1 Introduction The question raised in this article is about how to theoretically and methodologically apprehend public policy controversies (1). More precisely, the role of ideas during public policy controversies between different policy coalitions is put into perspective. The starting point is the will to analytically construct ideas as dependent variables. Public policy scholars have underlined the confusion that lies at the heart of public policy analysis, where the status of ideas as causes or as variables is often blurred (Hassenteufel/Smith 2002: 60). When ideas are considered as independent variables, the analysis is likely to be more descriptive than explicative. In order to construct ideas as dependent variables, the focus has to be on the progressive formation of belief through the coalitions' adversarial activities. Hence, what will be questioned here is the process by which individuals do engage--or not-in public policy debate regarding harm reduction. We will not consider actors' engagement in a cause as unilaterally deriving from their beliefs. This line of questioning is closely linked to the ontological and epistemological choices. We assume that a processualist ontological stance is well-fitted to avoid the tautology induced by considering ideas as deja-la. By viewing militant commitment as a social and dynamic activity, a processualist focus highlights how ideas occur in the course of action (Fillieule 2001: 199-200). From this point of view, mobilized groups are by no means seen as preexisting entities driven by fixed ideas (Offerle 1994). This is particularly salient in the case of highly emotional controversies, where actors' ideas are often considered as if they had always existed. Furthermore, actors engaged in the same struggle do not necessarily share homogenous beliefs. Analyzing the heterogeneity of investments enables to understand the dynamics of the collective action (Mathieu 2004: 19). Similarly, the focus on the process of idea formation during policy controversies provides an opportunity to attain a deep understanding of the dynamics of the controversy. Analyzing ideas as dependent variables has important methodological repercussions. It shifts the location to where the explicative factors -and hence the data- are searched. The present reflection on public policy controversies is based on a case study research on harm reduction policies in matters of drug addiction in two Swiss cantons, Vaud and Geneva. The theoretical starting point of this study is the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF). Daniel Kubler (2000) has convincingly illustrated that this particular subject is well captured with the help of ACF's theoretical framework. The formulation of harm reduction policies are regularly the scene of sharp confrontations between policy coalitions, and ACF's concepts are particularly well-suited to the analysis of the Swiss multilevel politico-administrative system. Meanwhile, the benefits of using concepts from the
{"title":"The Status of Ideas in Controversies on Public Policy. Analyzing Beliefs as Dependent Variables: A Case study on Harm Reduction Policies in Switzerland","authors":"Céline Mavrot","doi":"10.7892/BORIS.17414","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7892/BORIS.17414","url":null,"abstract":"1 Introduction The question raised in this article is about how to theoretically and methodologically apprehend public policy controversies (1). More precisely, the role of ideas during public policy controversies between different policy coalitions is put into perspective. The starting point is the will to analytically construct ideas as dependent variables. Public policy scholars have underlined the confusion that lies at the heart of public policy analysis, where the status of ideas as causes or as variables is often blurred (Hassenteufel/Smith 2002: 60). When ideas are considered as independent variables, the analysis is likely to be more descriptive than explicative. In order to construct ideas as dependent variables, the focus has to be on the progressive formation of belief through the coalitions' adversarial activities. Hence, what will be questioned here is the process by which individuals do engage--or not-in public policy debate regarding harm reduction. We will not consider actors' engagement in a cause as unilaterally deriving from their beliefs. This line of questioning is closely linked to the ontological and epistemological choices. We assume that a processualist ontological stance is well-fitted to avoid the tautology induced by considering ideas as deja-la. By viewing militant commitment as a social and dynamic activity, a processualist focus highlights how ideas occur in the course of action (Fillieule 2001: 199-200). From this point of view, mobilized groups are by no means seen as preexisting entities driven by fixed ideas (Offerle 1994). This is particularly salient in the case of highly emotional controversies, where actors' ideas are often considered as if they had always existed. Furthermore, actors engaged in the same struggle do not necessarily share homogenous beliefs. Analyzing the heterogeneity of investments enables to understand the dynamics of the collective action (Mathieu 2004: 19). Similarly, the focus on the process of idea formation during policy controversies provides an opportunity to attain a deep understanding of the dynamics of the controversy. Analyzing ideas as dependent variables has important methodological repercussions. It shifts the location to where the explicative factors -and hence the data- are searched. The present reflection on public policy controversies is based on a case study research on harm reduction policies in matters of drug addiction in two Swiss cantons, Vaud and Geneva. The theoretical starting point of this study is the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF). Daniel Kubler (2000) has convincingly illustrated that this particular subject is well captured with the help of ACF's theoretical framework. The formulation of harm reduction policies are regularly the scene of sharp confrontations between policy coalitions, and ACF's concepts are particularly well-suited to the analysis of the Swiss multilevel politico-administrative system. Meanwhile, the benefits of using concepts from the ","PeriodicalId":447682,"journal":{"name":"German policy studies","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125754403","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The German-speaking countries share a multitude of commonalities which separate Germany, Austria and Switzerland from other developed democracies. One prominent commonality of the German-speaking "family of nations" (Castles 1993, 2004; cf. Armingeon/Freitag 1997) is the broad integration of interest organizations into the process of policy deliberation, policy decision-making and policy implementation (Katzenstein 1987). The dominant role of interest organizations in public policy making is, however, not mirrored in standard attempts to measure the integration of interest-groups or, as it is called, neo-corporatism. While Austria ranks very high in most of the various empirical investigations (cf. Lehmbruch 1984, Siaroff 1999, Traxler/Blaschke/Kittel 2001), Germany usually is positioned in the middle of the range. Switzerland ranks low in most cases or is perceived as representing a very specific form of corporatism. As Isabelle Steffen and Wolf Linder (in this volume) argue, core institutional features classically associated with corporatism, such as strong trade unions or centralized wage bargaining patterns, are missing in Switzerland. Nevertheless, there are some "functional structures equivalent to neo-corporatist arrangements" (Kriesi 1995: p. 342), such as the institutionalized consultation procedure in policy deliberations ("Vernehmlassung"), which together with other institutional arrangements fosters and stabilizes the crucial influence of interest groups on policy decisions in Switzerland. The same might be argued for Germany. In contrast to Nordic-style corporatism, German wage bargaining was never centralized, nor did powerful, centralized peak associations of labor and capital dominate German politics after World War II. Nevertheless, interest groups and especially those from capital and labor are deeply involved into public policy-making patterns, either through parliamentary commissions or through their powerful position in agencies that implement welfare policies in Germany. Furthermore, self steering of interest groups in several sectors of the German welfare state is a prominent feature of the German Model, such as in wage bargaining or vocational training, to mention only the most important examples (cf. Czada 2003, Siegel 2003, Streeck 1997, Thelen 2004). This meso-corporatist interest mediation is furthermore segmented between different policy fields, and as a consequence, different logics of interest mediation rule at the same time the development of the German democracy (Dohler/Manow 1997). The clearest example of classical corporatism in the German-speaking family of nations is Austria. As Karlhofer (this volume) summarizes, the Austrian case is a prominent example of institutional corporatism because of centralized wage bargaining patterns and, especially, the extensive chamber system. These chambers have quasi-public functions and channel the interest of associated interest groups directly into policy deliberations and
{"title":"Introduction: Think Tanks in Austria, Switzerland and Germany - A Recalibration of Corporatist Policy Making?","authors":"Sven Jochem, A. Vatter","doi":"10.7892/BORIS.37430","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7892/BORIS.37430","url":null,"abstract":"The German-speaking countries share a multitude of commonalities which separate Germany, Austria and Switzerland from other developed democracies. One prominent commonality of the German-speaking \"family of nations\" (Castles 1993, 2004; cf. Armingeon/Freitag 1997) is the broad integration of interest organizations into the process of policy deliberation, policy decision-making and policy implementation (Katzenstein 1987). The dominant role of interest organizations in public policy making is, however, not mirrored in standard attempts to measure the integration of interest-groups or, as it is called, neo-corporatism. While Austria ranks very high in most of the various empirical investigations (cf. Lehmbruch 1984, Siaroff 1999, Traxler/Blaschke/Kittel 2001), Germany usually is positioned in the middle of the range. Switzerland ranks low in most cases or is perceived as representing a very specific form of corporatism. As Isabelle Steffen and Wolf Linder (in this volume) argue, core institutional features classically associated with corporatism, such as strong trade unions or centralized wage bargaining patterns, are missing in Switzerland. Nevertheless, there are some \"functional structures equivalent to neo-corporatist arrangements\" (Kriesi 1995: p. 342), such as the institutionalized consultation procedure in policy deliberations (\"Vernehmlassung\"), which together with other institutional arrangements fosters and stabilizes the crucial influence of interest groups on policy decisions in Switzerland. The same might be argued for Germany. In contrast to Nordic-style corporatism, German wage bargaining was never centralized, nor did powerful, centralized peak associations of labor and capital dominate German politics after World War II. Nevertheless, interest groups and especially those from capital and labor are deeply involved into public policy-making patterns, either through parliamentary commissions or through their powerful position in agencies that implement welfare policies in Germany. Furthermore, self steering of interest groups in several sectors of the German welfare state is a prominent feature of the German Model, such as in wage bargaining or vocational training, to mention only the most important examples (cf. Czada 2003, Siegel 2003, Streeck 1997, Thelen 2004). This meso-corporatist interest mediation is furthermore segmented between different policy fields, and as a consequence, different logics of interest mediation rule at the same time the development of the German democracy (Dohler/Manow 1997). The clearest example of classical corporatism in the German-speaking family of nations is Austria. As Karlhofer (this volume) summarizes, the Austrian case is a prominent example of institutional corporatism because of centralized wage bargaining patterns and, especially, the extensive chamber system. These chambers have quasi-public functions and channel the interest of associated interest groups directly into policy deliberations and","PeriodicalId":447682,"journal":{"name":"German policy studies","volume":"46 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-06-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128218514","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4419-6858-6_9
A. Zimmer, Eckhard Priller
{"title":"The Third Sector and Labour Market Policy in Germany","authors":"A. Zimmer, Eckhard Priller","doi":"10.1007/978-1-4419-6858-6_9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-6858-6_9","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":447682,"journal":{"name":"German policy studies","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129178497","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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