DIALECTICA最新文献

In this paper we analyse the notion of collective responsibility and the criteria for its application to different types of groups. We argue that most of the ways in which the notion of collective responsibility has been attributed to different types of groups actually refer to a form of responsibility that is not genuinely collective, but that boils down to some form of individual responsibility. We identify an intrinsically collective kind of responsibility and argue that it can be attributed to only one kind of group. We begin by setting two necessary and sufficient conditions for attribution of genuinely collective moral responsibility, asking whether these two conditions are satisfied in the case of different types of groups that have been taken to be bearers of moral responsibility: organized groups, groups with internal bonds of solidarity, groups that program individuals to act in a certain way, random collections of individuals, and individuals engaging in joint actions. Contrary to what various authors have maintained, we argue that only in the case of individuals engaging in joint actions is attribution of a genuinely collective form of moral responsibility warranted, i.e. only groups engaging in joint action satisfy the two conditions for attribution of genuinely collective moral responsibility.

In the paper I discuss and defuse Miklós Márton and János Tőzsér's phenomenological objection to mental fictionalism. The phenomenological objection states that mental fictionalism is phenomenologically undermotivated, because mental fictionalism is motivated by doubt in the existence of the subject matter of folk psychology but there undoubtedly exist conscious experiences which are subject matters of folk psychology. While one could argue, in the spirit of realist fictionalism, that mental fictionalism is not necessarily motivated by doubt in the existence of the subject matter of folk psychology, I choose a more direct approach. I defuse the phenomenological objection on the grounds that its premises cannot both be true, because conscious experiences which indubitably exist and conscious experiences which are subject matter of folk psychology are different things. In other words, their argument is either not sound or is invalid, because it commits an equivocation. So I defend mental fictionalism, but I am no mental fictionalist myself. I defend mental fictionalism, because I am against the idea of phenomenologically undermotivated theory of mind as such. The general point I want to make is that no theory of mind is phenomenologically undermotivated, that the metaphysics of mind is not on a short phenomenological leash.

Linguistic meaning underdetermines what is said. This has consequences for philosophical accounts of meaning, communication, and propositional attitude reports. I argue that the consequence we should endorse is that utterances typically express many propositions, that these are what speakers mean, and that the correct semantics for attitude reports will handle this fact while being relational and propositional.

Big decisions in a person's life often affect the preferences and standards of a good life which that person's future self will develop after implementing her decision. This paper argues that in such cases the person might lack any reasons to choose one way rather than the other. Neither preference-based views nor happiness-based views of justified choice offer sufficient help here. The available options are not comparable in the relevant sense and there is no rational choice to make. Thus, ironically, in many of a person's most important decisions the idea of that person's good seems to have no application.

A theory of normative reasons for action faces the fundamental challenge of accounting for the dual nature of reasons. On the one hand, some reasons appear to depend on, and vary with, desires. On the other hand, some reasons appear categorical in the sense of being desire-independent. However, it has turned out to be difficult to provide a theory that accommodates both these aspects. Internalism is able to account for the former aspect, but has difficulties to account for the latter, whereas externalism is vulnerable to the reverse problem. In this paper, I outline an ecumenical view that consists of two parts: First, I defend a distinction between requiring reasons and justifying reasons in terms of their different connections to rationality. Second, I put forward a subjectivist, procedural, view of rationality. The ecumenical alternative, I argue, is able to accommodate the mentioned duality within a unified theory. In outlining this view, I also suggest that it has a number of other significant advantages.