Pub Date : 2023-08-08DOI: 10.1007/s11403-023-00394-9
Ata Atay, A. Mauleon, Simon Schopohl, Vincent Vannetelbosch
{"title":"Key players in network-oriented interventions","authors":"Ata Atay, A. Mauleon, Simon Schopohl, Vincent Vannetelbosch","doi":"10.1007/s11403-023-00394-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11403-023-00394-9","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45479,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-08-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44039714","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-28DOI: 10.1007/s11403-023-00390-z
L. Di Domenico
{"title":"Multiplicity and not necessarily heterogeneity: implications for the long-run degree of capacity utilization","authors":"L. Di Domenico","doi":"10.1007/s11403-023-00390-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11403-023-00390-z","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45479,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-07-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49649835","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-16DOI: 10.1007/s11403-023-00393-w
R. Antonietti, G. De Masi, G. Ricchiuti
{"title":"Linking FDI and trade network topology with the COVID-19 pandemic","authors":"R. Antonietti, G. De Masi, G. Ricchiuti","doi":"10.1007/s11403-023-00393-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11403-023-00393-w","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45479,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-07-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46149451","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-08DOI: 10.1007/s11403-023-00391-y
Raffaella Barone
The aim of the paper is to analyse the role of the real estate market as a dirty money laundering channel for organized crime in Italy. We contribute to the economic literature on house price determinants, providing for the first time an agent-based model to evaluate the impact of money laundering on the amount and the prices of transactions in the Italian residential real estate market. To this purpose, we collected and processed data from the Real Estate Market Observatory of the Italian Revenue Agency, the Italian National Statistical Institute and the European Central Bank for the period 2006–2020. Then, we enriched the data set including for each province if it is a tourist destination, a university site and the corresponding crime rate. Using AgentPy, we built the model that consists of one agent—that can be a buyer (honest or criminal) and a seller—, banks, the real estate properties, and the environment. Buyers and sellers interact randomly according to the Italian market real estate purchase frequencies. We show a reverse relationship between the crime rate index and the percentage of criminal transaction out of the total. Moreover, the average price is higher for criminal transactions with a growing trend as the number of criminals increases.
{"title":"Home sweet home, how money laundering pollutes the real estate market: an agent based model","authors":"Raffaella Barone","doi":"10.1007/s11403-023-00391-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11403-023-00391-y","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The aim of the paper is to analyse the role of the real estate market as a dirty money laundering channel for organized crime in Italy. We contribute to the economic literature on house price determinants, providing for the first time an agent-based model to evaluate the impact of money laundering on the amount and the prices of transactions in the Italian residential real estate market. To this purpose, we collected and processed data from the Real Estate Market Observatory of the Italian Revenue Agency, the Italian National Statistical Institute and the European Central Bank for the period 2006–2020. Then, we enriched the data set including for each province if it is a tourist destination, a university site and the corresponding crime rate. Using AgentPy, we built the model that consists of one agent—that can be a buyer (honest or criminal) and a seller—, banks, the real estate properties, and the environment. Buyers and sellers interact randomly according to the Italian market real estate purchase frequencies. We show a reverse relationship between the crime rate index and the percentage of criminal transaction out of the total. Moreover, the average price is higher for criminal transactions with a growing trend as the number of criminals increases.\u0000</p>","PeriodicalId":45479,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination","volume":"20 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-07-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138520567","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-04DOI: 10.1007/s11403-023-00392-x
P. Morone, Rocco Caferra, A. Lopolito
{"title":"Knowledge diffusion in social networks under targeted attack and random failure: the resilience of communities","authors":"P. Morone, Rocco Caferra, A. Lopolito","doi":"10.1007/s11403-023-00392-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11403-023-00392-x","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45479,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-07-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46916705","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-30DOI: 10.1007/s11403-023-00388-7
Dave Cliff
Abstract I introduce parameterised response zero intelligence (PRZI), a new form of zero intelligence (ZI) trader intended for use in simulation studies of the dynamics of continuous double auction markets. Like Gode and Sunder’s classic ZIC trader, PRZI generates quote prices from a random distribution over some specified domain of discretely valued allowable quote prices. Unlike ZIC, which uses a uniform distribution to generate prices, the probability distribution in a PRZI trader is parameterised in such a way that its probability mass function (PMF) is determined by a real-valued control variable s in the range $$[-1.0, +1.0]$$ [-1.0,+1.0] that determines the strategy for that trader. When $$s=0$$ s=0 , a PRZI trader behaves identically to the ZIC strategy, with a uniform PMF; but when $$s approx pm 1$$ s≈±1 the PRZI trader’s PMF becomes maximally skewed to one extreme or the other of the price range, thereby making it more or less “urgent” in the prices that it generates, biasing the quote price distribution towards or away from the trader’s limit price. To explore the co-evolutionary dynamics of populations of PRZI traders that dynamically adapt their strategies, I show initial results from long-term market experiments in which each trader uses a simple stochastic hill-climber algorithm to repeatedly evaluate alternative s -values and choose the most profitable at any given time. In these experiments the profitability of any particular s -value may be non-stationary because the profitability of one trader’s strategy at any one time can depend on the mix of strategies being played by the other traders at that time, which are each themselves continuously adapting. Results from these market experiments demonstrate that the population of traders’ strategies can exhibit rich dynamics, with periods of stability lasting over hundreds of thousands of trader interactions interspersed by occasional periods of change. Python source code for PRZI traders, and for the stochastic hill-climber, have been made publicly available on GitHub.
{"title":"Parameterised response zero intelligence traders","authors":"Dave Cliff","doi":"10.1007/s11403-023-00388-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11403-023-00388-7","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract I introduce parameterised response zero intelligence (PRZI), a new form of zero intelligence (ZI) trader intended for use in simulation studies of the dynamics of continuous double auction markets. Like Gode and Sunder’s classic ZIC trader, PRZI generates quote prices from a random distribution over some specified domain of discretely valued allowable quote prices. Unlike ZIC, which uses a uniform distribution to generate prices, the probability distribution in a PRZI trader is parameterised in such a way that its probability mass function (PMF) is determined by a real-valued control variable s in the range $$[-1.0, +1.0]$$ <mml:math xmlns:mml=\"http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML\"> <mml:mrow> <mml:mo>[</mml:mo> <mml:mo>-</mml:mo> <mml:mn>1.0</mml:mn> <mml:mo>,</mml:mo> <mml:mo>+</mml:mo> <mml:mn>1.0</mml:mn> <mml:mo>]</mml:mo> </mml:mrow> </mml:math> that determines the strategy for that trader. When $$s=0$$ <mml:math xmlns:mml=\"http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML\"> <mml:mrow> <mml:mi>s</mml:mi> <mml:mo>=</mml:mo> <mml:mn>0</mml:mn> </mml:mrow> </mml:math> , a PRZI trader behaves identically to the ZIC strategy, with a uniform PMF; but when $$s approx pm 1$$ <mml:math xmlns:mml=\"http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML\"> <mml:mrow> <mml:mi>s</mml:mi> <mml:mo>≈</mml:mo> <mml:mo>±</mml:mo> <mml:mn>1</mml:mn> </mml:mrow> </mml:math> the PRZI trader’s PMF becomes maximally skewed to one extreme or the other of the price range, thereby making it more or less “urgent” in the prices that it generates, biasing the quote price distribution towards or away from the trader’s limit price. To explore the co-evolutionary dynamics of populations of PRZI traders that dynamically adapt their strategies, I show initial results from long-term market experiments in which each trader uses a simple stochastic hill-climber algorithm to repeatedly evaluate alternative s -values and choose the most profitable at any given time. In these experiments the profitability of any particular s -value may be non-stationary because the profitability of one trader’s strategy at any one time can depend on the mix of strategies being played by the other traders at that time, which are each themselves continuously adapting. Results from these market experiments demonstrate that the population of traders’ strategies can exhibit rich dynamics, with periods of stability lasting over hundreds of thousands of trader interactions interspersed by occasional periods of change. Python source code for PRZI traders, and for the stochastic hill-climber, have been made publicly available on GitHub.","PeriodicalId":45479,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135478841","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-26DOI: 10.1007/s11403-023-00387-8
Paula J. Brewer, Jeremy Juybari, Raymond Moberly
{"title":"A comparison of zero- and minimal-intelligence agendas in majority-rule voting models","authors":"Paula J. Brewer, Jeremy Juybari, Raymond Moberly","doi":"10.1007/s11403-023-00387-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11403-023-00387-8","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45479,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-05-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42583013","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-23DOI: 10.1007/s11403-023-00385-w
D. Green
{"title":"Emergence in complex networks of simple agents","authors":"D. Green","doi":"10.1007/s11403-023-00385-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11403-023-00385-w","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45479,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination","volume":"18 1","pages":"419 - 462"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-05-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44501408","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-23DOI: 10.1007/s11403-023-00381-0
C. Su, R. Schoney, J. Nolan
{"title":"Buy, sell or rent the farm: succession planning and the future of farming on the Great Plains","authors":"C. Su, R. Schoney, J. Nolan","doi":"10.1007/s11403-023-00381-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11403-023-00381-0","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45479,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination","volume":"18 1","pages":"627 - 669"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-05-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45918617","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-26DOI: 10.1007/s11403-023-00386-9
Giorgio Calcagnini, Slađana Pavlinović Mršić, Laura Policardo, Edgar J. Sanchez Carrera
{"title":"Correction to: Policy choices and compliance behavior in pandemic times","authors":"Giorgio Calcagnini, Slađana Pavlinović Mršić, Laura Policardo, Edgar J. Sanchez Carrera","doi":"10.1007/s11403-023-00386-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11403-023-00386-9","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45479,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination","volume":"103 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136380540","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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