In this article, I argue that the main contribution of Hegel's philosophy of right to the contemporary political debate is that it opens a window on the idea that liberalism and individual freedom are incompatible. My main thesis is that the liberal conception of the State and law, structured from a nonrelational account of singularity, ends up denying the individual freedom that it claims to defend. I begin by reconstructing the Hegelian concept of freedom from its most general lines, showing that being free consists in wanting to become someone and not so much in wanting to do something. After showing that the purpose of becoming someone can only be fulfilled in a social medium, I focus on Hegel's critique of the liberal state (as expounded in the section on “civil society”). I argue that civil society structurally impedes individuals from realizing their purpose of becoming someone: the economical interactions of civil society give rise to impersonal and inscrutable mechanisms, which take the social conditions of people's individuation beyond their control. Finally, I claim that (rational) individual freedom consists in being able to thematize and democratically control the very social conditions of individuation through the State and law.
{"title":"Individual freedom against liberalism: Hegel's nonliberal individualism","authors":"Andrés F. Parra‐Ayala","doi":"10.1111/sjp.12538","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/sjp.12538","url":null,"abstract":"In this article, I argue that the main contribution of Hegel's philosophy of right to the contemporary political debate is that it opens a window on the idea that liberalism and individual freedom are incompatible. My main thesis is that the liberal conception of the State and law, structured from a nonrelational account of singularity, ends up denying the individual freedom that it claims to defend. I begin by reconstructing the Hegelian concept of freedom from its most general lines, showing that being free consists in wanting to become someone and not so much in wanting to do something. After showing that the purpose of becoming someone can only be fulfilled in a social medium, I focus on Hegel's critique of the liberal state (as expounded in the section on “civil society”). I argue that civil society structurally impedes individuals from realizing their purpose of becoming someone: the economical interactions of civil society give rise to impersonal and inscrutable mechanisms, which take the social conditions of people's individuation beyond their control. Finally, I claim that (rational) individual freedom consists in being able to thematize and democratically control the very social conditions of individuation through the State and law.","PeriodicalId":46350,"journal":{"name":"SOUTHERN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-09-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41765491","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article defends a relational account of personhood. I argue that the structure of personhood consists of dyadic relations between persons who can wrong or be wronged by one another, even if some of them lack moral competence. I draw on recent work on directed duties to outline the structure of moral communities of persons. The upshot is that we can construct an inclusive theory of personhood that can accommodate nonhuman persons based on shared community membership. I argue that, once we unpack the internal relation between directed duties, moral status, and flourishing, relations can ground personhood and include nonhuman animals.
{"title":"Relational nonhuman personhood","authors":"Nicolas Delon","doi":"10.1111/sjp.12537","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/sjp.12537","url":null,"abstract":"This article defends a relational account of personhood. I argue that the structure of personhood consists of dyadic relations between persons who can wrong or be wronged by one another, even if some of them lack moral competence. I draw on recent work on directed duties to outline the structure of moral communities of persons. The upshot is that we can construct an inclusive theory of personhood that can accommodate nonhuman persons based on shared community membership. I argue that, once we unpack the internal relation between directed duties, moral status, and flourishing, relations can ground personhood and include nonhuman animals.","PeriodicalId":46350,"journal":{"name":"SOUTHERN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-09-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49066150","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Southern Journal of PhilosophyVolume 61, Issue S1 p. 86-86 SJP Announcements SJP Announcements First published: 18 October 2023 https://doi.org/10.1111/sjp.12472AboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onEmailFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat No abstract is available for this article. Volume61, IssueS1September 2023Pages 86-86 RelatedInformation
南方哲学杂志第61卷第S1期第86-86页SJP公告SJP公告首次发布:2023年10月18日https://doi.org/10.1111/sjp.12472AboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare全文accessShare全文accessShare请查看我们的使用条款和条件，并在下面的复选框中选择分享文章的全文版本。我已经阅读并接受了Wiley在线图书馆使用共享链接的条款和条件，请使用下面的链接与您的朋友和同事分享本文的全文版本。学习更多的知识。复制URL共享链接共享一个emailfacebooktwitterlinkedinreddit微信本文无摘要第61卷，第1期，2023年9月
{"title":"<i>SJP</i> Announcements","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/sjp.12472","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/sjp.12472","url":null,"abstract":"The Southern Journal of PhilosophyVolume 61, Issue S1 p. 86-86 SJP Announcements SJP Announcements First published: 18 October 2023 https://doi.org/10.1111/sjp.12472AboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onEmailFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat No abstract is available for this article. Volume61, IssueS1September 2023Pages 86-86 RelatedInformation","PeriodicalId":46350,"journal":{"name":"SOUTHERN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"52 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135735450","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The following article for this Spindel Supplement Issue was published in an earlier Issue Mackenzie, C. (2023), Autonomous agency, we‐agency, and social oppression. South J Philos , 61: 373‐389. https://doi.org/10.1111/sjp.12521 . https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/sjp.12521
{"title":"Autonomous agency, we‐agency, and social oppression","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/sjp.12539","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/sjp.12539","url":null,"abstract":"The following article for this Spindel Supplement Issue was published in an earlier Issue Mackenzie, C. (2023), Autonomous agency, we‐agency, and social oppression. South J Philos , 61: 373‐389. https://doi.org/10.1111/sjp.12521 . https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/sjp.12521","PeriodicalId":46350,"journal":{"name":"SOUTHERN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"375 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135735689","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Southern Journal of PhilosophyVolume 61, Issue 3 p. 552-552 SJP Announcements SJP Announcements First published: 03 October 2023 https://doi.org/10.1111/sjp.12468AboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onEmailFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat No abstract is available for this article. Volume61, Issue3September 2023Pages 552-552 RelatedInformation
南方哲学杂志第61卷第3期552-552页SJP公告SJP公告首次发布:2023年10月3日https://doi.org/10.1111/sjp.12468AboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare全文accessShare全文accessShare请查看我们的使用条款和条件，并勾选下面的复选框共享文章的全文版本。我已经阅读并接受了Wiley在线图书馆使用共享链接的条款和条件，请使用下面的链接与您的朋友和同事分享本文的全文版本。学习更多的知识。复制URL共享链接共享一个emailfacebooktwitterlinkedinreddit微信本文无摘要第61卷，第3期2023年9月页552-552
{"title":"<i>SJP</i> Announcements","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/sjp.12468","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/sjp.12468","url":null,"abstract":"The Southern Journal of PhilosophyVolume 61, Issue 3 p. 552-552 SJP Announcements SJP Announcements First published: 03 October 2023 https://doi.org/10.1111/sjp.12468AboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onEmailFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat No abstract is available for this article. Volume61, Issue3September 2023Pages 552-552 RelatedInformation","PeriodicalId":46350,"journal":{"name":"SOUTHERN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135640206","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I present and critically examine Dan Zahavi's view that minimal selfhood and self‐awareness per se do not have a social character. I argue that Zahavi's conception of the minimal self as fundamentally asocial makes it hard to comprehend the unity of the self and that it is partly the result of an overly narrow conception of what it might mean for the self to be social.
{"title":"Sociality and the minimal self: On Dan Zahavi’s “group‐identification, collectivism, and perspectival autonomy”","authors":"Matt E. M. Bower","doi":"10.1111/sjp.12532","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/sjp.12532","url":null,"abstract":"I present and critically examine Dan Zahavi's view that minimal selfhood and self‐awareness per se do not have a social character. I argue that Zahavi's conception of the minimal self as fundamentally asocial makes it hard to comprehend the unity of the self and that it is partly the result of an overly narrow conception of what it might mean for the self to be social.","PeriodicalId":46350,"journal":{"name":"SOUTHERN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49151481","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Synesthesia is occasionally offered as a challenge to Husserl's claims that the sense fields are necessarily distinct. This article demonstrates how synesthesia can be approached through phenomenology. We begin with a review of synesthesia and a brief discussion of how a phenomenological analysis of synesthesia could be productive both for those who experience synesthesia and for phenomenologists. We then shift to analyses of synesthesia through Husserl's notions of association and affectivity, and in light of intersubjective communication. While synesthesia might lead us to think that our individual experiences are unbridgeable, we will find instead that such autonomous experiences are relational and, further, that our different—even incommensurable—experiences are necessarily part of a shared lifeworld.
{"title":"What about synesthesia? A phenomenological analysis of a perceptual phenomenon","authors":"Lanei M. Rodemeyer","doi":"10.1111/sjp.12533","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/sjp.12533","url":null,"abstract":"Synesthesia is occasionally offered as a challenge to Husserl's claims that the sense fields are necessarily distinct. This article demonstrates how synesthesia can be approached through phenomenology. We begin with a review of synesthesia and a brief discussion of how a phenomenological analysis of synesthesia could be productive both for those who experience synesthesia and for phenomenologists. We then shift to analyses of synesthesia through Husserl's notions of association and affectivity, and in light of intersubjective communication. While synesthesia might lead us to think that our individual experiences are unbridgeable, we will find instead that such autonomous experiences are relational and, further, that our different—even incommensurable—experiences are necessarily part of a shared lifeworld.","PeriodicalId":46350,"journal":{"name":"SOUTHERN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-08-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48019613","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this article, I consider several different ways of unpacking the metaphor of self‐authorship, asking what an author might be and how authorship thus understood might be related to personal autonomy. First, I consider authors as makers or creators in a generic sense. Next, I consider authors as a particular sort of creator (the creator of a text), and, finally, authors as an interpretive construct implied by a text. Ultimately, I argue that we both construct ourselves as authors and take responsibility for our self‐constructs through narrative self‐interpretation. Importantly, however, narrative self‐interpretation is not simply a process of individual self‐narration. Given the limitations placed on the autobiographical perspective by our temporal and subjective locations and the intersection of any one person's story with the stories of others, I argue that both autonomy and autobiography are best understood as relational.
{"title":"Authors, narrators, and autonomous agents: The art of relational autobiography","authors":"Andrea C. Westlund","doi":"10.1111/sjp.12531","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/sjp.12531","url":null,"abstract":"In this article, I consider several different ways of unpacking the metaphor of self‐authorship, asking what an author might be and how authorship thus understood might be related to personal autonomy. First, I consider authors as makers or creators in a generic sense. Next, I consider authors as a particular sort of creator (the creator of a text), and, finally, authors as an interpretive construct implied by a text. Ultimately, I argue that we both construct ourselves as authors and take responsibility for our self‐constructs through narrative self‐interpretation. Importantly, however, narrative self‐interpretation is not simply a process of individual self‐narration. Given the limitations placed on the autobiographical perspective by our temporal and subjective locations and the intersection of any one person's story with the stories of others, I argue that both autonomy and autobiography are best understood as relational.","PeriodicalId":46350,"journal":{"name":"SOUTHERN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-08-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46809729","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This essay introduces the 40th Annual Spindel Conference special issue on relational autonomy and collective intentionality. Autonomy is often discussed in contexts of individual intention formation and moral decision making. When we consider collective intention formation and the decision‐making practices of institutions, a number of questions can be raised: How does the individual autonomy of participants affect the collective process? How do such collective processes modulate the autonomy of the individuals involved? How do institutional decisions and practices affect individual autonomy more generally—in what way do they enhance or undermine autonomy? Is there a significant difference in how we answer these questions if we already think of autonomy as relational rather than in a traditional individualistic way?
{"title":"Introduction to the special issue on relational autonomy and collective intentionality","authors":"S. Gallagher","doi":"10.1111/sjp.12535","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/sjp.12535","url":null,"abstract":"This essay introduces the 40th Annual Spindel Conference special issue on relational autonomy and collective intentionality. Autonomy is often discussed in contexts of individual intention formation and moral decision making. When we consider collective intention formation and the decision‐making practices of institutions, a number of questions can be raised: How does the individual autonomy of participants affect the collective process? How do such collective processes modulate the autonomy of the individuals involved? How do institutional decisions and practices affect individual autonomy more generally—in what way do they enhance or undermine autonomy? Is there a significant difference in how we answer these questions if we already think of autonomy as relational rather than in a traditional individualistic way?","PeriodicalId":46350,"journal":{"name":"SOUTHERN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-08-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45504008","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
One of the aims of the 40th Annual Spindel Conference was to discuss whether the ongoing, but relatively distinct, investigations of relational autonomy and collective intentionality could crossfertilize. Whereas the concept of relational autonomy was developed to do justice to the relational character of selfhood, and as an alternative to traditional conceptions of autonomy, which were accused of exaggerating the self‐reliance and social independence of the self, recent discussions of collective intentionality have often centered on the question of whether and how collective intentions differ from aggregations of individual intentions. As different as they might otherwise be, theoretical explorations of autonomy and collective intentionality intersect at a crucial point: both require an understanding of the relationship between the self and the group, between individual subjectivity and social life. The aim of the following paper is to argue that the collective intentionality literature contains insights that cannot merely contribute to our understanding of autonomy, but also prevent us from taking our relationism too far.
{"title":"Group‐identification, collectivism, and perspectival autonomy","authors":"D. Zahavi","doi":"10.1111/sjp.12534","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/sjp.12534","url":null,"abstract":"One of the aims of the 40th Annual Spindel Conference was to discuss whether the ongoing, but relatively distinct, investigations of relational autonomy and collective intentionality could crossfertilize. Whereas the concept of relational autonomy was developed to do justice to the relational character of selfhood, and as an alternative to traditional conceptions of autonomy, which were accused of exaggerating the self‐reliance and social independence of the self, recent discussions of collective intentionality have often centered on the question of whether and how collective intentions differ from aggregations of individual intentions. As different as they might otherwise be, theoretical explorations of autonomy and collective intentionality intersect at a crucial point: both require an understanding of the relationship between the self and the group, between individual subjectivity and social life. The aim of the following paper is to argue that the collective intentionality literature contains insights that cannot merely contribute to our understanding of autonomy, but also prevent us from taking our relationism too far.","PeriodicalId":46350,"journal":{"name":"SOUTHERN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-08-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46041889","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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