Quarterly Journal of Finance最新文献

This paper presents a portfolio model of asset price effects arising from central bank large-scale asset purchases, or quantitative easing (QE). Two financial frictions — segmentation of the market for central bank reserves and imperfect asset substitutability — give rise to two distinct portfolio effects. One is well known and derives from the reduced supply of the purchased assets. The other is new, runs through banks’ portfolio responses to reserves expansions, and is independent of the types of assets purchased. The results imply that central bank reserve expansions can affect long-term bond prices even in the absence of long-term bond purchases.

Issuing activity does not result in superior post-issue liquidity. New issues are just as liquid as their peer non-issuers. Even the kinds of new issues that are supposed to be more liquid than others (initial public offerings (IPOs) backed by venture capital, new issues with high-prestige underwriters, severely underpriced IPOs) have the same liquidity as other similar issuers. The paper thus refutes the existing liquidity-based explanations of the new issues puzzle. The paper also shows that the low-minus-high turnover factor seems to explain the new issues puzzle and related anomalies only because it picks up volatility risk.

This paper examines the impact of the recently passed Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act on the behavior of market participants. Using the JOBS Act — which relaxed mandatory information disclosure requirements — as a natural experiment on firms’ choices of the mix of hard, accounting information and textual disclosures, we find that relative to a peer group of firms, initial public offering (IPO) firms reduce accounting disclosures and change textual disclosures. Because it allows a partial revelation of IPO quality, only textual disclosures affect underpricing. We also find that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) changes its behavior post-JOBS Act in responding to draft registration statements. Specifically, the SEC’s comment letters to firms are more negative in tone, and more forceful in their recommendations, focusing on quantitative information. Finally, under the JOBS Act, investors place more emphasis on the information produced by the SEC when pricing the stock. Returns following public release of the letters vary by about 4% based on letter tone.

We report systematic, out-of-sample evidence on the benefits to an already well-diversified investor that may derive from further diversification into various hedge fund strategies. We investigate dynamic strategic asset allocation decisions that take into account investors’ preferences, realistic transaction costs, return predictability, and the parameter uncertainty that such predictability implies. Our results suggest that not all hedge fund strategies benefit a long-term investor who is already well-diversified across stocks, government and corporate bonds, and REITs. However, when parameter uncertainty is accounted for, the best performing models offer net positive economic gains to investors with low and moderate risk aversion. Most of the realized economic value fails to result from mean-variance-type enhancements in realized performance but comes instead from an improvement in realized higher-moment properties of optimal portfolios.

This paper studies optimal index design to facilitate both hedging and alleviate illegal manipulation in a competitive equilibrium paradigm, modified to deal with manipulation. Specifically, a large trader is trading both derivatives and assets that effectively hides her trades behind the competitive market clearing mechanism. Unlike the strategic game paradigm, a volume-weighted average pricing (VWAP) index introduces basis risk and encourages manipulation because of the additional randomness in volume weight and the greater price impact enjoyed by the large trader. In contrast, an equal-weighted average pricing (EWAP) index preserves market completeness and discourages manipulation.

Using establishment-level data compiling incidents of work-related injuries from the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), we find that workplace injury and illness rates decrease with institutional ownership stability. Our further analyses show that firms with more stable institutional ownership are likely to initiate socially responsible investing proposals and have lower employee workloads/pressure. These results suggest two potential mechanisms through which stable institutional investors influence workplace safety. Overall, stable institutional investors seem to benefit from improvements in employee safety, as work-related injuries have a negative impact on firm value.

Prior empirical studies find that dark pools are, on average, associated with uninformed order flow. The “exemption from fair-access requirement” has been conjectured as a necessary condition for dark venues to segment uninformed order flow. This study presents direct evidence contrasting a dark venue that offers equal access to all market participants to other dark pools which have the ability to subjectively exclude order flow. Using the period leading up to surprise corporate earnings news, I document robust evidence of informed trading taking place in the fair access dark venue. I do not find such evidence in other dark venues.

Momentum strategies tend to provide low returns during market crashes, and they crash themselves when the market rebounds after significant crashes. This is reflected by positive downside market betas and negative upside market betas of zero-cost momentum portfolios. Such asymmetry in upside and downside risks is unfavorable for investors and requires a risk premium. It arises mechanically because of momentum portfolio rebalancing based on trailing asset performance. The asymmetry in upside and downside risks is a robust unifying feature of momentum portfolios in various geographical and asset markets. The momentum premium can be rationalized within a standard asset-pricing framework, where upside and downside risks are priced differently.