We investigate the association between public versus private ownership and future changes in profitability. Managers have long debated the implications of public and private corporate ownership; however, little empirical research has provided insight into the issue. We find robust evidence that public firms are associated with significantly lower future changes in operating profitability compared to private firms matched on current profitability, size, growth, and industry. We also find that the differential future changes in profitability of public and private firms manifests in both future changes in profit margins and changes in asset turnovers. Additionally, we find evidence consistent with an association between short-termism, competition, and agency costs and the lower future changes in profitability for public versus private firms. The results provide insight for managers and investors into the differential future changes in profitability of public versus private firms and into the factors that drive the differential profitability. JEL Classifications: M41; M42; M44. Data Availability: Data are available from sources identified in the paper.
{"title":"Private versus Public Corporate Ownership: Implications for Future Changes in Profitability","authors":"Kristian D. Allee, Brad A. Badertscher, T. Yohn","doi":"10.2308/jmar-52550","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/jmar-52550","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 We investigate the association between public versus private ownership and future changes in profitability. Managers have long debated the implications of public and private corporate ownership; however, little empirical research has provided insight into the issue. We find robust evidence that public firms are associated with significantly lower future changes in operating profitability compared to private firms matched on current profitability, size, growth, and industry. We also find that the differential future changes in profitability of public and private firms manifests in both future changes in profit margins and changes in asset turnovers. Additionally, we find evidence consistent with an association between short-termism, competition, and agency costs and the lower future changes in profitability for public versus private firms. The results provide insight for managers and investors into the differential future changes in profitability of public versus private firms and into the factors that drive the differential profitability.\u0000 JEL Classifications: M41; M42; M44.\u0000 Data Availability: Data are available from sources identified in the paper.","PeriodicalId":46474,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Management Accounting Research","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2020-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46707165","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Knowledge sharing to internal auditors by managers helps internal auditors learn about critical information and improve operational effectiveness, internal controls, and the internal audit function. We examine the interactive effects of procedural fairness at the start of an internal audit, and auditor type (in-house or outsourced) on managers' intentions to share tacit knowledge during an audit, and intentions to share subsequent knowledge of a material control weakness. Our results indicate procedural fairness is an intervention that can increase managers' intentions to share knowledge, yet it depends on internal auditor type and differs by the type of knowledge shared. A high level of procedural fairness increases intentions to share tacit knowledge to outsourced internal auditors only. However, a high level of procedural fairness increases intentions to share subsequent knowledge of a material control weakness to in-house internal auditors only. We offer contributions to the accounting literature and implications for practice. Data Availability: Data available upon request from authors.
{"title":"Managers' Intentions to Share Knowledge to Internal Auditors: The Effects of Procedural Fairness and Internal Auditor Type","authors":"Megan Seymore, J. C. Robertson","doi":"10.2308/jmar-52563","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/jmar-52563","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Knowledge sharing to internal auditors by managers helps internal auditors learn about critical information and improve operational effectiveness, internal controls, and the internal audit function. We examine the interactive effects of procedural fairness at the start of an internal audit, and auditor type (in-house or outsourced) on managers' intentions to share tacit knowledge during an audit, and intentions to share subsequent knowledge of a material control weakness. Our results indicate procedural fairness is an intervention that can increase managers' intentions to share knowledge, yet it depends on internal auditor type and differs by the type of knowledge shared. A high level of procedural fairness increases intentions to share tacit knowledge to outsourced internal auditors only. However, a high level of procedural fairness increases intentions to share subsequent knowledge of a material control weakness to in-house internal auditors only. We offer contributions to the accounting literature and implications for practice.\u0000 Data Availability: Data available upon request from authors.","PeriodicalId":46474,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Management Accounting Research","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2020-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45309128","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
K. Rotaru, Dennis D. Fehrenbacher, Minli Liang, A. Schulz
One of the potential threats to the effectiveness of the Balanced Scorecard (BSC) is that managers over- or underuse particular perspectives of the BSC. Specifically, we investigate the effects of (1) the presentation of strategic objectives (generic strategy map versus strategic objective list), and (2) the performance outcome patterns (positive versus negative outer perspective) across the performance measurement perspectives of the BSC and find support that is consistent with the violation of the causal independence assumption (VCIA) in the psychology literature (Rehder 2014). Our findings show that the presentation of the strategic objectives and the performance outcome patterns interact significantly affecting performance evaluation outcomes. Two follow-up experiments provide further support for the VCIA observed in the main experiment by ruling out an alternative explanation that managers simply place a greater emphasis on financial performance measures. Data Availability: Data are available from the authors upon request.
{"title":"Causal Inference in Judgment Using the Balanced Scorecard","authors":"K. Rotaru, Dennis D. Fehrenbacher, Minli Liang, A. Schulz","doi":"10.2308/jmar-52574","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/jmar-52574","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 One of the potential threats to the effectiveness of the Balanced Scorecard (BSC) is that managers over- or underuse particular perspectives of the BSC. Specifically, we investigate the effects of (1) the presentation of strategic objectives (generic strategy map versus strategic objective list), and (2) the performance outcome patterns (positive versus negative outer perspective) across the performance measurement perspectives of the BSC and find support that is consistent with the violation of the causal independence assumption (VCIA) in the psychology literature (Rehder 2014). Our findings show that the presentation of the strategic objectives and the performance outcome patterns interact significantly affecting performance evaluation outcomes. Two follow-up experiments provide further support for the VCIA observed in the main experiment by ruling out an alternative explanation that managers simply place a greater emphasis on financial performance measures.\u0000 Data Availability: Data are available from the authors upon request.","PeriodicalId":46474,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Management Accounting Research","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2020-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47911004","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Operating performance is an important and widely used measure for evaluating firms. This paper documents that, contrary to the common belief, firms experiencing sales declines during economic slowdowns exhibit higher operating margins than firms experiencing sales declines during normal periods. This anomalous behavior results from (1) a decrease in costs of goods sold overall during economic slowdowns and (2) an additional reduction in SG&A costs other than expenditures that could affect the competitiveness (i.e., R&D and advertising) of sales-down firms. The relatively higher operating performance reported by sales-down firms during economic slowdowns is associated with improvements in operational efficiency and cannot be explained as earnings management or simply as a response to financial distress or a large sales decline. Our findings provide important insights into how macroeconomic conditions affect firms' operating performance in a predictable way.
{"title":"Anomalous Operating Performance During Economic Slowdowns","authors":"R. Banker, Shunlan Fang, Mihir N. Mehta","doi":"10.2308/jmar-52547","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/jmar-52547","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Operating performance is an important and widely used measure for evaluating firms. This paper documents that, contrary to the common belief, firms experiencing sales declines during economic slowdowns exhibit higher operating margins than firms experiencing sales declines during normal periods. This anomalous behavior results from (1) a decrease in costs of goods sold overall during economic slowdowns and (2) an additional reduction in SG&A costs other than expenditures that could affect the competitiveness (i.e., R&D and advertising) of sales-down firms. The relatively higher operating performance reported by sales-down firms during economic slowdowns is associated with improvements in operational efficiency and cannot be explained as earnings management or simply as a response to financial distress or a large sales decline. Our findings provide important insights into how macroeconomic conditions affect firms' operating performance in a predictable way.","PeriodicalId":46474,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Management Accounting Research","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2020-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43085333","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The notion of critical realism as defined by Professor Modell (2019) is a robust focal point to bridge the gap between economics and sociology-based research in management accounting, with a partic...
{"title":"Critical Realism in Management Accounting Research: The Relevance of the Work of John R. Commons","authors":"M. Covaleski","doi":"10.2308/jmar-19-074","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/jmar-19-074","url":null,"abstract":"The notion of critical realism as defined by Professor Modell (2019) is a robust focal point to bridge the gap between economics and sociology-based research in management accounting, with a partic...","PeriodicalId":46474,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Management Accounting Research","volume":"32 1","pages":"17-20"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2020-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44149674","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Understanding when incentive contracts are effective is important for organizations. Prior research documents that while employees generally prefer to work under contracts that include bonuses, employees exert more effort under economically equivalent penalty contracts. One reason for this is that penalties cause employees to experience greater expected disappointment than do bonuses. This study extends prior research in this area by documenting that external locus of control (ELOC), an individual characteristic, helps explain how different employees respond to incentive contracts. We predict and find that, compared to individuals with higher ELOC, individuals with lower ELOC are less susceptible to contract frame-induced differences in expected disappointment and not as motivated by penalty contracts compared to bonus contracts. This finding extends theory on contract framing and has important implications for organizations. Our results suggest that penalty provisions are most efficacious at lower ranks in the organization where higher ELOC is more common.
{"title":"Contract Framing, Expected Disappointment, and Effort: The Moderating Role of External Locus of Control","authors":"Michael Majerczyk, J. Owens, Nathan Waddoups","doi":"10.2308/jmar-52566","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/jmar-52566","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Understanding when incentive contracts are effective is important for organizations. Prior research documents that while employees generally prefer to work under contracts that include bonuses, employees exert more effort under economically equivalent penalty contracts. One reason for this is that penalties cause employees to experience greater expected disappointment than do bonuses. This study extends prior research in this area by documenting that external locus of control (ELOC), an individual characteristic, helps explain how different employees respond to incentive contracts. We predict and find that, compared to individuals with higher ELOC, individuals with lower ELOC are less susceptible to contract frame-induced differences in expected disappointment and not as motivated by penalty contracts compared to bonus contracts. This finding extends theory on contract framing and has important implications for organizations. Our results suggest that penalty provisions are most efficacious at lower ranks in the organization where higher ELOC is more common.","PeriodicalId":46474,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Management Accounting Research","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2020-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48708170","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This study provides exploratory evidence on the associations between the assignment of senior-level “risk ownership” and the sophistication of the enterprise risk management (ERM) process, ERM sophistication differences in firms with single versus multiple risk owners, and the relationship between CFO risk ownership and Finance's role in the ERM process. Using a global, multi-industry survey, we find ERM sophistication positively associated with broader risk ownership and CFO risk ownership. Finance functions in firms with more sophisticated ERM practices and with CFOs who are risk owners tend to contribute to the identification, monitoring, and management of a broader range of financial, operational, and market risks. Firms with more sophisticated ERM report being better prepared when they encountered major risk events and having stronger competitive positions. However, risk ownership differences are not directly associated with these outcomes after controlling for ERM sophistication.
{"title":"Risk Ownership, ERM Practices, and the Role of the Finance Function","authors":"C. Ittner, D. Oyón","doi":"10.2308/jmar-52549","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/jmar-52549","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This study provides exploratory evidence on the associations between the assignment of senior-level “risk ownership” and the sophistication of the enterprise risk management (ERM) process, ERM sophistication differences in firms with single versus multiple risk owners, and the relationship between CFO risk ownership and Finance's role in the ERM process. Using a global, multi-industry survey, we find ERM sophistication positively associated with broader risk ownership and CFO risk ownership. Finance functions in firms with more sophisticated ERM practices and with CFOs who are risk owners tend to contribute to the identification, monitoring, and management of a broader range of financial, operational, and market risks. Firms with more sophisticated ERM report being better prepared when they encountered major risk events and having stronger competitive positions. However, risk ownership differences are not directly associated with these outcomes after controlling for ERM sophistication.","PeriodicalId":46474,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Management Accounting Research","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2020-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47414409","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
According to organizational economists, the implementation of market-like control mechanisms, such as transfer prices, can never completely replicate the market since “the use of high-powered incentives in firms is inherently subject to corruption” (Williamson 1985, 140). This paper illustrates that this is not necessarily always so. By means of a case study, this paper illustrates that many problems that extant research claims are related to cost-based transfer prices were mitigated through an organizational design that created a quasi-market inside the firm. The paper contributes to extant research in several ways. First, it illustrates that strong incentives are somewhat preserved through an organizational design that fosters competition between product divisions. Second, the paper shows how the specific problems related to a standard variable cost transfer price were mitigated. Finally, the paper highlights the limits of the quasi-market and describes a number of problems that required central intervention.
{"title":"Preservation of Incentives Inside the Firm: A Case Study of a Quasi-Market for Cost-Based Transfer Pricing","authors":"I. Friis","doi":"10.2308/jmar-52562","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/jmar-52562","url":null,"abstract":"According to organizational economists, the implementation of market-like control mechanisms, such as transfer prices, can never completely replicate the market since “the use of high-powered incentives in firms is inherently subject to corruption” (Williamson 1985, 140). This paper illustrates that this is not necessarily always so. By means of a case study, this paper illustrates that many problems that extant research claims are related to cost-based transfer prices were mitigated through an organizational design that created a quasi-market inside the firm. The paper contributes to extant research in several ways. First, it illustrates that strong incentives are somewhat preserved through an organizational design that fosters competition between product divisions. Second, the paper shows how the specific problems related to a standard variable cost transfer price were mitigated. Finally, the paper highlights the limits of the quasi-market and describes a number of problems that required central intervention.","PeriodicalId":46474,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Management Accounting Research","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2020-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43280343","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We use survey data to estimate the effect of the 2008–2009 recession on three fundamental bonus plan choices. We find robust evidence that the recession (1) reduced incentive strength, (2) increased the relative incentive weight on financial performance measures, and (3) increased the perceived difficulty of financial performance targets, not only in absolute terms but also relative to the perceived difficulty of nonfinancial targets. To assess the extent to which these findings can be explained by standard theoretical explanations, we review prior agency literature and discuss several channels through which an economic downturn can affect firms' bonus plan choices. Our review highlights that contracting issues rarely examined in prior empirical work such as retention concerns and information asymmetry issues are likely to play an important role during an economic downturn.
{"title":"Bonus Plan Choices During an Economic Downturn","authors":"Pablo Casas-Arce, Raffi Indjejikian, M. Matějka","doi":"10.2308/JMAR-52548","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/JMAR-52548","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 We use survey data to estimate the effect of the 2008–2009 recession on three fundamental bonus plan choices. We find robust evidence that the recession (1) reduced incentive strength, (2) increased the relative incentive weight on financial performance measures, and (3) increased the perceived difficulty of financial performance targets, not only in absolute terms but also relative to the perceived difficulty of nonfinancial targets. To assess the extent to which these findings can be explained by standard theoretical explanations, we review prior agency literature and discuss several channels through which an economic downturn can affect firms' bonus plan choices. Our review highlights that contracting issues rarely examined in prior empirical work such as retention concerns and information asymmetry issues are likely to play an important role during an economic downturn.","PeriodicalId":46474,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Management Accounting Research","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2020-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47836853","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I study a class of contracts that is becoming ever more common among executives, in which the manager earns a discrete bonus if his performance clears an explicit threshold. These performance targets provide the firm with an additional instrument to resolve its moral hazard and adverse selection problems with its manager. The performance target can achieve first best under risk neutrality, with a target precisely equal to the desired effort that the firm seeks to induce. The optimal bonus increases in risk. If the manager is risk averse, the firm will shade the optimal target below equilibrium effort to provide a form of insurance to the manager, outside of the standard reduction in the bonus. When the manager has private information on his ability, the optimal bonus and target both increase in ability, to discourage misreporting of his private information. I’d like to acknowledge the helpful comments of Prasart Jongjaroenkamol, Volker Laux, Pierre Liang, Adrienne Rhodes, Florin Sabac, Jack Stecher, and seminar participants at the University of Alberta, Carnegie Mellon University, the University of Texas at Austin, and Texas A&M University. Anna Dai and Mehmet Kara provided excellent research assistance.
{"title":"Optimal Performance Targets","authors":"K. Hu, Yiwen Li, Korok Ray","doi":"10.2308/jmar-18-032","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/jmar-18-032","url":null,"abstract":"I study a class of contracts that is becoming ever more common among executives, in which the manager earns a discrete bonus if his performance clears an explicit threshold. These performance targets provide the firm with an additional instrument to resolve its moral hazard and adverse selection problems with its manager. The performance target can achieve first best under risk neutrality, with a target precisely equal to the desired effort that the firm seeks to induce. The optimal bonus increases in risk. If the manager is risk averse, the firm will shade the optimal target below equilibrium effort to provide a form of insurance to the manager, outside of the standard reduction in the bonus. When the manager has private information on his ability, the optimal bonus and target both increase in ability, to discourage misreporting of his private information. I’d like to acknowledge the helpful comments of Prasart Jongjaroenkamol, Volker Laux, Pierre Liang, Adrienne Rhodes, Florin Sabac, Jack Stecher, and seminar participants at the University of Alberta, Carnegie Mellon University, the University of Texas at Austin, and Texas A&M University. Anna Dai and Mehmet Kara provided excellent research assistance.","PeriodicalId":46474,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Management Accounting Research","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2020-05-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68996376","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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