Pub Date : 2020-12-01DOI: 10.1177/0002039720945720
A. Osei, Hervé Akinocho, Stephen Mwombela
Why do some leaders respect constitutional provisions like presidential term limits, while others do not? For all regimes, constitutions are important reference texts that provide some basic rules of the game. Within this framework, term limits and electoral laws are crucial because they are directly concerned with the exercise of power. Using Geddes’ regime typology, this article is proposing a regime-oriented approach to explain the variation on the African continent. Democracies, party-based regimes, and military regimes are surely different from each other, but they have a degree of depersonalisation in common that is not found in personalist regimes. For the latter type, term limits are a question of regime survival. Personalist rulers will therefore seek to amend or ignore constitutions, but their success will depend on the cohesion of their ruling coalition. The argument will be illustrated with two case studies: Togo and Tanzania.
{"title":"Presidential Term Limits and Regime Types: When Do Leaders Respect Constitutional Norms?","authors":"A. Osei, Hervé Akinocho, Stephen Mwombela","doi":"10.1177/0002039720945720","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0002039720945720","url":null,"abstract":"Why do some leaders respect constitutional provisions like presidential term limits, while others do not? For all regimes, constitutions are important reference texts that provide some basic rules of the game. Within this framework, term limits and electoral laws are crucial because they are directly concerned with the exercise of power. Using Geddes’ regime typology, this article is proposing a regime-oriented approach to explain the variation on the African continent. Democracies, party-based regimes, and military regimes are surely different from each other, but they have a degree of depersonalisation in common that is not found in personalist regimes. For the latter type, term limits are a question of regime survival. Personalist rulers will therefore seek to amend or ignore constitutions, but their success will depend on the cohesion of their ruling coalition. The argument will be illustrated with two case studies: Togo and Tanzania.","PeriodicalId":45570,"journal":{"name":"Africa Spectrum","volume":"55 1","pages":"251 - 271"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/0002039720945720","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44443339","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-12-01DOI: 10.1177/0002039720962119
D. Nowack
Attempts to circumvent presidential term limits in African countries show a puzzling variation of success or failure. This variation is due to both international and domestic factors. However, how these interact is not yet well understood. This article analyses how international donors and organisations intervened in the attempted term limit circumvention in Malawi from 1999 to 2003. It differentiates between different types of instruments used by donors in democracy promotion, and, by doing so, contributes to the question whether donors in term limit struggles can contribute to genuine democratic consolidation. It employs deductive process-tracing based on an analysis of primary media sources and interviews conducted during field research. The results show that erosion of party support as a proximate and a strong civil society response as a mediate factor were important in saving Malawi’s term limit. Aid conditionality and democracy promotion by donors and international organisations exerted influence on both factors.
{"title":"Process Tracing the Term Limit Struggle in Malawi: The Role of International Democracy Promotion in Muluzi’s Bid for a Third Term","authors":"D. Nowack","doi":"10.1177/0002039720962119","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0002039720962119","url":null,"abstract":"Attempts to circumvent presidential term limits in African countries show a puzzling variation of success or failure. This variation is due to both international and domestic factors. However, how these interact is not yet well understood. This article analyses how international donors and organisations intervened in the attempted term limit circumvention in Malawi from 1999 to 2003. It differentiates between different types of instruments used by donors in democracy promotion, and, by doing so, contributes to the question whether donors in term limit struggles can contribute to genuine democratic consolidation. It employs deductive process-tracing based on an analysis of primary media sources and interviews conducted during field research. The results show that erosion of party support as a proximate and a strong civil society response as a mediate factor were important in saving Malawi’s term limit. Aid conditionality and democracy promotion by donors and international organisations exerted influence on both factors.","PeriodicalId":45570,"journal":{"name":"Africa Spectrum","volume":"55 1","pages":"291 - 320"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/0002039720962119","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46994941","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-12-01DOI: 10.1177/0002039720980457
Mark Dawson, D. J. Young
Constitutions around Africa have been repeatedly tested on the issue of presidential term limits. We explore the four most recent cases of African presidents facing the end of their constitutionally mandated limit, all of which developed in Central Africa. Burundi, Rwanda, the Republic of Congo, and the Democratic Republic of Congo all adopted constitutions limiting presidential tenure to two terms; yet, in 2015, when these limits were approaching, none of the sitting presidents simply stood down. Our analysis focuses on the constitutional provisions meant to protect the two-term limit, the strategies employed by each of the four presidents, and the difficulty they faced in pursuing extended tenure. We find that constitutional provisions do constrain, but not always to the expected degree. Our analysis adds a consideration of a foundational constitutional factor to the growing literature on term limits in Africa, with implications for other regions of newly developing democracies.
{"title":"Presidential Tenure and Constitutional Provisions: Recent Evidence from Central Africa","authors":"Mark Dawson, D. J. Young","doi":"10.1177/0002039720980457","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0002039720980457","url":null,"abstract":"Constitutions around Africa have been repeatedly tested on the issue of presidential term limits. We explore the four most recent cases of African presidents facing the end of their constitutionally mandated limit, all of which developed in Central Africa. Burundi, Rwanda, the Republic of Congo, and the Democratic Republic of Congo all adopted constitutions limiting presidential tenure to two terms; yet, in 2015, when these limits were approaching, none of the sitting presidents simply stood down. Our analysis focuses on the constitutional provisions meant to protect the two-term limit, the strategies employed by each of the four presidents, and the difficulty they faced in pursuing extended tenure. We find that constitutional provisions do constrain, but not always to the expected degree. Our analysis adds a consideration of a foundational constitutional factor to the growing literature on term limits in Africa, with implications for other regions of newly developing democracies.","PeriodicalId":45570,"journal":{"name":"Africa Spectrum","volume":"55 1","pages":"272 - 290"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/0002039720980457","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43450784","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-12-01DOI: 10.1177/0002039720970957
Justice Richard Kwabena Owusu Kyei, L. Berckmoes
Literature on political vigilante groups has centred on the violence and conflict that emanate from their activities. This article approaches political vigilante groups as political actors who engage in political mobilisation and participation and therewith also contribute to nation state building. It explores how such groups participate in Ghana’s democratic governance and asks whether violence is an inevitable characteristic. The article builds on individual in-depth interviews and focus group discussions with political vigilante group members in Kumasi and Tamale in 2019. Findings show that political vigilante “youth” appeared to refer primarily to the social position attributed to non-elite groups in the political field. Political vigilante groups are multi-faceted in their organisational structures, membership, and activities both during electoral campaigns and during governing periods. While some groups revert to violence occasionally, the study concludes that political vigilante groups, in enabling different voices to be heard, are also contributing to democratic governance.
{"title":"Political Vigilante Groups in Ghana: Violence or Democracy?","authors":"Justice Richard Kwabena Owusu Kyei, L. Berckmoes","doi":"10.1177/0002039720970957","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0002039720970957","url":null,"abstract":"Literature on political vigilante groups has centred on the violence and conflict that emanate from their activities. This article approaches political vigilante groups as political actors who engage in political mobilisation and participation and therewith also contribute to nation state building. It explores how such groups participate in Ghana’s democratic governance and asks whether violence is an inevitable characteristic. The article builds on individual in-depth interviews and focus group discussions with political vigilante group members in Kumasi and Tamale in 2019. Findings show that political vigilante “youth” appeared to refer primarily to the social position attributed to non-elite groups in the political field. Political vigilante groups are multi-faceted in their organisational structures, membership, and activities both during electoral campaigns and during governing periods. While some groups revert to violence occasionally, the study concludes that political vigilante groups, in enabling different voices to be heard, are also contributing to democratic governance.","PeriodicalId":45570,"journal":{"name":"Africa Spectrum","volume":"55 1","pages":"321 - 338"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/0002039720970957","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48524962","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-12-01DOI: 10.1177/0002039720987696
J. Grauvogel, Charlotte Heyl
Studies on term limits in Africa have proliferated over the past two decades. This introduction to the special issue on the struggle over term limits contributes to advancing the research agenda with novel empirical evidence and a rigorous conceptual framework. Moreover, we propose complementing existing work on term limits and democratisation with a more explicit focus on their repercussions for authoritarian rule. Drawing on the comparative lessons of the special issue, we outline how term limits can be theorised as part of the institutional landscape in authoritarian regimes and how third-term bids can be understood as a tool of autocratisation.
{"title":"The Study of Term Limits in Sub-Saharan Africa: Lessons on Democratisation and Autocratisation","authors":"J. Grauvogel, Charlotte Heyl","doi":"10.1177/0002039720987696","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0002039720987696","url":null,"abstract":"Studies on term limits in Africa have proliferated over the past two decades. This introduction to the special issue on the struggle over term limits contributes to advancing the research agenda with novel empirical evidence and a rigorous conceptual framework. Moreover, we propose complementing existing work on term limits and democratisation with a more explicit focus on their repercussions for authoritarian rule. Drawing on the comparative lessons of the special issue, we outline how term limits can be theorised as part of the institutional landscape in authoritarian regimes and how third-term bids can be understood as a tool of autocratisation.","PeriodicalId":45570,"journal":{"name":"Africa Spectrum","volume":"55 1","pages":"215 - 227"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/0002039720987696","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43041279","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-12-01DOI: 10.1177/0002039720964218
A. Cassani
Besides the introduction of multi-party elections, the sub-Saharan wave of democratic reforms of the 1990s encompassed the introduction of limits to the number of terms that a chief executive can serve. Executive term limits (ETLs) are key for democracy to advance in a continent with a legacy of personal rule. However, the manipulation of ETLs has become a recurring mode of autocratisation, through which African aspiring over-stayers weaken executive constraints, taint political competition, and limit citizens’ possibility to choose who governs. This article presents a three-phase model of autocratisation by ETL manipulation and, using new data, offers one of the first regional comparative studies of ETL manipulation in sub-Saharan Africa that rests on econometric modelling. The analysis leads to revisiting some previous findings on the drivers of ETL manipulation and highlights the relevance of other previously underestimated factors that may either discourage a leader from challenging ETLs or prevent their successful manipulation.
{"title":"Autocratisation by Term Limits Manipulation in Sub-Saharan Africa","authors":"A. Cassani","doi":"10.1177/0002039720964218","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0002039720964218","url":null,"abstract":"Besides the introduction of multi-party elections, the sub-Saharan wave of democratic reforms of the 1990s encompassed the introduction of limits to the number of terms that a chief executive can serve. Executive term limits (ETLs) are key for democracy to advance in a continent with a legacy of personal rule. However, the manipulation of ETLs has become a recurring mode of autocratisation, through which African aspiring over-stayers weaken executive constraints, taint political competition, and limit citizens’ possibility to choose who governs. This article presents a three-phase model of autocratisation by ETL manipulation and, using new data, offers one of the first regional comparative studies of ETL manipulation in sub-Saharan Africa that rests on econometric modelling. The analysis leads to revisiting some previous findings on the drivers of ETL manipulation and highlights the relevance of other previously underestimated factors that may either discourage a leader from challenging ETLs or prevent their successful manipulation.","PeriodicalId":45570,"journal":{"name":"Africa Spectrum","volume":"55 1","pages":"228 - 250"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/0002039720964218","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48827197","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}