform's revenue, an ad valorem tax on consumers' access fees and tax imposed on per-transaction fees of sellers, in vertically differentiated two-sided duopoly platforms with cross-side network effects. The level of informative advertising which increases the probability of finding sellers by buyers, declines with taxes for each platform. Analytical comparison between tax regimes has been made. Additionally, for an increased degree of cross-group externality, platforms raise the level of informative advertising irrespective of tax structures.

This paper proposes a model of irresolute choice rationalizing random choice behavior and examines its applications to decision making under certainty, uncertainty, and risk. Depending on the context, the representations feature canonical signal spaces. Decisions are governed by random draws of signals generating stochastic choice functions. Application to portfolio selection and experimental testing are discussed.