Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_2_77_91
A. Rubinshtein
{"title":"TO THE ISSUE OF THEORY AND METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY OF CULTURAL ACTIVITY OF POPULATION","authors":"A. Rubinshtein","doi":"10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_2_77_91","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_2_77_91","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46923,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Economics","volume":"26 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81477386","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_3_157_172
S. Vasiliev
{"title":"AGRARIAN REFORMS IN RUSSIA IN THE XIX - EARLY XX CENTURIES: POLITICAL CONTEXT AND TECHNOLOGIES OF IMPLEMENTATION (Part 1. The Great Reforms of Alexander I)","authors":"S. Vasiliev","doi":"10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_3_157_172","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_3_157_172","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46923,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Economics","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91315929","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I develop a theory of intermediation in a market where agents meet bilaterally to trade and buyers cannot commit to payments. Some agents observe the past trading history of traders in the market. These informed agents can secure trades by punishing traders who previously defaulted. The punishing strategy affects equilibrium prices and determines which trades are hindered by the risk of default. Intermediation is a robust equilibrium feature, generated by asymmetric punishing strategies that yield informed agents either more effective opportunities to trade or the ability to extract more surplus in trades.
{"title":"Informed intermediaries","authors":"P. Onuchic","doi":"10.3982/te4072","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/te4072","url":null,"abstract":"I develop a theory of intermediation in a market where agents meet bilaterally to trade and buyers cannot commit to payments. Some agents observe the past trading history of traders in the market. These informed agents can secure trades by punishing traders who previously defaulted. The punishing strategy affects equilibrium prices and determines which trades are hindered by the risk of default. Intermediation is a robust equilibrium feature, generated by asymmetric punishing strategies that yield informed agents either more effective opportunities to trade or the ability to extract more surplus in trades.","PeriodicalId":46923,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Economics","volume":"63 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76611668","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_1_48_57
V. Polterovich
economic development. While pursuing common goals, they use different methodological guidelines. The synthesis of the two canons is possible; it will be an important step in the improvement of the science of society.
{"title":"ON THE WAY TO A GENERAL THEORY OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: TOWARDS THE SYNTHESIS OF TWO CANONS","authors":"V. Polterovich","doi":"10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_1_48_57","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_1_48_57","url":null,"abstract":"economic development. While pursuing common goals, they use different methodological guidelines. The synthesis of the two canons is possible; it will be an important step in the improvement of the science of society.","PeriodicalId":46923,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Economics","volume":"20 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79043408","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_1_163_185
S. Bratchenko
{"title":"QUALITY OF STATE GOVERNANCE UNDER IVAN III AND HIS HEIRS (1462-1606)","authors":"S. Bratchenko","doi":"10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_1_163_185","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_1_163_185","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46923,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Economics","volume":"41 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90617481","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper studies the optimal clearing arrangement for bilateral financial contracts in which an assessment of counterparty credit risk is crucial for efficiency. The economy is populated by borrowers and lenders. Borrowers are subject to limited commitment and hold private information about the severity of such lack of commitment. Lenders can acquire information, at a cost, about the commitment of their borrowers, which affects the assessment of counterparty risk. Clearing through a central counterparty allows lenders to mutualize counterparty credit risk, but this insurance may weaken incentives to acquire and reveal information. If information acquisition is incentive‐compatible, then lenders choose central clearing. If it is not, they may prefer bilateral clearing either to prevent strategic default or to optimize the allocation of costly collateral.
{"title":"Transparency and collateral: Central versus bilateral clearing","authors":"Gaetano Antinolfi,Francesca Carapella,Francesco Carli","doi":"10.3982/te3893","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/te3893","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies the optimal clearing arrangement for bilateral financial contracts in which an assessment of counterparty credit risk is crucial for efficiency. The economy is populated by borrowers and lenders. Borrowers are subject to limited commitment and hold private information about the severity of such lack of commitment. Lenders can acquire information, at a cost, about the commitment of their borrowers, which affects the assessment of counterparty risk. Clearing through a central counterparty allows lenders to mutualize counterparty credit risk, but this insurance may weaken incentives to acquire and reveal information. If information acquisition is incentive‐compatible, then lenders choose central clearing. If it is not, they may prefer bilateral clearing either to prevent strategic default or to optimize the allocation of costly collateral.","PeriodicalId":46923,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Economics","volume":"14 1","pages":"185-217"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138530029","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We study dynamic signaling in a game of stochastic stakes. Each period, a privately informed agent of binary type chooses whether to continue receiving a return that is an increasing function of both her reputation and an exogenous public stakes variable or to irreversibly exit the game. A strong type has a dominant strategy to continue. In the unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium, the weak type plays a mixed strategy that depends only on current stakes and her historical minimum and she builds a reputation by continuing when the stakes reach a new minimum. We discuss applications to corporate reputation management, online vendor reputation, and limit pricing with stochastic demand.
{"title":"Dynamic signaling with stochastic stakes","authors":"Sebastian Gryglewicz,Aaron Kolb","doi":"10.3982/te3710","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/te3710","url":null,"abstract":"We study dynamic signaling in a game of stochastic stakes. Each period, a privately informed agent of binary type chooses whether to continue receiving a return that is an increasing function of both her reputation and an exogenous public stakes variable or to irreversibly exit the game. A strong type has a dominant strategy to continue. In the unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium, the weak type plays a mixed strategy that depends only on current stakes and her historical minimum and she builds a reputation by continuing when the stakes reach a new minimum. We discuss applications to corporate reputation management, online vendor reputation, and limit pricing with stochastic demand.","PeriodicalId":46923,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Economics","volume":"10 1","pages":"539-559"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138530021","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_4_193_201
Y. Latov
{"title":"SOCIOLOGY OF LIFE CHANCES AND RISKS AS A CONTRIBUTE TO THE «ECONOMY OF HAPPINESS» (REFLECTIONS ON «UNEQUAL OPPORTUNITY SOCIETY: SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF MODERN RUSSIA»)","authors":"Y. Latov","doi":"10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_4_193_201","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_4_193_201","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46923,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Economics","volume":"18 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81982286","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_4_7_24
N. Ganichev, O. Koshovets
{"title":"«NEW DIGITAL U-TURN» - FROM ECONOMIC GROWTH DISCOURSE TO SEPARATED TECHNOLOGICAL ZONES AND FORCED RATIONALISATION","authors":"N. Ganichev, O. Koshovets","doi":"10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_4_7_24","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_4_7_24","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46923,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Economics","volume":"62 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86770786","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_1_58_73
K. Yanovskiy
{"title":"HOW OLD DEMOCRACIES’ GOVERNMENTS’ DECISION MAKING HAS WORKED IN CASE OF COVID-19 RESPONSES’ CHOICE","authors":"K. Yanovskiy","doi":"10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_1_58_73","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_1_58_73","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46923,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Economics","volume":"75 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77200904","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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