Axiomathes最新文献

The conception of possible worlds, as proposed by Plantinga, presents certain issues, notably its dependence on the prior concept of modality. While Plantinga’s strategy for addressing the enigma of transworld identity carries metaphysical significance, it lacks epistemological value. This deficiency emerges because world-indexed properties do not serve as effective tools in epistemic practice compared to their counterparts, space–time-indexed properties. Moreover, Plantinga’s attempt to isolate transworld identification from transworld identity proves unconvincing. This paper contends that the intelligibility of modal discourse and reference forms the crux of transworld identity. It further demonstrates that transworld identification underpins this intelligibility in an epistemological sense. Therefore, the problem of transworld identification is epistemologically foundational to the issue of transworld identity, necessitating a comprehensive solution.

The main thesis defended in this paper is that, interpreted in the light of reflections of Peirce and Poincaré, one can found in mathematical reasoning a non-logical symptom that may be aesthetic in Goodman’s sense. This symptom is called exemplification and serves to distinguish between only logically correct and even explanatory proofs. It broadens the scope of aesthetics to include all activities involving symbolic systems and blurs the boundaries between logic and aesthetics in mathematics. It gives a better understanding of Poincaré’s thesis that to affect aesthetic value to certain properties is not simply an added value, a bonus that somehow rewards the mathematician’s mechanical labor, but on the contrary, taking the aesthetic value into account can be helpful to mathematical practice. As an example, three proofs of the irrationality of √2 are compared for their aesthetic functioning.

The aim of this paper is to address the problem known as “the puzzle of imaginative” use, related to the ambiguities of an imagination that sometimes distances us from reality, but at other times, as for example in the use of scientific thought experiments, is used to understand some important aspects of the real world. The problem is closely related to that of imaginative constraints. It will be shown how, particularly in the scientific enterprise, the epistemic value of imagination depends on the embodiment of imagination itself. The work of scientific imagination, understood as an ability, will be re-read through the most recent studies on Embodied Simulation. This will make it possible to grasp in the imaginative act the link between creativity and method that is essential in the scientific enterprise.

Griffiths and Matthewson (2018) employ the selected effects theory to contend that disease involves the impairment of the normal functioning of biological items. Since the selected effects theory focuses on the past effects of those items, I refer to their proposal as “aetiological naturalism”. In this paper, I argue that aetiological naturalism cannot constitute an adequate theory of disease. This is due to the fact that the selected effects theory, which lies at the heart of aetiological naturalism, is flawed. One promise of the selected effects theory is indeed that it is able to account for our normative intuitions about dysfunctional biological items by grounding them on the concept of natural selection incorporated in the selected effects theory itself, where this promise rests upon its claim that appealing to the fitness-enhancing effect of biological items can always explain why they persisted in a population. However, I contend that the naturalisation of normativity cannot be cashed out in terms of biological items’ past effects by discussing two biological phenomena: phenotypic plasticity and negative frequency-dependent selection. I illustrate that in both cases the selected effects theory cannot recognise adaptive items as having a selected effects function, therefore preventing the possibility to assign them any dysfunction. The normative force of the selected effects theory is consequently much diminished, leading in turn to a weakening of aetiological naturalism, given that such project actually relies on the assumed normative force of the selected effects theory itself.

This paper develops an account of disagreement and agreement in logic in terms of rules of acceptance, rejection, and suspension of judgement. Acceptance, rejection, and suspension in logic are thereby taken to be doxastic attitudes resulting from, respectively, assenting, dissenting, or refraining from assenting and dissenting to arguments or propositions in light of their logical validity/invalidity. Disagreement between advocates of different logics is characterized as a form of doxastic noncotenability. A full account of agreement in logic does not only require doxastic cotenability between two logicians. It is also necessary that they share the reasons that ground their respective doxastic attitudes. These notions of disagreement and agreement will be applied to disagreements/agreements between advocates of three different logical systems: classical logic, the paracomplete logic K₃, and the paraconsistent logic LP. In particular, it will be discussed which doxastic attitudes those logicians ought to have with regard to a proposition expressed by the Liar sentence. In the last part of the paper, it will be examined in what sense a disagreement in logic can be understood as a genuine disagreement, even if no single neutral intertheoretic concept of validity is available that is shared by all logicians.

According to strong emergentism, it is a brute fact that higher-level properties (e.g., consciousness, values, etc.) emerge given certain complex structures. In this paper, I will argue that since it is allegedly a brute fact that emergent properties emerge in certain complex systems, they should emerge in anything. Since they do not emerge in anything, they also do not emerge only in certain complex systems. I will apply this argument to consciousness as the primary target, to refute certain views within the philosophy of mind, according to which consciousness is an emergent property that arises only in certain complex aggregates, i.e., brains.

Many authors have commented on the relative frequency of the present tense—and the relative infrequency of the past tense—in mathematical writing. However, none (to our knowledge) have provided an estimate for the size of this effect or explored how universal it is. In this short note we report an analysis of corpora of mathematical and day-to-day English. We conclude that the present-to-past ratio of tenses is at least 3:1 in mathematical English, compared to approximately 5:7 in day-to-day English. Further, we show that this tendency to favour the present tense is almost universally present in written mathematics.

Carl Mitcham has recently pointed out that the current approach to the ethics of technology has failed to solve large-scale socio-ethical challenges in the technological world, such as climate change. He then suggests that, in the face of an iceberg of issues regarding technological development, philosophers should recognize the intellectual heritage of the classical philosophers of technology to better deal with the escalating crises that threaten humankind. While Mitcham’s proposal is inspiring, there are several lacunae in his work. In this paper, we contribute to Mitcham’s idea by developing it and filling the important gaps. Our efforts have led to a new style of holistic thinking about the ethics of technology, according to which it is necessary to focus on the system of technologies as a whole (while not ignoring individual technologies, of course) to understand and address issues related to technology development.

One of the general criteria G. H. Hardy identifies and discusses in his famous essay A Mathematician’s Apology, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1940) by which a mathematician’s patterns must be judged is seriousness. This article focuses on one of Hardy’s examples of a non-serious theorem, namely that 8712 and 9801 are the only numbers below 10000 which are integral multiples of their reversals, in the sense that (8712=4cdot 2178), and (9801=9cdot 1089). In the context of a discussion of generality, which he considers an essential quality of seriousness, he explains that there is nothing in this example which “appeals much to a mathematician” and that it is “not capable of any significant generalization.” Interestingly, since the publication of the Apology, more than a dozen papers—including one by the renowned mathematician Neil Sloane—have been published that discuss generalizations of Hardy’s example. By identifying the most important aspect of Hardy’s notion of generality, it is argued that, contrary to the views of several researchers, Hardy’s claim regarding the non-capability of any significant generalization is still tenable. Furthermore, this case study is presented and discussed as an example of the multifaceted nature of mathematical interest.

Indolent T-lymphoblastic proliferation (iT-LBP) is a rare, non-clonal, extrathymic lymphoid proliferation with an immature T cell phenotype, indolent clinical course, and excellent prognosis. Although their pathogenesis is unclear, they are reported to be associated with Castleman disease, follicular dendritic cell tumors/sarcomas, angioimmunoblastic T cell lymphoma, hepatocellular carcinoma (HCC), myasthenia gravis, and acinic cell carcinoma. There are around 51 reported cases of iT-LBP in the literature. Recognition and accurate diagnosis of this entity is critical as it shares morphologic and immunophenotypic features with an aggressive malignancy-acute T cell leukemia/lymphoma (T-ALL). IT-LBP in HCC post-liver transplant and in metastatic sites has not been reported in the literature. Two case reports of patients presenting with recurrent and metastatic HCC in post-liver transplant settings are described. A 50-year-old man with an end-stage liver disease with HCC underwent liver transplant. A year later, he developed pulmonary metastasis with associated iT-LBP. A 69-year-old man underwent liver transplant for end-stage liver disease and HCC. Eighteen months later, he developed recurrent HCC in the transplanted liver and omental metastasis; both sites showed HCC with iT-LBP. iT-LBP in both patients expressed TdT, CD3, and CD4 and lacked CD34 and clonal T cell receptor gene rearrangements. On retrospective review, the pre-transplant HCC specimens lacked iT-LBP. We present two cases of iT-LBP associated with HCC in novel settings-in post-liver transplant patients and in recurrent/metastatic sites of HCC. In addition, a comprehensive literature review of clinical, histological, and immunophenotypic characteristics of reported cases of iT-LBP is presented.