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The anti-elitist strategy of political parties as a populist tool to (re)gain electoral support 政党的反精英战略是(重新)获得选举支持的民粹主义工具
IF 1.3 3区 社会学 Q1 AREA STUDIES Pub Date : 2023-11-25 DOI: 10.1080/14782804.2023.2288238
Anna Pacześniak
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引用次数: 0
Through the looking glass? Lessons from party Europeanisation in Denmark 透过玻璃看世界?丹麦政党欧洲化的经验教训
IF 1.3 3区 社会学 Q1 AREA STUDIES Pub Date : 2023-11-24 DOI: 10.1080/14782804.2023.2287209
Gilles Pittoors
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引用次数: 0
Illiberal spectatorship – the disfigurement of citizenship in Hungary and Poland 狭隘的旁观者——匈牙利和波兰公民身份的毁容
3区 社会学 Q1 AREA STUDIES Pub Date : 2023-11-12 DOI: 10.1080/14782804.2023.2280977
Robert Sata, Ireneusz Pawel Karolewski
Hungary and Poland have been forerunners of democratic backsliding in Europe. Both governments have been building an ‘illiberal democracy’ using the populist promise to return power to the people. We argue that despite this promise, the Fidesz and PiS governments have undertaken political reforms that turn citizens into spectators with a very limited say or take in politics and willing objects of propaganda and disinformation. The turning of citizens into spectators is integral part of democratic backsliding as illiberal policies empty citizenship of its meaning, thus facilitating transition to autocracy. Illiberal regimes 1) capture media to control public opinion, 2) remove the opportunities for citizens to exercise their political agency, 3) redefine the contours of the political community to the extent that critical citizens’ belonging is questioned, 4) and instead of political choices, they present an emotional spectacle, often based on propaganda, fake news or straight lies. Spectators do not merely watch the show, they assist in its creation as fans of leaders who supposedly express and realize their collective will – the voice of true people. This way, spectatorship becomes the societal and cultural underpinning of the illiberal regime, where leaders fake democracy to hoard and hold onto power.
匈牙利和波兰是欧洲民主倒退的先行者。两国政府一直在利用民粹主义承诺将权力归还给人民,建立“非自由民主”。我们认为,尽管有这样的承诺,青民盟和法律与公正党政府已经进行了政治改革,把公民变成了对政治有非常有限的发言权或参与的观众,并愿意成为宣传和虚假信息的对象。把公民变成旁观者是民主倒退的一个组成部分,因为不自由的政策使公民的意义变得空洞,从而促进了向独裁的过渡。不自由的政权1)抓住媒体来控制公众舆论;2)剥夺公民行使政治权力的机会;3)重新定义政治共同体的轮廓,使持批评态度的公民的归属感受到质疑;4)他们呈现的不是政治选择,而是一种情绪化的景象,往往基于宣传、假新闻或直接谎言。观众不仅仅是观看表演,他们还作为领导人的粉丝参与表演的创作,这些领导人应该表达和实现他们的集体意志——真正的人民的声音。这样一来,旁观者就成了这个不自由政权的社会和文化基础,在这个政权中,领导人假装民主,以囤积和掌握权力。
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引用次数: 0
European Union funds and corruption in the ex-communist member states 欧盟资金和前共产主义成员国的腐败
3区 社会学 Q1 AREA STUDIES Pub Date : 2023-11-10 DOI: 10.1080/14782804.2023.2280971
Mihai Mutascu
ABSTRACTThe paper analyses the impact of European Union (EU) funds on corruption in the EU ex-communist countries by following a panel Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) approach. The panel includes 10 former EU communist countries, over 2007–2019. The key findings reveal that an improvement in the EU funds paid and their rate of absorption can reduce the level of corruption in the long-run in the recipient EU ex-communist countries. This is due to better monitoring of EU funds paid compared with national resources, and a more efficient and fairer channel of EU funds absorption. In parallel with the EU funds, corruption can be controlled in certain conditions by the degree of economic development, size of government, level of democratisation and religiosity.KEYWORDS: CorruptionEU fundspanel analysisex-communist countriesimplications Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Data availability statementThe data that support the findings of this study are available in [ecrg.ro] at [ecrg.ro/dataset.xlsx], reference number [not applicable]. These data were derived from the following resources available in the public domain: Worldwide Governance Indicators, and World Development Indicators (World Bank online database); European Commission DG REGIO online database; EUROSTAT online database; Heritage Foundation online database; Economist Intelligence Unit of the Economist Group online database; Association of Religion Data Archives online database.Notes1. The sample includes only the countries being EU members whole considered period (i.e. Croatia is not included in the sample, as that country became EU member in 2013).2. Many other amendments have been done, notable being the Regulation (EU) 2017/1371 of 17 July 2017 (EU Regulation Citation2017), and Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of 18 July 2018 (EU Regulation Citation2018).3. After years of investigations, OLAF reports in 2022: 256 investigations concluded; 275 financial, judicial, disciplinary and administrative recommendations; 426.8 mil. Euro recommended for recovery; 192 investigations opened; 1017 selections made; and 197.9 mil. Euro prevented from being lost (OLAF, Citation2022). Herein, Hungary, Poland and Romania occupy the top five of investigations.
摘要本文采用面板自回归分布滞后(ARDL)方法分析了欧盟资金对欧盟前共产主义国家腐败的影响。该小组包括2007年至2019年期间的10个前欧盟共产主义国家。主要研究结果表明,从长远来看,欧盟资金支付和吸收率的提高可以降低欧盟前共产主义国家的腐败程度。这是因为与国家资源相比,欧盟支付的资金得到了更好的监控,欧盟资金吸收渠道也更加高效和公平。与欧盟基金一样,腐败也可以在一定条件下受到经济发展程度、政府规模、民主化程度和宗教信仰的控制。关键词:腐败欧盟基金小组分析前共产主义国家影响披露声明作者未报告潜在的利益冲突。数据可用性声明支持本研究结果的数据可在[ecrg]中找到。[ecrg.ro/dataset.xlsx],参考编号[不适用]。这些数据来自下列公共领域的资源:《世界治理指标》和《世界发展指标》(世界银行在线数据库);欧洲委员会DG REGIO在线数据库;欧盟统计局在线数据库;美国传统基金会在线数据库;经济学人智库经济学人集团在线数据库;宗教数据档案协会在线数据库。样本只包括整个考虑时期的欧盟成员国(即克罗地亚不包括在样本中,因为该国在2013年成为欧盟成员国)。许多其他修订已经完成,值得注意的是2017年7月17日的法规(EU) 2017/1371 (EU Regulation Citation2017)和2018年7月18日的法规(EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 (EU Regulation Citation2018)。经过多年的调查,OLAF在2022年报告:256项调查结束;275项财政、司法、纪律和行政建议;4.268亿欧元建议用于恢复;开展192项调查;1017次选择;防止1.979亿欧元的损失(OLAF, Citation2022)。其中,匈牙利、波兰和罗马尼亚占据了调查的前五位。
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引用次数: 0
From qualified to conspirative Euroscepticism: how the German AfD frames the EU in multiple crisis 从合格到阴谋的欧洲怀疑主义:德国新选择党如何在多重危机中塑造欧盟
3区 社会学 Q1 AREA STUDIES Pub Date : 2023-10-31 DOI: 10.1080/14782804.2023.2271854
Juan Roch
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引用次数: 0
Show me how to live: transactional advocacy organizations, managerial populism, and the EU 告诉我如何生活:交易倡导组织、管理民粹主义和欧盟
3区 社会学 Q1 AREA STUDIES Pub Date : 2023-10-30 DOI: 10.1080/14782804.2023.2271852
Jiří Navrátil, Ondřej Císař
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引用次数: 0
For things to remain the same, everything must change? Studying National front’s and National rally’s platforms on education 为了保持现状,一切都必须改变?学习国民阵线和国民集会的教育纲领
3区 社会学 Q1 AREA STUDIES Pub Date : 2023-10-25 DOI: 10.1080/14782804.2023.2269378
Ismaïl Ferhat
ABSTRACTThe Rassemblement national, or National Rally (previously known as Front national, or National Front, until 2018) has been the only European far-right party that has constantly been among the major political organizations of its country since the 1980s. However, its agendas, ideas and proposals on education are relatively unknown and have barely been studied. Its manifestos, from its rise in the 1980s to the mid-2000s, showed a mix of a conservative perception of school curricula, an intense hostility towards teachers and a market-oriented approach of education (including school vouchers). Since the party has been led by Marine le Pen in 2011, the National Front/National Rally’s agenda seems to have substantially changed, and now promotes state schools and professionals working in them, while opposing any cuts in educational spending. The idea this research wants to investigate is that such a shift is actually limited, as it does not change what could be theorized as a ‘pedagogical core’ of the French far-right, defined here as a stable corpus of proposals and beliefs towards education. This core has remained remarkably stable since the first platform of the party released in 1973: selective, pessimistic about the outcomes and effects of mass schooling, nationalistic.KEYWORDS: Far-rightFrancepoliticseducationschools Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1. The National Front will be referred as NF and the National Rally as NR afterwards.2. Front national, Droite et démocratie économique, 1978 (Contemporaine, Archive reference : S78805).
【摘要】法国国民大会党(Rassemblement national,简称national Rally, 2018年以前称为国民阵线或国民阵线)是欧洲唯一一个自20世纪80年代以来一直是本国主要政治组织之一的极右翼政党。然而,它在教育方面的议程、理念和建议相对不为人所知,几乎没有被研究过。从20世纪80年代兴起到21世纪头十年中期,该党的宣言表现出对学校课程的保守看法、对教师的强烈敌意和以市场为导向的教育方式(包括教育券)。自从2011年由马琳·勒庞领导以来,国民阵线/国民集会的议程似乎发生了重大变化,现在他们提倡公立学校和在公立学校工作的专业人士,同时反对削减教育支出。这项研究想要调查的想法是,这种转变实际上是有限的,因为它没有改变可以被理论化为法国极右翼的“教学核心”,这里定义为对教育的建议和信念的稳定语料库。自1973年该党发布第一个政纲以来,这个核心一直非常稳定:选择性,对大众教育的结果和影响持悲观态度,民族主义。关键词:极右翼法国政治诱惑学校披露声明作者未报告潜在的利益冲突。国民阵线将被称为NF,国民集会将被称为NR。《国民阵线》,1978年(当代,档案编号:S78805)。
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引用次数: 0
Non-recognizing the Other? Discursive deligitimation of the EAEU by the EU 不认识他者?欧盟对欧亚经济联盟的话语性谈判
3区 社会学 Q1 AREA STUDIES Pub Date : 2023-10-22 DOI: 10.1080/14782804.2023.2271849
Zhanibek Arynov, Serik Orazgaliyev, Laura Issova
ABSTRACTThe Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), despite being regarded as the most developed integration project in the post-Soviet area, has faced different hurdles in acquiring international recognition. Especially, the EU, the EAEU’s Significant Other, has been reluctant to formally recognize it, in spite of close ties with EAEU member states as well as of its own self-image as a supporter of regional integrations. This paper focuses on this puzzle and examines how the EU has been discursively explaining its non-recognition of the EAEU at the institutional level. Based on the analysis of EU-articulated narratives since 2010, the paper reveals three dominant representations of the EAEU in the EU discourse: (1) Russia’s geopolitical project; (2) a protectionist union; and (3) a dysfunctional union. These narratives have been used by Brussels to create the EAEU’s image as a threatening Other, thus justifying why the EU cannot formally recognize the EAEU and officially engage with it. The paper also identifies five different stages of the EU’s discursive representation of the EAEU since 2010, when its tone and content varied. The paper concludes that such non-recognition from the Significant Other still limits the EAEU’s international agency despite its increasing interest in cooperation with non-Western actors.KEYWORDS: European UnionEurasian Economic Unionrecognitionlegitimacydiscourse AcknowledgmentsZhanibek Arynov wants to thank Fondation Maison des sciences de l’homme (FMSH) and Institut Français d’Etudes sur l’Asie Centrale (IFEAC) for providing the ATLAS fellowship in May-June 2022 to visit Intégration et Coopération dans l’Espace Européen (ICEE), Sorbonne Nouvelle, and develop the earliest draft of this work. He thanks Professor Laure Delcour of Sorbonne Nouvelle for hosting him at ICEE and providing invaluable feedback on the project. All shortcomings belong to the authors.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1. The EAEU, which initially started as the Customs Union of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia, came into existence in January 2015. In the same year, it was joined by Armenia and Kyrgyzstan.2. The Eurasian Customs Union (EACU), the first step in creating the EAEU, officially entered into force on January 1, 2010.3. We acknowledge that the EU is a complex entity with multiple internal institutions. Yet, the European Commission is the EU’s main executive institution that deals with day-to-day relations with other external entities. When we mention ‘the EU’s refusal to recognise the EAEU’, we mainly refer to the absence of any formal relations between, first of all, the European Commission and Eurasian Economic Commission, as well as between any other institutions of the two sides.4. Such suspicion regarding the EAEU’s geopolitical nature existed in EAEU member-states too. For instance, in Kazakhstan, EAEU-critics were mostly concerned about losing sovereignty to Russia (e.g. Nursha Citatio
欧亚经济联盟(EAEU)被认为是后苏联地区最发达的一体化项目,但在获得国际认可方面却面临着诸多障碍。特别是,作为欧亚经济联盟的“重要他者”,欧盟一直不愿正式承认它,尽管它与欧亚经济联盟成员国关系密切,而且它自己的自我形象是区域一体化的支持者。本文关注这一难题,并考察欧盟如何在制度层面上话语性地解释其不承认欧亚经济联盟。在分析2010年以来欧盟话语的基础上,本文揭示了欧亚经济联盟在欧盟话语中的三种主要表征:(1)俄罗斯的地缘政治计划;(2)保护主义联盟;(3)一个功能失调的联盟。这些叙述被布鲁塞尔用来将欧亚经济联盟塑造成一个具有威胁性的他者形象,从而为欧盟不能正式承认欧亚经济联盟并与之正式接触辩护。本文还确定了自2010年以来欧盟对欧亚经济联盟的话语表达的五个不同阶段,当时其语气和内容发生了变化。论文的结论是,尽管欧亚经济联盟对与非西方国家合作的兴趣日益浓厚,但这种不被重要他者承认的情况仍然限制了它的国际机构地位。shahanibek Arynov感谢法国人类科学基金会(FMSH)和法国亚洲中心研究所(IFEAC)于2022年5月至6月提供ATLAS奖学金,访问新索邦大学的欧洲 ),并撰写了这项工作的最早草稿。他感谢新索邦大学(Sorbonne Nouvelle)的劳尔·德尔库尔(Laure Delcour)教授在ICEE的接待,并为该项目提供了宝贵的反馈。所有的缺点都属于作者。披露声明作者未报告潜在的利益冲突。欧亚经济联盟最初是白俄罗斯、哈萨克斯坦和俄罗斯的关税同盟,于2015年1月成立。同年,亚美尼亚和吉尔吉斯斯坦加入了该组织。欧亚关税同盟(EACU)是创建欧亚经济联盟的第一步,于2010年1月1日正式生效。我们承认欧盟是一个复杂的实体,拥有多个内部机构。然而,欧盟委员会(European Commission)是欧盟处理与其他外部实体日常关系的主要执行机构。当我们提到“欧盟拒绝承认欧亚经济联盟”时,我们主要是指欧盟委员会和欧亚经济委员会之间没有任何正式关系,以及双方的任何其他机构之间没有任何正式关系。这种对欧亚经济联盟地缘政治性质的怀疑也存在于欧亚经济联盟成员国之间。例如,在哈萨克斯坦,欧亚经济联盟的批评者最担心的是失去对俄罗斯的主权(例如Nursha Citation2014),特别是在2014年普京总统质疑哈萨克斯坦国家地位的历史之后(Lillis Citation2015b)。作为回应,哈萨克斯坦当局不断明确表示,欧亚经济联盟纯粹是经济性质的。2023年,卢卡申科总统承认,“无论我们(俄罗斯和白俄罗斯)多么努力地试图给我们的联盟赋予某种政治色彩,甚至可能是军事政治色彩,纳扎尔巴耶夫先生总是把我们放在经济联盟的框架内”(Kremlin Citation2023)。尽管欧盟把自己描绘成一个善意的角色,但一些作者,如Jan Zielonka (Citation2006)认为,欧盟扩大的条件也可以被解释为一种新帝国主义。采访#5(在线),与欧盟委员会的欧盟官员,2023.7年1月13日。采访#2,与欧盟官员在欧盟委员会,2022.8年6月20日。采访#5(在线),与欧盟委员会的欧盟官员,2023.9年1月13日。采访#4,与欧盟委员会的欧盟官员,2012.12月1日。采访#3,与欧盟委员会的欧盟官员,2022.11年12月1日。2012年12月1日,在欧盟委员会与欧盟官员的访谈#3。2013年12月1日,与欧盟委员会的欧盟官员进行的第4次访谈。采访#5(在线),与欧盟委员会的欧盟官员,20123.14年1月13日。2015年12月1日,与欧盟委员会的欧盟官员进行的第4次访谈。采访#5(在线),与欧盟官员在欧盟委员会,2023年1月13日。本工作得到了哈萨克斯坦共和国科学和高等教育部2022-2024年青年科学家资助项目的支持,项目编号:AP13068101。
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引用次数: 0
Spain as the EU’s ‘champion’ in Latin America: elites, government trustworthiness, and free trade 西班牙作为欧盟在拉丁美洲的“冠军”:精英、政府诚信和自由贸易
3区 社会学 Q1 AREA STUDIES Pub Date : 2023-10-19 DOI: 10.1080/14782804.2023.2271846
José Manuel Rivas Otero, Asbel Bohigues
ABSTRACTThis paper addresses attitudes around the projection of the EU among Latin American elites, namely the determinants of support for a Free Trade Agreement between the two regions and the trustworthiness of the EU government. We take as data elite surveys conducted in 15 Latin American countries (2014–2019) and consider sociodemographics, ideology, support for democracy, views of foreign powers, exports to the EU, and electoral democracy. Results show that ideology and support for democracy are key determinants of support for an interregional FTA, and that the trustworthiness of governments in the US, China, and Spain covary with attitudes toward the EU. The latter (trust in the government in Spain) proves to be the main driver and, furthermore, its impact is conditional on the economic strength (observed as exports) of the EU: wherever the EU is not a strong economic actor in Latin America, trust in the Spanish government does nothing but improve the image of the EU.KEYWORDS: Elitesgovernment trustworthinessFTAEULatin America Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Supplemental dataSupplemental data for this article can be accessed online at https://doi.org/10.1080/14782804.2023.2271846.Notes1. Lower Chambers in the case of bicameralism. For more information on the dataset see: https://oir.org.es/pela/en/2. Not national governments, but the European guiding authorities (that is, the Executive), regardless of the name appearing in the questionnaire. This question is one of a battery where legislators are also asked about the trustworthiness of the governments of the US, Russia, China, and Spain.3. The levels of confidence that LAC legislators express in the Spanish government vary from 66.7% (Uruguay in 2015) to 91.4% (Dominican Republic in 2017). There seems to be no impact on these percentages based on the government’s ideology. In 2017, for example, 86.2% of Nicaraguan legislators, mostly left-leaning, expressed confidence in the Spanish government, which was led at that time by conservative Mariano Rajoy. In comparison, during 2018, 84.9% of Colombian legislators, mostly right-leaning, voiced trust in the current Spanish government led by socialist Pedro Sánchez.4. The two questions on trustworthiness correlate positively (0.51), as expected. In the paper, we build the case that views on the EU in LAC are in part driven by attitudes toward specific EU members, especially Spain. A positive perception of the EU might have a feedback effect on the perception of EU members, but in the case of Spain we expect the causality to extend from that single EU member to the EU as a whole. Unlike other EU countries, Spain has maintained a long-term special relationship with LAC (Ayuso Pozo Citation2014).5. For more information on the descriptives of the variables and details of the analysis, see the supplementary file.6. Although the trade share of the EU might seem low when compared to countries like China
摘要本文探讨拉丁美洲精英对欧盟的态度,即支持两个地区之间的自由贸易协定和欧盟政府的可信度的决定因素。我们以在15个拉丁美洲国家(2014-2019年)进行的精英调查为数据,并考虑了社会人口统计学、意识形态、对民主的支持、对外国势力的看法、对欧盟的出口和选举民主。结果显示,意识形态和对民主的支持是支持区域间自由贸易协定的关键决定因素,美国、中国和西班牙政府的可信度与对欧盟的态度相关。后者(对西班牙政府的信任)被证明是主要驱动因素,此外,其影响取决于欧盟的经济实力(观察为出口):无论欧盟在拉丁美洲不是一个强大的经济参与者,对西班牙政府的信任除了改善欧盟的形象之外什么都没有。关键词:精英;政府信任度;亚太经合组织;拉丁美洲披露声明作者未报告潜在利益冲突。补充数据本文的补充数据可以在线访问https://doi.org/10.1080/14782804.2023.2271846.Notes1。两院制下的下议院。有关数据集的更多信息,请参见:https://oir.org.es/pela/en/2。不是国家政府,而是欧洲指导当局(即执行机构),不管问卷上出现的名字是什么。这个问题是立法者还被问及美国、俄罗斯、中国和西班牙政府的可信度的一系列问题之一。拉美和加勒比地区立法者对西班牙政府的信心水平从66.7%(乌拉圭2015年)到91.4%(多米尼加共和国2017年)不等。根据政府的意识形态,这些百分比似乎没有受到影响。例如,2017年,86.2%的尼加拉瓜议员(多数为左倾)对当时由保守派拉霍伊(Mariano Rajoy)领导的西班牙政府表示信心。相比之下,在2018年期间,84.9%的哥伦比亚立法者(主要是右倾)表示信任由社会主义者佩德罗Sánchez.4领导的现任西班牙政府。正如预期的那样,两个问题的可信度正相关(0.51)。在本文中,我们建立了一个案例,即LAC对欧盟的看法在一定程度上是由对特定欧盟成员国(尤其是西班牙)的态度驱动的。对欧盟的积极看法可能会对欧盟成员国的看法产生反馈效应,但在西班牙的情况下,我们预计因果关系将从单个欧盟成员国扩展到整个欧盟。与其他欧盟国家不同,西班牙与LAC保持着长期的特殊关系(Ayuso Pozo Citation2014)。有关变量描述和分析细节的更多信息,请参阅补充文件。尽管与中国或美国等国家相比,欧盟的贸易份额可能看起来很低,但商业(以及延伸的自由贸易协定)是经济关系(硬实力)运作的最佳指标。各国之间的差异也不小:出口份额从萨尔瓦多的3.5%到哥斯达黎加的22.6%不等。尽管如此,我们还是运行了另一种模型,根据欧盟是否是每个国家的第一到第七大贸易伙伴来记录出口。结果与表2显示的结果无显著差异。
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引用次数: 0
The sense of nations for cooperation. How threat perception and ideology influence counterterrorism cooperation between EU members 国家之间的合作意识。威胁认知和意识形态如何影响欧盟成员国之间的反恐合作
3区 社会学 Q1 AREA STUDIES Pub Date : 2023-10-18 DOI: 10.1080/14782804.2023.2269376
Francesco Baraldi
ABSTRACTWhich factors influence bilateral counterterrorism (CT) cooperation between EU Member States? Although scholars have studied European CT, the question still needs to be answered. This paper addresses the issue by introducing a new theoretical framework that combines CT and Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) literature. As citizens’ threat perception increases, governments are pressed to act. Overall, centrist cabinets tend to rely more on cooperation agreements; likewise, pushed by threat perception, left-wing executives also recourse to international cooperation. I tested this framework on a newly collected dataset, which comprehends bilateral CT agreements signed among EU Members from 2002 to 2017. As such, this paper fosters studies on EU CT, focusing on a less debated issue: bilateral cooperation between EU Member States. The results support the initial hypotheses, disclosing a robust influence of threat perception and cabinet ideology on the number of bilateral CT agreements signed. Furthermore, they show that the perception of the threat is more influential on cooperation than the actual impact of terrorism.KEYWORDS: CounterterrorismcooperationForeign Policy AnalysisEuropean Union Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1. https://www.osce.org/resources/documents2. First, I conducted different pre-estimation tests. I tested the DV for overdispersion and an excessive number of zeros. Both were absent. Then, I tested the independent variables. Threat perception and GDP have been transformed in logarithms to avoid skewness problems (Balžekienė Citation2019). Secondly, I tested the independent variables for unit-root. The government’s ideology, military and police expenditure and GDP showed signs of unit-root; thus, its first difference has been taken. A deeper explanation of these tests is in the appendix.3. These models are in the appendix.
[摘要]影响欧盟成员国双边反恐合作的因素有哪些?虽然学者们对欧洲CT进行了研究,但这个问题仍然需要回答。本文通过引入一个新的理论框架来解决这个问题,该框架结合了CT和外交政策分析(FPA)文献。随着公民威胁意识的增强,政府被迫采取行动。总体而言,中间派内阁倾向于更多地依赖合作协议;同样,在威胁感知的推动下,左翼高管也求助于国际合作。我在一个新收集的数据集上测试了这个框架,该数据集涵盖了2002年至2017年欧盟成员国之间签署的双边CT协议。因此,本文促进了对欧盟CT的研究,重点关注一个较少争论的问题:欧盟成员国之间的双边合作。结果支持了最初的假设,揭示了威胁感知和内阁意识形态对双边CT协议签署数量的强大影响。此外,它们表明,对威胁的感知比恐怖主义的实际影响对合作的影响更大。关键词:反恐合作;外交政策分析;欧盟披露声明作者未报告潜在的利益冲突。https://www.osce.org/resources/documents2。首先,我进行了不同的预估测试。我测试了DV的过度分散和过多的零。两人都缺席了。然后,我测试了自变量。威胁感知和GDP已转换为对数,以避免偏度问题(Balžekienė Citation2019)。其次,对自变量进行单位根检验。政府的意识形态、军警支出和GDP呈现出单位根化的迹象;这样,它的第一个区别就得到了。对这些测试的更深入的解释见附录。这些模型在附录中。
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Journal of Contemporary European Studies
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