Taste-based discrimination (i.e. discrimination due to racist preferences) receives more attention than statistical discrimination in the enforcement literature, because the latter allows enforcers to increase their “success rates.” I show here that when enforcers’ incentives can be altered via liabilities and rewards, all types of discrimination reduce deterrence. Moreover, adverse effects of statistical discrimination on deterrence are more persistent than similar effects due to taste-based discrimination. I identify crime minimizing liabilities and rewards when enforcers engage in racial discrimination and consider the robustness of the analysis in alternative settings.
{"title":"Discrimination and Deterrence with Enforcer Liability","authors":"Murat C. Mungan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3502398","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3502398","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Taste-based discrimination (i.e. discrimination due to racist preferences) receives more attention than statistical discrimination in the enforcement literature, because the latter allows enforcers to increase their “success rates.” I show here that when enforcers’ incentives can be altered via liabilities and rewards, all types of discrimination reduce deterrence. Moreover, adverse effects of statistical discrimination on deterrence are more persistent than similar effects due to taste-based discrimination. I identify crime minimizing liabilities and rewards when enforcers engage in racial discrimination and consider the robustness of the analysis in alternative settings.","PeriodicalId":46133,"journal":{"name":"American Law and Economics Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2020-06-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47562250","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Taste-based discrimination (i.e. discrimination due to racist preferences) receives more attention than statistical discrimination in the enforcement literature, because the latter allows enforcers to increase their “success rates.” I show here that when enforcers’ incentives can be altered via liabilities and rewards, all types of discrimination reduce deterrence. Moreover, adverse effects of statistical discrimination on deterrence are more persistent than similar effects due to taste-based discrimination. I identify crime minimizing liabilities and rewards when enforcers engage in racial discrimination and consider the robustness of the analysis in alternative settings.
{"title":"Discrimination and Deterrence with Enforcer Liability","authors":"Mungan M.","doi":"10.1093/aler/ahaa007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/aler/ahaa007","url":null,"abstract":"<span><div>Abstract</div>Taste-based discrimination (i.e. discrimination due to racist preferences) receives more attention than statistical discrimination in the enforcement literature, because the latter allows enforcers to increase their “success rates.” I show here that when enforcers’ incentives can be altered via liabilities and rewards, all types of discrimination reduce deterrence. Moreover, adverse effects of statistical discrimination on deterrence are more persistent than similar effects due to taste-based discrimination. I identify crime minimizing liabilities and rewards when enforcers engage in racial discrimination and consider the robustness of the analysis in alternative settings.</span>","PeriodicalId":46133,"journal":{"name":"American Law and Economics Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2020-06-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138528727","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract We use 911 call records and mobile device location data to study the impact of the coronavirus lockdown on domestic violence. The percent of people at home sharply increased at all hours, and nearly doubled during regular working hours, from 45% to 85%. Domestic violence increased 12% on average and 20% during working hours. Using neighborhood-level identifiers, we show that the rate of first-time abuse likely increased even more: 16% on average and 23% during working hours. Our results contribute to an urgent need to quantify the physical and psychological burdens of prolonged lockdown policies.
{"title":"The Impact of the Coronavirus Lockdown on Domestic Violence","authors":"J. Mccrary, Sarath Sanga","doi":"10.1093/aler/ahab003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/aler/ahab003","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We use 911 call records and mobile device location data to study the impact of the coronavirus lockdown on domestic violence. The percent of people at home sharply increased at all hours, and nearly doubled during regular working hours, from 45% to 85%. Domestic violence increased 12% on average and 20% during working hours. Using neighborhood-level identifiers, we show that the rate of first-time abuse likely increased even more: 16% on average and 23% during working hours. Our results contribute to an urgent need to quantify the physical and psychological burdens of prolonged lockdown policies.","PeriodicalId":46133,"journal":{"name":"American Law and Economics Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2020-05-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/aler/ahab003","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43601273","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We investigate the role that political ideology plays in the selection process for articles in law reviews. To do so, we match data on the political ideology of student editors from 15 top law reviews from 1990 to 2005 to data on the political ideology of the authors of accepted articles. We find that law reviews with a higher share of conservative editors accept a higher share of articles written by conservative authors. We then investigate potential explanations for this pattern. One possibility is that editors have a preference for publishing articles written by authors that share their ideology. Another possibility is that editors are objectively better at assessing the contribution of articles written by authors that share their ideology. We find evidence that the latter explanation drives the relationship between editor and author ideology.
{"title":"Political Ideology and the Law Review Selection Process","authors":"Chilton A, Masur J, Rozema K.","doi":"10.1093/aler/ahaa005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/aler/ahaa005","url":null,"abstract":"<span><div>Abstract</div>We investigate the role that political ideology plays in the selection process for articles in law reviews. To do so, we match data on the political ideology of student editors from 15 top law reviews from 1990 to 2005 to data on the political ideology of the authors of accepted articles. We find that law reviews with a higher share of conservative editors accept a higher share of articles written by conservative authors. We then investigate potential explanations for this pattern. One possibility is that editors have a preference for publishing articles written by authors that share their ideology. Another possibility is that editors are objectively better at assessing the contribution of articles written by authors that share their ideology. We find evidence that the latter explanation drives the relationship between editor and author ideology.</span>","PeriodicalId":46133,"journal":{"name":"American Law and Economics Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2020-05-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138528733","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article analyzes the workings of liability when harm-inflicting consumers are present biased and both product safety and consumer care influence expected harm. We show that present bias introduces a rationale for shifting some losses onto the manufacturer, in stark contrast with the baseline scenario in which strict consumer liability induces socially optimal product safety and precaution levels. In addition, we establish that strict liability with contributory negligence may induce socially optimal product safety and precaution choices.
{"title":"Liability for Third-Party Harm When Harm-Inflicting Consumers Are Present Biased","authors":"Tim Friehe, C. Rössler, Xiao-yuan. Dong","doi":"10.1093/ALER/AHZ013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ALER/AHZ013","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This article analyzes the workings of liability when harm-inflicting consumers are present biased and both product safety and consumer care influence expected harm. We show that present bias introduces a rationale for shifting some losses onto the manufacturer, in stark contrast with the baseline scenario in which strict consumer liability induces socially optimal product safety and precaution levels. In addition, we establish that strict liability with contributory negligence may induce socially optimal product safety and precaution choices.","PeriodicalId":46133,"journal":{"name":"American Law and Economics Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2020-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/ALER/AHZ013","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41520890","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
There is growing evidence that childbirth can have especially adverse effects on the career advancement of women. Our study examines how this affects the fertility decisions of men and women on the partner track. We use the After the JD study, a rich panel data set on a nationally representative sample of lawyers, and find that women are more likely than men to delay their first child until after the promotion decision is resolved. This difference in fertility timing is not easily explained by gender-based sorting; however, descriptive evidence suggests that reduced employer investment in mothers and social norms that tie women to child care are relevant mechanisms.
{"title":"The Disparate Impact of Up-or-Out Promotion Policy on Fertility Timing","authors":"Kyung H. Park, Nayoung Rim","doi":"10.1093/aler/ahaa003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/aler/ahaa003","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 There is growing evidence that childbirth can have especially adverse effects on the career advancement of women. Our study examines how this affects the fertility decisions of men and women on the partner track. We use the After the JD study, a rich panel data set on a nationally representative sample of lawyers, and find that women are more likely than men to delay their first child until after the promotion decision is resolved. This difference in fertility timing is not easily explained by gender-based sorting; however, descriptive evidence suggests that reduced employer investment in mothers and social norms that tie women to child care are relevant mechanisms.","PeriodicalId":46133,"journal":{"name":"American Law and Economics Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2020-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/aler/ahaa003","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45090846","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Law-and-economics has an ex-middle problem. First, there is the problem of preserving law’s deterrent power, and its ability to influence later behavior, even when it is sensible to renegotiate incentives later on. The issue is hardly limited to contract renegotiation, and the ubiquity of this kind of ex-middle thinking is examined here. Second, there is the idea that the more our thinking is driven by an ex-ante perspective, the more it distances itself from common ethical intuitions that tend to involve ex-post observations, or simply results. Solving ex-middle problems by tinkering with incentives leads to increased objections from ethically oriented audiences, who find efficiency claims unattractive when they burden individuals in the interest of future unidentifiable beneficiaries. This conflict makes it hard for law-and-economics to have its deserved influence on lawmaking. When law renegotiates with positive incentives, it reduces its ex-ante impact; when it relies on negative incentives, either ex-post or ex-middle, accompanied by a readjustment of the optimal ex-ante rule, it runs the risk of offending ethical sentiments, and then it rarely takes hold. One aim here is to draw attention to ex-middle recalibrations, and the second aim is to suggest that a law-and-economics approach is most successful when it devises efficient rules that are not at odds with ethical sentiments.
{"title":"The Ex-Middle Problem for Law-and-Economics","authors":"Saul Levmore","doi":"10.1093/aler/ahaa002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/aler/ahaa002","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Law-and-economics has an ex-middle problem. First, there is the problem of preserving law’s deterrent power, and its ability to influence later behavior, even when it is sensible to renegotiate incentives later on. The issue is hardly limited to contract renegotiation, and the ubiquity of this kind of ex-middle thinking is examined here. Second, there is the idea that the more our thinking is driven by an ex-ante perspective, the more it distances itself from common ethical intuitions that tend to involve ex-post observations, or simply results. Solving ex-middle problems by tinkering with incentives leads to increased objections from ethically oriented audiences, who find efficiency claims unattractive when they burden individuals in the interest of future unidentifiable beneficiaries. This conflict makes it hard for law-and-economics to have its deserved influence on lawmaking. When law renegotiates with positive incentives, it reduces its ex-ante impact; when it relies on negative incentives, either ex-post or ex-middle, accompanied by a readjustment of the optimal ex-ante rule, it runs the risk of offending ethical sentiments, and then it rarely takes hold. One aim here is to draw attention to ex-middle recalibrations, and the second aim is to suggest that a law-and-economics approach is most successful when it devises efficient rules that are not at odds with ethical sentiments.","PeriodicalId":46133,"journal":{"name":"American Law and Economics Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2020-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/aler/ahaa002","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42168628","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In recent years, numerous observers have raised concerns about “policing for profit,” or the deployment of law enforcement resources to raise revenue rather than to provide public safety. However, identifying the causal effects of fiscal incentives on law enforcement behavior has remained elusive. In a regression discontinuity design implemented on traffic citation and accident data from Saskatchewan, Canada between 1995 and 2016, a fiscal rule reducing by 75% the share of traffic fine revenue captured by the province in towns above 500 in 1996 population is associated with increased rates of accidents, accident-involved vehicles, accident costs, and accident-related injuries in towns just above this threshold, relative to towns just below the threshold. Further, cited drivers in towns just below this threshold are given fewer days to pay their fines and are less likely to pay their fines on time, leading to higher risks of late fees and license suspensions. These findings suggest that fiscal incentives can indeed distort the allocation of law enforcement effort, with distributional consequences for both public safety and economic well-being.
{"title":"Fiscal Incentives in Law Enforcement","authors":"A. Harvey","doi":"10.1093/aler/ahaa001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/aler/ahaa001","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In recent years, numerous observers have raised concerns about “policing for profit,” or the deployment of law enforcement resources to raise revenue rather than to provide public safety. However, identifying the causal effects of fiscal incentives on law enforcement behavior has remained elusive. In a regression discontinuity design implemented on traffic citation and accident data from Saskatchewan, Canada between 1995 and 2016, a fiscal rule reducing by 75% the share of traffic fine revenue captured by the province in towns above 500 in 1996 population is associated with increased rates of accidents, accident-involved vehicles, accident costs, and accident-related injuries in towns just above this threshold, relative to towns just below the threshold. Further, cited drivers in towns just below this threshold are given fewer days to pay their fines and are less likely to pay their fines on time, leading to higher risks of late fees and license suspensions. These findings suggest that fiscal incentives can indeed distort the allocation of law enforcement effort, with distributional consequences for both public safety and economic well-being.","PeriodicalId":46133,"journal":{"name":"American Law and Economics Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2020-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/aler/ahaa001","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42467240","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) prohibits U.S.-related firms from making bribes abroad. We analyze the FCPA’s effects in a model of competition between a U.S. and foreign firm for contracts in a host country. If the FCPA only applies to the U.S. firm, it reduces that firm’s competitiveness and either increases bribery by the foreign firm or reduces overall investment. If the FCPA also applies to foreign firms, it reduces total bribery, and in host countries with high corruption levels, it increases total investment. The model suggests that the FCPA will deter bribery and stimulate investment while not disadvantaging U.S. firms if its enforcement is aimed at firms who engaged in bribery in highly corrupt countries and whose main competitors are also subject to the FCPA.
{"title":"The Impact of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act on Competitiveness, Bribery, and Investment","authors":"Arbatskaya M, Mialon H.","doi":"10.1093/aler/ahaa004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/aler/ahaa004","url":null,"abstract":"<span><div>Abstract</div>The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) prohibits U.S.-related firms from making bribes abroad. We analyze the FCPA’s effects in a model of competition between a U.S. and foreign firm for contracts in a host country. If the FCPA only applies to the U.S. firm, it reduces that firm’s competitiveness and either increases bribery by the foreign firm or reduces overall investment. If the FCPA also applies to foreign firms, it reduces total bribery, and in host countries with high corruption levels, it increases total investment. The model suggests that the FCPA will deter bribery and stimulate investment while not disadvantaging U.S. firms if its enforcement is aimed at firms who engaged in bribery in highly corrupt countries and whose main competitors are also subject to the FCPA.</span>","PeriodicalId":46133,"journal":{"name":"American Law and Economics Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2020-03-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138528737","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Unlike the cash-bail regimes that are prevalent in state courts, federal courts rarely use money bail as a condition of pretrial release. Nonetheless, this article presents evidence that pretrial release influences case outcomes for federal defendants. Using case data spanning 71 federal district courts, the article suggests that pretrial release reduces a defendant’s sentence and increases the probability that they will receive a sentence below the recommended sentencing range. Pretrial release also appears to lessen the probability that a defendant will receive a mandatory minimum sentence when one is charged. The analysis exploits variation in magistrate judges’ propensities to release defendants pending trial, which allows magistrate judge leniency to serve as an instrumental variable for pretrial release. The article also provides suggestive evidence that pretrial release affects case outcomes through two channels: first, by giving defendants the opportunity to present mitigating evidence at sentencing and second, by making it easier for defendants to earn a sentencing reduction by providing assistance to the government.
{"title":"The Immediate Consequences of Federal Pretrial Detention","authors":"Didwania S.","doi":"10.1093/aler/ahz012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/aler/ahz012","url":null,"abstract":"<span><div>Abstract</div>Unlike the cash-bail regimes that are prevalent in state courts, federal courts rarely use money bail as a condition of pretrial release. Nonetheless, this article presents evidence that pretrial release influences case outcomes for federal defendants. Using case data spanning 71 federal district courts, the article suggests that pretrial release reduces a defendant’s sentence and increases the probability that they will receive a sentence below the recommended sentencing range. Pretrial release also appears to lessen the probability that a defendant will receive a mandatory minimum sentence when one is charged. The analysis exploits variation in magistrate judges’ propensities to release defendants pending trial, which allows magistrate judge leniency to serve as an instrumental variable for pretrial release. The article also provides suggestive evidence that pretrial release affects case outcomes through two channels: first, by giving defendants the opportunity to present mitigating evidence at sentencing and second, by making it easier for defendants to earn a sentencing reduction by providing assistance to the government.</span>","PeriodicalId":46133,"journal":{"name":"American Law and Economics Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2020-01-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138528745","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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