Using survey data from 300 employees, we examine whether feedback, training, standard operating procedures (SOPs) and visual management are positively related to intrinsic motivation, and, in turn, performance, via perceptions of autonomy. Specifically, we consider these relationships in the context of a lean organizational setting. We aim to contribute to the management accounting literature by investigating when and how employees' perceptions of control mechanisms facilitate intrinsic motivation and ultimately performance. Our results show that perceptions of training, feedback, and visual management are positively related to intrinsic motivation (and, in turn performance) via autonomy. In a supplemental analysis, we decompose intrinsic motivation into two dimensions, challenge and enjoyment. We find that our original model holds but is driven by the intrinsic motivation employees receive from challenging tasks. We also show that SOPs are not related to autonomy but are directly related to the enjoyment dimension of intrinsic motivation.
{"title":"Management Controls and Intrinsic Motivation: Insights from a Lean Organizational Setting","authors":"Amy M. Donnelly, Frances A. Kennedy, S. Widener","doi":"10.2308/JMAR-19-078","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/JMAR-19-078","url":null,"abstract":"Using survey data from 300 employees, we examine whether feedback, training, standard operating procedures (SOPs) and visual management are positively related to intrinsic motivation, and, in turn, performance, via perceptions of autonomy. Specifically, we consider these relationships in the context of a lean organizational setting. We aim to contribute to the management accounting literature by investigating when and how employees' perceptions of control mechanisms facilitate intrinsic motivation and ultimately performance. Our results show that perceptions of training, feedback, and visual management are positively related to intrinsic motivation (and, in turn performance) via autonomy. In a supplemental analysis, we decompose intrinsic motivation into two dimensions, challenge and enjoyment. We find that our original model holds but is driven by the intrinsic motivation employees receive from challenging tasks. We also show that SOPs are not related to autonomy but are directly related to the enjoyment dimension of intrinsic motivation.","PeriodicalId":46474,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Management Accounting Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2021-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41498043","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This study investigates the economic consequences of financial misreporting from the employee perspective. Specifically, we examine two employee reactions: (1) exiting from misreporting firms and (2) reducing holding of employer stock, in both the misreporting period and the post-restatement period. We find an increase in employee turnover and a decrease in employee holding of employer stock in the post-restatement period (restatement effect) and some evidence that employees start to react in the period of misreporting (misreporting effect). We also find some evidence that the misreporting effect varies with employee tenure in the misreporting period and the restatement effect varies with the severity of misreporting in the post-restatement period. We further show that our results are not driven by labor demand, increased likelihood of executive turnover, declining stock prices, internal control weakness disclosure, and poor firm performance.
{"title":"The Economic Consequences of Financial Misreporting: Evidence from Employee Perspective","authors":"Xinghua Gao, Yonghong Jia","doi":"10.2308/JMAR-2020-032","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/JMAR-2020-032","url":null,"abstract":"This study investigates the economic consequences of financial misreporting from the employee perspective. Specifically, we examine two employee reactions: (1) exiting from misreporting firms and (2) reducing holding of employer stock, in both the misreporting period and the post-restatement period. We find an increase in employee turnover and a decrease in employee holding of employer stock in the post-restatement period (restatement effect) and some evidence that employees start to react in the period of misreporting (misreporting effect). We also find some evidence that the misreporting effect varies with employee tenure in the misreporting period and the restatement effect varies with the severity of misreporting in the post-restatement period. We further show that our results are not driven by labor demand, increased likelihood of executive turnover, declining stock prices, internal control weakness disclosure, and poor firm performance.","PeriodicalId":46474,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Management Accounting Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2021-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49250989","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This study examines how spillovers affect a multinational company's choice of an intangible's location and the corresponding transfer price for using this intangible. Our model uses a company with a domestic division in a high-tax country and a foreign division in a low-tax country, where each division's activities generate spillovers on the other division's income. In contrast to previous studies, our analysis incorporates an intangible's optimal location when the company trades off tax minimization and efficient activities. By locating the intangible abroad, the company reduces its tax liability, whereas locating the intangible domestically yields more efficient domestic division activities. For a high spillover of the domestic division, the company locates the intangible domestically. Our model supports empirical evidence regarding intangibles' location that is interpreted as "home bias". Additionally, we show how variations in regulatory parameters-arm's length range and tax rate differential-affect the divisions' activities and the intangible's location.
{"title":"Transfer Pricing and Location of Intangibles - Spillover and Tax Avoidance through Profit Shifting","authors":"Rebecca Reineke, Katrin Weiskirchner-Merten","doi":"10.2308/jmar-19-052","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/jmar-19-052","url":null,"abstract":"This study examines how spillovers affect a multinational company's choice of an intangible's location and the corresponding transfer price for using this intangible. Our model uses a company with a domestic division in a high-tax country and a foreign division in a low-tax country, where each division's activities generate spillovers on the other division's income. In contrast to previous studies, our analysis incorporates an intangible's optimal location when the company trades off tax minimization and efficient activities. By locating the intangible abroad, the company reduces its tax liability, whereas locating the intangible domestically yields more efficient domestic division activities. For a high spillover of the domestic division, the company locates the intangible domestically. Our model supports empirical evidence regarding intangibles' location that is interpreted as \"home bias\". Additionally, we show how variations in regulatory parameters-arm's length range and tax rate differential-affect the divisions' activities and the intangible's location.","PeriodicalId":46474,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Management Accounting Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2020-12-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68996423","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We examine the implication of management for credit rating quality by focusing on the relation between management tenure and rating quality. Using a large sample of corporate bond issues in the U.S., we find robust evidence that firms with longer-tenured CEOs have lower rating quality, as reflected in lower rating accuracy, informativeness, and timeliness. Further analyses uncover two channels that underlie this relation. One channel is through learned confidence: as CEO tenure increases, rating agencies learn about how the CEO influences firm value, which leads agencies to reduce their caution and effort in management assessment. The other channel is through developed relationships: as CEO tenure increases, rating agencies develop relationships with the CEO, which leads agencies to reduce scrutiny of or cater to the CEO and her firm. Overall, we show that management tenure has important implications for the external oversight of rating agencies.
{"title":"Management Tenure and the Quality of Corporate Bond Ratings","authors":"E. Zhang, Jason D. Schloetzer","doi":"10.2308/jmar-19-021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/jmar-19-021","url":null,"abstract":"We examine the implication of management for credit rating quality by focusing on the relation between management tenure and rating quality. Using a large sample of corporate bond issues in the U.S., we find robust evidence that firms with longer-tenured CEOs have lower rating quality, as reflected in lower rating accuracy, informativeness, and timeliness. Further analyses uncover two channels that underlie this relation. One channel is through learned confidence: as CEO tenure increases, rating agencies learn about how the CEO influences firm value, which leads agencies to reduce their caution and effort in management assessment. The other channel is through developed relationships: as CEO tenure increases, rating agencies develop relationships with the CEO, which leads agencies to reduce scrutiny of or cater to the CEO and her firm. Overall, we show that management tenure has important implications for the external oversight of rating agencies.","PeriodicalId":46474,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Management Accounting Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2020-10-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41794997","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Generalist CEOs enjoy higher pay than specialist CEOs (Custódio et al. 2013). However, the implication of CEO expertise on how CEOs are paid is little known. We conjecture that due to information asymmetry, generalist CEOs may overstate their ability in contracting with shareholders. To design an optimal contract, the pay for generalist CEOs should be more closely linked to firm performance. Our results support this conjecture. The pay-performance sensitivity is higher for generalist than for specialist CEOs, especially when generalist CEOs are younger or in their early years of tenure or when they are more important to firm performance. JEL Classification: G34; J24; J33
通才型ceo的薪酬高于专才型ceo (Custódio et al. 2013)。然而，CEO专业知识对CEO薪酬的影响却鲜为人知。我们推测，由于信息不对称，多面手ceo可能会夸大他们与股东签订合同的能力。为了设计一个最优契约，多面手ceo的薪酬应该与公司业绩更紧密地联系在一起。我们的结果支持这一猜想。多面手ceo的薪酬绩效敏感性高于专门型ceo，尤其是当多面手ceo较年轻或刚入职不久，或者他们对公司绩效更重要时。JEL分类:G34;J24;J33
{"title":"CEO Expertise and the Design of Compensation Contracts: Evidence from Generalist versus Specialist CEOs","authors":"Chunbo Liu, Wei Shi, K. Wei","doi":"10.2308/JMAR-19-019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/JMAR-19-019","url":null,"abstract":"Generalist CEOs enjoy higher pay than specialist CEOs (Custódio et al. 2013). However, the implication of CEO expertise on how CEOs are paid is little known. We conjecture that due to information asymmetry, generalist CEOs may overstate their ability in contracting with shareholders. To design an optimal contract, the pay for generalist CEOs should be more closely linked to firm performance. Our results support this conjecture. The pay-performance sensitivity is higher for generalist than for specialist CEOs, especially when generalist CEOs are younger or in their early years of tenure or when they are more important to firm performance. JEL Classification: G34; J24; J33","PeriodicalId":46474,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Management Accounting Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2020-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47199607","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper explores the dependency of multinational enterprises (MNEs) on the international transfer pricing (ITP) knowledge offered by external tax consultants. Based on interviews with 13 ITP/tax executives working for large MNEs in the UK, we find that the dependency on consultants varies significantly across specific ITP tasks. This dependency is not rooted in a lack of in-house technical ITP knowledge. Rather, consultants offer importantindustry and process knowledge, often at the individual tax inspector level, that MNEs need to successfully implement their ITP policy and to handle negotiations with tax authorities. Therecent OECD project on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) is found to have a limited effect on MNE dependency on consultants, except for the documentation task. We conclude that the profile of consultants as knowledge experts depends on the specific ITP task they undertake.
{"title":"International Transfer Pricing: MNE Dependency on Knowledge of External Tax Consultants","authors":"M. Cools, C. Rossing","doi":"10.2308/jmar-19-061","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/jmar-19-061","url":null,"abstract":"This paper explores the dependency of multinational enterprises (MNEs) on the international transfer pricing (ITP) knowledge offered by external tax consultants. Based on interviews with 13 ITP/tax executives working for large MNEs in the UK, we find that the dependency on consultants varies significantly across specific ITP tasks. This dependency is not rooted in a lack of in-house technical ITP knowledge. Rather, consultants offer importantindustry and process knowledge, often at the individual tax inspector level, that MNEs need to successfully implement their ITP policy and to handle negotiations with tax authorities. Therecent OECD project on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) is found to have a limited effect on MNE dependency on consultants, except for the documentation task. We conclude that the profile of consultants as knowledge experts depends on the specific ITP task they undertake.","PeriodicalId":46474,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Management Accounting Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2020-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44269327","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This case study develops our understanding of the ways in which management control and creativity co-exist within organizations. We extend current understandings of how management control and creativity may combine by theorizing a broad typological framework comprising four basic forms. We postulate that not only can control and creativity co-exist, but that they are mutually reliant and can function concurrently to differing extents within one operational entity as circumstances dictate. The case we use to illustrate our framework is based on a review of NASA documentation and first-person accounts of the ill-fated Apollo 13 mission during which the need to manage the apparent dichotomy between control and creativity was literally a matter of life and death. Our findings serve as a foundational basis for further empirical and theoretical enquiry and offer research directions that may provide a deeper understanding of the ways in which control and creativity may combine.
{"title":"Necessity: The Mother of Invention? The Tension Between Management Control and Creativity: Lessons from Apollo 13","authors":"Basil P. Tucker, Ian P. B. Halkett, A. James","doi":"10.2308/jmar-19-047","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/jmar-19-047","url":null,"abstract":"This case study develops our understanding of the ways in which management control and creativity co-exist within organizations. We extend current understandings of how management control and creativity may combine by theorizing a broad typological framework comprising four basic forms. We postulate that not only can control and creativity co-exist, but that they are mutually reliant and can function concurrently to differing extents within one operational entity as circumstances dictate. The case we use to illustrate our framework is based on a review of NASA documentation and first-person accounts of the ill-fated Apollo 13 mission during which the need to manage the apparent dichotomy between control and creativity was literally a matter of life and death. Our findings serve as a foundational basis for further empirical and theoretical enquiry and offer research directions that may provide a deeper understanding of the ways in which control and creativity may combine.","PeriodicalId":46474,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Management Accounting Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2020-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47677150","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper examines whether relations among organizational design choices (subjective performance evaluation, delegation, and incentive intensity) vary depending on strategic priorities. When firms...
本文考察了组织设计选择（主观绩效评估、授权和激励强度）之间的关系是否因战略优先级而异。当公司。。。
{"title":"Strategic Priorities and Organizational Design","authors":"Sara Bormann","doi":"10.2308/jmar-16-137","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/jmar-16-137","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines whether relations among organizational design choices (subjective performance evaluation, delegation, and incentive intensity) vary depending on strategic priorities. When firms...","PeriodicalId":46474,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Management Accounting Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47058732","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Clara Xiaoling Chen, Jeremy B. Lill, Thomas W. Vance
Using an online survey of 468 U.S. employees from diverse industries and professions, we provide empirical evidence that management control system design choices can affect autonomous motivation in...
{"title":"Management Control System Design and Employees' Autonomous Motivation","authors":"Clara Xiaoling Chen, Jeremy B. Lill, Thomas W. Vance","doi":"10.2308/jmar-17-068","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/jmar-17-068","url":null,"abstract":"Using an online survey of 468 U.S. employees from diverse industries and professions, we provide empirical evidence that management control system design choices can affect autonomous motivation in...","PeriodicalId":46474,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Management Accounting Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41360605","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Learning from the Field","authors":"S. Young","doi":"10.2308/jmar-10754","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/jmar-10754","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46474,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Management Accounting Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43835629","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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