The aim of this paper is to inform a sociological jurisprudence of the implied duty in the contract of employment of mutual trust and confidence. Present analyses of the emerging term have been doctrinal in nature. Such scholarship contributes a normative internal perspective to what can be understood as the jurisprudential project of guarding and maintaining law as a practice of regulation. This paper seeks to generate knowledge that will allow for an extension of the jurisprudential analysis to take into account how mutual trust and confidence may manifest in contemporary conditions of work. This is achieved by, first, presenting original sociological data of the employment relation in a work context likely to demonstrate practices that resonate with features of mutual trust and confidence – that of early-stage digital technology startups – and, secondly, contrasting this empirical account with doctrinal conceptions of the term. Findings unsettle the dominant jurisprudential account of mutual trust and confidence as positively contributing to the social goal of labour law as operating to counter the power of capital.
{"title":"Informing a sociological jurisprudence of mutual trust and confidence","authors":"Emily Rose","doi":"10.1017/lst.2024.1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/lst.2024.1","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The aim of this paper is to inform a sociological jurisprudence of the implied duty in the contract of employment of mutual trust and confidence. Present analyses of the emerging term have been doctrinal in nature. Such scholarship contributes a normative internal perspective to what can be understood as the jurisprudential project of guarding and maintaining law as a practice of regulation. This paper seeks to generate knowledge that will allow for an extension of the jurisprudential analysis to take into account how mutual trust and confidence may manifest in contemporary conditions of work. This is achieved by, first, presenting original sociological data of the employment relation in a work context likely to demonstrate practices that resonate with features of mutual trust and confidence – that of early-stage digital technology startups – and, secondly, contrasting this empirical account with doctrinal conceptions of the term. Findings unsettle the dominant jurisprudential account of mutual trust and confidence as positively contributing to the social goal of labour law as operating to counter the power of capital.</p>","PeriodicalId":46121,"journal":{"name":"Legal Studies","volume":"36 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-03-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140098432","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper examines the interaction between ‘radical’ constitutional change, in the form of political devolution, and property systems in the UK, from the perspective of those at the margins of those systems. The paper adopts a property ‘from below’ approach and critically applies the theoretical framework developed by AJ van der Walt in Property in the Margins. In that book, van der Walt outlined how property systems frequently operate to resist democratic and constitutional change and transformation through the functioning of the property paradigm, which refers to a set of doctrinal, rhetorical, and logical assumptions and beliefs about the relative value and power of discrete property interests in law and in society. Building on van der Walt's work, this paper takes eviction, which represents the landlord's apex right, as a case study and considers how qualifications of that right have been reformed by the Private Residential Tenancies (Scotland) Act 2016. It is argued that while the strength of the property paradigm is apparent in both English and Scottish property systems, Living Rent, a national tenants’ union in Scotland, have organised tenants to effectively contest and, in some respects, displace the logic of the property paradigm during the reform process.
本文从英国政治权力下放形式的 "激进 "宪法变革和财产制度的边缘人的视角出发,探讨了这些制度之间的互动关系。本文采用了一种 "自下而上 "的财产研究方法,并批判性地应用了 AJ van der Walt 在《边缘财产》一书中提出的理论框架。在该书中,van der Walt 概述了财产制度如何经常通过财产范式的运作来抵制民主和宪法变革与转型,财产范式指的是关于法律和社会中离散财产利益的相对价值和权力的一系列理论、修辞和逻辑假设与信念。本文以 van der Walt 的研究为基础,以代表房东最高权利的驱逐权为案例,探讨 2016 年《私人住宅租赁(苏格兰)法案》如何对该权利的资格进行改革。本文认为,虽然物业范式的力量在英格兰和苏格兰的物业系统中都很明显,但苏格兰的全国性租户联盟 "生活租房"(Living Rent)在改革过程中组织租户对物业范式的逻辑进行了有效的抗衡,并在某些方面取代了物业范式的逻辑。
{"title":"Contesting the property paradigm amid ‘radical’ constitutional change: Living Rent and the Private Residential Tenancies (Scotland) Act 2016","authors":"Mark Jordan","doi":"10.1017/lst.2024.4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/lst.2024.4","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper examines the interaction between ‘radical’ constitutional change, in the form of political devolution, and property systems in the UK, from the perspective of those at the margins of those systems. The paper adopts a property ‘from below’ approach and critically applies the theoretical framework developed by AJ van der Walt in <span>Property in the Margins</span>. In that book, van der Walt outlined how property systems frequently operate to resist democratic and constitutional change and transformation through the functioning of the property paradigm, which refers to a set of doctrinal, rhetorical, and logical assumptions and beliefs about the relative value and power of discrete property interests in law and in society. Building on van der Walt's work, this paper takes eviction, which represents the landlord's apex right, as a case study and considers how qualifications of that right have been reformed by the Private Residential Tenancies (Scotland) Act 2016. It is argued that while the strength of the property paradigm is apparent in both English and Scottish property systems, Living Rent, a national tenants’ union in Scotland, have organised tenants to effectively contest and, in some respects, displace the logic of the property paradigm during the reform process.</p>","PeriodicalId":46121,"journal":{"name":"Legal Studies","volume":"128 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-03-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140098436","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper analyses legal responses to the problem of debt taken out due to coercion within an intimate relationship. Coerced debt differs from other forms of domestic abuse, as it involves a contractual relationship between the victim and a third-party lender. Legal responses must consider whether the victim should be released from her contractual obligation. The paper employs a theoretical lens of vulnerability and relationality, examining lenders’ duties to combat coerced debt, as well as contractual doctrines of undue influence and duress, which allow victims to have transactions set aside under certain circumstances. The paper argues that victims are being failed by an inadequate legal response. The law views vulnerability as an exceptional state and relationality as a constraint, rather than inherent features of the human condition. Through the social construct of the ‘free market’, lenders are consistently favoured by the law, with little obligation to ensure that transactions are free from coercion. The paper concludes with a call for the state to take greater responsibility for coerced debt and to allocate the risk differently than it currently does. This will promote higher levels of resilience for victims and allow them to escape abusive relational contexts.
{"title":"Analysing legal responses to coerced debt","authors":"Ellen Gordon-Bouvier","doi":"10.1017/lst.2023.46","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/lst.2023.46","url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyses legal responses to the problem of debt taken out due to coercion within an intimate relationship. Coerced debt differs from other forms of domestic abuse, as it involves a contractual relationship between the victim and a third-party lender. Legal responses must consider whether the victim should be released from her contractual obligation. The paper employs a theoretical lens of vulnerability and relationality, examining lenders’ duties to combat coerced debt, as well as contractual doctrines of undue influence and duress, which allow victims to have transactions set aside under certain circumstances. The paper argues that victims are being failed by an inadequate legal response. The law views vulnerability as an exceptional state and relationality as a constraint, rather than inherent features of the human condition. Through the social construct of the ‘free market’, lenders are consistently favoured by the law, with little obligation to ensure that transactions are free from coercion. The paper concludes with a call for the state to take greater responsibility for coerced debt and to allocate the risk differently than it currently does. This will promote higher levels of resilience for victims and allow them to escape abusive relational contexts.","PeriodicalId":46121,"journal":{"name":"Legal Studies","volume":"74 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139767471","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Questions of statutory interpretation form a significant portion of administrative law cases. Accordingly, judicial methodology in this area requires careful consideration by public law commentators. The core aim of this paper is to question the general orthodoxy that statutory interpretation is invariably a question for judges. In recent times, one prominent argument has been that between jurists arguing that interpretation should be the realisation of Parliament's intention (‘intentionalist’), and those who prefer the closely related but subtly distinct focus on its objective purpose (‘purposivist’). I contend that this argument, framed as a question over the inter-institutional relationship between Parliament and the courts, focuses on how interpretation is carried out without considering who is best placed to do the interpreting. Given, as I demonstrate with a series of case studies, that in hard cases the distinction between interpretation and discretion/policymaking can become obscure to the point of nullity, the debate fails to consider institutional arguments for judicial deference on questions of law. Moreover, and counterintuitively, the arguments of the intentionalists/purposivists can be used to bolster an argument for deference. My conclusion adopts a wider lens, setting out a broader constitutional argument for, and addressing objections against, cautious and context-sensitive deference.
{"title":"Statutory interpretation and the administrative state: refocusing the purposivist/intentionalist debate","authors":"Tim Sayer","doi":"10.1017/lst.2023.44","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/lst.2023.44","url":null,"abstract":"Questions of statutory interpretation form a significant portion of administrative law cases. Accordingly, judicial methodology in this area requires careful consideration by public law commentators. The core aim of this paper is to question the general orthodoxy that statutory interpretation is invariably a question for judges. In recent times, one prominent argument has been that between jurists arguing that interpretation should be the realisation of Parliament's intention (‘intentionalist’), and those who prefer the closely related but subtly distinct focus on its objective purpose (‘purposivist’). I contend that this argument, framed as a question over the inter-institutional relationship between Parliament and the courts, focuses on how interpretation is carried out without considering who is best placed to do the interpreting. Given, as I demonstrate with a series of case studies, that in hard cases the distinction between interpretation and discretion/policymaking can become obscure to the point of nullity, the debate fails to consider institutional arguments for judicial deference on questions of law. Moreover, and counterintuitively, the arguments of the intentionalists/purposivists can be used to bolster an argument for deference. My conclusion adopts a wider lens, setting out a broader constitutional argument for, and addressing objections against, cautious and context-sensitive deference.","PeriodicalId":46121,"journal":{"name":"Legal Studies","volume":"39 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-02-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139767464","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper examines how English courts have responded to the contract problems generated by the Covid-19 pandemic and considers what this tells us about future contract law development. In relation to consumers, the case law on pandemic-affected contracts, though limited, indicates that traditional contract doctrine does not necessarily produce beneficial outcomes for consumers. This further diminishes the importance of the common law in the consumer contracting context. In the commercial sector, contracting parties were encouraged by government and other organisations to co-operate with one another and act in good faith during the crisis, but this has not influenced the courts applying contract law in the pandemic aftermath. The emerging case law suggests that contract law has retained its commitment to certainty, freedom of contract and sanctity of contract, notwithstanding the extraordinary circumstances around the outbreak and its unpredictable effects on contracts. The unalloyed application of formal contract law in the post-pandemic case law augments the position of relational norms as extra-contractual in English law, putting the further judicial development of relational contract principles in doubt. The paper concludes that despite the considerable social and economic upheaval caused by the pandemic, its impact on contract law development is likely to be minimal.
{"title":"What does Covid-19 teach us about English contract law?","authors":"Catherine Mitchell","doi":"10.1017/lst.2023.45","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/lst.2023.45","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines how English courts have responded to the contract problems generated by the Covid-19 pandemic and considers what this tells us about future contract law development. In relation to consumers, the case law on pandemic-affected contracts, though limited, indicates that traditional contract doctrine does not necessarily produce beneficial outcomes for consumers. This further diminishes the importance of the common law in the consumer contracting context. In the commercial sector, contracting parties were encouraged by government and other organisations to co-operate with one another and act in good faith during the crisis, but this has not influenced the courts applying contract law in the pandemic aftermath. The emerging case law suggests that contract law has retained its commitment to certainty, freedom of contract and sanctity of contract, notwithstanding the extraordinary circumstances around the outbreak and its unpredictable effects on contracts. The unalloyed application of formal contract law in the post-pandemic case law augments the position of relational norms as extra-contractual in English law, putting the further judicial development of relational contract principles in doubt. The paper concludes that despite the considerable social and economic upheaval caused by the pandemic, its impact on contract law development is likely to be minimal.","PeriodicalId":46121,"journal":{"name":"Legal Studies","volume":"5 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-02-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139767467","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Immigration measures such as deportation are currently not regarded as punitive and there has been little exploration of this from a legal perspective. This paper will consider this issue in depth, covering little discussed case law from the European Court of Human Rights. It will also explore how this legal position on deportation does not reflect the findings of other disciplines such as criminology and sociology on how immigration measures are used and experienced as punitive. This paper will build on existing literature by demonstrating the significance of a recent development in UK law to this debate. Section 47 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 (NBA 2022) introduced a ‘stop the clock’ provision into the Early Removal Scheme for foreign national prisoners. This new provision may prompt the judiciary to revisit the question of whether deportation is punitive in some contexts.
目前,递解出境等移民措施不被视为惩罚性措施,从法律角度对这一问题的探讨也很少。本文将深入探讨这一问题,涉及欧洲人权法院鲜有讨论的案例法。本文还将探讨关于递解出境的法律立场如何没有反映出犯罪学和社会学等其他学科关于如何使用移民措施以及如何将其视为惩罚性措施的研究结果。本文将以现有文献为基础,说明英国法律的最新发展对这一辩论的重要意义。2022 年国籍与边境法案》(Nationality and Borders Act 2022)第 47 条在外国囚犯提前遣返计划中引入了 "停止计时 "条款。这一新规定可能会促使司法机构重新审视递解出境在某些情况下是否具有惩罚性的问题。
{"title":"Revisiting the punitiveness of deportation","authors":"Amanda Spalding","doi":"10.1017/lst.2023.41","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/lst.2023.41","url":null,"abstract":"Immigration measures such as deportation are currently not regarded as punitive and there has been little exploration of this from a legal perspective. This paper will consider this issue in depth, covering little discussed case law from the European Court of Human Rights. It will also explore how this legal position on deportation does not reflect the findings of other disciplines such as criminology and sociology on how immigration measures are used and experienced as punitive. This paper will build on existing literature by demonstrating the significance of a recent development in UK law to this debate. Section 47 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 (NBA 2022) introduced a ‘stop the clock’ provision into the Early Removal Scheme for foreign national prisoners. This new provision may prompt the judiciary to revisit the question of whether deportation is punitive in some contexts.","PeriodicalId":46121,"journal":{"name":"Legal Studies","volume":"85 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-01-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139408934","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Vicarious liability in the UK Supreme Court and High Court of Australia","authors":"P. Giliker","doi":"10.1017/lst.2023.38","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/lst.2023.38","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46121,"journal":{"name":"Legal Studies","volume":"18 12","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-01-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139443777","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The National Security Act 2023 replaces the Official Secrets Acts 1911, 1920 and 1939, updating, rationalising, and expanding the various offences which they contained and introducing new rules aimed at the same broad end of countering the threat posed to the UK by the efforts of hostile states and their proxies. It therefore represents a legislative confirmation of the ongoing pivot back to ‘state threats’ rather than terrorism as the focus of the national security enterprise in the UK, though now informed by the experience of counter-terrorism law since 2000. This paper assesses the main changes made by the 2023 Act, including in the context of threats to the democratic process, actual and potential, which have been identified in recent years. The argument offered is that the focus of the 2023 Act – encompassing threats to democracy only where they rise to the level of threats to national security – is undermined by the absence of a more thoroughgoing project to protect the democratic process more generally against foreign interference.
{"title":"‘State threats’, security, and democracy: the National Security Act 2023","authors":"Paul F Scott","doi":"10.1017/lst.2023.39","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/lst.2023.39","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The National Security Act 2023 replaces the Official Secrets Acts 1911, 1920 and 1939, updating, rationalising, and expanding the various offences which they contained and introducing new rules aimed at the same broad end of countering the threat posed to the UK by the efforts of hostile states and their proxies. It therefore represents a legislative confirmation of the ongoing pivot back to ‘state threats’ rather than terrorism as the focus of the national security enterprise in the UK, though now informed by the experience of counter-terrorism law since 2000. This paper assesses the main changes made by the 2023 Act, including in the context of threats to the democratic process, actual and potential, which have been identified in recent years. The argument offered is that the focus of the 2023 Act – encompassing threats to democracy only where they rise to the level of threats to national security – is undermined by the absence of a more thoroughgoing project to protect the democratic process more generally against foreign interference.</p>","PeriodicalId":46121,"journal":{"name":"Legal Studies","volume":"38 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-12-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138576026","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}