Pub Date : 2021-07-22DOI: 10.1177/1470594X211032394
Verena Löffler
When studying the feasibility and justice of basic income, researchers usually assume that policymakers would be introducing the unconditional benefit to a closed economic entity. When contemplating the introduction of a universal policy, few researchers take into consideration the fact that citizens and foreigners migrate, and that this movement alters the size and skill structure of the population. This article addresses this oversight by analyzing how basic income schemes based on residence or citizenship may affect tax base, wages, and employment while incorporating migration incentives. The discussion is based upon neoclassical labor supply and migration theory and informed by the conjectured economic effects from a normative perspective. This research suggests that a basic income would create migration incentives that reduce the tax base, leading us to question this policy’s feasibility. Moreover, the flow-on effects of migration call into question the justice of both residence-based and citizenship-based basic income schemes. Therefore, this article sheds light on how basic income’s feasibility and justice relate to each other and identifies the benefits and further opportunities for interdisciplinary social policy research.
{"title":"Questioning the feasibility and justice of basic income accounting for migration","authors":"Verena Löffler","doi":"10.1177/1470594X211032394","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1470594X211032394","url":null,"abstract":"When studying the feasibility and justice of basic income, researchers usually assume that policymakers would be introducing the unconditional benefit to a closed economic entity. When contemplating the introduction of a universal policy, few researchers take into consideration the fact that citizens and foreigners migrate, and that this movement alters the size and skill structure of the population. This article addresses this oversight by analyzing how basic income schemes based on residence or citizenship may affect tax base, wages, and employment while incorporating migration incentives. The discussion is based upon neoclassical labor supply and migration theory and informed by the conjectured economic effects from a normative perspective. This research suggests that a basic income would create migration incentives that reduce the tax base, leading us to question this policy’s feasibility. Moreover, the flow-on effects of migration call into question the justice of both residence-based and citizenship-based basic income schemes. Therefore, this article sheds light on how basic income’s feasibility and justice relate to each other and identifies the benefits and further opportunities for interdisciplinary social policy research.","PeriodicalId":45971,"journal":{"name":"Politics Philosophy & Economics","volume":"65 1","pages":"273 - 314"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-07-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91007933","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-05-03DOI: 10.1177/1470594X211015467
D. Halliday
The emergence of so-called ‘gig work’, particularly that sold through digital platforms accessed through smartphone apps, has led to disputes about the proper classification of workers: Should platform workers be classified as independent contractors (as platforms typically insist), or as employees of the platforms through which they sell labor (as workers often claim)? Such disputes have urgency due to the way in which employee status is necessary to access certain benefits such as a minimum wage, sick pay, and so on. In addition, classification disputes have philosophical significance because their resolution requires some foundational account of why the law should make a distinction between employed and freelance workers in the first place. This paper aims to fill this foundational gap. Central to it is the idea that employment involves a worker ceding certain freedoms in return for a degree of security, at least with respect to income. Insofar as the misclassification objection has force against digital platforms, it is when a platform is attempting to have it both ways: Workers are giving up freedom but not being granted a proportionate increase in security. As I shall explain, this approach offers some flexibility as to how actual disputes might be resolved – justice may be indifferent between whether platforms offer greater security or permit workers greater freedom, provided they do at least one of these things.
{"title":"On the (mis)classification of paid labor: When should gig workers have employee status?","authors":"D. Halliday","doi":"10.1177/1470594X211015467","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1470594X211015467","url":null,"abstract":"The emergence of so-called ‘gig work’, particularly that sold through digital platforms accessed through smartphone apps, has led to disputes about the proper classification of workers: Should platform workers be classified as independent contractors (as platforms typically insist), or as employees of the platforms through which they sell labor (as workers often claim)? Such disputes have urgency due to the way in which employee status is necessary to access certain benefits such as a minimum wage, sick pay, and so on. In addition, classification disputes have philosophical significance because their resolution requires some foundational account of why the law should make a distinction between employed and freelance workers in the first place. This paper aims to fill this foundational gap. Central to it is the idea that employment involves a worker ceding certain freedoms in return for a degree of security, at least with respect to income. Insofar as the misclassification objection has force against digital platforms, it is when a platform is attempting to have it both ways: Workers are giving up freedom but not being granted a proportionate increase in security. As I shall explain, this approach offers some flexibility as to how actual disputes might be resolved – justice may be indifferent between whether platforms offer greater security or permit workers greater freedom, provided they do at least one of these things.","PeriodicalId":45971,"journal":{"name":"Politics Philosophy & Economics","volume":"52 1","pages":"229 - 250"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-05-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80366245","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-05-01DOI: 10.1177/1470594X21999736
P. Dietsch
Theories of justice rely on a variety of criteria to determine what social arrangements should be considered just. For most theories, the distribution of financial resources matters. However, they take the existence of money as a given and tend to ignore the way in which the creation of money impacts distributive justice. Those with access to collateral are favoured in the creation of credit or debt, which represents the main form of money today. Appealing to the idea that access to credit confers freedom, and that inequalities in this freedom are morally arbitrary, this article shows how the advantage to those with collateral plays out in different ways in today’s economy. The article identifies several forms of bias inherent in money creation, and its subsequent destruction: loans from commercial banks to individuals and corporations, interbank lending, lending from central banks to commercial banks, and selective bail-outs by central banks. These are not mere inequalities: they are unjust since alternative designs of the financial architecture exist that would significantly reduce them. The paper focuses on one possible reform with the potential to address several of the types of bias identified, namely the separation of money creation from private bank credit.
{"title":"Money creation, debt, and justice","authors":"P. Dietsch","doi":"10.1177/1470594X21999736","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1470594X21999736","url":null,"abstract":"Theories of justice rely on a variety of criteria to determine what social arrangements should be considered just. For most theories, the distribution of financial resources matters. However, they take the existence of money as a given and tend to ignore the way in which the creation of money impacts distributive justice. Those with access to collateral are favoured in the creation of credit or debt, which represents the main form of money today. Appealing to the idea that access to credit confers freedom, and that inequalities in this freedom are morally arbitrary, this article shows how the advantage to those with collateral plays out in different ways in today’s economy. The article identifies several forms of bias inherent in money creation, and its subsequent destruction: loans from commercial banks to individuals and corporations, interbank lending, lending from central banks to commercial banks, and selective bail-outs by central banks. These are not mere inequalities: they are unjust since alternative designs of the financial architecture exist that would significantly reduce them. The paper focuses on one possible reform with the potential to address several of the types of bias identified, namely the separation of money creation from private bank credit.","PeriodicalId":45971,"journal":{"name":"Politics Philosophy & Economics","volume":"19 1","pages":"151 - 179"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72565819","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-05-01DOI: 10.1177/1470594X211003334
D. Callies, D. Moellendorf
With the significant disconnect between the collective aim of limiting warming to well below 2°C and the current means proposed to achieve such an aim, the goal of this paper is to offer a moral assessment of prominent alternatives to current international climate policy. To do so, we’ll outline five different policy routes that could potentially bring the means and goal in line. Those five policy routes are: (1) exceed 2°C; (2) limit warming to less than 2°C by economic de-growth; (3) limit warming to less than 2°C by traditional mitigation only; (4) limit warming to less than 2°C by traditional mitigation and widespread deployment of Negative Emissions Technologies (NETs); and (5) limit warming to less than 2°C by traditional mitigation, NETs, and Solar Radiation Management as a fallback. In assessing these five policy routes, we rely primarily upon two moral considerations: the avoidance of catastrophic climate change and the right to sustainable development. We’ll conclude that we should continue to aim at the two-degree target, and that to get there we should use aggressive mitigation, pursue the deployment of NETs, and continue to research SRM.
{"title":"Assessing climate policies: Catastrophe avoidance and the right to sustainable development","authors":"D. Callies, D. Moellendorf","doi":"10.1177/1470594X211003334","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1470594X211003334","url":null,"abstract":"With the significant disconnect between the collective aim of limiting warming to well below 2°C and the current means proposed to achieve such an aim, the goal of this paper is to offer a moral assessment of prominent alternatives to current international climate policy. To do so, we’ll outline five different policy routes that could potentially bring the means and goal in line. Those five policy routes are: (1) exceed 2°C; (2) limit warming to less than 2°C by economic de-growth; (3) limit warming to less than 2°C by traditional mitigation only; (4) limit warming to less than 2°C by traditional mitigation and widespread deployment of Negative Emissions Technologies (NETs); and (5) limit warming to less than 2°C by traditional mitigation, NETs, and Solar Radiation Management as a fallback. In assessing these five policy routes, we rely primarily upon two moral considerations: the avoidance of catastrophic climate change and the right to sustainable development. We’ll conclude that we should continue to aim at the two-degree target, and that to get there we should use aggressive mitigation, pursue the deployment of NETs, and continue to research SRM.","PeriodicalId":45971,"journal":{"name":"Politics Philosophy & Economics","volume":"80 1","pages":"127 - 150"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81576505","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-06DOI: 10.1177/1470594X211003333
Dorothea Gädeke
Who is responsible for fighting domination? Answering this question, I argue, requires taking the structural dimension of domination seriously to avoid unwillingly reproducing domination in the name of justice. Having cast domination as a structural injustice that refers to structurally constituted positions of power and disempowerment, I show that the outcome-based, the capacity-based and the social connection model suggested in literature on responsibility, fail to fully meet this challenge. Drawing on insights from all of them, I propose an account that proves more sensitive towards the power dynamics at play in fighting domination. It is based on a fundamental duty of justice, which gives rise to two kinds of responsibility. Dominators, dominated and peripheral agents share political responsibility for domination in virtue of reproducing domination by occupying a position within structures of dominating power; they are required to acknowledge and undermine their position of power or disempowerment rather than simply using and thus tacitly reaffirming it. Political responsibility for domination is distinct from moral responsibility for acting within contexts of domination; in fact, ignoring this difference risks reproducing rather than transforming relations of domination. Bystanders who are not implicated in reproducing domination bear limited remedial responsibility to support this struggle.
{"title":"Who should fight domination? Individual responsibility and structural injustice","authors":"Dorothea Gädeke","doi":"10.1177/1470594X211003333","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1470594X211003333","url":null,"abstract":"Who is responsible for fighting domination? Answering this question, I argue, requires taking the structural dimension of domination seriously to avoid unwillingly reproducing domination in the name of justice. Having cast domination as a structural injustice that refers to structurally constituted positions of power and disempowerment, I show that the outcome-based, the capacity-based and the social connection model suggested in literature on responsibility, fail to fully meet this challenge. Drawing on insights from all of them, I propose an account that proves more sensitive towards the power dynamics at play in fighting domination. It is based on a fundamental duty of justice, which gives rise to two kinds of responsibility. Dominators, dominated and peripheral agents share political responsibility for domination in virtue of reproducing domination by occupying a position within structures of dominating power; they are required to acknowledge and undermine their position of power or disempowerment rather than simply using and thus tacitly reaffirming it. Political responsibility for domination is distinct from moral responsibility for acting within contexts of domination; in fact, ignoring this difference risks reproducing rather than transforming relations of domination. Bystanders who are not implicated in reproducing domination bear limited remedial responsibility to support this struggle.","PeriodicalId":45971,"journal":{"name":"Politics Philosophy & Economics","volume":"77 6","pages":"180 - 201"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-04-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1470594X211003333","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72404938","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-06DOI: 10.1177/1470594X211005652
Shuk Ying Chan
The international investment regime has come under increasing scrutiny, with several developing countries withdrawing from bilateral investment treaties in recent years. A central worry raised by critics is that investment treaties undermine national self-determination. Proposed reforms to the regime have focused on rebalancing the distribution of power between states and investors to restore ‘enlarged regulatory space’ for the former. Contra this critique from national self-determination, in this paper I argue that infringements on national self- determination cannot alone explain why the investment regime is morally problematic. Instead, on this egalitarian view, the regime is objectionable because it empowers a class of agents, whose interests are reliably opposed to egalitarian economic policy, to constrain national self-determination. In effect, the investment regime undermines states’ capacity to address inequality within and between states and is unjust for that reason. The moral and practical upshot is that reforms to the regime ought to empower disadvantaged groups to exert disproportionate leverage over the terms and practice of international investment, and to appeal to global institutions to do so. In other words, our moral assessment of a given global institution or practice should not depend on whether it constrains national self-determination, but on who it empowers to do so.
{"title":"On the international investment regime: A critique from equality","authors":"Shuk Ying Chan","doi":"10.1177/1470594X211005652","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1470594X211005652","url":null,"abstract":"The international investment regime has come under increasing scrutiny, with several developing countries withdrawing from bilateral investment treaties in recent years. A central worry raised by critics is that investment treaties undermine national self-determination. Proposed reforms to the regime have focused on rebalancing the distribution of power between states and investors to restore ‘enlarged regulatory space’ for the former. Contra this critique from national self-determination, in this paper I argue that infringements on national self- determination cannot alone explain why the investment regime is morally problematic. Instead, on this egalitarian view, the regime is objectionable because it empowers a class of agents, whose interests are reliably opposed to egalitarian economic policy, to constrain national self-determination. In effect, the investment regime undermines states’ capacity to address inequality within and between states and is unjust for that reason. The moral and practical upshot is that reforms to the regime ought to empower disadvantaged groups to exert disproportionate leverage over the terms and practice of international investment, and to appeal to global institutions to do so. In other words, our moral assessment of a given global institution or practice should not depend on whether it constrains national self-determination, but on who it empowers to do so.","PeriodicalId":45971,"journal":{"name":"Politics Philosophy & Economics","volume":"57 1","pages":"202 - 226"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-04-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85954420","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-02-19DOI: 10.1177/1470594X21994495
Daniel Muñoz
How could it be wrong to exploit – say, by paying sweatshop wages – if the exploited party benefits? How could it be wrong to do something gratuitously bad – like giving to a wasteful charity – if that is better than permissibly doing nothing? Joe Horton argues that these puzzles, known as the Exploitation Problem and All or Nothing Problem, have no unified answer. I propose one and pose a challenge for Horton’s take on the Exploitation Problem.
{"title":"Exploitation and effective altruism","authors":"Daniel Muñoz","doi":"10.1177/1470594X21994495","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1470594X21994495","url":null,"abstract":"How could it be wrong to exploit – say, by paying sweatshop wages – if the exploited party benefits? How could it be wrong to do something gratuitously bad – like giving to a wasteful charity – if that is better than permissibly doing nothing? Joe Horton argues that these puzzles, known as the Exploitation Problem and All or Nothing Problem, have no unified answer. I propose one and pose a challenge for Horton’s take on the Exploitation Problem.","PeriodicalId":45971,"journal":{"name":"Politics Philosophy & Economics","volume":"11 1","pages":"409 - 423"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-02-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72999592","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-02-07DOI: 10.1177/1470594X20982051
Andrew Mason
Everyday lookism, by which I mean the widespread practice of commenting upon and judging the appearance of others, is often regarded as morally troubling. But when, and why, is it morally problematic? I argue that in many cases everyday lookism is wrongful because it involves morally objectionable appearance discrimination. I consider various respects in which everyday lookism can be morally objectionable in virtue of the acts of wrongful discrimination it involves. I argue that these acts are wrongful when they are demeaning, or when they have unjust consequences whether singly or cumulatively. There are a number of ways in which they may have unjust consequences. First, the appearance norms in which these acts are rooted may be biased in such a way that the acts contribute to creating an unjust distribution of benefits and burdens. Second, these acts may combine to make everyday lookism oppressive in virtue of impairing the personal autonomy of its victims or contributing to doing so. Third, these acts may be unjustly harmful in terms of their effects.
{"title":"What’s wrong with everyday lookism?","authors":"Andrew Mason","doi":"10.1177/1470594X20982051","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1470594X20982051","url":null,"abstract":"Everyday lookism, by which I mean the widespread practice of commenting upon and judging the appearance of others, is often regarded as morally troubling. But when, and why, is it morally problematic? I argue that in many cases everyday lookism is wrongful because it involves morally objectionable appearance discrimination. I consider various respects in which everyday lookism can be morally objectionable in virtue of the acts of wrongful discrimination it involves. I argue that these acts are wrongful when they are demeaning, or when they have unjust consequences whether singly or cumulatively. There are a number of ways in which they may have unjust consequences. First, the appearance norms in which these acts are rooted may be biased in such a way that the acts contribute to creating an unjust distribution of benefits and burdens. Second, these acts may combine to make everyday lookism oppressive in virtue of impairing the personal autonomy of its victims or contributing to doing so. Third, these acts may be unjustly harmful in terms of their effects.","PeriodicalId":45971,"journal":{"name":"Politics Philosophy & Economics","volume":"22 1","pages":"315 - 335"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-02-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80235549","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-02-01DOI: 10.1177/1470594X21992005
Marco Meyer
Politicians around the globe wrangle about how to deal with trade imbalances. In the Eurozone, members running a trade deficit accuse members running a surplus of forcing them into deficit. Yet political philosophers have largely overlooked issues of justice related to trade imbalances. I address three such issues. First, what, if anything, is wrong with trade imbalances? I argue that in monetary unions, trade imbalances can lead to domination between member states. Second, who should bear the burden of rebalancing trade? I argue that surplus and deficit countries should share that burden. The current situation placing the burden squarely on deficit countries is unjust. Third, which institutional arrangements should monetary unions adopt to regulate trade balances? Monetary unions can either reduce trade imbalances within the monetary union, neutralise the impact of trade imbalances on the economic sovereignty of member states, or delegate economic policy affecting trade balances to a legitimate supranational institution. The Eurozone must adopt one of these options to prevent member states from domination. Which option protects members best against domination depends on what makes interference between members arbitrary, an unresolved question in republican theories of justice.
{"title":"Dealing fairly with trade imbalances in monetary unions","authors":"Marco Meyer","doi":"10.1177/1470594X21992005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1470594X21992005","url":null,"abstract":"Politicians around the globe wrangle about how to deal with trade imbalances. In the Eurozone, members running a trade deficit accuse members running a surplus of forcing them into deficit. Yet political philosophers have largely overlooked issues of justice related to trade imbalances. I address three such issues. First, what, if anything, is wrong with trade imbalances? I argue that in monetary unions, trade imbalances can lead to domination between member states. Second, who should bear the burden of rebalancing trade? I argue that surplus and deficit countries should share that burden. The current situation placing the burden squarely on deficit countries is unjust. Third, which institutional arrangements should monetary unions adopt to regulate trade balances? Monetary unions can either reduce trade imbalances within the monetary union, neutralise the impact of trade imbalances on the economic sovereignty of member states, or delegate economic policy affecting trade balances to a legitimate supranational institution. The Eurozone must adopt one of these options to prevent member states from domination. Which option protects members best against domination depends on what makes interference between members arbitrary, an unresolved question in republican theories of justice.","PeriodicalId":45971,"journal":{"name":"Politics Philosophy & Economics","volume":"50 1","pages":"45 - 66"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89877268","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：