Advances in Accounting最新文献

We examine the relation between executive equity compensation and corporate disclosure. Specifically, we propose that options and stock awards provide executives with distinct incentives to disclose forecasts to market participants. Since options are risker than stock awards, executives receiving more options will have greater incentives to guide investors and influence the stock price to maximize their compensation payout. We find that a greater proportion of options in executive equity compensation is associated with a greater likelihood to issue earnings forecasts as well as with greater frequency. Overall, these results suggest that options provide executives with stronger incentives than stock awards to mitigate the disclosure agency problem.

We specify two measures of accounting estimation intensity (AEI) based on the textual analysis of the qualitative disclosures in the critical accounting policies (CAP) section of firms' MD&A. We then examine how these measures relate to financial analyst following and earnings forecast properties. Using a narrow dictionary definition of accounting estimates, we find AEI is positively associated with analyst following. It is also associated with increasing levels of private information in analysts' forecasts and the informativeness of analysts' reports when analysts engage in greater scrutiny of accounting estimates. Using a broader definition of accounting estimates yields a statistically significant relation with the informativeness of analysts' reports. Overall, our results are consistent with AEI stimulating investor demand for analysts' services and increasing the informativeness of these services.

In this research, I examine the effect of relationship-specific investments (RSI) made by suppliers on customers' decisions to issue management forecasts. Suppliers' RSI have a low value outside of the customer-supplier relationship. Anticipating that their RSI may provide their customers more bargaining power (i.e., the “hold up” problem), suppliers may be reluctant to make RSI in the first place. To lessen suppliers' hold-up concerns and underinvestment in RSI, customers may issue management forecasts to build reputation and credibility, and establish an image of cooperation and transparency by meeting suppliers' information demands. I find the likelihood of customers' issuing management forecasts is positively associated with suppliers' RSI. I also find that such positive association is less pronounced when suppliers have higher bargaining power, and that customers' management forecasts contribute to longer-term customer-supplier relationships.

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requires Form 8-K filings of quantitative deficiency notices. This study examines whether investors use these 8-K filings in a way that influences their investment decisions. Using abnormal returns, I show that investors react negatively to these 8-K filings. Reactions to filings are less negative for firms with more institutional investors. I also find that firms with more analyst following experience less negative market reaction, supporting the notion that 8-K filings are more informative when the firm's information environment is poor. I further document that equity and multiple deficiency notice filings elicit more negative reactions and are also more likely to result in actual delisting compared to bid price deficiency notice filings. Together, these results help us understand investors' perceptions and delisting risks associated with quantitative deficiency notice filings.

This study examines whether voluntary disclosure of internal control weaknesses (ICWs) in IPO registration statements is associated with managerial ability and subsequent SOX 404 adverse audit opinions. Using a sample of IPO registrants that voluntarily disclosed ICWs in their registration statements, we examine the relationship between ICW disclosure, managerial ability, and subsequent material weaknesses in internal control. We find that IPO registrants with higher managerial ability are more likely to disclose ICWs voluntarily than other registrants. Further, we find evidence that registrants that include voluntary ICW disclosures are more likely to subsequently receive an adverse SOX 404 audit opinion. Additionally, we find evidence that registrants are associated with negative cumulative abnormal returns when an auditor issues an adverse SOX 404 auditor opinion regardless of whether the ICWs were disclosed in the registration statement.

We examine the impact that industry concentration has on superior and inferior analysts' performance by utilizing a Herfindahl-Hirschman index of analyst specialization. Using broker M&As as a plausibly exogenous shock to analyst workloads, we find that superior analysts' forecast accuracy improves when their coverage is more concentrated within a few industries. However, there is no evidence of an equivalent improvement for inferior analysts. We argue that this is due to superior analysts having a comparative advantage in utilizing intra-industry relevant information and, therefore, the more concentrated their portfolio, the better they can extract this type of information for pricing stocks. We also find that investors who trade according to the buy-sell recommendations of superior analysts who have recently experienced increased industry concentration can gain extra returns on their stock portfolio.