Pub Date : 2013-01-01DOI: 10.1111/J.1540-5850.2013.12006.X
Cheryl A. Brown
{"title":"Book Review: Budgeting: Politics and Power, by Carol W.Lewis and W. BartleyHildreth. New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.","authors":"Cheryl A. Brown","doi":"10.1111/J.1540-5850.2013.12006.X","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/J.1540-5850.2013.12006.X","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46065,"journal":{"name":"Public Budgeting and Finance","volume":"33 1","pages":"135-139"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2013-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/J.1540-5850.2013.12006.X","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"63319655","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2013-01-01DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5850.2013.12014.x
Travis St. Clair
Despite the shortfalls in public employee pension funds, there is little known about the effect of fiscal institutions on pension funding. This paper focuses attention on the link between pension contributions and budget stabilization funds (BSFs) over the period 1997–2008. It employs the Blundell–Bond (1998) estimator in order to address the concern that the deposit and withdrawal rules that drive the management of BSFs may be endogenous to state pension contributions. Empirical results suggest that BSFs with strict deposit rules are associated with higher pension contributions, while strict withdrawal rules are associated with lower contributions.
{"title":"The Impact of Budget Stabilization Funds on State Pension Contributions","authors":"Travis St. Clair","doi":"10.1111/j.1540-5850.2013.12014.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5850.2013.12014.x","url":null,"abstract":"Despite the shortfalls in public employee pension funds, there is little known about the effect of fiscal institutions on pension funding. This paper focuses attention on the link between pension contributions and budget stabilization funds (BSFs) over the period 1997–2008. It employs the Blundell–Bond (1998) estimator in order to address the concern that the deposit and withdrawal rules that drive the management of BSFs may be endogenous to state pension contributions. Empirical results suggest that BSFs with strict deposit rules are associated with higher pension contributions, while strict withdrawal rules are associated with lower contributions.","PeriodicalId":46065,"journal":{"name":"Public Budgeting and Finance","volume":"36 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2013-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/j.1540-5850.2013.12014.x","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"63319890","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2012-09-01DOI: 10.1111/J.1540-5850.2012.01019.X
P. Joyce
It will not come as a surprise to anyone who reads this journal that the federal budget— indeed, federal budgeting—is a mess. The problems are both substantive and procedural. Barring some unforeseen and unprecedented event, fiscal year 2012, which will end on September 30th of this year, will represent the fourth consecutive year of deficits in excess of $1 trillion. Over this four-year period, more than $5 trillion has been added to the national debt, which will stand at more than $11 trillion (more than 70 percent of GDP) by the end of 2012. While much of this growth in debt can be traced to the most recent recession and attempts to address it, something will have to be done to address the chronic imbalance between taxes and spending. The procedural story is not much better. In fact, the procedural challenges facing the budget predate the recent increase in the deficit. There are three main problems with the federal budget process as of 2012. First, appropriations legislation, necessary to fund 40 percent of the government on an annual basis, is chronically late. Second, and related, the budget resolution, designed to promote the setting of overall fiscal policy, has become an “optional” device, seemingly only enacted when broad consensus already exists on a path for the budget; there has been no budget resolution in 7 of the past 15 years. Third, the budget process, far from encouraging fiscal discipline, detracts from a responsible approach to budgeting, in part because of the dysfunction of the political system and partly because the appropriations process tends to focus on the provision of specific benefits to particular constituencies. Both the magnitude of the problems, and past history, would indicate that these difficulties are not likely to disappear between now and the 2012 election. In fact, the campaign itself is unlikely to feature an illuminating debate concerning the future fiscal path that
{"title":"Introduction to Symposium: The Crisis in Federal Budgeting","authors":"P. Joyce","doi":"10.1111/J.1540-5850.2012.01019.X","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/J.1540-5850.2012.01019.X","url":null,"abstract":"It will not come as a surprise to anyone who reads this journal that the federal budget— indeed, federal budgeting—is a mess. The problems are both substantive and procedural. Barring some unforeseen and unprecedented event, fiscal year 2012, which will end on September 30th of this year, will represent the fourth consecutive year of deficits in excess of $1 trillion. Over this four-year period, more than $5 trillion has been added to the national debt, which will stand at more than $11 trillion (more than 70 percent of GDP) by the end of 2012. While much of this growth in debt can be traced to the most recent recession and attempts to address it, something will have to be done to address the chronic imbalance between taxes and spending. The procedural story is not much better. In fact, the procedural challenges facing the budget predate the recent increase in the deficit. There are three main problems with the federal budget process as of 2012. First, appropriations legislation, necessary to fund 40 percent of the government on an annual basis, is chronically late. Second, and related, the budget resolution, designed to promote the setting of overall fiscal policy, has become an “optional” device, seemingly only enacted when broad consensus already exists on a path for the budget; there has been no budget resolution in 7 of the past 15 years. Third, the budget process, far from encouraging fiscal discipline, detracts from a responsible approach to budgeting, in part because of the dysfunction of the political system and partly because the appropriations process tends to focus on the provision of specific benefits to particular constituencies. Both the magnitude of the problems, and past history, would indicate that these difficulties are not likely to disappear between now and the 2012 election. In fact, the campaign itself is unlikely to feature an illuminating debate concerning the future fiscal path that","PeriodicalId":46065,"journal":{"name":"Public Budgeting and Finance","volume":"32 1","pages":"1-3"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2012-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/J.1540-5850.2012.01019.X","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"63319590","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2012-09-01DOI: 10.1111/J.1540-5850.2012.01014.X
Jim Nussle
Chairman Ryan, Ranking Member Van Hollen, and Members of the Committee thank you for the privilege of appearing before you today. It’s great to be back before the House Budget Committee at the witness table but your vantage point is better. I commend you and the entire professional staff here at the committee including TomKahn and Austin Smythe; true experts, patriots, and friends. In my testimony here today I hope to make the following points:
{"title":"Perspectives on Budget Process Reform","authors":"Jim Nussle","doi":"10.1111/J.1540-5850.2012.01014.X","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/J.1540-5850.2012.01014.X","url":null,"abstract":"Chairman Ryan, Ranking Member Van Hollen, and Members of the Committee thank you for the privilege of appearing before you today. It’s great to be back before the House Budget Committee at the witness table but your vantage point is better. I commend you and the entire professional staff here at the committee including TomKahn and Austin Smythe; true experts, patriots, and friends. In my testimony here today I hope to make the following points:","PeriodicalId":46065,"journal":{"name":"Public Budgeting and Finance","volume":"32 1","pages":"57-60"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2012-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/J.1540-5850.2012.01014.X","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"63319326","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2012-09-01DOI: 10.1111/J.1540-5850.2012.01017.X
A. Rivlin
There is no doubt that the budget process is broken. Congress has not even tried to agree on a Budget Resolution—the normal first step in the annual budget process–for several years. Instead, hopes of a major agreement designed to stabilize the rising debt have rested on the creation of special mechanisms outside the regular budget process. First there was the President’s Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform (the Simpson Bowles Commission) in 2010. When no legislative action followed that report, U.S. Vice President Joe Biden tried to hammer out a deal withHouse and senate leadership. ThenU.S. President Barack H. Obama and U.S. Speaker John Boehner worked together on a “grand bargain” both political parties could accept. After these efforts failed—and the debt ceiling debacle in the fall summer of 2011 showed how deeply broken regular congressional processes had become—hopes were pinned on yet another special committee. Legislation created the Joint Select Committee (JSC), dubbed the “Super Committee,” and gave it a tight deadline and truly extraordinary powers. Optimists thought that the JSC might succeed. If it had had strong from the president and the leadership in both houses, it might indeed have been able to agree on actions to stabilize the rising debt and use its powers to set the federal budget on a sustainable path. But that support did not materialize, gridlock prevailed, and the JSC became one more entry on a list of failures. Gridlock is likely to last at least through the 2012 presidential election, perhaps longer. But even if one of these extraordinary mechanisms had succeeded in reaching a “grand bargain,” this dismal history simply illustrates how completely the normal budget process has failed. Our much-vaunted democracy should not have to abandon its normal decision processes and concentrate power in the hands of an ad hoc group to solve a budget problem.
{"title":"Rescuing the Budget Process","authors":"A. Rivlin","doi":"10.1111/J.1540-5850.2012.01017.X","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/J.1540-5850.2012.01017.X","url":null,"abstract":"There is no doubt that the budget process is broken. Congress has not even tried to agree on a Budget Resolution—the normal first step in the annual budget process–for several years. Instead, hopes of a major agreement designed to stabilize the rising debt have rested on the creation of special mechanisms outside the regular budget process. First there was the President’s Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform (the Simpson Bowles Commission) in 2010. When no legislative action followed that report, U.S. Vice President Joe Biden tried to hammer out a deal withHouse and senate leadership. ThenU.S. President Barack H. Obama and U.S. Speaker John Boehner worked together on a “grand bargain” both political parties could accept. After these efforts failed—and the debt ceiling debacle in the fall summer of 2011 showed how deeply broken regular congressional processes had become—hopes were pinned on yet another special committee. Legislation created the Joint Select Committee (JSC), dubbed the “Super Committee,” and gave it a tight deadline and truly extraordinary powers. Optimists thought that the JSC might succeed. If it had had strong from the president and the leadership in both houses, it might indeed have been able to agree on actions to stabilize the rising debt and use its powers to set the federal budget on a sustainable path. But that support did not materialize, gridlock prevailed, and the JSC became one more entry on a list of failures. Gridlock is likely to last at least through the 2012 presidential election, perhaps longer. But even if one of these extraordinary mechanisms had succeeded in reaching a “grand bargain,” this dismal history simply illustrates how completely the normal budget process has failed. Our much-vaunted democracy should not have to abandon its normal decision processes and concentrate power in the hands of an ad hoc group to solve a budget problem.","PeriodicalId":46065,"journal":{"name":"Public Budgeting and Finance","volume":"32 1","pages":"53-56"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2012-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/J.1540-5850.2012.01017.X","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"63319729","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2012-09-01DOI: 10.1111/J.1540-5850.2012.01018.X
I. Rubin
{"title":"The Congressional Budget Office: Honest Numbers, Power, and Policy Making, by Philip Joyce. Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2011.","authors":"I. Rubin","doi":"10.1111/J.1540-5850.2012.01018.X","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/J.1540-5850.2012.01018.X","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46065,"journal":{"name":"Public Budgeting and Finance","volume":"32 1","pages":"102-105"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2012-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/J.1540-5850.2012.01018.X","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"63319796","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2012-06-01DOI: 10.1111/J.1540-5850.2012.01010.X
W. Duncombe, P. Joyce, Nathan J. Bowen
{"title":"Moving PB&F Forward: Feedback from Our Membership","authors":"W. Duncombe, P. Joyce, Nathan J. Bowen","doi":"10.1111/J.1540-5850.2012.01010.X","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/J.1540-5850.2012.01010.X","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46065,"journal":{"name":"Public Budgeting and Finance","volume":"32 1","pages":"103-109"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2012-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/J.1540-5850.2012.01010.X","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"63319277","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2012-06-01DOI: 10.1111/J.1540-5850.2011.01012.X
Kenneth A. Klase
{"title":"Capital Budgeting and Finance: A Guide for Local Governments, edited by Justin Marlowe, William C. Rivenbark, and A. John Vogt. Washington, DC: ICMA Press, 2009.","authors":"Kenneth A. Klase","doi":"10.1111/J.1540-5850.2011.01012.X","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/J.1540-5850.2011.01012.X","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46065,"journal":{"name":"Public Budgeting and Finance","volume":"32 1","pages":"115-118"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2012-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/J.1540-5850.2011.01012.X","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"63319213","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2012-06-01DOI: 10.1111/J.1540-5850.2011.01011.X
D. Carroll
{"title":"Managing the Fiscal Metropolis: The Financial Policies, Practices, and Health of Suburban Municipalities, by Rebecca M. Hendrick. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2011.","authors":"D. Carroll","doi":"10.1111/J.1540-5850.2011.01011.X","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/J.1540-5850.2011.01011.X","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46065,"journal":{"name":"Public Budgeting and Finance","volume":"32 1","pages":"110-114"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2012-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/J.1540-5850.2011.01011.X","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"63318742","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2012-03-01DOI: 10.1111/J.1540-5850.2011.01004.X
Todd L. Ely
The credit crisis that roiled the financial and housing markets in late 2007 and early 2008 resulted in well-publicized budget challenges for state and local governments. Less visible has been a dramatic change in the bond insurance market, which alters how governments issue long-term debt. Debt issuance data from Texas are used to model bond insurance premiums and examine utilization following the crisis. The results provide evidence that insurance premiums rose dramatically following the fiscal crisis, even when controlling for widening credit spreads and changes in the underlying credit quality of issuers.
{"title":"No Guaranties: The Decline of Municipal Bond Insurance","authors":"Todd L. Ely","doi":"10.1111/J.1540-5850.2011.01004.X","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/J.1540-5850.2011.01004.X","url":null,"abstract":"The credit crisis that roiled the financial and housing markets in late 2007 and early 2008 resulted in well-publicized budget challenges for state and local governments. Less visible has been a dramatic change in the bond insurance market, which alters how governments issue long-term debt. Debt issuance data from Texas are used to model bond insurance premiums and examine utilization following the crisis. The results provide evidence that insurance premiums rose dramatically following the fiscal crisis, even when controlling for widening credit spreads and changes in the underlying credit quality of issuers.","PeriodicalId":46065,"journal":{"name":"Public Budgeting and Finance","volume":"32 1","pages":"105-127"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2012-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/J.1540-5850.2011.01004.X","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"63319035","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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