{"title":"Non‐epistemic perception as technology","authors":"Kurt L. Sylvan","doi":"10.1111/PHIS.12188","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/PHIS.12188","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46360,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Issues","volume":"30 1","pages":"324-345"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2020-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/PHIS.12188","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48292671","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Suppose that I’m charged with helping a child learn his colours. The child has a number of uniformly coloured cubes, and we play the ‘which colour?’ game. This involves him presenting me with a cube and me saying which colour it is, and then me presenting him with a cube and him saying which colour it is, and so on. He holds up a green cube, and says ‘which colour?’ I say: ‘it’s green’. I judge correctly. But is my judgement rational? It depends on the scenario. Compare two. In the first, Inattentive, the game has been going on for what seems like hours, and I am losing the will to live. I go through the motions and just guess that the cube is green, without even looking. Though my judgement is correct, it is not rational. In the second scenario, Perception, I am playing the game properly and attentively. Based on what I can see, I judge that the cube is green. In Perception, my judgement is rational in the light of my visual perception. This illustrates the phenomenon I want to focus on: the rationalizing role of visual perception. My interest is in whether reflecting upon this enables us to settle a dispute in the metaphysics of perceptual experience: that between representationalism and naive realism. In §2 I clarify what it means to say that perceptions are rationalizing. In §3 I set out Ginsborg’s (2011) argument which aims to show that reflecting upon the rationalizing role of perception supports representationalism. In §4 I show how this argument can be extended so as to challenge naive realism. In §5 I explain why these arguments fail. I do not claim that reflecting upon the rationalizing role of visual perception supports naive realism over representationalism. Rather, I doubt that we can settle the dispute by reflecting on the rationalizing role of perception.
{"title":"Naive realism, representationalism, and the rationalizing role of visual perception","authors":"C. French","doi":"10.1111/PHIS.12174","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/PHIS.12174","url":null,"abstract":"Suppose that I’m charged with helping a child learn his colours. The child has a number of uniformly coloured cubes, and we play the ‘which colour?’ game. This involves him presenting me with a cube and me saying which colour it is, and then me presenting him with a cube and him saying which colour it is, and so on. He holds up a green cube, and says ‘which colour?’ I say: ‘it’s green’. I judge correctly. But is my judgement rational? It depends on the scenario. Compare two. In the first, Inattentive, the game has been going on for what seems like hours, and I am losing the will to live. I go through the motions and just guess that the cube is green, without even looking. Though my judgement is correct, it is not rational. In the second scenario, Perception, I am playing the game properly and attentively. Based on what I can see, I judge that the cube is green. In Perception, my judgement is rational in the light of my visual perception. This illustrates the phenomenon I want to focus on: the rationalizing role of visual perception. My interest is in whether reflecting upon this enables us to settle a dispute in the metaphysics of perceptual experience: that between representationalism and naive realism. In §2 I clarify what it means to say that perceptions are rationalizing. In §3 I set out Ginsborg’s (2011) argument which aims to show that reflecting upon the rationalizing role of perception supports representationalism. In §4 I show how this argument can be extended so as to challenge naive realism. In §5 I explain why these arguments fail. I do not claim that reflecting upon the rationalizing role of visual perception supports naive realism over representationalism. Rather, I doubt that we can settle the dispute by reflecting on the rationalizing role of perception.","PeriodicalId":46360,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Issues","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2020-09-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/PHIS.12174","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43157999","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Adam Marushak on the hypothetical given","authors":"Anil Gupta","doi":"10.1111/PHIS.12178","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/PHIS.12178","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46360,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Issues","volume":"30 1","pages":"167-174"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2020-09-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/PHIS.12178","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46628188","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The puzzle of the laws of appearance","authors":"Adam Pautz","doi":"10.1111/PHIS.12184","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/PHIS.12184","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46360,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Issues","volume":"30 1","pages":"257-272"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2020-09-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/PHIS.12184","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44139763","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper is about internalism, phenomenal conservatism, and defeat. It has three aims. The first is to develop an argument against internalism to the effect that the correct epistemology of defeat must be externalist (Section 1). The second is to show that cases involving defeat also cause trouble for phenomenal conservatism (Sections 2 and 3). The third is to cast doubt on the idea that phenomenal conservatism might work as a specific thesis about the status of seemings of particular kinds as justifiers. In particular, I will ask whether perceptual seemings might still be justifiers and provide some reason for pessimism (Section 4).
{"title":"Internalism, phenomenal conservatism, and defeat","authors":"Christoph Kelp","doi":"10.1111/PHIS.12180","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/PHIS.12180","url":null,"abstract":"This paper is about internalism, phenomenal conservatism, and defeat. It has three aims. The first is to develop an argument against internalism to the effect that the correct epistemology of defeat must be externalist (Section 1). The second is to show that cases involving defeat also cause trouble for phenomenal conservatism (Sections 2 and 3). The third is to cast doubt on the idea that phenomenal conservatism might work as a specific thesis about the status of seemings of particular kinds as justifiers. In particular, I will ask whether perceptual seemings might still be justifiers and provide some reason for pessimism (Section 4).","PeriodicalId":46360,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Issues","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2020-09-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/PHIS.12180","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48632535","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Correspondence MonaSimion,COGITOEpistemology ResearchCentre,University ofGlasgow. Email:mona.simion@glasgow.ac.uk Abstract Tyler Burge notably offers a truth-first account of perceptual entitlement in terms of a priori necessary representational functions and norms: on his account, epistemic normativity turns on natural norms, which turn on representational functions. This paper has two aims: first, it criticises Tyler Burge’s truth-first a priori derivation on functionalist and value-theoretic grounds. Second, it develops a novel, knowledge-first a priori derivation of perceptual entitlement. According to the view developed here, it is a priori that we are entitled to believe the deliverances of our perceptual belief formation system, in virtue of the latter’s constitutive function of generating knowledge.
{"title":"A priori perceptual entitlement, knowledge‐first","authors":"M. Simion","doi":"10.1111/PHIS.12187","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/PHIS.12187","url":null,"abstract":"Correspondence MonaSimion,COGITOEpistemology ResearchCentre,University ofGlasgow. Email:mona.simion@glasgow.ac.uk Abstract Tyler Burge notably offers a truth-first account of perceptual entitlement in terms of a priori necessary representational functions and norms: on his account, epistemic normativity turns on natural norms, which turn on representational functions. This paper has two aims: first, it criticises Tyler Burge’s truth-first a priori derivation on functionalist and value-theoretic grounds. Second, it develops a novel, knowledge-first a priori derivation of perceptual entitlement. According to the view developed here, it is a priori that we are entitled to believe the deliverances of our perceptual belief formation system, in virtue of the latter’s constitutive function of generating knowledge.","PeriodicalId":46360,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Issues","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2020-09-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/PHIS.12187","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43901270","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Appearance and reality","authors":"Christopher S. Hill","doi":"10.1111/PHIS.12179","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/PHIS.12179","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46360,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Issues","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2020-09-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/PHIS.12179","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43568630","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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