The Australian common law suffers from a lack of judicial authority on the right to die, in particular the right of patients to make anticipatory decisions to refuse treatment. Recent cases concerning the right of patients to refuse life-saving blood transfusions have highlighted the need for a substantial judicial clarification of this area. This article critically examines one of the most recent Australian cases in detail and compares its approach with those from other common countries. After taking this comparative analysis the article puts forth a common law model of anticipatory decision-making and examines how that model might work in the context of current legislative frameworks.
{"title":"Advanced directives, the right to die and the common law: recent problems with blood transfusions.","authors":"C Stewart","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>The Australian common law suffers from a lack of judicial authority on the right to die, in particular the right of patients to make anticipatory decisions to refuse treatment. Recent cases concerning the right of patients to refuse life-saving blood transfusions have highlighted the need for a substantial judicial clarification of this area. This article critically examines one of the most recent Australian cases in detail and compares its approach with those from other common countries. After taking this comparative analysis the article puts forth a common law model of anticipatory decision-making and examines how that model might work in the context of current legislative frameworks.</p>","PeriodicalId":46300,"journal":{"name":"Melbourne University Law Review","volume":"23 1","pages":"161-83"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"1999-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"22325075","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Human tissue is used in an increasing number of medical and scientific contexts. Despite this, the law has traditionally regarded such tissue as having no status in law. This paper provides an overview of the issue of property rights in human corpses, cadaveric specimens, donated living tissue, and human tissue used in biotechnology and human reproductive technology. It discusses Australian common law and legislation, and reviews developments in England and the United States from an Australian perspective. The paper argues that limited proprietary rights, consistent with Australian legislation, ought to be recognized both in living and in dead human tissue, in order to achieve worthwhile objectives.
{"title":"The recognition of proprietary rights in human tissue in common law jurisdictions.","authors":"R S Magnusson","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Human tissue is used in an increasing number of medical and scientific contexts. Despite this, the law has traditionally regarded such tissue as having no status in law. This paper provides an overview of the issue of property rights in human corpses, cadaveric specimens, donated living tissue, and human tissue used in biotechnology and human reproductive technology. It discusses Australian common law and legislation, and reviews developments in England and the United States from an Australian perspective. The paper argues that limited proprietary rights, consistent with Australian legislation, ought to be recognized both in living and in dead human tissue, in order to achieve worthwhile objectives.</p>","PeriodicalId":46300,"journal":{"name":"Melbourne University Law Review","volume":"18 ","pages":"601-29"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"1992-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"25894482","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In the article Mr. Smith considers the need for reform in the area of defining when death occurs and the various approaches that exist to define death. He then analyses the stages of the developments in the various Australian jurisdictions and discusses the substantive content of the basic definition adopted and the practical implications of any enactment. The author suggests that the concept of death should be legislatively enacted in relevant pieces of legislation which call for a resolution of the question at the present time and a more general separate statement defining death should be avoided at the moment. Conceptually death should be defined as the permanent and irreversible loss of consciousness of the individual as determined by irreversible cessation of the brain stem function. The actual operational criteria of death should form the subject of a circular published by the relevant statutory health authority for the guidance of medical practitioners in relation to the specific problems they face.
{"title":"Refining the definition of death for Australian legislation.","authors":"R G Smith","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>In the article Mr. Smith considers the need for reform in the area of defining when death occurs and the various approaches that exist to define death. He then analyses the stages of the developments in the various Australian jurisdictions and discusses the substantive content of the basic definition adopted and the practical implications of any enactment. The author suggests that the concept of death should be legislatively enacted in relevant pieces of legislation which call for a resolution of the question at the present time and a more general separate statement defining death should be avoided at the moment. Conceptually death should be defined as the permanent and irreversible loss of consciousness of the individual as determined by irreversible cessation of the brain stem function. The actual operational criteria of death should form the subject of a circular published by the relevant statutory health authority for the guidance of medical practitioners in relation to the specific problems they face.</p>","PeriodicalId":46300,"journal":{"name":"Melbourne University Law Review","volume":"14 2","pages":"199-237"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"1983-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"25248747","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}