Abstract This article analyzes the jurisdiction, function, powers, and expertise of oversight mechanisms with reference to capacity to oversee the legality of emerging police intelligence practices such as facial recognition, social media analytics, and predictive policing. It argues that oversight of such practices raises distinct issues ranging from the general oversight of policing, given the secrecy associated with police intelligence generally, to the use of complex software in particular. It combines doctrinal analysis with analysis of interviews with policing intelligence analysts, intelligence managers, lawyers, and IT professionals in three jurisdictions: Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. It brings together the roles of a variety of entities involved directly or indirectly in oversight; in particular, professional standards units, independent police and public sector oversight bodies, intelligence oversight, privacy and human rights regulators, courts, political bodies, contracting parties, and ad hoc bodies. Understanding the web of oversight as a whole, and comparing across jurisdictions, it concludes with specific proposals for reform.
{"title":"Oversight of Police Intelligence: A Complex Web, but Is It Enough?","authors":"Lyria Bennett Moses","doi":"10.60082/2817-5069.3892","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.60082/2817-5069.3892","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article analyzes the jurisdiction, function, powers, and expertise of oversight mechanisms with reference to capacity to oversee the legality of emerging police intelligence practices such as facial recognition, social media analytics, and predictive policing. It argues that oversight of such practices raises distinct issues ranging from the general oversight of policing, given the secrecy associated with police intelligence generally, to the use of complex software in particular. It combines doctrinal analysis with analysis of interviews with policing intelligence analysts, intelligence managers, lawyers, and IT professionals in three jurisdictions: Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. It brings together the roles of a variety of entities involved directly or indirectly in oversight; in particular, professional standards units, independent police and public sector oversight bodies, intelligence oversight, privacy and human rights regulators, courts, political bodies, contracting parties, and ad hoc bodies. Understanding the web of oversight as a whole, and comparing across jurisdictions, it concludes with specific proposals for reform.","PeriodicalId":45757,"journal":{"name":"OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-07-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42638175","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Social Rights and Transformative Private Law","authors":"E. Béchard-Torres","doi":"10.60082/2817-5069.3894","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.60082/2817-5069.3894","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45757,"journal":{"name":"OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-07-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42665869","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Clamouring for Legal Protection: What the Great Books Teach Us About People Fleeing from Persecution by Robert F. Barsky","authors":"Julia Schabas","doi":"10.60082/2817-5069.3897","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.60082/2817-5069.3897","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45757,"journal":{"name":"OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-07-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42289117","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract The possibility of assigning contractual rights to third parties has often been taken to suggest that they amount to a form of “property” or “asset.” This point has been seized upon by proponents of transfer-based accounts of contract law, which understand contract as a means of transferring existing rights instead of creating new rights and duties between its parties. In this article, I set out to critically examine the extent to which this assumed compatibility between transfer theories of contract and the assignment of contractual rights can truly be sustained. As I argue, only one version of transfer theory is able to properly account for the way in which assignment actually operates within the common law tradition, corresponding to the version that most closely resembles more orthodox promise theories of contract law by understanding contract as a transfer of rights directly against the person of the promisor. By contrast, I suggest that the dominant version of transfer theory, according to which contract amounts to a transfer of rights over external things, is unable to draw a full distinction between contract and a completed assignment of contractual rights and so is unable to explain the rules that govern the latter class of transaction at common law and in equity.
{"title":"Transfer Theory and the Assignment of Contractual Rights","authors":"Stéphane Sérafin","doi":"10.60082/2817-5069.3891","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.60082/2817-5069.3891","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The possibility of assigning contractual rights to third parties has often been taken to suggest that they amount to a form of “property” or “asset.” This point has been seized upon by proponents of transfer-based accounts of contract law, which understand contract as a means of transferring existing rights instead of creating new rights and duties between its parties. In this article, I set out to critically examine the extent to which this assumed compatibility between transfer theories of contract and the assignment of contractual rights can truly be sustained. As I argue, only one version of transfer theory is able to properly account for the way in which assignment actually operates within the common law tradition, corresponding to the version that most closely resembles more orthodox promise theories of contract law by understanding contract as a transfer of rights directly against the person of the promisor. By contrast, I suggest that the dominant version of transfer theory, according to which contract amounts to a transfer of rights over external things, is unable to draw a full distinction between contract and a completed assignment of contractual rights and so is unable to explain the rules that govern the latter class of transaction at common law and in equity.","PeriodicalId":45757,"journal":{"name":"OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-07-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44003881","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Assisted Suicide in Canada: Moral, Legal, and Policy Considerations by Travis Dumsday","authors":"Anita Singh","doi":"10.60082/2817-5069.3896","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.60082/2817-5069.3896","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45757,"journal":{"name":"OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-07-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47029920","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"How Antitrust Failed Workers by Eric A. Posner","authors":"Maria Arabella M. Robles","doi":"10.60082/2817-5069.3898","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.60082/2817-5069.3898","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45757,"journal":{"name":"OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-07-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42839908","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Sin of Omission: Exploring a Key Credibility Inference in Canadian Refugee Status Rejections","authors":"Hilary Evans Cameron","doi":"10.60082/2817-5069.3877","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.60082/2817-5069.3877","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45757,"journal":{"name":"OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-05-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45772438","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Pattern of Violence: How the Law Classifies Crimes and What It Means for Justice by David Alan Sklansky","authors":"Ainsley Doell","doi":"10.60082/2817-5069.3879","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.60082/2817-5069.3879","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45757,"journal":{"name":"OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-05-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48779374","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Notwithstanding Clause in Canada: The First Forty Years","authors":"T. Kahana","doi":"10.60082/2817-5069.3875","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.60082/2817-5069.3875","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45757,"journal":{"name":"OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-05-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44765679","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Statutory Interpretation is a comprehensive and nuanced account of some of the most fundamental features of the law: legal reasoning and interpretation. The book draws on philosophy, argumentative theory, linguistics, artificial intelligence, and dialectics to develop a robust theory of argumentation and pragmatics both in and outside of the law. The work is written by Douglas Walton, former Distinguished Research Fellow at the University of Windsor’s Centre for Research in Reasoning, Argumentation and Rhetoric; Fabrizio Macagno, professor at Universidade NOVA de Lisboa; and Giovanni Sartor, professor at the University of Bologna. This work represents a balance, most of all, of theoretical and practical understandings of statutory interpretation. It makes inroads into some of the most challenging abstract aspects of statutory interpretation, yet grounds itself in a space where applicability and practicality are the text’s raison d’être. Readers will come away from this book with a keen understanding of how they can interpret the law and, more importantly, how they can justify the frameworks guiding these interpretations. Creative Commons License This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License. This book review is available in Osgoode Hall Law Journal: https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol60/ iss1/7
{"title":"Statutory Interpretation: Pragmatics and Argumentation by Douglas Walton, Fabrizio Macagno and Giovanni Sartor","authors":"Matthew Traister","doi":"10.60082/2817-5069.3881","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.60082/2817-5069.3881","url":null,"abstract":"Statutory Interpretation is a comprehensive and nuanced account of some of the most fundamental features of the law: legal reasoning and interpretation. The book draws on philosophy, argumentative theory, linguistics, artificial intelligence, and dialectics to develop a robust theory of argumentation and pragmatics both in and outside of the law. The work is written by Douglas Walton, former Distinguished Research Fellow at the University of Windsor’s Centre for Research in Reasoning, Argumentation and Rhetoric; Fabrizio Macagno, professor at Universidade NOVA de Lisboa; and Giovanni Sartor, professor at the University of Bologna. This work represents a balance, most of all, of theoretical and practical understandings of statutory interpretation. It makes inroads into some of the most challenging abstract aspects of statutory interpretation, yet grounds itself in a space where applicability and practicality are the text’s raison d’être. Readers will come away from this book with a keen understanding of how they can interpret the law and, more importantly, how they can justify the frameworks guiding these interpretations. Creative Commons License This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License. This book review is available in Osgoode Hall Law Journal: https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol60/ iss1/7","PeriodicalId":45757,"journal":{"name":"OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-05-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45345345","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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