This paper aims to examine the association between money laundering (ML)/terrorist financing (TF) risks (hereafter, money laundering risks) and democratic governance across 117 countries.
A cross-sectional design was used to examine the association between ML risks and democratic governance by a quantitative approach. The findings are based on annual ratings of 117 countries on ML/TF risks and democracy while controlling for criminality and peace. The data was compiled from the Basel Anti-Money Laundering/Countering Financing Terrorism Risks Index, the Economic Intelligence Unit (Democracy Index), the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crimes (Criminality Index) and the Institute for Economics and Peace Index for 2020.
A multiple linear regression model found a statistically significant negative association between democratic governance and ML risks (B = −0.354, t = −7.454, p = <0.001) and a significant positive association between criminality and ML risks (B = 0.242, t = 2.692, p = 0.008).
A cross-sectional design cannot determine causal inferences and generalization (Levin, 2006). The study only used a year to examine the hypothesis of a negative correlation between ML risks and democratic governance, thus making generalization difficult.
Extant literature examined ML, terrorism and AML diversely. There was a need to estimate the association between ML risks and democratic governance, especially globally, during a global crisis like COVID-19, when democratic principles, such as the rule of law, transparency and accountability, are challenged. Many personnel were laid off, thus limiting supervision for ML and TF. This study presents evidence of this association.
This paper aims to examine the specific findings on the level of technical compliance and operational effectiveness of the national financial intelligence units (FIUs) in 55 members of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) under the mutual evaluations carried out by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and its regional bodies (also referred to as FATF-style regional bodies) in connection with the current international standard for combating money laundering and terrorism financing (i.e. the FATF recommendations). It also provides three observations for enhancing the use of financial information and intelligence.
Review of published reports on country mutual evaluations from the FATF and its regional bodies.
A majority of the FIUs from these 55 members of the ADB were rated around the “mid-range” under the FATF methodology used for the mutual evaluations (i.e. “compliant and substantially effective”, “largely compliant and substantially effective”, “compliant and moderately effective” and “largely compliant and moderately effective”). Observations were also provided on cross-cutting areas for enhancing the use of financial information and intelligence.
FIU operations are key to combating money laundering and terrorism financing, and this examination of the level of technical compliance with the international standard and related operational effectiveness provides an useful account of current developments in this space and suggestions for further actions by relevant national authorities and provision of country technical assistance and support by donor partners.
This paper aims to demonstrate to lawmakers that the addition of art dealers to the designated non-financial businesses and professions (DNFBPs) definition would provide Australia with more comprehensive protection against money laundering within the art market.
The paper opted for an exploratory study using doctrinal and jurisdictional comparative analysis that focused on arguments for and against the inclusion of art dealers in respective DNFBPs definitions. Evaluation of these arguments concludes that art dealers should be included in Australia’s DNFBPs definition and subject to anti-money laundering (AML) regulation.
The current omission of art dealers from Australia’s DNFBPs definition perpetuates AML vulnerabilities within the Australian art market.
This paper fulfils an identified need to study high-value dealers not included in Australia’s DNFBPs definition and provide arguments for and against the inclusion of Australian art dealers in the listed DNFBP.
This paper aims to investigate how best to classify money laundering through online video games (i.e. virtual laundering). Currently, there is no taxonomy available for scholars and practitioners to refer to when discussing money laundering through online video games. Without a well-defined taxonomy it becomes difficult to reason through, formulate and implement effective regulatory measures, policies and security controls. As such, efforts to prevent and reduce virtual laundering incidence rates are hampered.
This paper proposes three mutually exclusive virtual laundering categorizations. However, instead of fixating on the processes undergirding individual instances of virtual laundering, it is argued that focusing on the initial locale of the illicit proceeds provides the appropriate framing within which to classify instances of virtual laundering. Thus, the act of classification becomes an ontological endeavour, rather than an attempt at elucidating an inherently varied process (as is common of the placement, layering and integration model).
A taxonomy is proposed that details three core virtual laundering processes. It is demonstrated how different virtual laundering categories have varied levels of associated risk, and thus, demand unique interventions.
To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first taxonomy available in the knowledge base that systematically classifies instances of virtual laundering. The taxonomy is available for scholars and practitioners to use and apply when discussing how to regulate and formulate legislation, policies and appropriate security controls.
The purpose of this paper is to explore and evaluate the current legal position on the admissibility and exclusion of illegally obtained evidence in money laundering cases.
A thorough exploratory analytical analysis signifies that such illegally obtained evidence from money laundering offences is admissible, provided it does not undermine the administration of justice or the right to a fair trial.
By virtue of the lack of written or codified rules governing the admissibility and exclusion of illegally obtained evidence in cases involving money laundering, the rule of admissibility remains the primary foundational principle for the governance of the admissibility and exclusion of illegally obtained evidence in money laundering cases.
The Malaysian Criminal Justice System has historically relied on the long-standing admissibility principles to admit and exclude illegally obtained evidence. For decades, courts have used their discretion to admit illegally obtained evidence based on the relevancy test, and they have further demonstrated to use the same discretion to exclude gravely prejudicial evidence. Evidence obtained illegally but if relevant to the matter in issue is deemed admissible. Evidence derived from an act associated with unlawful activities or a predicate offence in money laundering may be obtained illegally, which may influence the prosecution case and conversely, defend the accused’s rights to a fair trial.
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：