Constitutional Political Economy最新文献

While the economic approach to constitutions highlights their contribution to resolving conflict, recent work on the de jure–de facto distinction in relation to various constitutional rules suggests that political conflict and polarization could play a role in explaining the size and evolution of the gap between constitution text and constitutional practice. In this paper, we are interested in the relationship between the degree of conflict in the political arena within the state, captured by the polarization of the political landscape, as well as the underlying political polarization in society, and compliance of government actors with the country’s constitution. Based on a number of theoretical arguments, we provide an empirical investigation for ca. 170 countries in the period 1975–2020, using the new Comparative Constitutional Compliance Database. Our results suggest that constitutional non-compliance is associated with more intense political polarization in society, but it does not seem to be correlated with polarization of the political landscape.

Between 1965 and 1988, Gordon Tullock dramatically altered his view of the infamous Dred Scott v. Sandford decision of 1857 (Dred Scott v. Sandford. (1857). 60 U.S. 393.). In 1965, Tullock maintained the orthodox view that Dred Scott was incorrectly decided and justifiably reversed by the bloodshed of the Civil War. By the 1980s, Tullock changed his view, asserting instead that Dred Scott correctly interpreted a pro-slavery and racist Constitution. He maintained his earlier views on the emancipationist purpose of the Civil War in reversing Dred Scott. This paper explores Tullock’s evolving understanding of the Dred Scott decision, the Civil War, and the Battle of Gettysburg through the interpretive lenses of constitutional mythology and Civil War memory.

This article develops an account of political legitimacy based on the articulation of a social choice theoretic framework with the idea of public reason. I pursue two related goals. First, I characterize in detail what I call the Ideal Two-Tier Social Choice Model of Politics in conjunction with the idea of public reason. Second, I explore the implications of this model, when it is assumed that decision rules are among the constitutive features of the social alternatives on which individuals have preferences. The choice of the decision rule cannot be made independently of considerations regarding the likelihood that individuals will vote based on political judgments that are not publicly justified. The result is an account of political legitimacy according to which only “elitist” decision rules are amenable to public justification. Some of them are plainly compatible with liberal democracies as they currently exist. Others are however more naturally associated with the concept of epistocracy.

Abstract

An error is corrected in the paper by Charles T. Munger, Jr., The best Condorcet-compatible election method: Ranked Pairs, Const Polit Econ (2022).

We bring attention to a previously overlooked determinant of de jure-de facto constitutional gaps: a polity’s transition to a nation-state. We argue that nation-statehood, predicated on the formation of a strong sense of national identity, lowers the government’s incentive to violate constitutional provisions. To test our theory, we use a recently released longitudinal database on constitutional compliance and exploit variation in the timing of countries’ attainment of nation-statehood. Our empirical findings substantiate our hypothesis. Based on our preferred estimation approach, nation-statehood bolsters both overall constitutional compliance and constitutional compliance within the subdomains of basic rights, civil rights, and property rights & the rule of law. The estimated long-run effects of nation-statehood on constitutional compliance are considerable in size. Our analysis, thus, illuminates the foundational role of nation-statehood in fostering constitutional compliance.