Ting Chen, Xiaotao Kelvin Liu, Chi Wan, Yakun Wang
ABSTRACT We investigate whether firms’ ineffective internal control over financial reporting is associated with customer satisfaction, measured by product ratings on Amazon.com. Internal control weaknesses will likely corrupt the information environment, compromise coordination, and divert corporate resources to address the control deficiencies. Using a large sample of product rating data from Amazon.com, we find robust and consistent evidence that internal control weaknesses are negatively associated with customer satisfaction. Furthermore, the negative association is more pronounced for environment-level (versus other) internal control weaknesses, noncore (versus core) products, and more (versus less) operationally complex firms. Our findings provide initial evidence that ineffective internal control compromises customer satisfaction. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: M11; M41; M42; M48.
{"title":"Customer Satisfaction and Internal Control","authors":"Ting Chen, Xiaotao Kelvin Liu, Chi Wan, Yakun Wang","doi":"10.2308/jmar-2022-073","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/jmar-2022-073","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT We investigate whether firms’ ineffective internal control over financial reporting is associated with customer satisfaction, measured by product ratings on Amazon.com. Internal control weaknesses will likely corrupt the information environment, compromise coordination, and divert corporate resources to address the control deficiencies. Using a large sample of product rating data from Amazon.com, we find robust and consistent evidence that internal control weaknesses are negatively associated with customer satisfaction. Furthermore, the negative association is more pronounced for environment-level (versus other) internal control weaknesses, noncore (versus core) products, and more (versus less) operationally complex firms. Our findings provide initial evidence that ineffective internal control compromises customer satisfaction. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: M11; M41; M42; M48.","PeriodicalId":46474,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Management Accounting Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135255105","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ABSTRACT Climate risk is a critically important challenge for society. Current accounting-related efforts include initiatives by regulators to promulgate climate risk disclosure standards, focusing on disclosure of nonfinancial and forward-looking information. These proposals are certain to evolve over time. With management accounting research’s focus on decision-making and performance evaluation using nonfinancial performance measures and effective management control systems, management accounting researchers are in a strong position to provide unique input into the ongoing development of these reporting standards. In this commentary, we discuss topics where management accounting researchers can contribute to the standard-setting efforts. Contributing to these efforts requires a change in mindset for management accounting researchers from primarily focusing on internal and potentially idiosyncratic decision-makers to a broader audience that includes external providers of capital. However, the reward to doing so is participation in interesting and important research avenues that can have a real impact on society. JEL Classifications: M49; M48; M14.
{"title":"Management Accounting Research Opportunities in Climate Change Reporting","authors":"Jonathan Jona, Naomi S. Soderstrom","doi":"10.2308/jmar-2023-022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/jmar-2023-022","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Climate risk is a critically important challenge for society. Current accounting-related efforts include initiatives by regulators to promulgate climate risk disclosure standards, focusing on disclosure of nonfinancial and forward-looking information. These proposals are certain to evolve over time. With management accounting research’s focus on decision-making and performance evaluation using nonfinancial performance measures and effective management control systems, management accounting researchers are in a strong position to provide unique input into the ongoing development of these reporting standards. In this commentary, we discuss topics where management accounting researchers can contribute to the standard-setting efforts. Contributing to these efforts requires a change in mindset for management accounting researchers from primarily focusing on internal and potentially idiosyncratic decision-makers to a broader audience that includes external providers of capital. However, the reward to doing so is participation in interesting and important research avenues that can have a real impact on society. JEL Classifications: M49; M48; M14.","PeriodicalId":46474,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Management Accounting Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135895160","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This study investigates digital anxiety as a potential barrier to the digital transformation of the finance function. To embrace digital transformation, the finance function crucially relies on the engagement of its employees. However, due to this transformation, these employees face high uncertainty regarding future job demands, possibly invoking digital anxiety. Based on a survey of 1,038 finance employees from a multinational business group and rich qualitative insights, we first indicate the relevance of digital anxiety in the finance function. Our results further show that digital anxiety is negatively associated with work engagement. Finally, we find that employees who have taken part in digital trainings, who are surrounded by digitally savvy peers, and who work under a transformational leader are associated with less digital anxiety. Our study highlights the need to carefully consider employee emotions to digitally transform the finance function and outlines means for organizations to cope with these emotions.
{"title":"Digital Anxiety in the Finance Function: Consequences and Mitigating Factors","authors":"Sebastian Firk, Yannik Gehrke, Michael Wolff","doi":"10.2308/jmar-2021-056","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/jmar-2021-056","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This study investigates digital anxiety as a potential barrier to the digital transformation of the finance function. To embrace digital transformation, the finance function crucially relies on the engagement of its employees. However, due to this transformation, these employees face high uncertainty regarding future job demands, possibly invoking digital anxiety. Based on a survey of 1,038 finance employees from a multinational business group and rich qualitative insights, we first indicate the relevance of digital anxiety in the finance function. Our results further show that digital anxiety is negatively associated with work engagement. Finally, we find that employees who have taken part in digital trainings, who are surrounded by digitally savvy peers, and who work under a transformational leader are associated with less digital anxiety. Our study highlights the need to carefully consider employee emotions to digitally transform the finance function and outlines means for organizations to cope with these emotions.","PeriodicalId":46474,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Management Accounting Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-08-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45044589","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
J. Gay, Scott B. Jackson, Nathan Waddoups, Xiaomei Xiong
The controllability principle states that superiors should hold subordinates responsible only for outcomes and events that the subordinates can control. Although the principle is intuitively appealing, the extent to which this principle is applied can vary substantially in practice. Using four experiments, we predict and find evidence suggesting that the controllability judgments of superiors and subordinates can diverge even when the objective controllability of the outcome is held constant. Specifically, we find that subordinates' controllability judgments, relative to those of superiors, are consistently lower when performance outcomes are negative and sometimes higher when performance outcomes are positive. Further, we find that divergence in controllability judgments has important, negative implications for subordinates' perceptions of fairness and trust, intended effort, job satisfaction, and turnover intentions. Our results highlight several costs of implementing the controllability principle, which may help explain why the controllability principle is not universally adopted. Data Availability: Data are available from the authors upon written request.
{"title":"Superior-Subordinate Divergence in Controllability Judgments","authors":"J. Gay, Scott B. Jackson, Nathan Waddoups, Xiaomei Xiong","doi":"10.2308/jmar-2022-051","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/jmar-2022-051","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The controllability principle states that superiors should hold subordinates responsible only for outcomes and events that the subordinates can control. Although the principle is intuitively appealing, the extent to which this principle is applied can vary substantially in practice. Using four experiments, we predict and find evidence suggesting that the controllability judgments of superiors and subordinates can diverge even when the objective controllability of the outcome is held constant. Specifically, we find that subordinates' controllability judgments, relative to those of superiors, are consistently lower when performance outcomes are negative and sometimes higher when performance outcomes are positive. Further, we find that divergence in controllability judgments has important, negative implications for subordinates' perceptions of fairness and trust, intended effort, job satisfaction, and turnover intentions. Our results highlight several costs of implementing the controllability principle, which may help explain why the controllability principle is not universally adopted.\u0000 Data Availability: Data are available from the authors upon written request.","PeriodicalId":46474,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Management Accounting Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-08-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44209899","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We identify several manifestations of hybridity in accounting and control systems. Hybridity in the form of multiple accounting systems and actual or postural conformity to institutional expectations can enable organizations to overtly, but sometimes ostensibly, combine multiple logics to appease stakeholders. Hybridity increases costs and the risk of internal inconsistency. Consequently, firms decouple some practices to provide an impression of conformance. We offer a typology of three forms of hybridity—compliance, complete decoupling, and partial decoupling—and illustrate using examples from accounting hybridization choices regarding corporate social responsibility (CSR), diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI), and international reporting standards. We empirically examine hybridity in the context of the voluntary adoption of international financial reporting standards (IFRS). We find that instrumental pressures are associated with adoption through compliance; however, social pressures are likely to be placated through complete decoupling, whereby firms voluntarily adopt multiple systems in policy, but not in practice. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: B50; L21; M41.
{"title":"Institutional Theory and Hybrid Accounting and Control Systems","authors":"Nishant Agarwal, Ranjani Krishnan, Luke Weiler","doi":"10.2308/jmar-2023-024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/jmar-2023-024","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 We identify several manifestations of hybridity in accounting and control systems. Hybridity in the form of multiple accounting systems and actual or postural conformity to institutional expectations can enable organizations to overtly, but sometimes ostensibly, combine multiple logics to appease stakeholders. Hybridity increases costs and the risk of internal inconsistency. Consequently, firms decouple some practices to provide an impression of conformance. We offer a typology of three forms of hybridity—compliance, complete decoupling, and partial decoupling—and illustrate using examples from accounting hybridization choices regarding corporate social responsibility (CSR), diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI), and international reporting standards. We empirically examine hybridity in the context of the voluntary adoption of international financial reporting standards (IFRS). We find that instrumental pressures are associated with adoption through compliance; however, social pressures are likely to be placated through complete decoupling, whereby firms voluntarily adopt multiple systems in policy, but not in practice.\u0000 Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.\u0000 JEL Classifications: B50; L21; M41.","PeriodicalId":46474,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Management Accounting Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-08-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41346119","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Recent research shows that the United States Securities and Exchange Commission’s enhanced compensation disclosures introduced in 2006 reduced boards’ flexibility in their compensation decisions and that boards immediately reacted by increasing executive pay to compensate for additional pay risk. We investigate firms’ longer-term reactions to these new disclosure rules. We find that firms often adjust realized earnings per share ex post when deciding their executives’ bonuses, and this practice has gained popularity since 2006. The use of ex post discretionary adjustments is more pronounced when boards’ demand for compensation flexibility is higher. Overall, our findings suggest that ex post discretionary adjustments are a source of flexibility that boards use to cope with limited compensation flexibility under the new compensation discussion and analysis disclosure rules. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: M41; M52.
最近的研究表明，美国证券交易委员会（United States Securities and Exchange Commission）在2006年引入的强化薪酬披露降低了董事会在薪酬决策方面的灵活性，董事会立即做出反应，提高高管薪酬，以补偿额外的薪酬风险。我们调查了公司对这些新披露规则的长期反应。我们发现，公司在决定高管奖金时，经常会调整税后实现的每股收益，这种做法自2006年以来一直很流行。当董事会对薪酬灵活性的要求更高时，事后自由裁量调整的使用更为明显。总的来说，我们的研究结果表明，根据新的薪酬讨论和分析披露规则，董事会利用事后自由裁量调整来应对有限的薪酬灵活性。数据可用性：数据可从文本中引用的公共来源获得。JEL分类：M41；M52。
{"title":"Enhanced Compensation Disclosure and Ex Post Discretionary Adjustments of Realized Performance in Executive Incentive Contracts","authors":"Sunyoung Kim, J. Shin","doi":"10.2308/jmar-2020-082","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/jmar-2020-082","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Recent research shows that the United States Securities and Exchange Commission’s enhanced compensation disclosures introduced in 2006 reduced boards’ flexibility in their compensation decisions and that boards immediately reacted by increasing executive pay to compensate for additional pay risk. We investigate firms’ longer-term reactions to these new disclosure rules. We find that firms often adjust realized earnings per share ex post when deciding their executives’ bonuses, and this practice has gained popularity since 2006. The use of ex post discretionary adjustments is more pronounced when boards’ demand for compensation flexibility is higher. Overall, our findings suggest that ex post discretionary adjustments are a source of flexibility that boards use to cope with limited compensation flexibility under the new compensation discussion and analysis disclosure rules.\u0000 Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.\u0000 JEL Classifications: M41; M52.","PeriodicalId":46474,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Management Accounting Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-08-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47471019","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Span of control and temporal disaggregation of performance reports are two important control system elements that jointly determine the benchmarks that managers have available when evaluating employees’ performance. Using an experiment, we investigate whether widening managers’ span of control and temporally disaggregating performance reports affect managers’ evaluation decisions. We predict and find that managers with a wider span of control evaluate their best performing employees more favorably and their worst performing employees less favorably. We also find that disaggregating performance reports, i.e., providing quarterly performance figures in addition to annual performance figures, has a negative effect on managers’ evaluations of their best performing employees, but only when their span of control is wide. We discuss the implications of our findings for management accounting research and practice. Data Availability: The data and research instrument are available from the authors upon request. JEL Classifications: M10; M40; M50; D91.
{"title":"The Effects of Span of Control and Temporal Disaggregation of Performance Reports on Discretionary Performance Evaluations","authors":"Razvan S. Ghita, V. S. Maas","doi":"10.2308/jmar-2022-066","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/jmar-2022-066","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Span of control and temporal disaggregation of performance reports are two important control system elements that jointly determine the benchmarks that managers have available when evaluating employees’ performance. Using an experiment, we investigate whether widening managers’ span of control and temporally disaggregating performance reports affect managers’ evaluation decisions. We predict and find that managers with a wider span of control evaluate their best performing employees more favorably and their worst performing employees less favorably. We also find that disaggregating performance reports, i.e., providing quarterly performance figures in addition to annual performance figures, has a negative effect on managers’ evaluations of their best performing employees, but only when their span of control is wide. We discuss the implications of our findings for management accounting research and practice.\u0000 Data Availability: The data and research instrument are available from the authors upon request.\u0000 JEL Classifications: M10; M40; M50; D91.","PeriodicalId":46474,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Management Accounting Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-08-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46051704","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Jeffrey R. Cohen, Dennis D. Fehrenbacher, A. Schulz, M. Weisner
In a setting that considers both operational and accounting decentralization, we propose that controllability and outcome valence effects (i.e., positive versus negative contractual outcomes for managers) interact to affect managers’ misreporting behavior. Experimental results show that the level of cost-shifting under negative outcome valence is relatively invariant to the amount of control over a project’s results, whereas the decision to engage in cost-shifting under positive outcome valence is contingent upon whether the manager had control or not. We contribute to the management accounting literature on contract framing and misreporting and extend research on how decentralization choices affect managers’ use of private information, with direct implications for practice. Our results suggest that limiting individual managers’ operational control primarily to constrain misreporting may only be beneficial when contracts stipulate positive outcomes for managers.
{"title":"The Influence of Controllability and Outcome Valence on Cost-Shifting","authors":"Jeffrey R. Cohen, Dennis D. Fehrenbacher, A. Schulz, M. Weisner","doi":"10.2308/jmar-2021-030","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/jmar-2021-030","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In a setting that considers both operational and accounting decentralization, we propose that controllability and outcome valence effects (i.e., positive versus negative contractual outcomes for managers) interact to affect managers’ misreporting behavior. Experimental results show that the level of cost-shifting under negative outcome valence is relatively invariant to the amount of control over a project’s results, whereas the decision to engage in cost-shifting under positive outcome valence is contingent upon whether the manager had control or not. We contribute to the management accounting literature on contract framing and misreporting and extend research on how decentralization choices affect managers’ use of private information, with direct implications for practice. Our results suggest that limiting individual managers’ operational control primarily to constrain misreporting may only be beneficial when contracts stipulate positive outcomes for managers.","PeriodicalId":46474,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Management Accounting Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-08-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41477296","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Using a sample of Australian Securities Exchange Ltd. (ASX) 500 firms over the 2004–2020 period, we find that contracting on corporate social responsibility (CSR) increases the likelihood of CSR restatements and that these restatements are biased toward showing improvements in CSR performance for the current period. This is especially the case when firms contract on social CSR performance measures. We also find that CEOs’ short-term incentive compensation is significantly greater when restatements result in improved comparative performance, but only for firms that contract on CSR. Overall, our results suggest that contracting on CSR is another explanation for the increasing prevalence of CSR restatements and that standard setters should address metrics and measures when formulating policies with respect to CSR reporting. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: M12; M14; M52.
{"title":"CSR Restatements: Mischief or Mistake?","authors":"Rebecca L. Bachmann, Helen Spiropoulos","doi":"10.2308/jmar-2022-028","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/jmar-2022-028","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Using a sample of Australian Securities Exchange Ltd. (ASX) 500 firms over the 2004–2020 period, we find that contracting on corporate social responsibility (CSR) increases the likelihood of CSR restatements and that these restatements are biased toward showing improvements in CSR performance for the current period. This is especially the case when firms contract on social CSR performance measures. We also find that CEOs’ short-term incentive compensation is significantly greater when restatements result in improved comparative performance, but only for firms that contract on CSR. Overall, our results suggest that contracting on CSR is another explanation for the increasing prevalence of CSR restatements and that standard setters should address metrics and measures when formulating policies with respect to CSR reporting.\u0000 Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.\u0000 JEL Classifications: M12; M14; M52.","PeriodicalId":46474,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Management Accounting Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-08-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42799243","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We experimentally investigate the combined effects of CSR-related informal (i.e., CSR mission) and formal control elements (i.e., provision of monetary CSR incentives) on employee CSR engagement, considering employees’ CSR norms. We predict that a substantive rather than a symbolic CSR mission positively impacts the CSR engagement of employees who attach high importance to CSR and expect monetary CSR incentives to be effective under a symbolic CSR mission, and if employees attach low importance to CSR. The findings show that a substantive relative to a symbolic CSR mission increases the CSR engagement of employees who attach high importance to CSR. Under a symbolic CSR mission, employees increase their CSR engagement when monetary CSR incentives are provided, while under a substantive CSR mission, monetary CSR incentives are only effective for participants who attach low importance to CSR. The results support firms in designing suitable and effective CSR-related management control systems. Data Availability: Data is available from the authors upon request. JEL Classifications: M41; M52.
{"title":"The More, the Merrier? The Behavioral Effects of a Firm’s CSR Mission and Monetary CSR Incentives on Employee CSR Engagement","authors":"Franziska Spallek, Karola Bastini, M. Lachmann","doi":"10.2308/jmar-2022-037","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/jmar-2022-037","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 We experimentally investigate the combined effects of CSR-related informal (i.e., CSR mission) and formal control elements (i.e., provision of monetary CSR incentives) on employee CSR engagement, considering employees’ CSR norms. We predict that a substantive rather than a symbolic CSR mission positively impacts the CSR engagement of employees who attach high importance to CSR and expect monetary CSR incentives to be effective under a symbolic CSR mission, and if employees attach low importance to CSR. The findings show that a substantive relative to a symbolic CSR mission increases the CSR engagement of employees who attach high importance to CSR. Under a symbolic CSR mission, employees increase their CSR engagement when monetary CSR incentives are provided, while under a substantive CSR mission, monetary CSR incentives are only effective for participants who attach low importance to CSR. The results support firms in designing suitable and effective CSR-related management control systems.\u0000 Data Availability: Data is available from the authors upon request.\u0000 JEL Classifications: M41; M52.","PeriodicalId":46474,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Management Accounting Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-08-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47549495","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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