Pub Date : 2023-10-01DOI: 10.5325/jspecphil.37.4.0479
Jennifer Hansen
ABSTRACT In considering the hopeful rhetoric that pervades the “nothing but” psychopharmacological approaches to depression—a contemporary version of what William James calls medical materialism—this article argues that only a thorough-going pluralist account of hope is a hope worth wanting. Medical materialist hope is better conceptualized as a variation of optimism, which assumes a single universe that is already the best of all possible universes, and thereby only promotes optimization of the status quo, rather than encourage a wider undertaking of a variety of experiments in living. A pluralist hope, as opposed to optimism, cannot logically infer what the future will bring from a reigning scientific model of the brain. Rather, a pluralist hope is a passionate belief that a not-yet unimagined, and therefore indeterminate, future will meliorate current human ills should humans strenuously work toward achieving it.
{"title":"A Pluralist Hope: Or, Against Optimizing Neurochemistry on Some Moonlit Dream-Visited Planet","authors":"Jennifer Hansen","doi":"10.5325/jspecphil.37.4.0479","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5325/jspecphil.37.4.0479","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In considering the hopeful rhetoric that pervades the “nothing but” psychopharmacological approaches to depression—a contemporary version of what William James calls medical materialism—this article argues that only a thorough-going pluralist account of hope is a hope worth wanting. Medical materialist hope is better conceptualized as a variation of optimism, which assumes a single universe that is already the best of all possible universes, and thereby only promotes optimization of the status quo, rather than encourage a wider undertaking of a variety of experiments in living. A pluralist hope, as opposed to optimism, cannot logically infer what the future will bring from a reigning scientific model of the brain. Rather, a pluralist hope is a passionate belief that a not-yet unimagined, and therefore indeterminate, future will meliorate current human ills should humans strenuously work toward achieving it.","PeriodicalId":44744,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Speculative Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135707819","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-01DOI: 10.5325/jspecphil.37.4.0461
Larry Cahoone
ABSTRACT Relativism and discussions of the relativity of human judgment have played an important role in philosophy since the 1950s. Such claims are regarded by many as the enemy of realism, the view that human judgments can be valid with respect to their objects as those objects obtain independent of the judgments. Most relativisms assert the relativity of human judgment to some trait of the judge, hence are anthropic. But there is another kind: objective relativism. It was espoused by some of the American pragmatists of the early to mid-twentieth century. Their hope was that objective relativism was compatible with realism while avoiding dualism and idealism. It claimed things themselves are relative. The view eventually disappeared. This article examines this neglected doctrine, not to determine its truth, but its nature. What kind of theory was it, what could it claim to accomplish, and what could it not? Some of its proponents regarded it as a naturalistic metaphysics, but this is problematic. This topic is suggestive for the formulation of a naturalism that rejects physicalism yet is compatible with science and realism.
{"title":"The Other Relativism","authors":"Larry Cahoone","doi":"10.5325/jspecphil.37.4.0461","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5325/jspecphil.37.4.0461","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Relativism and discussions of the relativity of human judgment have played an important role in philosophy since the 1950s. Such claims are regarded by many as the enemy of realism, the view that human judgments can be valid with respect to their objects as those objects obtain independent of the judgments. Most relativisms assert the relativity of human judgment to some trait of the judge, hence are anthropic. But there is another kind: objective relativism. It was espoused by some of the American pragmatists of the early to mid-twentieth century. Their hope was that objective relativism was compatible with realism while avoiding dualism and idealism. It claimed things themselves are relative. The view eventually disappeared. This article examines this neglected doctrine, not to determine its truth, but its nature. What kind of theory was it, what could it claim to accomplish, and what could it not? Some of its proponents regarded it as a naturalistic metaphysics, but this is problematic. This topic is suggestive for the formulation of a naturalism that rejects physicalism yet is compatible with science and realism.","PeriodicalId":44744,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Speculative Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135705894","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-01DOI: 10.5325/jspecphil.37.4.0564
D. M. Spitzer
ABSTRACT Translating archaic Greek philosophies presents a complex of opportunities and challenges for translators, several of which are regularly overlooked. Among these figure prominently the culture and thematics of oralcy and the predisciplinarity in which early Greek thinking took shape. Additionally, translators engaged with early Greek thinking face layers of interpretive history and expectations that can determine the scope of possible translation, which, in turn, limits the range of interpretive possibilities. Yet their predisciplinary or at least hybrid modes summon a broad attention to contexts of language, forms, and meanings that may challenge, or even disrupt, the predominant lines of inquiry and interpretation. How can translation motivated by the oralcy and predisciplinarity of archaic Greece open new directions for interpretation of the early Greek thinkers? Ranging through Anaximander, Xenophanes, Heraclitus, Parmenides, and others, this article articulates some possibilities for translating on and beyond the boundaries of philosophy.
{"title":"<i>Trans-philosophy:</i> Translating Philosophy on and beyond the Boundaries","authors":"D. M. Spitzer","doi":"10.5325/jspecphil.37.4.0564","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5325/jspecphil.37.4.0564","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Translating archaic Greek philosophies presents a complex of opportunities and challenges for translators, several of which are regularly overlooked. Among these figure prominently the culture and thematics of oralcy and the predisciplinarity in which early Greek thinking took shape. Additionally, translators engaged with early Greek thinking face layers of interpretive history and expectations that can determine the scope of possible translation, which, in turn, limits the range of interpretive possibilities. Yet their predisciplinary or at least hybrid modes summon a broad attention to contexts of language, forms, and meanings that may challenge, or even disrupt, the predominant lines of inquiry and interpretation. How can translation motivated by the oralcy and predisciplinarity of archaic Greece open new directions for interpretation of the early Greek thinkers? Ranging through Anaximander, Xenophanes, Heraclitus, Parmenides, and others, this article articulates some possibilities for translating on and beyond the boundaries of philosophy.","PeriodicalId":44744,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Speculative Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135707826","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-01DOI: 10.5325/jspecphil.37.4.0503
J. Edward Hackett
ABSTRACT In this article, the author wishes to defend a naturalistic version of phenomenology rooted in and expropriated from William James’s radical empiricism against Max Scheler’s non-naturalistic phenomenology. By drawing from Jack Reynolds’s arguments for a minimal phenomenology, the author posits that radical empiricism is a middle way between the misguided self-sufficiency of transcendental phenomenology and the misguided self-sufficiency of ontological naturalism. The orthodox reading of Scheler as a dualist is found problematic, and in outlining four propositions characteristic of Scheler’s positions, the author motivates resources from Jamesian thought to argue for the superiority of a naturalistic phenomenology.
{"title":"Radical Empiricism as Naturalistic Phenomenology vs. Non-naturalistic Phenomenology of Max Scheler","authors":"J. Edward Hackett","doi":"10.5325/jspecphil.37.4.0503","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5325/jspecphil.37.4.0503","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In this article, the author wishes to defend a naturalistic version of phenomenology rooted in and expropriated from William James’s radical empiricism against Max Scheler’s non-naturalistic phenomenology. By drawing from Jack Reynolds’s arguments for a minimal phenomenology, the author posits that radical empiricism is a middle way between the misguided self-sufficiency of transcendental phenomenology and the misguided self-sufficiency of ontological naturalism. The orthodox reading of Scheler as a dualist is found problematic, and in outlining four propositions characteristic of Scheler’s positions, the author motivates resources from Jamesian thought to argue for the superiority of a naturalistic phenomenology.","PeriodicalId":44744,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Speculative Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135706057","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-01DOI: 10.5325/jspecphil.37.4.0545
Steven G. Smith
ABSTRACT To understand the internal structure of moral positions and the nature of moral disagreements, it would be useful to have a “moral sense” model of our different types of moral sensitivity, from our relatively spontaneous friendliness to our appreciation for traditional community norms, ideal ethical norms, and spiritual appeals to ultimate concern. After the first round of modern moral sense theory in Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Edwards, most discussions of the moral sense concept have centered on general theses about moral value (objective or subjective, rational or emotional) without attending to this complexity. Even though the familiar positions in these discussions are not reconcilable on the plane of ethical theory, they need not be seen as simply antagonistic. Working with clearly differentiated senses of both “moral” and “sense,” this article refashions “moral sense theory” as a way of placing the insights of the classic moral sense theories, ethical rationalism, and a distinctly spiritual sensibility in a conceptually stable and empirically more discriminating order. The article also suggests strengthening the realist premise of moral sensing by invoking the model of a game player’s operational sense of how things are going in pursuit of a game’s objectives.
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Pub Date : 2023-06-01DOI: 10.5325/jspecphil.37.3.0237
Alan D. Schrift, Shannon Sullivan
The articles in this special issue of the Journal of Speculative Philosophy were selected from revised versions of papers that were originally presented at the sixtieth annual meeting of the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy (SPEP) at Texas A&M University in College Station, Texas October 13–15, 2022.Michael Hardt of Duke University and Patricia Pisters of the University of Amsterdam gave the SPEP 2022 Plenary Addresses, and we are grateful to be able to include their plenary papers in this special issue. Hardt’s paper, “The Politics of Articulation and Strategic Multiplicities,” treated SPEP members to an early peek at his newest book, The Subversive 70s (Oxford University Press, 2023). In this work, Hardt digs into the powerful resources for social movements that activists and theorists from the 1970s developed. As he argues, in many ways those activists and thinkers were ahead of their times—and also ahead of ours—in understanding how to analyze interwoven multiplicities of power and how to articulate and organize liberation struggles based on those multiplicities. Hardt brilliantly demonstrates how analyzing the progressive and revolutionary social movements of the ’70s can help us not only understand the roots of contemporary social and political struggles but also reclaim critical resources for those struggles.Patricia Pisters’s paper, “Thinking with Fire: Elemental Philosophy and Media Technology,” draws upon Gaston Bachelard’s “fire complexes” to address a variety of pyrotechnical images appearing in contemporary cinema. Noting that elemental philosophy is on the rise in media studies and elsewhere, not least because of current environmental crises, fire is particularly engaging for its metaphorical, “matterphorical,” and technological associations. While acknowledging fire as a material medium—cooking, heating, burning, etc.—Pisters’s primary focus in her paper is on fire as an immaterial medium, and it is here that she turns to Bachelard’s constellation of fire complexes—the Empedocles, Prometheus, and Novalis Complexes—to which she adds her own fourth complex, the Sita Complex. With these complexes, she provides readings of four cinematic productions that elucidate the annihilating, transgressive, sexual, and purifying qualities of fire, and she suggests that these entangled fire complexes present different kinds of combustive knowledge in which the element of fire manifests itself as material phenomenon of nature, the engine for modern life, and immaterial affective reverie of destruction, transgression, and sexuality.The other articles in this special issue have been organized according to five broad groupings. The first grouping, “On Latin American Philosophy,” brings together three papers that engage Latin American philosophy, particularly as found in Mexican, Columbian, and Venezuelan history and political movements. In “Radicalizing Localization: Notes on Santiago Castro-Gómez’s Genealogies of Coloniality,” Jul
华莱士专注于加尔文·沃伦的作品，认为沃伦过度扩展了西尔维娅·温特的《人类》史学，盗用了赛迪亚·哈特曼关于可替代商品的概念。作为回应，华莱士呼吁纠正非洲悲观主义，更好地利用黑人女性的学术研究，避开关于黑人存在的抽象和超越历史的理论。在“María卢戈内斯、西尔维娅·温特和双性人解放”中，亚历克斯·亚当森与双性人理论家一起阅读卢戈内斯和温特，以帮助避免性别在酷儿和女权主义哲学中的殖民性。正如亚当森所说，阴阳人的解放可以帮助激进分子避开殖民所依赖的异性恋规范，但前提是解放的目标必须在非殖民化的框架内得到理解。对亚当森来说，把这些理论家放在一起阅读，为建立有效的联盟和国际团结提供了最好的机会。丹尼尔斯的文章《阿多诺与生态女性主义伦理学》将阿多诺的批判理论与当代生态女性主义相结合，发展了一种遵循阿多诺要求避免自然与人之间严格二元论的女性主义伦理学。丹尼尔斯认为，使这种二元论复杂化的是关于“事物是什么”以及我们应该如何对它们采取行动的本体论和伦理含义。丹尼尔斯通过对历史的反自然化和对自然的历史化，为环境和动物伦理的思考开辟了新的可能性。在第三组“神话与诗学”中，我们有三篇文章以不同的方式将我们的注意力吸引到语言的想象性使用上。首先，马修·j·德尔希(Matthew J. Delhey)的《Hölderlin新神话的政治》为Hölderlin的社会和政治思想辩护，反对乔治·Lukács的批评，即Hölderlin新神话的乌托邦政治除了“神秘的”社会政治理论之外没有提供任何东西。相反，通过阅读Hölderlin的几篇散文作品，这些作品要么没有提供给Lukács，要么没有被他讨论过，Delhey证明，虽然可能最终没有成功，Hölderlin确实采取了措施，用一种理论来补充亥伯龙，这种理论解决了现代社会不可或缺的以市场为基础的社会关系和异化形式，在其中看到了实现自由的可能性，通过一种能够使这些关系变得高尚的美学经验。Bryan Smyth在《批判现象学和自然的神话学》中认为，如果批判现象学要真正具有解放意义，就需要一种替代假设，即现象学的任务是提供对经验内容的严格描述。史密斯认为，批判现象学将通过参与批判神话的实践来找到这样一种选择，汉斯·布鲁门伯格称之为“对神话的研究”，因为它将自然重新定义为不仅仅是给予经验的东西(类似于“给予的神话”)，而是将神话理解为与自然的辩证连续性。布迪·德霍斯特的文章《饱和、语言和历史:马里昂和伽达默尔关于过剩的可沟通性》将法国和德国哲学置于对话中，以研究像马里昂的“饱和现象”这样的非或超视界事件如何出现在语言和历史中。这很重要，因为这类事件往往是公共价值观的重要基础。但是，如果他们置身于一个社区的语言和历史之外，他们怎么能扮演这个角色呢?对于德霍斯特来说，答案可以在伽达默尔对问题在理解事件中的作用的描述中找到，因为作为“饱和问题”出现的过度现象可能允许以他者的出现为基础的社区。第四组，“德里达的研讨会”，以论述德里达后期两次研讨会中重要问题的论文为特色。第一部分，“伪证，有希望，和伦理生活”，查尔斯·巴伯探索了德里达的伪证概念，因为它出现在他1997-99年关于“parjure et Le pardon”的研讨会上，以及他在那些年出版的一些经常被描述为构成德里达“伦理转向”的文章中。巴伯认为，与将伪证视为错误、错误或谎言的普遍观点相反，德里达将伪证呈现为真理不可避免的、充满活力的条件。尽管巴伯认为这样的描述给德里达的伦理生活观点带来了令人不安的后果，即伦理生活是一种与他者的关系，但他认为，它实际上可能在德里达的人与自己的关系伦理中扮演了一个构成性的角色。在“《野兽与君主》中的虚构主义和美学经验”中，阿蒙·奥尔雷德在他的最后一次研讨会上论证了美学经验在将德里达的本体论研究的政治和存在主义含义联系起来方面的重要性。
{"title":"Editors’ Introduction","authors":"Alan D. Schrift, Shannon Sullivan","doi":"10.5325/jspecphil.37.3.0237","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5325/jspecphil.37.3.0237","url":null,"abstract":"The articles in this special issue of the Journal of Speculative Philosophy were selected from revised versions of papers that were originally presented at the sixtieth annual meeting of the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy (SPEP) at Texas A&M University in College Station, Texas October 13–15, 2022.Michael Hardt of Duke University and Patricia Pisters of the University of Amsterdam gave the SPEP 2022 Plenary Addresses, and we are grateful to be able to include their plenary papers in this special issue. Hardt’s paper, “The Politics of Articulation and Strategic Multiplicities,” treated SPEP members to an early peek at his newest book, The Subversive 70s (Oxford University Press, 2023). In this work, Hardt digs into the powerful resources for social movements that activists and theorists from the 1970s developed. As he argues, in many ways those activists and thinkers were ahead of their times—and also ahead of ours—in understanding how to analyze interwoven multiplicities of power and how to articulate and organize liberation struggles based on those multiplicities. Hardt brilliantly demonstrates how analyzing the progressive and revolutionary social movements of the ’70s can help us not only understand the roots of contemporary social and political struggles but also reclaim critical resources for those struggles.Patricia Pisters’s paper, “Thinking with Fire: Elemental Philosophy and Media Technology,” draws upon Gaston Bachelard’s “fire complexes” to address a variety of pyrotechnical images appearing in contemporary cinema. Noting that elemental philosophy is on the rise in media studies and elsewhere, not least because of current environmental crises, fire is particularly engaging for its metaphorical, “matterphorical,” and technological associations. While acknowledging fire as a material medium—cooking, heating, burning, etc.—Pisters’s primary focus in her paper is on fire as an immaterial medium, and it is here that she turns to Bachelard’s constellation of fire complexes—the Empedocles, Prometheus, and Novalis Complexes—to which she adds her own fourth complex, the Sita Complex. With these complexes, she provides readings of four cinematic productions that elucidate the annihilating, transgressive, sexual, and purifying qualities of fire, and she suggests that these entangled fire complexes present different kinds of combustive knowledge in which the element of fire manifests itself as material phenomenon of nature, the engine for modern life, and immaterial affective reverie of destruction, transgression, and sexuality.The other articles in this special issue have been organized according to five broad groupings. The first grouping, “On Latin American Philosophy,” brings together three papers that engage Latin American philosophy, particularly as found in Mexican, Columbian, and Venezuelan history and political movements. In “Radicalizing Localization: Notes on Santiago Castro-Gómez’s Genealogies of Coloniality,” Jul","PeriodicalId":44744,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Speculative Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136249758","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-01-01DOI: 10.5325/JSPECPHIL.31.2.0299
Justo Serrano Zamora
According to Miranda Fricker, through the generation of cognitive confidence that facilitates the free exchange of individual experiences, mobilized groups are able to generate new symbolic resources that overcome existing gaps in the shared hermeneutical resource. In my essay, I aim at showing that an account of conceptual innovation on the side of mobilized groups must take into consideration deeper transformations of their epistemic practices. Drawing on the work of John Dewey, I develop an account of these transformations as a process of collective learning that involves both the emergence of a self-appropriative cultural life and epistemic innovation. I focus on the notion of experimentalism as a paradigm for these epistemic transformations.
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Pub Date : 2015-01-29DOI: 10.5325/JSPECPHIL.29.1.0091
R. StroudScott
This article explores what the contours of a pragmatist theory of rhetoric would be like in its democratic instantiation. The threat of partisan thought and dogmatism in argument is examined as a threat to the sort of democratic community pragmatists such as John Dewey desired to create. Partisans fail to realize not only their own limitations in pursuing the true and the good but also the fact that solving problems through overly partisan forms of reasoning or argument only creates future obstacles to community life. This provides an extended reading of what Dewey meant by free communication: communication not only free from legal constraints and censorship but also free from the binding habits of thought and interaction that can be identified as “partisan perfect reasoning.”
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Pub Date : 2015-01-01DOI: 10.5325/JSPECPHIL.29.3.0283
G. Hunt
This article develops an Arendtian conception of resentment and shows that resentment as a response to injustice is in fact only possible within a community of persons engaged in moral and recognitive relations. While Arendt is better known for her work on forgiveness—characterized as a creative rather than vindictive response to injury—this article suggests that Arendt provides a unique way of thinking about resentment as essentially a response to another human’s subjectivity. But when injury is massive, so beyond the pale that the possibility of face-to-face human interaction is annihilated, the space for resentment is thereby destroyed. Ironically, while the absence of resentment might at first seem to be an unproblematically good thing, Arendt shows us that the loss of resentment actually signals the loss of the properly human realm.
{"title":"Arendt on Resentment","authors":"G. Hunt","doi":"10.5325/JSPECPHIL.29.3.0283","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5325/JSPECPHIL.29.3.0283","url":null,"abstract":"This article develops an Arendtian conception of resentment and shows that resentment as a response to injustice is in fact only possible within a community of persons engaged in moral and recognitive relations. While Arendt is better known for her work on forgiveness—characterized as a creative rather than vindictive response to injury—this article suggests that Arendt provides a unique way of thinking about resentment as essentially a response to another human’s subjectivity. But when injury is massive, so beyond the pale that the possibility of face-to-face human interaction is annihilated, the space for resentment is thereby destroyed. Ironically, while the absence of resentment might at first seem to be an unproblematically good thing, Arendt shows us that the loss of resentment actually signals the loss of the properly human realm.","PeriodicalId":44744,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Speculative Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2015-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.5325/JSPECPHIL.29.3.0283","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70855921","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2012-10-02DOI: 10.5325/JSPECPHIL.26.2.0394
Gertrude James González de Allen
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