Constitutional Political Economy最新文献

Between 1965 and 1988, Gordon Tullock dramatically altered his view of the infamous Dred Scott v. Sandford decision of 1857 (Dred Scott v. Sandford. (1857). 60 U.S. 393.). In 1965, Tullock maintained the orthodox view that Dred Scott was incorrectly decided and justifiably reversed by the bloodshed of the Civil War. By the 1980s, Tullock changed his view, asserting instead that Dred Scott correctly interpreted a pro-slavery and racist Constitution. He maintained his earlier views on the emancipationist purpose of the Civil War in reversing Dred Scott. This paper explores Tullock’s evolving understanding of the Dred Scott decision, the Civil War, and the Battle of Gettysburg through the interpretive lenses of constitutional mythology and Civil War memory.

This article develops an account of political legitimacy based on the articulation of a social choice theoretic framework with the idea of public reason. I pursue two related goals. First, I characterize in detail what I call the Ideal Two-Tier Social Choice Model of Politics in conjunction with the idea of public reason. Second, I explore the implications of this model, when it is assumed that decision rules are among the constitutive features of the social alternatives on which individuals have preferences. The choice of the decision rule cannot be made independently of considerations regarding the likelihood that individuals will vote based on political judgments that are not publicly justified. The result is an account of political legitimacy according to which only “elitist” decision rules are amenable to public justification. Some of them are plainly compatible with liberal democracies as they currently exist. Others are however more naturally associated with the concept of epistocracy.

Abstract

An error is corrected in the paper by Charles T. Munger, Jr., The best Condorcet-compatible election method: Ranked Pairs, Const Polit Econ (2022).

We bring attention to a previously overlooked determinant of de jure-de facto constitutional gaps: a polity’s transition to a nation-state. We argue that nation-statehood, predicated on the formation of a strong sense of national identity, lowers the government’s incentive to violate constitutional provisions. To test our theory, we use a recently released longitudinal database on constitutional compliance and exploit variation in the timing of countries’ attainment of nation-statehood. Our empirical findings substantiate our hypothesis. Based on our preferred estimation approach, nation-statehood bolsters both overall constitutional compliance and constitutional compliance within the subdomains of basic rights, civil rights, and property rights & the rule of law. The estimated long-run effects of nation-statehood on constitutional compliance are considerable in size. Our analysis, thus, illuminates the foundational role of nation-statehood in fostering constitutional compliance.

Abstract

The purpose of this study is to explore the relationship between individuals’ satisfaction with amenities and environmental quality and taste for revolt in the Middle East. Using recent World Value Survey data (WVS7, 2017–2021) from Egypt and Iraq (which have been experiencing severe environmental degradation and inadequate and mismanagement of public infrastructure) and applying Probit regressions, our results show that satisfaction with amenities and environmental quality indicators are negatively and statistically related to individuals' inclination towards revolt in both countries. This finding is more pronounced in urban areas, particularly in large cities. We also find that individuals’ satisfaction with amenities and environmental quality affect the taste of revolt through the individual’s life satisfaction and satisfaction with the government’s provision of utilities. The analysis for Egypt suggests that satisfaction with public transportation systems, roads and highways, air quality, and housing quality are significantly and negatively associated with support for revolutionary action. For the Iraq sample, we find that dissatisfaction with roads and highways, water quality, school quality, and the physical settings of cities lead to a higher probability of support for uprising.

This study develops a view of Hume’s is/ought distinction as an extension of Scottish jurisprudence that, in turn, was influenced by Pufendorf’s discussion of entia moralia. Further, it investigates the unique role that Hume’s sentimentalism played in the production of elements in the context of liberalism under the rule of law, independently of previous philosophical traditions.

First, we observe that Hume’s is/ought distinction corresponds to a distinction between uncivilized and civilized entities, rather than between amoral rationality and moral passions. Next, analyzing Hume’s argument for “moral evidence,” we find that such evidence is necessary for various activities, such as consent or trading, in the field of moral entities as civil societies. Finally, a study of Hume’s stance with respect to civil and common laws shows that his moral sentimentalism, which includes the is/ought distinction and moral evidence, suggests a new possibility for social development that is distinct from previous rational forms of jurisprudence. From this discussion, a unique sprout of modern liberalism can be seen in Hume’s theory of justice.