{"title":"In the logic of certainty, ⊃ is stronger than ⇒","authors":"Kurt Norlin","doi":"10.1002/tht3.443","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/tht3.443","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44963,"journal":{"name":"Thought-A Journal of Philosophy","volume":"9 1","pages":"58-63"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2020-02-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1002/tht3.443","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48098140","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Ruling out solutions to Prior's dilemma for Hume's law","authors":"Aaron Wolf","doi":"10.1002/tht3.445","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/tht3.445","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44963,"journal":{"name":"Thought-A Journal of Philosophy","volume":"9 1","pages":"84-93"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2020-02-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1002/tht3.445","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47213833","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Correspondence Joshua Rasmussen, Department of Philosophy, Azusa Pacific University, 701 E Foothill Blvd, Azusa, CA 91702. Email: jrasmus1@gmail.com Abstract We uncover a surprising discovery about the basis of thoughts. We begin by giving some plausible axioms about thoughts and their grounds. We then deduce a theorem, which has dramatic ramifications for the basis of all thoughts. The theorem implies that thoughts cannot come deterministically from any purely “thoughtless” states. We expect this result to be too dramatic for many philosophers. Hence, we proceed to investigate the prospect of giving up the axioms. We show that each axiom's negation itself has dramatic consequences that should be of interest to philosophers of mind. Our proof of the theorem provides a new guiderail for thinking about the nature and origin of thoughts.
Joshua Rasmussen, Azusa太平洋大学哲学系，701 E Foothill Blvd, Azusa, CA 91702。摘要我们发现了一个关于思想基础的惊人发现。我们首先给出一些关于思想及其根据的似是而非的公理。然后我们推导出一个定理，它对所有思想的基础都有戏剧性的影响。这个定理暗示思想不可能决定论地来自任何纯粹的“无思想”状态。我们认为这个结果对许多哲学家来说过于戏剧性了。因此，我们继续探讨放弃公理的前景。我们表明，每个公理的否定本身具有戏剧性的后果，这应该是精神哲学家感兴趣的。我们对该定理的证明为思考思想的本质和起源提供了新的指导。
{"title":"How to build a thought","authors":"Joshua Rasmussen, Andrew M. Bailey","doi":"10.1002/tht3.444","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/tht3.444","url":null,"abstract":"Correspondence Joshua Rasmussen, Department of Philosophy, Azusa Pacific University, 701 E Foothill Blvd, Azusa, CA 91702. Email: jrasmus1@gmail.com Abstract We uncover a surprising discovery about the basis of thoughts. We begin by giving some plausible axioms about thoughts and their grounds. We then deduce a theorem, which has dramatic ramifications for the basis of all thoughts. The theorem implies that thoughts cannot come deterministically from any purely “thoughtless” states. We expect this result to be too dramatic for many philosophers. Hence, we proceed to investigate the prospect of giving up the axioms. We show that each axiom's negation itself has dramatic consequences that should be of interest to philosophers of mind. Our proof of the theorem provides a new guiderail for thinking about the nature and origin of thoughts.","PeriodicalId":44963,"journal":{"name":"Thought-A Journal of Philosophy","volume":"9 1","pages":"75-83"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2020-02-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1002/tht3.444","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44911864","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The argument from sideways music","authors":"Sayid R. Bnefsi","doi":"10.1002/tht3.439","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/tht3.439","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44963,"journal":{"name":"Thought-A Journal of Philosophy","volume":"9 1","pages":"64-69"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2020-01-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1002/tht3.439","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47426513","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"What it takes to be hunky","authors":"Daniel Giberman","doi":"10.1002/tht3.442","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/tht3.442","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44963,"journal":{"name":"Thought-A Journal of Philosophy","volume":"9 1","pages":"51-57"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2020-01-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1002/tht3.442","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46653120","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Moral understanding and moral illusions","authors":"D. Wilkenfeld","doi":"10.1002/tht3.438","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/tht3.438","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44963,"journal":{"name":"Thought-A Journal of Philosophy","volume":"9 1","pages":"25-33"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2020-01-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1002/tht3.438","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48577411","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Work on the nature and scope of formal logic has focused unduly on the distinction between logical and extra-logical vocabulary; which argument forms a logical theory countenances depends not only on its stock of logical terms, but also on its range of grammatical categories and modes of composition. Furthermore, there is a sense in which logical terms are unnecessary. Alexandra Zinke has recently pointed out that propositional logic can be done without logical terms. By defining a logical-term-free language with the full expressive power of first-order logic with identity, I show that this is true of logic more generally. Further-more, having, in a logical theory, non-trivial valid forms that do not involve logical terms is not merely a technical possibility. As the case of adverbs shows, issues about the range of argument forms logic should countenance can quite naturally arise in such a way that they do not turn on whether we countenance certain terms as logical. like “ is to be explained by reference to the meanings of the particular expressions occurring in them? We a clue in an idea, from Davidson (1973, but finds of via recursive base We is syncategorematic — that is, by that a meaning in a broad
{"title":"The accident of logical constants","authors":"T. Haze","doi":"10.1002/tht3.440","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/tht3.440","url":null,"abstract":"Work on the nature and scope of formal logic has focused unduly on the distinction between logical and extra-logical vocabulary; which argument forms a logical theory countenances depends not only on its stock of logical terms, but also on its range of grammatical categories and modes of composition. Furthermore, there is a sense in which logical terms are unnecessary. Alexandra Zinke has recently pointed out that propositional logic can be done without logical terms. By defining a logical-term-free language with the full expressive power of first-order logic with identity, I show that this is true of logic more generally. Further-more, having, in a logical theory, non-trivial valid forms that do not involve logical terms is not merely a technical possibility. As the case of adverbs shows, issues about the range of argument forms logic should countenance can quite naturally arise in such a way that they do not turn on whether we countenance certain terms as logical. like “ is to be explained by reference to the meanings of the particular expressions occurring in them? We a clue in an idea, from Davidson (1973, but finds of via recursive base We is syncategorematic — that is, by that a meaning in a broad","PeriodicalId":44963,"journal":{"name":"Thought-A Journal of Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2020-01-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1002/tht3.440","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43851892","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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