{"title":"Separating the evaluative from the descriptive: An empirical study of thick concepts","authors":"P. Willemsen, K. Reuter","doi":"10.1002/THT3.488","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/THT3.488","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44963,"journal":{"name":"Thought-A Journal of Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2021-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1002/THT3.488","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41500605","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Throughout the years, Sosa has taken different views on the safety condition on knowledge. In his early work, he endorsed the safety condition, but later ret-racted this view when first developing his much dis-cussed virtue epistemology. Recently, Sosa has further developed his virtue theory with the notion of competence and has developed an accompanying, modified safety condition that he maintains is entailed by that theory: the SSS-safety condition. Sosa's view is that this condition holds on both knowledge and action, because both knowledge and action are the manifestations of competence. The SSS-safety condition, roughly, says that if S were to make an attempt at φ -ing under certain specified shape-situation pairs, holding fixed their seat , then S would φ . The argument of this paper is that this new SSS-safety condition does not hold on either knowledge or action. We argue for this conclusion by providing a principled way to generate counterexamples to the condition for both knowledge and action. The reasoning is that there can exist a non-empty symmetric difference between the sets of shape-situation pairs under which distinct agents can manifest their
{"title":"Need knowing and acting be\u0000 SSS‐Safe\u0000 ?","authors":"Jaakko Hirvelä, Niall J. Paterson","doi":"10.1002/THT3.487","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/THT3.487","url":null,"abstract":"Throughout the years, Sosa has taken different views on the safety condition on knowledge. In his early work, he endorsed the safety condition, but later ret-racted this view when first developing his much dis-cussed virtue epistemology. Recently, Sosa has further developed his virtue theory with the notion of competence and has developed an accompanying, modified safety condition that he maintains is entailed by that theory: the SSS-safety condition. Sosa's view is that this condition holds on both knowledge and action, because both knowledge and action are the manifestations of competence. The SSS-safety condition, roughly, says that if S were to make an attempt at φ -ing under certain specified shape-situation pairs, holding fixed their seat , then S would φ . The argument of this paper is that this new SSS-safety condition does not hold on either knowledge or action. We argue for this conclusion by providing a principled way to generate counterexamples to the condition for both knowledge and action. The reasoning is that there can exist a non-empty symmetric difference between the sets of shape-situation pairs under which distinct agents can manifest their","PeriodicalId":44963,"journal":{"name":"Thought-A Journal of Philosophy","volume":"10 1","pages":"127-134"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2021-04-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1002/THT3.487","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43322448","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Sounds as properties","authors":"Nick Young","doi":"10.1002/THT3.485","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/THT3.485","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44963,"journal":{"name":"Thought-A Journal of Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2021-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1002/THT3.485","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47042531","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Comparing apples to oranges; Is it better to be human than otherwise?","authors":"Casey S. Elliott","doi":"10.1002/tht3.474","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/tht3.474","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44963,"journal":{"name":"Thought-A Journal of Philosophy","volume":"10 1","pages":"19-27"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2021-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1002/tht3.474","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48819927","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The trivalent, truth-functional theory of conditionals proposed by de Finetti in 1936 and developed in a scattered literature since has enjoyed a recent revival in philosophy, psychology, and linguistics. However, several theorists have argued that this approach is fatally flawed in that it cannot correctly account for nested conditionals and compounds of conditionals. Focusing on nested conditionals, we observe that the problem cases uniformly involve generic predicates, and that the inference patterns claimed to be problematic are very plausible when we ensure that only non-generic (episodic and stative) predicates are used. In addition, the trivalent theory makes correct predictions about the original, generic counter-examples when combined with an off-the-shelf theory of genericity. The ability of the trivalent semantics to account for this complex interaction with genericity thus appears as a strong argument in its favor. 1 The trivalent semantics for indicative conditionals An extensive theoretical and experimental literature supports ‘Stalnaker’s thesis’, the equation between probabilities of conditionals and conditional probabilities (Stalnaker 1970; Edgington 1995; Bennett 2003; Hadjichristidis, Stevenson, Over, Sloman, Evans & Feeney 2001; Over & Evans 2003; Fugard, Pfeifer, Mayerhofer & Kleiter 2010; Douven & Verbrugge 2010, 2013 and many others). Stalnaker’s thesis: P(If A, C) = P(C ∣ A). Lewis’s (1976) proof is widely thought to show that this equation cannot hold. However, Lewis’ proof tacitly assumes bivalence, as do a wide range of other triviality proofs for Stalnaker’s thesis (Lassiter 2019). In fact, a trivalent, truth-functional semantics that supports Stalnaker’s thesis while avoiding triviality results was provided more than 3 decades before this thesis was proposed, in de Finetti 1936 (English translation in de Finetti 1995). According to de Finetti, the indicative conditional If A, C is true if A∧C, and false if A∧¬C, and otherwise undefined (here noted ‘#’). Most crucially, the indicative conditional is always undefined when its antecedent is false.1 1 For de Finetti, the third truth-value represents an epistemic relation of “doubt” between an agent and a sentence (de Finetti 1995: 182). Other interpretations are possible: for example, Hailperin (1996) interprets the # value as ‘don’t care’. For our purposes, it is not the meaning of the # value that is critical but its formal role in the semantics of conditionals, and so we will not take a stand on this interpretive question.
由de Finetti于1936年提出的三价、真功能条件句理论，在零散的文献中得到发展，最近在哲学、心理学和语言学中复兴。然而，一些理论家认为这种方法有致命的缺陷，因为它不能正确地解释嵌套条件句和条件句的复合。专注于嵌套条件，我们观察到问题情况一致涉及通用谓词，并且当我们确保只使用非通用(情景和静态)谓词时，声称有问题的推理模式非常合理。此外，当与现成的泛型理论相结合时，三价理论对原始的、通用的反例做出了正确的预测。因此，三价语义解释这种与泛型的复杂相互作用的能力似乎是支持它的有力论据。大量的理论和实验文献支持“斯托纳克命题”，即条件句的概率和条件概率之间的方程(斯托纳克1970;Edgington 1995;班尼特2003;哈吉克里斯提迪斯，史蒂文森，奥弗，斯洛曼，埃文斯和菲尼2001;Over & Evans 2003;Fugard, Pfeifer, Mayerhofer & Kleiter 2010;Douven & Verbrugge(2010、2013等)。斯托纳克的命题:P(如果A, C) = P(C∣A)。刘易斯(1976)的证明被广泛认为表明这个方程不成立。然而，刘易斯的证明默认地假设了二价性，就像斯托纳克论文的许多其他琐碎证明一样(Lassiter 2019)。事实上，在该论文提出30多年前，de Finetti 1936 (de Finetti 1995的英文翻译)就提出了一个三价的真-功能语义，该语义支持了Stalnaker的论文，同时避免了琐碎的结果。根据de Finetti，指示性条件If A, C如果A∧C为真，如果A∧C为假，否则没有定义(这里用#表示)。最关键的是，当先行词为假时，指示性条件句总是未定义的。11对于de Finetti来说，第三真值代表了主体和句子之间的“怀疑”的认知关系(de Finetti 1995: 182)。其他解释也是可能的:例如，Hailperin(1996)将#值解释为“don ' t care”。就我们的目的而言，关键的不是# value的意义，而是它在条件语义中的形式作用，因此我们不会在这个解释性问题上采取立场。
{"title":"Nested conditionals and genericity in the de Finetti semantics","authors":"Daniel Lassiter, Jean Baratgin","doi":"10.1002/THT3.478","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/THT3.478","url":null,"abstract":"The trivalent, truth-functional theory of conditionals proposed by de Finetti in 1936 and developed in a scattered literature since has enjoyed a recent revival in philosophy, psychology, and linguistics. However, several theorists have argued that this approach is fatally flawed in that it cannot correctly account for nested conditionals and compounds of conditionals. Focusing on nested conditionals, we observe that the problem cases uniformly involve generic predicates, and that the inference patterns claimed to be problematic are very plausible when we ensure that only non-generic (episodic and stative) predicates are used. In addition, the trivalent theory makes correct predictions about the original, generic counter-examples when combined with an off-the-shelf theory of genericity. The ability of the trivalent semantics to account for this complex interaction with genericity thus appears as a strong argument in its favor. 1 The trivalent semantics for indicative conditionals An extensive theoretical and experimental literature supports ‘Stalnaker’s thesis’, the equation between probabilities of conditionals and conditional probabilities (Stalnaker 1970; Edgington 1995; Bennett 2003; Hadjichristidis, Stevenson, Over, Sloman, Evans & Feeney 2001; Over & Evans 2003; Fugard, Pfeifer, Mayerhofer & Kleiter 2010; Douven & Verbrugge 2010, 2013 and many others). Stalnaker’s thesis: P(If A, C) = P(C ∣ A). Lewis’s (1976) proof is widely thought to show that this equation cannot hold. However, Lewis’ proof tacitly assumes bivalence, as do a wide range of other triviality proofs for Stalnaker’s thesis (Lassiter 2019). In fact, a trivalent, truth-functional semantics that supports Stalnaker’s thesis while avoiding triviality results was provided more than 3 decades before this thesis was proposed, in de Finetti 1936 (English translation in de Finetti 1995). According to de Finetti, the indicative conditional If A, C is true if A∧C, and false if A∧¬C, and otherwise undefined (here noted ‘#’). Most crucially, the indicative conditional is always undefined when its antecedent is false.1 1 For de Finetti, the third truth-value represents an epistemic relation of “doubt” between an agent and a sentence (de Finetti 1995: 182). Other interpretations are possible: for example, Hailperin (1996) interprets the # value as ‘don’t care’. For our purposes, it is not the meaning of the # value that is critical but its formal role in the semantics of conditionals, and so we will not take a stand on this interpretive question.","PeriodicalId":44963,"journal":{"name":"Thought-A Journal of Philosophy","volume":"10 1","pages":"42-52"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2021-02-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1002/THT3.478","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44154498","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Group nouns and pseudo‐singularity","authors":"Eric Snyder, S. Shapiro","doi":"10.1002/THT3.476","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/THT3.476","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44963,"journal":{"name":"Thought-A Journal of Philosophy","volume":"10 1","pages":"66-77"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2021-02-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1002/THT3.476","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49584175","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I argue that culpable ignorance can be irreducibly collective. In some cases, it is not fair to expect any individual to have avoided her ignorance of some fact, but it is fair to expect the agents together to have avoided their ignorance of that fact. Hence, no agent is individually culpable for her ignorance, but they are culpable for their ignorance together. This provides us with good reason to think that any group that is culpably ignorant in this irreducibly collective sense is non-distributively collectively responsible for subsequent unwitting acts and consequences.
{"title":"Collective culpable ignorance","authors":"N. D. Haan","doi":"10.1002/THT3.484","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/THT3.484","url":null,"abstract":"I argue that culpable ignorance can be irreducibly collective. In some cases, it is not fair to expect any individual to have avoided her ignorance of some fact, but it is fair to expect the agents together to have avoided their ignorance of that fact. Hence, no agent is individually culpable for her ignorance, but they are culpable for their ignorance together. This provides us with good reason to think that any group that is culpably ignorant in this irreducibly collective sense is non-distributively collectively responsible for subsequent unwitting acts and consequences.","PeriodicalId":44963,"journal":{"name":"Thought-A Journal of Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2021-02-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1002/THT3.484","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46953859","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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