Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_2_92_111
Yakov Shemyakin
{"title":"THE PROBLEM OF CULTURAL DETERMINATION OF VARIOUS SPHERES OF SOCIAL LIFE: LATIN AMERICAN EXPERIENCE IN A UNIVERSAL CONTEXT (INSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION)","authors":"Yakov Shemyakin","doi":"10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_2_92_111","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_2_92_111","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46923,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Economics","volume":"16 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91261938","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_2_155_171
N. Pliskevich
{"title":"THE MAN, THE SOCIETY AND THE STATE IN YEARS OF POST-SOCIALIST TRANSFORMATION (ABOUT THE BOOK «DISMANTLING COMMUNISM. THIRTY YEARS LATER»)","authors":"N. Pliskevich","doi":"10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_2_155_171","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_2_155_171","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46923,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Economics","volume":"17 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74667834","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We study a principal‐agent framework in which the agent forms beliefs about the principal's project based on a misspecified subjective model. She fits this model to the objective probability distribution to predict output under alternative actions. Misspecifications in the subjective model may lead to biased beliefs. However, under mild restrictions, the agent has correct beliefs on the equilibrium path so that the optimal contract is nonexploitative. This allows for a behavioral version of the informativeness principle: The optimal contract conditions on an additional variable only if it is informative about the action according to the agent's subjective model. We further characterize when misspecifications affect the optimal contract. One implication of this characterization is that the scope for belief biases depends on the agent's job, for example, her position in the hierarchy.
{"title":"Equilibrium contracts and boundedly rational expectations","authors":"Heiner Schumacher, Heidi C. Thysen","doi":"10.3982/te4231","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/te4231","url":null,"abstract":"We study a principal‐agent framework in which the agent forms beliefs about the principal's project based on a misspecified subjective model. She fits this model to the objective probability distribution to predict output under alternative actions. Misspecifications in the subjective model may lead to biased beliefs. However, under mild restrictions, the agent has correct beliefs on the equilibrium path so that the optimal contract is nonexploitative. This allows for a behavioral version of the informativeness principle: The optimal contract conditions on an additional variable only if it is informative about the action according to the agent's subjective model. We further characterize when misspecifications affect the optimal contract. One implication of this characterization is that the scope for belief biases depends on the agent's job, for example, her position in the hierarchy.","PeriodicalId":46923,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Economics","volume":"351 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76394988","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_2_112_127
Vladimir Rimskiy
{"title":"ARCHAIZATION OF THE RUSSIAN JUDICIARY: A RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS","authors":"Vladimir Rimskiy","doi":"10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_2_112_127","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_2_112_127","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46923,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Economics","volume":"74 11","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72369949","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We introduce a game‐theoretic model with switching costs and endogenous references. An agent endogenizes his reference strategy, and then taking switching costs into account, he selects a strategy from which there is no profitable deviation. We axiomatically characterize this selection procedure in one‐player games. We then extend this procedure to multiplayer simultaneous games by defining a Switching Cost Nash Equilibrium (SNE) notion, and prove that (i) an SNE always exists; (ii) there are sets of SNE, which can never be a set of Nash equilibrium for any standard game; and (iii) SNE with a specific cost structure exactly characterizes the Nash equilibrium of nearby games, in contrast to Radner's (1980) ε‐equilibrium. Subsequently, we apply our SNE notion to a product differentiation model, and reach the opposite conclusion of Radner (1980): switching costs for firms may benefit consumers. Finally, we compare our model with others, especially Köszegi and Rabin's (2006) personal equilibrium.
{"title":"Games with switching costs and endogenous references","authors":"Begum Guney, Michael Richter","doi":"10.3982/te4169","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/te4169","url":null,"abstract":"We introduce a game‐theoretic model with switching costs and endogenous references. An agent endogenizes his reference strategy, and then taking switching costs into account, he selects a strategy from which there is no profitable deviation. We axiomatically characterize this selection procedure in one‐player games. We then extend this procedure to multiplayer simultaneous games by defining a Switching Cost Nash Equilibrium (SNE) notion, and prove that (i) an SNE always exists; (ii) there are sets of SNE, which can never be a set of Nash equilibrium for any standard game; and (iii) SNE with a specific cost structure exactly characterizes the Nash equilibrium of nearby games, in contrast to Radner's (1980) ε‐equilibrium. Subsequently, we apply our SNE notion to a product differentiation model, and reach the opposite conclusion of Radner (1980): switching costs for firms may benefit consumers. Finally, we compare our model with others, especially Köszegi and Rabin's (2006) personal equilibrium.","PeriodicalId":46923,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Economics","volume":"34 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79345326","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_3_130_143
N. Pliskevich
{"title":"INSTITUTIONAL SCARS IN «FRONTIER» SOCIETIES AND THE EVOLUTION OF HUMAN POTENTIAL (Part 1. Institutional scars)","authors":"N. Pliskevich","doi":"10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_3_130_143","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_3_130_143","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46923,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Economics","volume":"38 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73898115","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_4_177_192
M. Feldman
{"title":"THE SECOND PLENUM (COUNCIL UNDER THE PEOPLE’S COMMISSAR OF HEAVY INDUSTRY OF THE USSR): RETROSPECTIVE (JUNE 25-29, 1936)","authors":"M. Feldman","doi":"10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_4_177_192","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_4_177_192","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46923,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Economics","volume":"60 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78094736","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We characterize equilibria of oligopolistic markets where identical firms with constant marginal cost compete à la Cournot. For given maximal willingness to pay and maximal total demand, we first identify all combinations of equilibrium consumer surplus and industry profit that can arise from arbitrary demand functions. Then, as a further restriction, we fix the average willingness to pay above marginal cost (i.e., first‐best surplus) and identify all possible triples of consumer surplus, industry profit, and deadweight loss.
{"title":"Surplus sharing in Cournot oligopoly","authors":"D. Condorelli, Balázs Szentes","doi":"10.3982/te4515","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/te4515","url":null,"abstract":"We characterize equilibria of oligopolistic markets where identical firms with constant marginal cost compete à la Cournot. For given maximal willingness to pay and maximal total demand, we first identify all combinations of equilibrium consumer surplus and industry profit that can arise from arbitrary demand functions. Then, as a further restriction, we fix the average willingness to pay above marginal cost (i.e., first‐best surplus) and identify all possible triples of consumer surplus, industry profit, and deadweight loss.","PeriodicalId":46923,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Economics","volume":"6 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80218302","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We study a receiver's learning problem of choosing an informative test in a signaling environment. Each test induces a signaling subgame. Thus, in addition to its direct effect on the receiver's information, a test has an indirect effect through the sender's signaling strategy. We show that the informativeness of signaling in the equilibrium that a test induces depends on the relative informativeness of the test's high and low grades. Consequently, we find that the receiver's preference relation over tests needs not comply with Blackwell's (1951) order. Our findings may shed light on phenomena such as grade inflation and information coarsening.
{"title":"Informative tests in signaling environments","authors":"R. Weksler, Boaz Zik","doi":"10.3982/te4461","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/te4461","url":null,"abstract":"We study a receiver's learning problem of choosing an informative test in a signaling environment. Each test induces a signaling subgame. Thus, in addition to its direct effect on the receiver's information, a test has an indirect effect through the sender's signaling strategy. We show that the informativeness of signaling in the equilibrium that a test induces depends on the relative informativeness of the test's high and low grades. Consequently, we find that the receiver's preference relation over tests needs not comply with Blackwell's (1951) order. Our findings may shed light on phenomena such as grade inflation and information coarsening.","PeriodicalId":46923,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Economics","volume":"69 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84230526","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_3_99_117
G. Gloveli, E. Minaeva
{"title":"FORMATION OF THE CONCEPT OF THE WORLD ECONOMY IN GERMAN AND RUSSIAN POLITICAL ECONOMY","authors":"G. Gloveli, E. Minaeva","doi":"10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_3_99_117","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_3_99_117","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46923,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Economics","volume":"27 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80096501","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：