Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences最新文献

In this paper the genesis of the cooperation between Alexander Luria and Jean Piaget is reconstructed on the basis of recently found correspondence and historical data. It is shown that their initial meeting at the famous Ninth International Congress of Psychology in New Haven, 1929, formed the beginning of a cordial and productive relationship which, however, was abruptly interrupted in the late 1930's. At the background of much of their cooperation was the monumental figure of Lev Vygotsky, whose work Luria attempted to promote in the West and who for Piaget, in a way, would probably become the most valuable interlocutor he never met.

This paper explores the origins and development of the “contemplative psychotherapy” project in the United States, emerging around psychoanalyst Edward Podvoll and the intellectual environment at Naropa University during the 1970s and 1980s. It situates Podvoll's work within the broader dialogue between Buddhism and Western psychotherapy, highlighting how his contributions shed light on this dynamic and complex encounter. The paper begins by outlining Podvoll's psychiatric and psychoanalytic background, then examines the establishment of contemplative psychotherapy at Naropa, and finally discusses the creation of the Windhorse community therapy model—while contextualising Podvoll's dialogues with influential figures such as Chögyam Trungpa, Erik Erikson, Manfred Bleuler, and Oliver Sacks. Drawing on published and unpublished material by Podvoll, it argues that his work exemplified a pioneering effort to integrate Buddhist and psychoanalytic perspectives on mental health and recovery. At the same time, the paper reflects on some of the conceptual and therapeutic tensions that arise when spiritual and clinical paradigms converge. By examining contemplative psychotherapy as both a historical case study and a continuing experiment, the paper contributes to ongoing debates about the possibilities—and limits—of East–West intersections in psychological practice.

The article contains a brief overview of the main metatheoretical and conceptual ideas, as well as empirical data, of the general psychological theory of set developed by Dmitry Uznadze (1886-1950) and his followers. They are considered from the point of view of the systemic approach, the problem of the crisis of psychology and the task of building a comprehensive integrative theoretical system. The theory of set is a holistic system of views on the origin and implementation of mental activity. The article focuses on the ideas contained in this concept around the problem of the unconscious psyche. From the standpoint of the theory of set, an attempt is made to present a certain point of view on the issue of types of the unconscious psyche. Particular attention is paid to the critical assessment of the psychoanalytic understanding of the unconscious given in the works of D. Uznadze. In this regard, a brief overview of the discussions at the Tbilisi symposium on the unconscious in 1979 is presented, at which a remarkable dialog between the followers of psychoanalysis and the theory of set took place.

Betty Eisner represents a prominent figure in the “golden age” of psychedelics research, as well as a cautionary tale about questionable therapeutic practices, exercising authority and control, and the misuse of psychedelics during the counterculture of the 1960s and 70s. Situating her work and the consequences of her problematic practices in the counterculture, the Human Potential Movement, and integrative experiences helps provide some context for the decline of the first wave of psychedelics research and the more cautious and conservative approach to the second wave of psychedelics research. Some of the dangers associated with figures like Eisner, and consequently the first wave of psychedelics, may help explain the slower development of group therapy approaches and the inclusion of social context in the second wave focus on psychedelic-assisted psychotherapy.

American pragmatism is traditionally described as a logico-philosophical movement that arose in opposition to the theological and metaphysical assumptions of the early American idealists. Mary Whiton Calkins (1863–1930) challenges this narrative in two central ways: she presents pragmatism as encompassing psychological, logical, and metaphysical doctrines, and she characterizes “metaphysical pragmatism” as a form of idealism. This paper offers a systematic reconstruction of Calkins's philosophical and psychological commitments to explain these challenges to the traditional narrative. The first part proposes that Calkins's taxonomy of “pragmatisms” reflects her views on the proper roles of philosophy and psychology. During a time when psychology was separating from philosophy, Calkins argued that psychology should study reality as experienced through introspection, while philosophy should address the metaphysical nature of the realities experienced. The second part of this article explores Calkins's rationale for characterizing metaphysical pragmatism as idealism. She understood the pluralism characteristic of pragmatism as a “pluralistic personalism”, where reality is the nature of consciousness, and consciousness is viewed as a plurality of conscious selves. Calkins rejected metaphysical pragmatism because she believed that pluralism could not account for absolute truth. However, she maintained support for psychological pragmatism, believing it to be metaphysically neutral. The article concludes with a brief critical analysis of Calkins's position on pragmatism as regards her philosophy-psychology distinction and the supposed opposition between pragmatism and metaphysics more broadly.