Pub Date : 2022-10-02DOI: 10.1080/10383441.2022.2143663
Julia Cooper
ABSTRACT The Victorian and New South Wales Law Reform Commissions (‘the Commissions’) have recently heralded jury directions as a solution to ‘counter and correct’ rape myths in the courtroom. The Commissions recommended several new directions and espoused considerable optimism in their power to transform rape trials. These recommendations are driven by an unscrutinised rationalist agenda, which assumes that rape myths can be corrected. In response, this article maps out an empirical and theoretical re-examination of jury directions and their ability to ‘counter’ rape myths. This article draws on the theoretical works of Pierre Bourdieu and Roland Barthes to scrutinise this construction of myths and the assumption underpinning the recommendations. By doing so, this article argues that the confidence espoused by the law reform bodies is misguided.
{"title":"Judges as myth-busters: a re-examination of jury directions in rape trials","authors":"Julia Cooper","doi":"10.1080/10383441.2022.2143663","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10383441.2022.2143663","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The Victorian and New South Wales Law Reform Commissions (‘the Commissions’) have recently heralded jury directions as a solution to ‘counter and correct’ rape myths in the courtroom. The Commissions recommended several new directions and espoused considerable optimism in their power to transform rape trials. These recommendations are driven by an unscrutinised rationalist agenda, which assumes that rape myths can be corrected. In response, this article maps out an empirical and theoretical re-examination of jury directions and their ability to ‘counter’ rape myths. This article draws on the theoretical works of Pierre Bourdieu and Roland Barthes to scrutinise this construction of myths and the assumption underpinning the recommendations. By doing so, this article argues that the confidence espoused by the law reform bodies is misguided.","PeriodicalId":45376,"journal":{"name":"Griffith Law Review","volume":"31 1","pages":"485 - 512"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2022-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49577200","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-09DOI: 10.1080/10383441.2022.2121462
K. James, Henry D. Tuidraki, Anare Tuidraki, Semi Tabaiwalu
ABSTRACT The aim of this article is to reflect on oral history interview data provided by an ex-soccer star who played for Fiji and in what is now the Fiji Premier League, and reconcile his criminal past (according to town-based criminal laws) with his current village assistant headman status. The article compares and contrasts two sources of law – customary Indigenous traditions of rights and responsibilities and town-based criminal laws, which have their origins in British colonial-era laws and are now administered and enforced by the neoliberal Bainimarama government. Because the soccer star’s jewellery store robberies were of Fiji Indian-owned stores, it is difficult for them to penetrate into the world of ‘village-space’, other than as a repressed spectre, since non-Indigenous people cannot live in Indigenous villages. For the Indigenous Fijians, ‘town-space’ is a place for employment, education, venturing out and partying, beyond the gaze of village elders, whereas ‘village-space’ is the ordered space of home and community. ‘Quasi-space’ is here defined as space physically in the town, but when Indigenous people are the only ones present, or a clear majority, some aspects of village understandings can dominate in that space at least for certain time periods and with variable intensity.
{"title":"Sources of Indigenous Fijian ‘law’: village mores versus town-based criminal laws","authors":"K. James, Henry D. Tuidraki, Anare Tuidraki, Semi Tabaiwalu","doi":"10.1080/10383441.2022.2121462","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10383441.2022.2121462","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The aim of this article is to reflect on oral history interview data provided by an ex-soccer star who played for Fiji and in what is now the Fiji Premier League, and reconcile his criminal past (according to town-based criminal laws) with his current village assistant headman status. The article compares and contrasts two sources of law – customary Indigenous traditions of rights and responsibilities and town-based criminal laws, which have their origins in British colonial-era laws and are now administered and enforced by the neoliberal Bainimarama government. Because the soccer star’s jewellery store robberies were of Fiji Indian-owned stores, it is difficult for them to penetrate into the world of ‘village-space’, other than as a repressed spectre, since non-Indigenous people cannot live in Indigenous villages. For the Indigenous Fijians, ‘town-space’ is a place for employment, education, venturing out and partying, beyond the gaze of village elders, whereas ‘village-space’ is the ordered space of home and community. ‘Quasi-space’ is here defined as space physically in the town, but when Indigenous people are the only ones present, or a clear majority, some aspects of village understandings can dominate in that space at least for certain time periods and with variable intensity.","PeriodicalId":45376,"journal":{"name":"Griffith Law Review","volume":"31 1","pages":"465 - 484"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2022-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49008951","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-03DOI: 10.1080/10383441.2022.2096966
Andrés Blanco
ABSTRACT ‘Ideology' is a central concept in critical approaches to law. After a brief overview of the aspects of ideology, I propose a restricted concept, synonymous with a social discourse that establishes a certain view of social life in order to create, maintain, and consolidate social relationships. I then provide an introduction to the ideological analysis of law, revealing the function of ideology as creator of the beliefs that sustain the legislation and the reproduction of law through adjudication. Based on this, I analyse the BEPS Action Plan of the OECD, and the documents issued to provide rationales for its proposed actions. I thus critically show how a factual context is ideologically created for the BEPS Plan through the distortion or omission of crucial features of the workings of the global capitalist system. That is the case of the defence of the supposedly ‘general and worldwide benefits of globalisation,' the aim of a ‘fair taxation' of multinational enterprises, the omission of direct production activities in the design of a criterion for assigning taxation power, etc. The article also focuses on the role played by the plan’s explanatory documents in the drafting of national legislations and the resolution of judicial disputes
{"title":"An ideological critique of the OECD’s BEPS Action Plan","authors":"Andrés Blanco","doi":"10.1080/10383441.2022.2096966","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10383441.2022.2096966","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT ‘Ideology' is a central concept in critical approaches to law. After a brief overview of the aspects of ideology, I propose a restricted concept, synonymous with a social discourse that establishes a certain view of social life in order to create, maintain, and consolidate social relationships. I then provide an introduction to the ideological analysis of law, revealing the function of ideology as creator of the beliefs that sustain the legislation and the reproduction of law through adjudication. Based on this, I analyse the BEPS Action Plan of the OECD, and the documents issued to provide rationales for its proposed actions. I thus critically show how a factual context is ideologically created for the BEPS Plan through the distortion or omission of crucial features of the workings of the global capitalist system. That is the case of the defence of the supposedly ‘general and worldwide benefits of globalisation,' the aim of a ‘fair taxation' of multinational enterprises, the omission of direct production activities in the design of a criterion for assigning taxation power, etc. The article also focuses on the role played by the plan’s explanatory documents in the drafting of national legislations and the resolution of judicial disputes","PeriodicalId":45376,"journal":{"name":"Griffith Law Review","volume":"31 1","pages":"333 - 360"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2022-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47069224","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-03DOI: 10.1080/10383441.2022.2108582
Daniel Matthews, K. Birrell, Timothy Lindgren
ABSTRACT This article is an edited version of a conversation animated by Daniel Matthews’ recent monograph Earthbound: The Aesthetics of Sovereignty in the Anthropocene. We discuss the impetus and context for the book, its contribution to an emergent literature on law and the Anthropocene, and its commentary on the continued relevance of humanistic approaches to law and politics. The conversation traverses a range of concerns raised by Earthbound, such as the politics of place, the nature of community, and the priority of obligations in the ‘age of rights’. Exploring Matthews’ rendering of the ‘aesthetic aspect’ of sovereignty, which contours contemporary approaches to our environmental predicament, we consider the limits and possibilities of the sovereign political form in the context of the climate and ecological crises, and discuss how the Anthropocene might challenge existing approaches to law and the humanities. The interview is preceded by a contextualisation of Matthews’ work within the intellectual reorientations and recalibrations prompted by the Anthropocene, and the broader provocation of the ‘inhumanities’.
{"title":"Sovereignty in the Anthropocene","authors":"Daniel Matthews, K. Birrell, Timothy Lindgren","doi":"10.1080/10383441.2022.2108582","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10383441.2022.2108582","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article is an edited version of a conversation animated by Daniel Matthews’ recent monograph Earthbound: The Aesthetics of Sovereignty in the Anthropocene. We discuss the impetus and context for the book, its contribution to an emergent literature on law and the Anthropocene, and its commentary on the continued relevance of humanistic approaches to law and politics. The conversation traverses a range of concerns raised by Earthbound, such as the politics of place, the nature of community, and the priority of obligations in the ‘age of rights’. Exploring Matthews’ rendering of the ‘aesthetic aspect’ of sovereignty, which contours contemporary approaches to our environmental predicament, we consider the limits and possibilities of the sovereign political form in the context of the climate and ecological crises, and discuss how the Anthropocene might challenge existing approaches to law and the humanities. The interview is preceded by a contextualisation of Matthews’ work within the intellectual reorientations and recalibrations prompted by the Anthropocene, and the broader provocation of the ‘inhumanities’.","PeriodicalId":45376,"journal":{"name":"Griffith Law Review","volume":"31 1","pages":"435 - 451"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2022-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45542177","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-03DOI: 10.1080/10383441.2022.2108975
J. Crowe
ABSTRACT Interpreters of Emmanuel Levinas often note the central role he gives to language in his account of ethical discourse. Levinas himself puts the matter quite strongly, claiming, for example, that ‘[a]bsolute difference … is established only by language’. This aspect of Levinas’s thought has seemed to many readers to rule out the possibility of ethical relations with non-human animals. My aim in this article is to present an alternative reading of Levinas that avoids this implication. I argue that the core emphasis of Levinas’s account lies not on language, but on our capacity to learn from the other. We do this through what I term the second look: we respect [re-specere] the other by letting her teach us, by giving her our undivided attention, by looking at her again. Learning from the other, whether through language or otherwise, creates an ethical conversation that ‘puts in common a world hitherto mine’.
{"title":"Learning from the other: Levinas on ethics, discourse and language","authors":"J. Crowe","doi":"10.1080/10383441.2022.2108975","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10383441.2022.2108975","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Interpreters of Emmanuel Levinas often note the central role he gives to language in his account of ethical discourse. Levinas himself puts the matter quite strongly, claiming, for example, that ‘[a]bsolute difference … is established only by language’. This aspect of Levinas’s thought has seemed to many readers to rule out the possibility of ethical relations with non-human animals. My aim in this article is to present an alternative reading of Levinas that avoids this implication. I argue that the core emphasis of Levinas’s account lies not on language, but on our capacity to learn from the other. We do this through what I term the second look: we respect [re-specere] the other by letting her teach us, by giving her our undivided attention, by looking at her again. Learning from the other, whether through language or otherwise, creates an ethical conversation that ‘puts in common a world hitherto mine’.","PeriodicalId":45376,"journal":{"name":"Griffith Law Review","volume":"31 1","pages":"452 - 464"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2022-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42142198","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-03DOI: 10.1080/10383441.2022.2096973
A. Scardamaglia
ABSTRACT Banksy has long been the poster boy for the art counterculture. But like most things in the art world, the counterculture has become mainstream, and so has Banksy. Having spent his entire career shunning the intellectual property system, Banksy is now firmly entrenched in it. This article will explore Banksy’s recent trade mark strategy, including his success and his failures in a trilogy of cases heard across Europe. This article will explore the consequences of these decisions for Banksy’s remaining trade mark portfolio and how they may influence his legal strategy, and his art, into the future.
{"title":"Banksy: culture, counterculture and cancellation","authors":"A. Scardamaglia","doi":"10.1080/10383441.2022.2096973","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10383441.2022.2096973","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Banksy has long been the poster boy for the art counterculture. But like most things in the art world, the counterculture has become mainstream, and so has Banksy. Having spent his entire career shunning the intellectual property system, Banksy is now firmly entrenched in it. This article will explore Banksy’s recent trade mark strategy, including his success and his failures in a trilogy of cases heard across Europe. This article will explore the consequences of these decisions for Banksy’s remaining trade mark portfolio and how they may influence his legal strategy, and his art, into the future.","PeriodicalId":45376,"journal":{"name":"Griffith Law Review","volume":"31 1","pages":"418 - 434"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2022-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43043906","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-03DOI: 10.1080/10383441.2022.2096967
C. Arup
ABSTRACT Recent disruptions to the usual working conditions, such as the pandemic, highlight the insecurity of the minimum waged, casually employed working poor; they also point up the precarity of the heavily indebted, over-worked middle-class. Contrasting the cause of social protection with that of market liberty, this study examines the terms of the security debate to see how the cause of protection seeks to counter the cause of liberty. It reviews three recent regulatory events to see what success the cause of protection has had: the industrial relations reform process, the government response to the COVID-19 pandemic, and the agenda setting for women’s economic security. It notes the reforms that Australia's new Labor government proposes. The study recommends that, if reforms are to be effective, the cause of protection must move beyond the particulars of the labour contract to address the structures of power in the political economy of law making.
{"title":"Liberty or protection? Making law for employment and social security","authors":"C. Arup","doi":"10.1080/10383441.2022.2096967","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10383441.2022.2096967","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Recent disruptions to the usual working conditions, such as the pandemic, highlight the insecurity of the minimum waged, casually employed working poor; they also point up the precarity of the heavily indebted, over-worked middle-class. Contrasting the cause of social protection with that of market liberty, this study examines the terms of the security debate to see how the cause of protection seeks to counter the cause of liberty. It reviews three recent regulatory events to see what success the cause of protection has had: the industrial relations reform process, the government response to the COVID-19 pandemic, and the agenda setting for women’s economic security. It notes the reforms that Australia's new Labor government proposes. The study recommends that, if reforms are to be effective, the cause of protection must move beyond the particulars of the labour contract to address the structures of power in the political economy of law making.","PeriodicalId":45376,"journal":{"name":"Griffith Law Review","volume":"31 1","pages":"361 - 396"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2022-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42370046","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-03DOI: 10.1080/10383441.2022.2096968
M. Worthington
ABSTRACT This article extends discussion of the recently introduced licence theory of legal personality to the two remaining categories of legal personality available under Australian law, namely, Natural Legal Personality and Bodies Politic. The licence theory conceives of legal personality as designated legal functions, grouped together for nominated purposes. More particularly, it conceives of legal personality as a licensing system, whereby legal personality is granted by the State subject to various nominated conditions. These conditions reflect the overarching purpose behind the grant of legal personality, and may be organised into three general categories: Capability Conditions; Public Interest Conditions; and Use Conditions. According to the licence theory, in forming an understanding of legal personality it is necessary to consider the following design factors: i) the means by which a particular legal person is activated; ii) the purpose underwriting the grant of legal personality by the State; iii) legal capacities and obligations; and iv) the various different conditions operative in relation to the grant of a particular class of legal personality. In this article, these four factors are applied and considered in relation to both Natural Legal Personality and the Commonwealth of Australia (being the pre-eminent manifestation of the Body Politic).
{"title":"Legal personality as licence","authors":"M. Worthington","doi":"10.1080/10383441.2022.2096968","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10383441.2022.2096968","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article extends discussion of the recently introduced licence theory of legal personality to the two remaining categories of legal personality available under Australian law, namely, Natural Legal Personality and Bodies Politic. The licence theory conceives of legal personality as designated legal functions, grouped together for nominated purposes. More particularly, it conceives of legal personality as a licensing system, whereby legal personality is granted by the State subject to various nominated conditions. These conditions reflect the overarching purpose behind the grant of legal personality, and may be organised into three general categories: Capability Conditions; Public Interest Conditions; and Use Conditions. According to the licence theory, in forming an understanding of legal personality it is necessary to consider the following design factors: i) the means by which a particular legal person is activated; ii) the purpose underwriting the grant of legal personality by the State; iii) legal capacities and obligations; and iv) the various different conditions operative in relation to the grant of a particular class of legal personality. In this article, these four factors are applied and considered in relation to both Natural Legal Personality and the Commonwealth of Australia (being the pre-eminent manifestation of the Body Politic).","PeriodicalId":45376,"journal":{"name":"Griffith Law Review","volume":"31 1","pages":"397 - 417"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2022-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41965531","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-03DOI: 10.1080/10383441.2022.2076968
Tegan Evans
ABSTRACT The socio-legal tendency to categorise female killers as either ‘mad’, ‘sad’ ‘bad’ has been recognised as reflective of narrow notions of women’s capacity for violence. If women only kill due to insanity, or as the result of prior victimisation (the ‘mad’ and ‘sad’), then those who fall outside this narrative (the ‘bad’) risk legal and popular characterisation as non-women and even non-human. I consider the role of gender performance in which of these narratives are imposed upon a defendant and suggest that queer women are particularly susceptible to framing as monstrous due to their transgression of gender norms. This article will focus on the murders of Edward Baldock and Stacey Mitchell, both killed by lesbian couples in Australia in 1989 and 2006 respectively. Despite the intervening years, the defendants in both were characterised as vampiric in court and the news media, to the exclusion of relevant evidence of mental illness. I will examine this discursive and textual construction of the lesbian offender through Julie Kristeva’s theory of abjection and explore how the creation of a legal monster justifies, and indeed necessitates, its expulsion from society, leading to harsher punishment for lesbian defendants.
{"title":"Murderesses, monsters and madwomen: gender performance and the assessment of queer culpability in the Australian legal imagining","authors":"Tegan Evans","doi":"10.1080/10383441.2022.2076968","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10383441.2022.2076968","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The socio-legal tendency to categorise female killers as either ‘mad’, ‘sad’ ‘bad’ has been recognised as reflective of narrow notions of women’s capacity for violence. If women only kill due to insanity, or as the result of prior victimisation (the ‘mad’ and ‘sad’), then those who fall outside this narrative (the ‘bad’) risk legal and popular characterisation as non-women and even non-human. I consider the role of gender performance in which of these narratives are imposed upon a defendant and suggest that queer women are particularly susceptible to framing as monstrous due to their transgression of gender norms. This article will focus on the murders of Edward Baldock and Stacey Mitchell, both killed by lesbian couples in Australia in 1989 and 2006 respectively. Despite the intervening years, the defendants in both were characterised as vampiric in court and the news media, to the exclusion of relevant evidence of mental illness. I will examine this discursive and textual construction of the lesbian offender through Julie Kristeva’s theory of abjection and explore how the creation of a legal monster justifies, and indeed necessitates, its expulsion from society, leading to harsher punishment for lesbian defendants.","PeriodicalId":45376,"journal":{"name":"Griffith Law Review","volume":"31 1","pages":"217 - 239"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2022-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42106895","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-03DOI: 10.1080/10383441.2022.2076036
Marinella Marmo, Elvio Anthony Sinopoli, Sanzhuan Guo
ABSTRACT Through the case study of Gupta in the food delivery sector, this article argues that the gig economy has further increased the potential for worker exploitation in neoliberal capitalist global markets. Adopting a state-corporate criminology theoretical lens, the article addresses the harmful impact on gig workers, stating that incidents like the Gupta case constitute market-generated social harms. The proposed argument contributes to the existing literature on the gig economy by highlighting that any potential legal reforms would also require a review of the capitalist market, within which new forms of economy such as this one generate ongoing precariousness and vulnerability.
{"title":"Worker exploitation in the Australian gig economy: emerging mechanisms of social control","authors":"Marinella Marmo, Elvio Anthony Sinopoli, Sanzhuan Guo","doi":"10.1080/10383441.2022.2076036","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10383441.2022.2076036","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Through the case study of Gupta in the food delivery sector, this article argues that the gig economy has further increased the potential for worker exploitation in neoliberal capitalist global markets. Adopting a state-corporate criminology theoretical lens, the article addresses the harmful impact on gig workers, stating that incidents like the Gupta case constitute market-generated social harms. The proposed argument contributes to the existing literature on the gig economy by highlighting that any potential legal reforms would also require a review of the capitalist market, within which new forms of economy such as this one generate ongoing precariousness and vulnerability.","PeriodicalId":45376,"journal":{"name":"Griffith Law Review","volume":"31 1","pages":"171 - 192"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2022-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45621253","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}