Advances in Accounting最新文献

Understanding the behavior of chief executive officers (CEOs) enables investors, regulators, and others to better appreciate CEOs' corporate decisions. Among the many aspects that determine CEO behavior are early-life experiences, we examine whether a CEO's exposure to two important events—fatal natural disasters and violent crime—during the individual's formative years is associated with the firm's financial reporting outcomes. We argue that a CEO with early life exposure to fatal natural disasters and violent crime may be over-confident when dealing with risk and is more likely to make riskier decisions. However, this relationship becomes negative when the exposure reaches a certain level, consistent with the CEO becoming risk-averse when making business decisions (Bernile, Bhagwat, & Rau, 2017). Consistently, we report evidence of a U-shaped association between financial reporting quality and both types of early-life exposures. In addition, we find that the link between a CEO's early-life exposures and financial reporting quality is more pronounced in firms with greater incentives to manage earnings.

We examine whether and how the degree of conditional conservatism in GAAP earnings influences managers' decisions to disclose non-GAAP earnings. Conditional conservatism imposes a downward bias and may negatively affect the information content of GAAP earnings. However, prior research documents that non-GAAP earnings exhibit higher persistence, predictive ability, and information content than GAAP earnings. Consequently, we argue that companies may disclose non-GAAP earnings to circumvent the constraints imposed by conditional conservatism. Our evidence is consistent with the existence of a positive association between the degree of conditional conservatism in GAAP earnings and the decision by firms to disclose non-GAAP earnings. We also document a positive association between the extent of conditional conservatism in GAAP earnings and both the magnitude of non-GAAP exclusions and frequency of non-GAAP disclosures.

Schedule UTP was instituted by the Internal Revenue Service to obtain more detailed information about firms' uncertain tax benefits (UTBs) that are required to be reported on a firm's financial statements. We document that the reaction of firms was not uniform. We provide evidence that post Schedule UTP, firms with higher political costs lower their UTBs more than average firms but do not increase their cash taxes paid. In addition, we look at firms reporting zero or missing UTBs before Schedule UTP was implemented. We find that these firms paid more in cash taxes after the introduction of Schedule UTP. From a policy standpoint, schedule UTP affects significant subgroups of firms in different manners.

This study examines the effect of uncertain tax position (UTP) disclosures on analysts' effective tax rate (ETR) forecasts. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) requires that firms provide detailed information about UTPs reported in their annual 10-K filings on their Schedule UTP form. Schedule UTP applies to federal tax positions for which a corresponding tax reserve has been created for financial reporting purposes. Academics and practitioners have deliberated whether Schedule UTP disclosures could lead to firms altering how they account for their unrecognized tax benefits (UTBs) in financial statements. Overall, we find that UTB additions were originally useful to analysts in forecasting ETRs but became less useful after the implementation of the Schedule UTP form, as it likely reduced the usefulness of information for financial statement users. Our findings contribute to the debate regarding the extent of tax policy overlapping with the generally accepted accounting principles of financial reporting. Following up on a 2018 Treasury Department study that recommended more disclosure on Schedule UTP, the IRS, in December of 2022, finalized additional disclosure requirements to Schedule UTP, These new requirements may further incentivize firms to alter UTB reporting in their financial statements.

On April 28, 2003, ten of the largest investment banks reached an agreement with the Securities and Exchange Commission and other regulatory bodies regarding alleged misconduct of security analysts. This agreement, called the Global Research Analyst Settlement, allocated $460 million to source independent analyst research. Unlike other forms of analyst research, this research was not financed through investment banking or trading commissions and was theoretically “unbiased research”. We compare independent research funded by the Global Settlement to research provided by the same firms that was not funded by the Global Settlement. Research funded by the Global Settlement appears to be of lower quality than non-funded research produced by the same set of firms, suggesting that unbiased research does not necessarily generate higher quality research. More specifically, we find that quality declined in the later years of the Global Settlement period when there was no expectation of future funding for this research, commonly referred to as the horizon effect.

We investigate whether industry-level product market competition and firm-level market leadership affect firms' tax aggressiveness. Studying competition from both current market participants and potential entrants, and using a market share-based measure of market leadership, we find that firms facing higher competition from current market participants engage in more tax aggressiveness. We further find that market-following firms — rather than market‑leading firms — engage in relatively more tax aggressiveness within these higher competition settings. Our results contrast with most political and regulatory anecdotes that target market‑leading firms for aggressive tax behaviors, and add to the ongoing policy debates on tax incidence. Our main findings and additional tests are consistent with the view that market‑leading firms in imperfectively competitive product markets are able to pass on tax costs to customers, while market-following firms in crowded industries are pressured to engage in tax aggressiveness because they cannot pass on tax costs.

Literature has documented income classification shifting to increase core earnings. There has been little research on whether firms reduce income increasing classification shifting or classification shift to reduce core earnings - classify non-core items as core expenses. Also, research on classification shifting under non-market incentives is limited. We fill these gaps by examining the shifting behavior of oil and gas firms in response to the BP oil spill. The oil spill was an unexpected event that led to regulations and restrictions, as well as adverse publicity. This could have encouraged petroleum firms to suppress core earnings. We show that after the oil spill, (1) the likelihood of petroleum firms' classification shifting to inflate core earnings declines relative to other firms and (2) the likelihood of petroleum companies' shifting to report lower core earnings increases relative to other firms.