Adam Bonica, Adam Chilton, Jacob Goldin, K. Rozema, M. Sen
In order to study the political ideologies of judicial law clerks in the United States, we construct a novel dataset that combines information on the identity of clerks with a measure of political ideology based on political donations. We then use this data to empirically investigate several important questions about the ideologies of clerks. First, we examine whether clerks tend to share the liberal ideology of other lawyers or the more conservative ideology associated with federal judges and find that clerks tend to be disproportionately liberal. Second, we investigate how the ideologies of clerks compares to the ideologies of lawyers and find that liberal lawyers are more likely to have clerked than conservatives. Third, we assess whether the ideologies of clerks differs based on the level of clerkship and find that the liberal skew becomes less pronounced as the prestige of the clerkship increases. Fourth, we analyze the relationship between ideology and the hiring of clerks and find that the ideology of judges is strongly correlated with the ideology of their clerks.
{"title":"The Political Ideologies of Law Clerks","authors":"Adam Bonica, Adam Chilton, Jacob Goldin, K. Rozema, M. Sen","doi":"10.1093/ALER/AHW012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ALER/AHW012","url":null,"abstract":"In order to study the political ideologies of judicial law clerks in the United States, we construct a novel dataset that combines information on the identity of clerks with a measure of political ideology based on political donations. We then use this data to empirically investigate several important questions about the ideologies of clerks. First, we examine whether clerks tend to share the liberal ideology of other lawyers or the more conservative ideology associated with federal judges and find that clerks tend to be disproportionately liberal. Second, we investigate how the ideologies of clerks compares to the ideologies of lawyers and find that liberal lawyers are more likely to have clerked than conservatives. Third, we assess whether the ideologies of clerks differs based on the level of clerkship and find that the liberal skew becomes less pronounced as the prestige of the clerkship increases. Fourth, we analyze the relationship between ideology and the hiring of clerks and find that the ideology of judges is strongly correlated with the ideology of their clerks.","PeriodicalId":46133,"journal":{"name":"American Law and Economics Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2016-07-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/ALER/AHW012","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"60727167","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
There is a dearth of affirmative action policies designed to impact executive level hiring. The National Football League's (NFL) "Rooney Rule" is the exception. The Rooney Rule requires NFL teams to interview at least one minority candidate for any head coaching vacancy. Using a difference-in-differences approach, I present evidence that the Rooney Rule had a significant, positive impact on the likelihood that a minority candidate would fill an NFL head coaching vacancy. The Rooney Rule could serve as a case study for other types of firms wishing to enact "soft" affirmative action policies to impact executive hiring.
{"title":"The Impact of “Soft” Affirmative Action Policies on Minority Hiring in Executive Leadership: The Case of the NFL's Rooney Rule","authors":"C. DuBois","doi":"10.1093/ALER/AHV019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ALER/AHV019","url":null,"abstract":"There is a dearth of affirmative action policies designed to impact executive level hiring. The National Football League's (NFL) \"Rooney Rule\" is the exception. The Rooney Rule requires NFL teams to interview at least one minority candidate for any head coaching vacancy. Using a difference-in-differences approach, I present evidence that the Rooney Rule had a significant, positive impact on the likelihood that a minority candidate would fill an NFL head coaching vacancy. The Rooney Rule could serve as a case study for other types of firms wishing to enact \"soft\" affirmative action policies to impact executive hiring.","PeriodicalId":46133,"journal":{"name":"American Law and Economics Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2016-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/ALER/AHV019","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"60727206","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper analyzes the principal-agent relationship between a plaintiff and her lawyer when the lawyer chooses the settlement offer and undertakes legal discovery. Our objective was to highlight the implications of discovery for the contingent-fee arrangement that is optimal for the plaintiff. We consider bifurcated contingent fees and show that the consideration of legal discovery attenuates the standard asymmetry between the contingent fee for a settlement and the contingent fee for a judgment. To obtain the maximal joint surplus of the plaintiff–lawyer pair, the arrangement must specify nonlinear contingent fees.
{"title":"Contingent Fees with Legal Discovery","authors":"F. Baumann, Tim Friehe","doi":"10.1093/ALER/AHV020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ALER/AHV020","url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyzes the principal-agent relationship between a plaintiff and her lawyer when the lawyer chooses the settlement offer and undertakes legal discovery. Our objective was to highlight the implications of discovery for the contingent-fee arrangement that is optimal for the plaintiff. We consider bifurcated contingent fees and show that the consideration of legal discovery attenuates the standard asymmetry between the contingent fee for a settlement and the contingent fee for a judgment. To obtain the maximal joint surplus of the plaintiff–lawyer pair, the arrangement must specify nonlinear contingent fees.","PeriodicalId":46133,"journal":{"name":"American Law and Economics Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2016-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/ALER/AHV020","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"60727259","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper introduces a formal model of Supreme Court retirement, in which the justices, the President and the Senate are rational agents who aim to shift the median ideology of the Court as close as possible to their own ideologies. The model shows that the probability of retirement depends on a set of personal, contextual, and political variables. It provides a rigorous theory for the effect of extant variables, and identifies variables that have not previously been fully appreciated. In particular, it shows the impact of the ideologies of the non-retiring justices and whether the ideology of the retiring justice is moderate or extreme. This more complete explanation of strategic judicial retirements raises empirically testable predictions to differentiate among the disparate findings of the existing literature.
{"title":"A Theory of Justices’ Retirement","authors":"Álvaro E. Bustos, Tonja Jacobi","doi":"10.1093/ALER/AHV014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ALER/AHV014","url":null,"abstract":"This paper introduces a formal model of Supreme Court retirement, in which the justices, the President and the Senate are rational agents who aim to shift the median ideology of the Court as close as possible to their own ideologies. The model shows that the probability of retirement depends on a set of personal, contextual, and political variables. It provides a rigorous theory for the effect of extant variables, and identifies variables that have not previously been fully appreciated. In particular, it shows the impact of the ideologies of the non-retiring justices and whether the ideology of the retiring justice is moderate or extreme. This more complete explanation of strategic judicial retirements raises empirically testable predictions to differentiate among the disparate findings of the existing literature.","PeriodicalId":46133,"journal":{"name":"American Law and Economics Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2015-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/ALER/AHV014","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"60726809","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I discuss the empirical revolution in law and economics, and use the analysis of the deterrent impact of the death penalty to chart the tremendous advances in estimating causal effects since the mid-1970s. This story highlights how ostensibly sophisticated studies frequently generate incorrect estimates, and how difficult it is to know what studies should be believed—a difficulty open to being exploited by those (the media, think tanks, and others) who seek to promote clearly weak studies for some private agenda. I offer a hierarchy of methodologies to assist in evaluating empirical studies and some suggestions for promoting the search for truth.
{"title":"Empirical Evaluation of Law: The Dream and the Nightmare","authors":"J. Donohue","doi":"10.1093/ALER/AHV007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ALER/AHV007","url":null,"abstract":"I discuss the empirical revolution in law and economics, and use the analysis of the deterrent impact of the death penalty to chart the tremendous advances in estimating causal effects since the mid-1970s. This story highlights how ostensibly sophisticated studies frequently generate incorrect estimates, and how difficult it is to know what studies should be believed—a difficulty open to being exploited by those (the media, think tanks, and others) who seek to promote clearly weak studies for some private agenda. I offer a hierarchy of methodologies to assist in evaluating empirical studies and some suggestions for promoting the search for truth.","PeriodicalId":46133,"journal":{"name":"American Law and Economics Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2015-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/ALER/AHV007","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"60726843","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Policymakers have often been explicit in expanding statutory rape laws to reduce teenage pregnancies and live births by teenage mothers, often with the goal of reducing associated welfare outlays. In this paper, we explore whether expansions in such laws are indeed associated with reductions in teen birth rates. In order to codify statutory-rape-law expansions, we use a national micro-level sample of sexual encounters to simulate the degree to which such encounters generally implicate the relevant laws. By codifying statutory rape laws in terms of their potential reach into sexual encounters, as opposed to using crude binary treatment variables, this simulation approach facilitates the use of multi-state difference-in-difference designs in the face of highly heterogeneous legal structures. Our results suggest that live birth rates for teenage mothers fall by roughly 4.5% (or 0.1 percentage points) upon a 1 standard-deviation increase in the share of sexual activity among a given age group that triggers a felony for the elder party to the encounter. This response, however, is highly heterogeneous across ages and weakens notably in the case of the older teen years. Furthermore, we do not find strong results suggesting a further decline in birth rates upon increases in punishment severities.
{"title":"The Effect of Statutory Rape Laws on Teen Birth Rates","authors":"Michael D. Frakes, M. Harding","doi":"10.1093/ALER/AHV013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ALER/AHV013","url":null,"abstract":"Policymakers have often been explicit in expanding statutory rape laws to reduce teenage pregnancies and live births by teenage mothers, often with the goal of reducing associated welfare outlays. In this paper, we explore whether expansions in such laws are indeed associated with reductions in teen birth rates. In order to codify statutory-rape-law expansions, we use a national micro-level sample of sexual encounters to simulate the degree to which such encounters generally implicate the relevant laws. By codifying statutory rape laws in terms of their potential reach into sexual encounters, as opposed to using crude binary treatment variables, this simulation approach facilitates the use of multi-state difference-in-difference designs in the face of highly heterogeneous legal structures. Our results suggest that live birth rates for teenage mothers fall by roughly 4.5% (or 0.1 percentage points) upon a 1 standard-deviation increase in the share of sexual activity among a given age group that triggers a felony for the elder party to the encounter. This response, however, is highly heterogeneous across ages and weakens notably in the case of the older teen years. Furthermore, we do not find strong results suggesting a further decline in birth rates upon increases in punishment severities.","PeriodicalId":46133,"journal":{"name":"American Law and Economics Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2015-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/ALER/AHV013","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"60726696","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Numerous “arrangements,” such as hybrids, alliances, joint ventures, are formed with the goal of creating a new product, such as a new drug or software application. Arrangements commonly require parties to make sunk-cost investments that the arrangement partner cannot observe, to disclose private information, and to make financing commitments. The requirements of efficient contracting—individual rationality, incentive compatibility, and budget balance—are difficult to satisfy in arrangement contexts, so that, as the literature suggests, parties’ best response is to form firms. We show, in contrast, that flexible and efficient contracting is possible for arrangements. With the arrival of new information, each party is asked to “pay-to -play” which requires the firms to agree to future terms of exchange that are mutually beneficial. When properly negotiated, these payments to play support the efficient multistage joint development of the new product, with hybrid relationships that are governed by conventional control rights and legal enforcement.
{"title":"Pay for Play: A Theory of Hybrid Relationships","authors":"T. Lewis, Alan L. Schwartz","doi":"10.1093/ALER/AHV012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ALER/AHV012","url":null,"abstract":"Numerous “arrangements,” such as hybrids, alliances, joint ventures, are formed with the goal of creating a new product, such as a new drug or software application. Arrangements commonly require parties to make sunk-cost investments that the arrangement partner cannot observe, to disclose private information, and to make financing commitments. The requirements of efficient contracting—individual rationality, incentive compatibility, and budget balance—are difficult to satisfy in arrangement contexts, so that, as the literature suggests, parties’ best response is to form firms. We show, in contrast, that flexible and efficient contracting is possible for arrangements. With the arrival of new information, each party is asked to “pay-to -play” which requires the firms to agree to future terms of exchange that are mutually beneficial. When properly negotiated, these payments to play support the efficient multistage joint development of the new product, with hybrid relationships that are governed by conventional control rights and legal enforcement.","PeriodicalId":46133,"journal":{"name":"American Law and Economics Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2015-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/ALER/AHV012","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"60726939","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper examines empirically why sophisticated parties in some merger and acquisition deals choose to waive their right to jury trials and some do not. We examine merger agreements for a large sample of 276 deals for the 11-year period from 2001 to 2011. We exclude private company deals and those where the choice of forum and law is Delaware. First, we find that 48.2% of the deals have jury waiver clauses. Second, we find that deals in which New York is chosen as the governing law and forum state are more likely to include a jury waiver clause. No other state has such an effect. Third, we find that contracts negotiated by counsel from high reputation law firms tend to include jury waiver clauses, and this effect is more significant for the acquirer's law firm than for the target's law firm. Fourth, we find strong evidence for the bargaining power hypothesis wherein larger acquirers that take over smaller targets are more likely to include jury waiver clauses. Finally, we find no evidence that lawyer familiarity, industry effects, whether the acquirer was an international firm, or whether the deal was completed has a statistically significant impact on the likelihood of having a jury waiver clause.
{"title":"Ex Ante Choice of Jury Waiver Clauses in Mergers","authors":"Darius N Palia, R. Scott","doi":"10.1093/ALER/AHV016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ALER/AHV016","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines empirically why sophisticated parties in some merger and acquisition deals choose to waive their right to jury trials and some do not. We examine merger agreements for a large sample of 276 deals for the 11-year period from 2001 to 2011. We exclude private company deals and those where the choice of forum and law is Delaware. First, we find that 48.2% of the deals have jury waiver clauses. Second, we find that deals in which New York is chosen as the governing law and forum state are more likely to include a jury waiver clause. No other state has such an effect. Third, we find that contracts negotiated by counsel from high reputation law firms tend to include jury waiver clauses, and this effect is more significant for the acquirer's law firm than for the target's law firm. Fourth, we find strong evidence for the bargaining power hypothesis wherein larger acquirers that take over smaller targets are more likely to include jury waiver clauses. Finally, we find no evidence that lawyer familiarity, industry effects, whether the acquirer was an international firm, or whether the deal was completed has a statistically significant impact on the likelihood of having a jury waiver clause.","PeriodicalId":46133,"journal":{"name":"American Law and Economics Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2015-08-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/ALER/AHV016","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"60726985","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I develop a model of marriage and divorce with privately known spouse characteristics, producing new insights: the switch from consent to unilateral divorce raises second-marriage spouse quality, hence, short-run divorce, when "good" types are in minority. Spouse quality declines from first to second marriage under both rules, but selection into first marriage is unambiguously better under unilateral divorce, which should reduce long-run divorce. An improvement in outside options amplifies the selectivity advantage of unilateral divorce provided the majority of the population marries. If the value of outside options is projected to continue rising, marriage and divorce rates should continue to fall.
{"title":"On the Selection Effects Under Consent and Unilateral Divorce","authors":"M. Baç","doi":"10.1093/ALER/AHV003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ALER/AHV003","url":null,"abstract":"I develop a model of marriage and divorce with privately known spouse characteristics, producing new insights: the switch from consent to unilateral divorce raises second-marriage spouse quality, hence, short-run divorce, when \"good\" types are in minority. Spouse quality declines from first to second marriage under both rules, but selection into first marriage is unambiguously better under unilateral divorce, which should reduce long-run divorce. An improvement in outside options amplifies the selectivity advantage of unilateral divorce provided the majority of the population marries. If the value of outside options is projected to continue rising, marriage and divorce rates should continue to fall.","PeriodicalId":46133,"journal":{"name":"American Law and Economics Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2015-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/ALER/AHV003","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"60726661","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper quantitatively assesses media influence on civil case adjudication in U.S. state courts. It shows that media influence substantially mitigates disparity in damage awards across political orientation of districts. That is, in areas with frequent newspaper coverage of courts, there is little difference in damage awards between conservative and liberal districts. In contrast, in areas with little newspaper coverage, liberal districts tend to grant substantially larger damage awards than do conservative ones. This result suggests that the presence of active media coverage may enhance consistency in the civil justice system.
{"title":"Media Influence on Courts: Evidence from Civil Case Adjudication","authors":"C. Lim","doi":"10.1093/ALER/AHV005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ALER/AHV005","url":null,"abstract":"This paper quantitatively assesses media influence on civil case adjudication in U.S. state courts. It shows that media influence substantially mitigates disparity in damage awards across political orientation of districts. That is, in areas with frequent newspaper coverage of courts, there is little difference in damage awards between conservative and liberal districts. In contrast, in areas with little newspaper coverage, liberal districts tend to grant substantially larger damage awards than do conservative ones. This result suggests that the presence of active media coverage may enhance consistency in the civil justice system.","PeriodicalId":46133,"journal":{"name":"American Law and Economics Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2015-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/ALER/AHV005","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"60726730","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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