Pub Date : 2021-02-09DOI: 10.1080/0098261X.2021.1881668
Rachael Houston, Siyu Li, T. Johnson
Abstract A long line of literature examines acclimation effects for newly confirmed U.S. Supreme Court justices. However, most of these analyses focus only on how new justices vote or write opinions. Here, we examine how they act during the one public aspect of the Court’s decision-making process—its oral arguments on the merits. In so doing, we seek to determine whether new justices speak, and interrupt their colleagues, less often than do their more senior colleagues. Using data on justices’ speaking turns and interruptions during all orally argued cases from the 1955 to 2018 terms, we find an acclimation effect exists whereby new justices are significantly less inclined to speak and interrupt their more senior colleagues. Our models also suggest gender and judicial ideology influence the extent to which new justices exhibit such effects during oral argument proceedings.
{"title":"Learning to Speak Up: Acclimation Effects and Supreme Court Oral Argument","authors":"Rachael Houston, Siyu Li, T. Johnson","doi":"10.1080/0098261X.2021.1881668","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0098261X.2021.1881668","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract A long line of literature examines acclimation effects for newly confirmed U.S. Supreme Court justices. However, most of these analyses focus only on how new justices vote or write opinions. Here, we examine how they act during the one public aspect of the Court’s decision-making process—its oral arguments on the merits. In so doing, we seek to determine whether new justices speak, and interrupt their colleagues, less often than do their more senior colleagues. Using data on justices’ speaking turns and interruptions during all orally argued cases from the 1955 to 2018 terms, we find an acclimation effect exists whereby new justices are significantly less inclined to speak and interrupt their more senior colleagues. Our models also suggest gender and judicial ideology influence the extent to which new justices exhibit such effects during oral argument proceedings.","PeriodicalId":45509,"journal":{"name":"Justice System Journal","volume":"30 1","pages":"115 - 129"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2021-02-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83779345","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-02-05DOI: 10.1080/0098261X.2020.1869631
Shane A. Gleason, Diana K. Ivy
Abstract Attorney success at oral arguments is related to compliance with gender norms, subtle expectations about how men and women should speak and act in a host of contexts. While oral arguments are typically between two attorneys, amici curiae are present in a significant minority of cases. Amici, often representing the federal government, lend credibility to their endorsed attorney and complement the argument. Much like arguments for attorneys representing the petitioner and respondent, we contend amici oral argument success is tied to the performance of gender. However, while attorneys for the petitioner and respondent are more successful when adhering to gender norms, amici success is tied to mimicry of the gender norms associated with the endorsed attorney. Thus, a female attorney supporting a male attorney will be more successful if she utilizes male gender norms. Drawing on communication literature, we argue this is because endorsed attorneys and their amici collectively construct a narrative. By arguing first, the endorsed attorney sets gender norm expectations which the amicus then matches via mimicry. We find support for this argument via a quantitative textual analysis of oral amicus arguments from the 2004–2016 terms. While our results add a new wrinkle to our understanding of gender at oral arguments, they also raise normative concerns. Whereas previous work indicates women must balance gender and professional norms, our results suggest that it is not just women who are held to this double standard, but also the men who support them. This compounds concerns about how effectively women can participate as counsel at the Supreme Court.
{"title":"As She Was Saying: The Role of Gender and Narratives in Oral Argument Amicus Success","authors":"Shane A. Gleason, Diana K. Ivy","doi":"10.1080/0098261X.2020.1869631","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0098261X.2020.1869631","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Attorney success at oral arguments is related to compliance with gender norms, subtle expectations about how men and women should speak and act in a host of contexts. While oral arguments are typically between two attorneys, amici curiae are present in a significant minority of cases. Amici, often representing the federal government, lend credibility to their endorsed attorney and complement the argument. Much like arguments for attorneys representing the petitioner and respondent, we contend amici oral argument success is tied to the performance of gender. However, while attorneys for the petitioner and respondent are more successful when adhering to gender norms, amici success is tied to mimicry of the gender norms associated with the endorsed attorney. Thus, a female attorney supporting a male attorney will be more successful if she utilizes male gender norms. Drawing on communication literature, we argue this is because endorsed attorneys and their amici collectively construct a narrative. By arguing first, the endorsed attorney sets gender norm expectations which the amicus then matches via mimicry. We find support for this argument via a quantitative textual analysis of oral amicus arguments from the 2004–2016 terms. While our results add a new wrinkle to our understanding of gender at oral arguments, they also raise normative concerns. Whereas previous work indicates women must balance gender and professional norms, our results suggest that it is not just women who are held to this double standard, but also the men who support them. This compounds concerns about how effectively women can participate as counsel at the Supreme Court.","PeriodicalId":45509,"journal":{"name":"Justice System Journal","volume":"43 1","pages":"416 - 433"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2021-02-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84514180","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-29DOI: 10.1080/0098261X.2021.1881666
Maxwell Mak, Andrew H. Sidman, V. Palmeri, Nico Denise, Ruben Huertero
Abstract Work on the Courts of Appeals has found that judges adjust their behavior based on the judges with whom they serve. These “panel effects” are traditionally described in terms of preferences, with the effect of a judge’s ideology conditioned by the preferences of other judges on the panel. Additionally, prior work has observed panel effects based in demographic diversity. The theoretical argument offered by this work is that white, male judges learn from the personal experiences of their nonwhite and female colleagues, becoming more receptive to claims of discrimination. This learning is facilitated in the Courts of Appeals because of the repeated interactions of circuit court judges. What happens when collegiality based on repeated interactions is disrupted and deciding cases together happens only on a single case? This is the context of three-judge district court panels, which hear cases involving the Voting Rights Act. Decisions of these panels can be appealed directly to the Supreme Court, creating added pressure to make correct decisions, yet providing little opportunity for judges to learn from their colleagues. We find that race-based panel effects in this context are quite strong, but the mechanism through which they work is different than on circuit court panels. When serving with nonwhite judges, white judges appear to take their cue on how to vote from their nonwhite colleagues. Our results suggest that white judges in this context assume an expertise on the part of their nonwhite colleagues by virtue of their race. These findings potentially have important implications for the way we understand the effects of demographic diversity on judicial behavior.
{"title":"Judges’ Race and the Voting Rights Act: Perceived Expertise in Three-Judge District Court Panels","authors":"Maxwell Mak, Andrew H. Sidman, V. Palmeri, Nico Denise, Ruben Huertero","doi":"10.1080/0098261X.2021.1881666","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0098261X.2021.1881666","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Work on the Courts of Appeals has found that judges adjust their behavior based on the judges with whom they serve. These “panel effects” are traditionally described in terms of preferences, with the effect of a judge’s ideology conditioned by the preferences of other judges on the panel. Additionally, prior work has observed panel effects based in demographic diversity. The theoretical argument offered by this work is that white, male judges learn from the personal experiences of their nonwhite and female colleagues, becoming more receptive to claims of discrimination. This learning is facilitated in the Courts of Appeals because of the repeated interactions of circuit court judges. What happens when collegiality based on repeated interactions is disrupted and deciding cases together happens only on a single case? This is the context of three-judge district court panels, which hear cases involving the Voting Rights Act. Decisions of these panels can be appealed directly to the Supreme Court, creating added pressure to make correct decisions, yet providing little opportunity for judges to learn from their colleagues. We find that race-based panel effects in this context are quite strong, but the mechanism through which they work is different than on circuit court panels. When serving with nonwhite judges, white judges appear to take their cue on how to vote from their nonwhite colleagues. Our results suggest that white judges in this context assume an expertise on the part of their nonwhite colleagues by virtue of their race. These findings potentially have important implications for the way we understand the effects of demographic diversity on judicial behavior.","PeriodicalId":45509,"journal":{"name":"Justice System Journal","volume":"64 3 1","pages":"375 - 393"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2021-01-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90945076","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-12-17DOI: 10.1080/0098261X.2020.1856738
Benjamin Bricker
Abstract This article seeks to shed new light on how judicial consensus is formed. Through a multi-country series of 17 interviews with judges and clerks in six different courts – both ordinary and constitutional – across Europe, I investigate how judges negotiate and bargain to create final outcomes, and how the deliberative process itself may help to shape outcomes. Interview responses suggest two factors affect the probability that judges will be able to reach consensus outcomes: the complexity of the case and the background of the case rapporteur. These interview responses are then paired with an original dataset of case outcomes from seven European constitutional courts. The dataset of court outcomes suggests that the complexity of the case matters greatly, though limited testing shows judicial backgrounds do not appear to be a significant factor in the creation of consensus.
{"title":"Consensus Decision Making: A Comparative Analysis of Judging and Judicial Deliberations","authors":"Benjamin Bricker","doi":"10.1080/0098261X.2020.1856738","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0098261X.2020.1856738","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article seeks to shed new light on how judicial consensus is formed. Through a multi-country series of 17 interviews with judges and clerks in six different courts – both ordinary and constitutional – across Europe, I investigate how judges negotiate and bargain to create final outcomes, and how the deliberative process itself may help to shape outcomes. Interview responses suggest two factors affect the probability that judges will be able to reach consensus outcomes: the complexity of the case and the background of the case rapporteur. These interview responses are then paired with an original dataset of case outcomes from seven European constitutional courts. The dataset of court outcomes suggests that the complexity of the case matters greatly, though limited testing shows judicial backgrounds do not appear to be a significant factor in the creation of consensus.","PeriodicalId":45509,"journal":{"name":"Justice System Journal","volume":"52 1","pages":"25 - 49"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2020-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73042562","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-12-12DOI: 10.1080/0098261X.2020.1852985
Elisa Fusco, Martina Laurenzi, B. Maggi
Abstract In recent years, the Italian judicial system has been at the center of both the political debate and policy actions aiming at modifying the territorial structure and the organization of the courts as well as the procedural processes. The measures adopted concerned the reorganization of the magistrate’s career and the reform of judicial districts. Despite the several reforms, the Italian judicial system does not reach yet the European standards, principally for the so called magistrate-duration procedures binomial, according to which the number of magistrates is above the European average level and the time of legal trials is too long compared with most European countries. Hence, performance and efficiency are worthy of attention in this field. Here, the territorial displacement of efficiency for the Italian judicial districts is studied using a DEA approach followed by a spatial analysis consisting in a PCA for macro-area where the problem of long trials is taken into account. We assess on the geographical characterization of both productivity and expenses of the judicial sector and provide indications to improve efficiency according to the dimensions of the courts.
{"title":"Length of Trials in the Italian Judicial System: An Efficiency Analysis by Macro-Area","authors":"Elisa Fusco, Martina Laurenzi, B. Maggi","doi":"10.1080/0098261X.2020.1852985","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0098261X.2020.1852985","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In recent years, the Italian judicial system has been at the center of both the political debate and policy actions aiming at modifying the territorial structure and the organization of the courts as well as the procedural processes. The measures adopted concerned the reorganization of the magistrate’s career and the reform of judicial districts. Despite the several reforms, the Italian judicial system does not reach yet the European standards, principally for the so called magistrate-duration procedures binomial, according to which the number of magistrates is above the European average level and the time of legal trials is too long compared with most European countries. Hence, performance and efficiency are worthy of attention in this field. Here, the territorial displacement of efficiency for the Italian judicial districts is studied using a DEA approach followed by a spatial analysis consisting in a PCA for macro-area where the problem of long trials is taken into account. We assess on the geographical characterization of both productivity and expenses of the judicial sector and provide indications to improve efficiency according to the dimensions of the courts.","PeriodicalId":45509,"journal":{"name":"Justice System Journal","volume":"21 1","pages":"78 - 105"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2020-12-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78776958","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-12-11DOI: 10.1080/0098261X.2020.1854905
Caio Castelliano, Peter Grajzl, A. Alves, Eduardo Watanabe
Abstract Exploring a large-scale case-level dataset from Brazilian federal courts, we offer empirical insight into the implications of the organizational structure and jurisdictional specialization of in-court adjudication forums for case duration, a measure of tribunal efficacy. Federal trial courts in Brazil are organized into offices, with each office further divided into a titled and a substitute judgeship. Random case assignment between judgeships within the offices and between same-jurisdiction offices within the courts facilitates the estimation of causal effects of different adjudicatory forums on case duration. Titled judgeships on average exhibit a modest efficacy advantage over substitute judgeships, although substitute judgeships are more efficacious than titled judgeships in some of the court offices. Case duration differences between same-jurisdiction offices can be considerable, an indication of inequities in recourse to justice. Estimates exploiting variation in court offices' jurisdictional specialization suggest that office specialization reduces case duration only if offices are either specialized with respect to procedure or fully specialized with respect to issue, or both. Partial specialization in issue does not exhibit an effect on case duration. Because specialization of in-court adjudication forums is a common organizational feature of many justice systems worldwide, our findings are relevant beyond Brazilian borders.
{"title":"Adjudication Forums, Specialization, and Case Duration: Evidence from Brazilian Federal Courts","authors":"Caio Castelliano, Peter Grajzl, A. Alves, Eduardo Watanabe","doi":"10.1080/0098261X.2020.1854905","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0098261X.2020.1854905","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Exploring a large-scale case-level dataset from Brazilian federal courts, we offer empirical insight into the implications of the organizational structure and jurisdictional specialization of in-court adjudication forums for case duration, a measure of tribunal efficacy. Federal trial courts in Brazil are organized into offices, with each office further divided into a titled and a substitute judgeship. Random case assignment between judgeships within the offices and between same-jurisdiction offices within the courts facilitates the estimation of causal effects of different adjudicatory forums on case duration. Titled judgeships on average exhibit a modest efficacy advantage over substitute judgeships, although substitute judgeships are more efficacious than titled judgeships in some of the court offices. Case duration differences between same-jurisdiction offices can be considerable, an indication of inequities in recourse to justice. Estimates exploiting variation in court offices' jurisdictional specialization suggest that office specialization reduces case duration only if offices are either specialized with respect to procedure or fully specialized with respect to issue, or both. Partial specialization in issue does not exhibit an effect on case duration. Because specialization of in-court adjudication forums is a common organizational feature of many justice systems worldwide, our findings are relevant beyond Brazilian borders.","PeriodicalId":45509,"journal":{"name":"Justice System Journal","volume":"48 1","pages":"50 - 77"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2020-12-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87399974","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-12-09DOI: 10.1080/0098261X.2020.1854904
T. Kidd
Abstract Research consistently finds that jurors bring preexisting attitudes and opinions, which can influence trial outcomes, into the courtroom. This research seeks to understand if juror decision-making is influenced by implicit and explicit perceptions of legal actor trustworthiness. Participants were recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk online platform and were randomly assigned to read a summarized trial scenario and render a guilty or not guilty verdict. Two of the three trials differed according to presentation of “compromising” evidence by either the prosecution or the defense, with the third serving as a control condition. To establish if participants had trustworthy or untrustworthy implicit attitudes toward prosecutors or defense attorneys, participants completed an Implicit Association Test (IAT). Participants then reported their explicit attitudes toward prosecutors and defense attorneys, in addition to providing their demographic information and attitudes toward the criminal legal system. Results indicate that implicit and explicit biases, as well as certain socio-demographics, are associated with verdicts in the trial scenarios. However, in particularly ambiguous cases (control condition), preexisting implicit biases of legal actor trustworthiness appear to inform verdicts more than explicit attitudes. These results suggest that attorney reliance on explicit attitudes during voir dire may be more informative, except in cases in which the evidence for both the prosecution and defense is particularly ambiguous.
{"title":"Implicit and Explicit Attitudes Toward Prosecutors and Defense Attorneys","authors":"T. Kidd","doi":"10.1080/0098261X.2020.1854904","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0098261X.2020.1854904","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Research consistently finds that jurors bring preexisting attitudes and opinions, which can influence trial outcomes, into the courtroom. This research seeks to understand if juror decision-making is influenced by implicit and explicit perceptions of legal actor trustworthiness. Participants were recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk online platform and were randomly assigned to read a summarized trial scenario and render a guilty or not guilty verdict. Two of the three trials differed according to presentation of “compromising” evidence by either the prosecution or the defense, with the third serving as a control condition. To establish if participants had trustworthy or untrustworthy implicit attitudes toward prosecutors or defense attorneys, participants completed an Implicit Association Test (IAT). Participants then reported their explicit attitudes toward prosecutors and defense attorneys, in addition to providing their demographic information and attitudes toward the criminal legal system. Results indicate that implicit and explicit biases, as well as certain socio-demographics, are associated with verdicts in the trial scenarios. However, in particularly ambiguous cases (control condition), preexisting implicit biases of legal actor trustworthiness appear to inform verdicts more than explicit attitudes. These results suggest that attorney reliance on explicit attitudes during voir dire may be more informative, except in cases in which the evidence for both the prosecution and defense is particularly ambiguous.","PeriodicalId":45509,"journal":{"name":"Justice System Journal","volume":"46 1","pages":"3 - 24"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2020-12-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86002820","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-11-28DOI: 10.1080/0098261X.2020.1843093
Kristen M. Renberg
Abstract Judicial selection methods have been reformed in many states over the 20th century. I will show how changing electoral institutions have influenced judicial behavior. To do this, I employ an original dataset and a causal inference methodology to estimate the impact of reforming a state’s selection system from partisan to nonpartisan elections on opinion writing behavior. I predict that justices, initially elected through partisan elections, will write more dissenting opinions once they face nonpartisan retention elections. The results suggest that electoral reform leads to justices authoring more dissenting opinions than they otherwise would have. Most who favor electoral reform posit that the removal of partisan labels increases the legitimacy of state supreme courts. However, if the demise of consensual norms on courts threatens their legitimacy, then electoral reform appears to have a counter-intuitive outcome. This article contributes to our understanding of how elections impact judicial behavior.
{"title":"The Impact of Retention Systems on Judicial Behavior: a Synthetic Controls Analysis of State Supreme Courts","authors":"Kristen M. Renberg","doi":"10.1080/0098261X.2020.1843093","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0098261X.2020.1843093","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Judicial selection methods have been reformed in many states over the 20th century. I will show how changing electoral institutions have influenced judicial behavior. To do this, I employ an original dataset and a causal inference methodology to estimate the impact of reforming a state’s selection system from partisan to nonpartisan elections on opinion writing behavior. I predict that justices, initially elected through partisan elections, will write more dissenting opinions once they face nonpartisan retention elections. The results suggest that electoral reform leads to justices authoring more dissenting opinions than they otherwise would have. Most who favor electoral reform posit that the removal of partisan labels increases the legitimacy of state supreme courts. However, if the demise of consensual norms on courts threatens their legitimacy, then electoral reform appears to have a counter-intuitive outcome. This article contributes to our understanding of how elections impact judicial behavior.","PeriodicalId":45509,"journal":{"name":"Justice System Journal","volume":"93 1","pages":"292 - 312"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2020-11-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75658022","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-11-16DOI: 10.1080/0098261X.2020.1839822
Albert H. Rivero
Abstract Do judges follow public opinion when they decide cases that present related issues over which the public has differing ideological views? This study addresses this question by comparing the U.S. District Court behavior in race and gender discrimination cases. By measuring public opinion on two issue areas that raise similar legal questions, I provide a better estimate of the effect of public opinion with fewer confounding variables relating to the agenda of the federal courts. Using a difference-in-differences approach, I show that district court judges are more likely to vote liberally in gender discrimination cases than in race discrimination cases when public opinion on gender becomes relatively more liberal than public opinion on race. This holds even when including a series of important covariates such as demographic information about the judges. This paper thus provides further support for a counterintuitive claim in the literature: unelected judges may nonetheless respond to public opinion.
{"title":"The Public’s Influence on the U.S. District Courts in Discrimination Cases","authors":"Albert H. Rivero","doi":"10.1080/0098261X.2020.1839822","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0098261X.2020.1839822","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Do judges follow public opinion when they decide cases that present related issues over which the public has differing ideological views? This study addresses this question by comparing the U.S. District Court behavior in race and gender discrimination cases. By measuring public opinion on two issue areas that raise similar legal questions, I provide a better estimate of the effect of public opinion with fewer confounding variables relating to the agenda of the federal courts. Using a difference-in-differences approach, I show that district court judges are more likely to vote liberally in gender discrimination cases than in race discrimination cases when public opinion on gender becomes relatively more liberal than public opinion on race. This holds even when including a series of important covariates such as demographic information about the judges. This paper thus provides further support for a counterintuitive claim in the literature: unelected judges may nonetheless respond to public opinion.","PeriodicalId":45509,"journal":{"name":"Justice System Journal","volume":"17 1","pages":"359 - 374"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2020-11-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82009259","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-11-11DOI: 10.1080/0098261X.2020.1839823
Jonathan P. Kastellec
Abstract This paper examines how the identities of judges on multimember courts interact with case context to influence judicial decision making. Specifically, I leverage variation in panel composition and defendant race to examine race-based panel effects in death penalty cases on the Courts of Appeals. Using a dataset that accounts for several characteristics of a defendant and his crime, I find that the assignment of a black judge to an otherwise all-nonblack panel substantially increases the probability that the panel will grant relief to a defendant on death row—but only in cases where the defendant is black. The size of the increase is substantively large: conditional on the defendant being black, a three-judge panel with a single African-American judge is about 23 percentage points more likely to grant relief than an all-nonblack panel. These results have important implications for assessing the role of racial diversity on the federal courts and contribute to the empirical literature on the application of the death penalty in the United States.
{"title":"Race, Context, and Judging on the Courts of Appeals: Race-Based Panel Effects in Death Penalty Cases","authors":"Jonathan P. Kastellec","doi":"10.1080/0098261X.2020.1839823","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0098261X.2020.1839823","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper examines how the identities of judges on multimember courts interact with case context to influence judicial decision making. Specifically, I leverage variation in panel composition and defendant race to examine race-based panel effects in death penalty cases on the Courts of Appeals. Using a dataset that accounts for several characteristics of a defendant and his crime, I find that the assignment of a black judge to an otherwise all-nonblack panel substantially increases the probability that the panel will grant relief to a defendant on death row—but only in cases where the defendant is black. The size of the increase is substantively large: conditional on the defendant being black, a three-judge panel with a single African-American judge is about 23 percentage points more likely to grant relief than an all-nonblack panel. These results have important implications for assessing the role of racial diversity on the federal courts and contribute to the empirical literature on the application of the death penalty in the United States.","PeriodicalId":45509,"journal":{"name":"Justice System Journal","volume":"59 1","pages":"394 - 415"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2020-11-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87919924","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：