Pub Date : 2022-02-14DOI: 10.1017/S1752971921000051
S. Prozorov
Abstract The paper focuses on two problems with Alexander Wendt's unification of physical and social ontology on the basis of quantum theory. Firstly, by endowing social phenomena with an ontological foundation in physical reality defined in quantum terms Wendt risks reducing a plurality of worlds as ‘fields of sense’, ordered by their immanent rules, to the physical world ordered by the laws of quantum theory. Secondly, by defining his quantum social science as an ontology Wendt risks excluding from consideration all that which violates ontological laws, yet may still be said to exist or take place: event, potentiality, and alterity. Although the advantages of a scientific ontology are indisputable, the price we pay for it is a sense of ontological captivity, whereby everything that is definitely is so, being and non-being rigorously distinguished and separated with nothing between them. This captivity may be escaped by supplementing quantum ontology with ethics in the Levinasian sense of ‘otherwise than being’.
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Pub Date : 2022-02-14DOI: 10.1017/s1752971921000117
Toni Erskine, Stefano Guzzini, David A. Welch
Few living scholars have had as much impact on the field of International Relations as Alexander Wendt. His breakout 1999 book, Social Theory of International Politics, established constructivism as a true peer competitor paradigm to realism, liberalism, and Marxism. He easily topped the 2014 TRIP survey as the scholar generally regarded as having had the greatest influence on the discipline over the previous 20 years. And he was a founding editor of what we, at least, like to think of as the premier journal in international theory. In 2015, Wendt published his second book, Quantum Mind and Social Science. Although not a study of International Relations per se, the book tackled what Wendt believed to be two of the deepest and most profound questions animating any and all social science: How is consciousness possible? What explains free will? These, in turn, led to further questions about what it means to be human and how humans interact in society. The answers, Wendt argued, lay, as the book’s subtitle suggests, in ‘unifying physical and social ontology’ – or, more specifically, in conceiving of consciousness as ‘the subjective manifestation of wave function collapse in the moment’ (p. 139) and of free will as a function of the indeterminacy of quantum brain systems. With such a unified ontology, Wendt argued, social science could finally be put on firm (panpsychist and vitalist) foundations. Wendt’s opus elicited reactions generally ranging from quizzical to skeptical to outright dismissive. It also led to a lively roundtable in a packed ballroom at the 2016 annual meeting of the International Studies Association in Atlanta, Georgia, that inspired the exchange that follows. Like the roundtable itself, it begins with Wendt making his case and throwing down a series of gauntlets. Social scientists, Wendt insists, have no choice but to come to terms with the problems of consciousness and will. Classical ontologies are not up to the task. Quantum physics is. In view of the fact that quantum is the only game in town, the burden of proof falls not on its proponents, but on its critics. And so forth and so on. The critics then have at him, sometimes taking up his challenges, sometimes rejecting them; firing at targets he offers, and at others in defilade; and occasionally trying to steer the
{"title":"Preface","authors":"Toni Erskine, Stefano Guzzini, David A. Welch","doi":"10.1017/s1752971921000117","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1752971921000117","url":null,"abstract":"Few living scholars have had as much impact on the field of International Relations as Alexander Wendt. His breakout 1999 book, Social Theory of International Politics, established constructivism as a true peer competitor paradigm to realism, liberalism, and Marxism. He easily topped the 2014 TRIP survey as the scholar generally regarded as having had the greatest influence on the discipline over the previous 20 years. And he was a founding editor of what we, at least, like to think of as the premier journal in international theory. In 2015, Wendt published his second book, Quantum Mind and Social Science. Although not a study of International Relations per se, the book tackled what Wendt believed to be two of the deepest and most profound questions animating any and all social science: How is consciousness possible? What explains free will? These, in turn, led to further questions about what it means to be human and how humans interact in society. The answers, Wendt argued, lay, as the book’s subtitle suggests, in ‘unifying physical and social ontology’ – or, more specifically, in conceiving of consciousness as ‘the subjective manifestation of wave function collapse in the moment’ (p. 139) and of free will as a function of the indeterminacy of quantum brain systems. With such a unified ontology, Wendt argued, social science could finally be put on firm (panpsychist and vitalist) foundations. Wendt’s opus elicited reactions generally ranging from quizzical to skeptical to outright dismissive. It also led to a lively roundtable in a packed ballroom at the 2016 annual meeting of the International Studies Association in Atlanta, Georgia, that inspired the exchange that follows. Like the roundtable itself, it begins with Wendt making his case and throwing down a series of gauntlets. Social scientists, Wendt insists, have no choice but to come to terms with the problems of consciousness and will. Classical ontologies are not up to the task. Quantum physics is. In view of the fact that quantum is the only game in town, the burden of proof falls not on its proponents, but on its critics. And so forth and so on. The critics then have at him, sometimes taking up his challenges, sometimes rejecting them; firing at targets he offers, and at others in defilade; and occasionally trying to steer the","PeriodicalId":46771,"journal":{"name":"International Theory","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2022-02-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49233384","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-02-14DOI: 10.1017/S175297192100004X
Alexander Wendt
Abstract How burdens of proof are allocated in science has an important bearing on how new knowledge develops. Usually, the burden is on new theories to prove their worth relative to a default, baseline of knowledge that is considered established and secure. However, in the case of classical vs. quantum social science matters are not that simple because the long-standing classical default has itself already failed to pass crucial tests, which has spurred the search for quantum solutions instead. Part I of this paper, therefore, tries to ‘re-balance’ the burdens of proof with Quantum Mind and Social Science’ critics, by highlighting two significant limits to date of classical thinking about the mind and society: the philosophical problem of finding a place for consciousness in the universe, and the scientific problem of explaining the Kahneman–Tversky anomalies in psychology. Acknowledging these outstanding problems does not equalize the burdens of proof, but it does mean that as we head into the more substantive discussion in Part II there is no secure default position. Just burdens of proof all around.
{"title":"Why IR scholars should care about quantum theory, part I: burdens of proof and uncomfortable facts","authors":"Alexander Wendt","doi":"10.1017/S175297192100004X","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S175297192100004X","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract How burdens of proof are allocated in science has an important bearing on how new knowledge develops. Usually, the burden is on new theories to prove their worth relative to a default, baseline of knowledge that is considered established and secure. However, in the case of classical vs. quantum social science matters are not that simple because the long-standing classical default has itself already failed to pass crucial tests, which has spurred the search for quantum solutions instead. Part I of this paper, therefore, tries to ‘re-balance’ the burdens of proof with Quantum Mind and Social Science’ critics, by highlighting two significant limits to date of classical thinking about the mind and society: the philosophical problem of finding a place for consciousness in the universe, and the scientific problem of explaining the Kahneman–Tversky anomalies in psychology. Acknowledging these outstanding problems does not equalize the burdens of proof, but it does mean that as we head into the more substantive discussion in Part II there is no secure default position. Just burdens of proof all around.","PeriodicalId":46771,"journal":{"name":"International Theory","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2022-02-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48154490","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-02-14DOI: 10.1017/S1752971921000087
Kimberly Hutchings
Abstract I argue that the dangers inherent in Wendt's project are not that it radically undermines the project of social science as it currently exists, in positivist or interpretivist forms, but rather that it reinforces the will to knowledge that has powered the development of the social and human sciences since the late 19th century. The ultimate significance of Wendt's argument is not ontological or epistemic but political.
{"title":"Empire and insurgency: the politics of truth in Alexander Wendt's Quantum Mind and Social Science: Unifying Physical and Social Ontology","authors":"Kimberly Hutchings","doi":"10.1017/S1752971921000087","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S1752971921000087","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract I argue that the dangers inherent in Wendt's project are not that it radically undermines the project of social science as it currently exists, in positivist or interpretivist forms, but rather that it reinforces the will to knowledge that has powered the development of the social and human sciences since the late 19th century. The ultimate significance of Wendt's argument is not ontological or epistemic but political.","PeriodicalId":46771,"journal":{"name":"International Theory","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2022-02-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43934437","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-12-09DOI: 10.1017/S1752971921000269
V. Gentile, Megan Foster
Abstract Transitional Justice (TJ) focuses on the processes of dealing with the legacy of large-scale past abuses (in the aftermath of traumatic experiences such as war or authoritarianism) with the aim of fostering domestic justice and creating the basis for a sustainable peace. TJ however also entails the problem of how a torn society may be able to become a self-determining member of a just international order. This paper presents a minimal conception of TJ, which departs from Rawls' conception of normative stability of the international order, which suggests disentangling the two goals of fostering democracy within torn societies and TJ itself. The scope of TJ is therefore limited to enabling these societies to create minimal internal conditions for joining a just international order on equal footing. This paper makes an original contribution to two different debates, namely normative research on TJ, and post-Rawlsian literature in general. First, it provides a new direction for normative theorizing about TJ which takes both its domestic and international dimensions seriously into consideration. Second, it extends Rawls' political liberal outlook to an area where it is not usually understood to apply.
{"title":"Towards a minimal conception of Transitional Justice","authors":"V. Gentile, Megan Foster","doi":"10.1017/S1752971921000269","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S1752971921000269","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Transitional Justice (TJ) focuses on the processes of dealing with the legacy of large-scale past abuses (in the aftermath of traumatic experiences such as war or authoritarianism) with the aim of fostering domestic justice and creating the basis for a sustainable peace. TJ however also entails the problem of how a torn society may be able to become a self-determining member of a just international order. This paper presents a minimal conception of TJ, which departs from Rawls' conception of normative stability of the international order, which suggests disentangling the two goals of fostering democracy within torn societies and TJ itself. The scope of TJ is therefore limited to enabling these societies to create minimal internal conditions for joining a just international order on equal footing. This paper makes an original contribution to two different debates, namely normative research on TJ, and post-Rawlsian literature in general. First, it provides a new direction for normative theorizing about TJ which takes both its domestic and international dimensions seriously into consideration. Second, it extends Rawls' political liberal outlook to an area where it is not usually understood to apply.","PeriodicalId":46771,"journal":{"name":"International Theory","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2021-12-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46050744","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-20DOI: 10.1017/S1752971921000257
L. Considine
Abstract This paper contributes a novel way to theorise the power of narratives of nuclear weapons politics through Kenneth Burke's concept of entelechy: the means of stating a things essence through narrating its beginning or end. The paper argues that the Manhattan Project functions narratively in nuclear discourse as an origin myth, so that the repeated telling of atomic creation over time frames the possibilities of nuclear politics today. By linking Burke's work on entelechy with literature on narrative and eschatology, the paper develops a theoretical grounding for understanding the interconnection of the nuclear past, present, and future. The paper supports its argument by conducting a wide-ranging survey of academic and popular accounts of the development of the atomic weapon in the US Manhattan Project. It reveals a dominant narrative across these accounts that contains three core tropes: the nuclear weapon as the inevitable and perfected culmination of humankind's tendency towards violence; the Manhattan Project as a race against time; and the nuclear weapon as a product of a fetishized masculine brilliance.
{"title":"Narrative and nuclear weapons politics: the entelechial force of the nuclear origin myth","authors":"L. Considine","doi":"10.1017/S1752971921000257","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S1752971921000257","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper contributes a novel way to theorise the power of narratives of nuclear weapons politics through Kenneth Burke's concept of entelechy: the means of stating a things essence through narrating its beginning or end. The paper argues that the Manhattan Project functions narratively in nuclear discourse as an origin myth, so that the repeated telling of atomic creation over time frames the possibilities of nuclear politics today. By linking Burke's work on entelechy with literature on narrative and eschatology, the paper develops a theoretical grounding for understanding the interconnection of the nuclear past, present, and future. The paper supports its argument by conducting a wide-ranging survey of academic and popular accounts of the development of the atomic weapon in the US Manhattan Project. It reveals a dominant narrative across these accounts that contains three core tropes: the nuclear weapon as the inevitable and perfected culmination of humankind's tendency towards violence; the Manhattan Project as a race against time; and the nuclear weapon as a product of a fetishized masculine brilliance.","PeriodicalId":46771,"journal":{"name":"International Theory","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2021-10-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46814218","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-14DOI: 10.1017/S1752971921000154
Alena Drieschova
Abstract The paper introduces a new explanation of international order that focuses on representants. Representants are practices, artifacts, and language that stand in for the international system's units in international fora. They are crucial for International Relations (IR), given that IR deal with a macro-realm that can never be fully present, but needs to be made concrete in specific localities. Representants have four interrelated effects: (1) they define the units of the international system; (2) they legitimize them; (3) they provide them with differential degrees of power; and (4) they serve as tools for governing. When representants are seriously challenged, orders are in crisis; when new representants emerge, a new order has taken hold. The paper develops a mechanism of change emerging from struggles over representants. It studies the transition from the medieval order of universal monarchy to an order of divine right absolutism. Representants, such as gothic cathedrals, the mass, and coronation rituals maintained the medieval hierarchical order with the pope/emperor at the apex. The Reformation provided the last step in kings' challenge to the medieval order. Kings adapted existing representants, so that they would portray the independence of kings from the papacy/emperor, and simultaneously position kings above feudal lords.
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