Legal Studies最新文献

Litigation funding has become an essential ingredient in collective actions for breaches of competition law brought in the Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT). In the recent PACCAR proceedings, the Supreme Court was asked to rule on the nature and enforceability of litigation funding agreements (LFAs) between third-party litigation funders and group representatives where the success fee is determined as a percentage of the damages award.1 The Court held with a 4:1 majority (Lady Rose dissenting)2 that the LFAs in question are damages-based fee agreements (DBAs) and, as such, unenforceable. This judgment has wide-ranging consequences, as the CAT is unlikely to allow collective actions to proceed if the funding agreements cannot be relied on. The decision has caused uncertainty and upheaval in the funding market as a considerable number of funding agreements in collective proceedings contain DBAs. It also triggered legal challenges in collective proceedings where funders are seeking to amend the funding agreements to deal with the Supreme Court ruling.3 The fall-out from the decision suggests that funding rules for collective actions may need more legislative attention – litigation funding was given some thought during the drafting of the opt-out action regime, but the legal framework for litigation funding remains fragmented and open to interpretation.4

Judges communicate outside of the courtroom on a regular basis. They give speeches at universities and to societies; appear before select committees; write for a range of publications; and engage in both media and outreach activities. Existing literature has charted the value and perils of such extrajudicial communication. This paper contributes an explanation of what motivates judges towards such communication, and what shapes their discourse. The work draws on 13 semi-structured interviews with senior serving and recently retired judges, along with an extensive range of examples of judicial speech beyond the bench. It argues that extrajudicial communication is shaped by a shared conception amongst the judicial community of what is appropriate. This conception of propriety is principally motivated by a communal pursuit of sustaining public confidence in the judicial office. The conception also informs the limits of appropriate discourse and establishes the ramifications for breach.

All aspects of law possess scaler elements, but critiques from the ‘politics of scale’, a concept well established in political geography, remain rare in legal analysis. Brexit, especially as regards Northern Ireland, provides a key opportunity to consider scaler analysis both in a descriptive and theoretical sense. Scale deepens our understanding of how law co-constitutes multiple scales but also highlights where a flat understanding of law tied to vertical jurisdictional frames foils attempts to garner a full understanding of its operation. Northern Ireland, a legal and political space that from one perspective lends itself to an apparently clear-cut vertical description of legal scales, actually presents a rich space where networked, rhetorical and nodular scales and structures continuously (re)contest scaled solutions. The Brexit outcome of what used to be known as the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland and is now known as the Windsor Framework – and specifically how the Framework is intended to operate in practice – provides an opportunity to not only understand Northern Ireland within a scale and law frame, but also to highlight the shortcomings of law's traditional scaler approach and what lessons may be learned when analysing or engaging with the intersection of law and politics in similar future situations.